CIA FILE ON
REINHARD GEHLLEN
VOL. I
General Reinhard Gehlen is a professional military and intelligence officer. Until his retirement on 30 April 1968, he was President of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the West German Federal Intelligence Service, as well as chief of its predecessor organizations formed at the end of World War II.

General Gehlen was born 3 April 1902 in Erfurt. He currently lives in Berg on the Starnberg Lake near Munich. He finished his formal schooling in 1920 and entered the military service directly. He received his commission as second lieutenant in 1923 and served his initial tours of duty in the horse artillery. He married in 1931 and in 1935 he attended the War Academy in Berlin. At that time he held the rank of captain. By 1939 and shortly before the outbreak of World War II, he was promoted to major. He participated in the Polish campaign, but by 1940 he was transferred to a headquarters post. At that time he became an aid to General Halder, who was Chief of the General Staff. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1941 and became chief of Fremde Heere Ost in 1942. (Fremde Heere Ost /Foreign Armies East/ was that section of the German High Command charged with responsibility for charting the enemy order of battle on the eastern front. It was essentially an evaluation unit and worked closely with the Abwehr. It did engage in line crossing operations as the war progressed, however.) Gehlen received his promotion to colonel soon after taking over Fremde Heere Ost and by 1944 was promoted to brigadier general. In the course of preparing estimates on enemy order of battle, he reached the conclusion as early as 1943 that the German cause on the eastern front was lost; and his continued pessimistic evaluations led to a reprimand from Hitler, and in the last days of the war he was relieved of command by order of Hitler. Long before that day General Gehlen had already consulted with senior members of his staff and made plans to continue their efforts against the Russians after the inevitable capitulation of the German Army, but in cooperation with the American Army. General Gehlen consequently cached his files in the Bavarian Alps and withdrew to that area in the final days of the war. He subsequently surrendered to the Americans, and after his initial POW debriefings, he presented his plan for the continued collection of order of battle information of the Soviet Armies.

General Gehlen was motivated by his strong view that the position of the Soviet Army so deep in Europe constituted a
real threat to Western civilization. His views were so strong that he was able to convince his captors of these views. He was then flown back to Washington in 1946 for further debriefings, and the decision was made at the G-2 level to allow General Gehlen to reform his unit and to permit him to engage in a collection effort against the Soviet Army in Eastern Europe. Some two and a half million dollars were appropriated for this effort. General Gehlen succeeded in reforming his unit and retrieving most of his files. He operated under G-2 sponsorship from 1946 until 1949 when CIA assumed responsibility for the Gehlen organization as it was then known. From 1949 until 1956 General Gehlen devoted his full energies to legalizing his organization as the West German Federal Intelligence Service. He achieved this goal in March 1956 and thereby became its first president. He became directly responsible to the Chancellor's officer. After legalization he strove to develop his organization into a world-wide intelligence service having collection capabilities and liaison on a world-wide basis. He has gone a long way toward accomplishing this goal.

As a personality General Gehlen still remains essentially a professional military officer in habits and attitudes though he never entered on active duty after World War II. He is, however, a lieutenant general in the reserve. At one time he was an accomplished horseman though he no longer permits himself this luxury, primarily because of time considerations. He is a family man and has four children. It is believed General Gehlen leads a quiet life outside of his official duties. In all things he is essentially conservative. He rarely entertains, and he does not drink. His English is fluent, and he is socially poised and very much at ease among senior American officials. Since his retirement he has been engaged in writing his memoirs and compiling a history of the BND.

General Gehlen was succeeded on 1 May 1968 by General Gerhard Wessel, his adjutant in Fremde Heere Ost, who was instrumental in assisting in the formation of the Gehlen organization. Wessel has served with the BND, the West German Ministry of Defense, and the NATO Military Committee in Washington and Brussels.
PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

SEE 201 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

GEHLEN
GEHLEN, Reinhard

geb. 3.4.02 Erfurt

Adresse: Berg/Krs.Starnberg, Waldstr. 68

Pass: 849/51
Gehlen, Herta Charlotte

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 2828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
EFFECTIVE 2005
GEHLEN, Herta

geb. 17.4.04 LEOBSCHTZ/Schlesien

Adresse: Berg/Kre. Starnberg, Waldstr. 68

Pass: 858/51

Kinder: Maria-Theres GEHLEN geb. 4.9.40

Dorothee GEHLEN, geb. 28.2.43
GEHLEN, Christoph

geb. 11.2.37    Berlin

Adresse: Berg/Krs. Starnberg, Waldstr. 68

Kennkarte: BY I 656502 3
GEHLEN, Herta

D.O.B.: 17 Mar/Apr 1904

BIRTHPLACE: Lodz, Silesia

RESIDENCE: 17. Sternberger Str., Berlin-Wilhelmshof

RELIGION: Protestant

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AS OF:

BUILD

HEIGHT

EYES

HAIR

PHOTO DATE: 1st July 1951

FAMILY BY DATA

FATHER: Friedrich-Wilhelm von SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH

MOTHER: Meta von SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH

SPOUSE: Reinhard GEHLEN (who sep)

CHILDREN: Katharina GEHLEN (who sep) (nee: GEHLEN)

Other Relatives: Dorothee GEHLEN

OTHER

UPWARD EMPLOYMENT

RANK:

POSITION:

SECTION:

DATE TERMINATION OR SEPARATION:

NEW STATUS:
CHILDREN OF Reinhard and Herta GEHLEN:

Christoph    Marie Therese    Dorothee
1. Gehlen van Warnewyck
2. ---
3. Reinhard
4. Erfurt-Germany
5. 3 April 1902
6a German
6b ---
7. German
8. Walther - German
9. Katharina - German
10. 1937 - 1945 German Wehrmacht
    1946 - Present: merchant
10. 10, Guentersburg Allee
    Frankfurt a/M.
    c/o Dr. Erhardt
12. married
   a) ---
   b) ---
   c) ---
14. 174 darkblond
    blue
    none
15. ---
   b) ---
   a) Switzerland, Italy, Austria
   b) Authorized Crossing Points
   c) 20 June 1949
   d) one year
17) ---
18) on business
19 no
20 ---
   b) ---
21 no
22 none
23 Armed Forces, Brigadier General
   NSDAP: no
24 classified: not concerned
25 none
   b) none
26 ---
27 expenses will be paid by friends
28 ----
29 H 519 712
   3 March 1947
   From: 1st a/M.
   Police President
1. Personal Background

   Full name: Reinhard Gehlen
   Date of birth: 3 April 1902
   Place of birth: Erfurt/Thuringia
   Nationality: German, no previous nationalities.

2. Marital Status

   Name of wife: Herta Gehlen, nee von Seydlitz-Kurzbach
   Date of birth: 17 April 1904
   Place of birth: Leobschütz/Silesia
   Nationality: German

3. Children

   Katharina Gehlen Age 16
   Christoph Gehlen Age 13
   Maria-Theresia Gehlen Age 9
   Dorothea Gehlen Age 7

4. Father

   Full name: Walther Gehlen
   Date of birth: 21 July 1871
   Date of death: 1943
   Nationality: German

5. Mother

   Full name: Katharina Gehlen, nee von Vaarmwyck
   Date of birth: 12 June 1881
   Date of death: 1921
   Nationality: German

6. Father-in-Law

   Full name: Friedrich-Wilhelm von Seydlitz-Kurzbach
   Date of birth: 15 October 1873
   Nationality: German

7. Mother-in-Law

   Full name: Beta von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, nee Fischer
   Date of birth: 29 July 1882
   Nationality: German

8. Education

   1908 - 1920 Humanistisches Gymnasium Dresden, with graduation.
9. Military Service

April 1920
Entered military service (artillery)

Dec. 1923
Promotion to Lieutenant

1928
Promotion to First Lieutenant

1933 - 1935
General Staff Academy

1935
Promotion to Captain

1935 - 1938
General Staff assignment

1938 - 1939
Battery Commander

1939
Promotion to Major

Sept. - Nov. 1939
Chief of Staff 223, Inf. Div.

Nov. 1939 - Spring 1940
Chief of Fortifications Section, General Staff

Spring 1940 - Fall 1940
Adjutant to Chief of General Staff

Fall 1940 - Spring 1942
Section Chief within the Department for Plans and Operations (Operationsabteilung)

Spring 1942 - Spring 1945
Chief of the Department "Preude Heere Ost"

10. Political Background

No membership to any political party or affiliated associations at any time.
Biographical Data Report on ex-General Reinhard GEHLEN

GEHLEN, Reinhard (ex-Brigadier General)

Personal data:
Born 3 April 1902 in Erfurt, Thuringia. Protestant.
Married; four children.

Education:
Graduated from Humanistisches Gymnasium, Breslau, 1920.

Languages:
English, some French.

Career:
1920 Entered military service (artillery).
1923 Commissioned Second Lieutenant.
1928 Promoted to First Lieutenant.
1933-1935 General Staff Academy, Berlin.
1934 Promoted to Captain.
1935-1938 General Staff assignment.
1938-1939 Battery commander.
1939 Promoted to Major.
1939 Chief of Staff, 223th Infantry Division.
1939-1940 Chief of Fortifications Section, General Staff.
1940 Adjutant to General HALDER, Chief of General Staff.
1941 Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.
1940-1942 Section Chief in Department for Plans and Operations.
1942 Promoted to Colonel.
1942-1945 Chief of Department Frenze Heers Ost.
1945 Promoted to Brigadier General.
1945 Dismissed by special order of HITLER on 9 April 1945.

American POW, 27 May 1945.

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Remarks:

Reinhard GEHLEN was born the son of German Army First Lieutenant Walter GEHLEN. His father left the military service a few years after Reinhard was born and became a moderately successful business man, and spent the majority of his years as Director of a Publishing House in Breslau until his death in 1943.

Up until 1942 Reinhard GEHLEN followed a routine career pattern similar to other professional army officers. His promotions can be considered consistent with other officers. His highest tactical command function was that of a company commander.

In April of 1942 GEHLEN, then a Colonel, was assigned to take over the intelligence group "Freunde-Heere Ost" or "Foreign Armies East" under the High Command of the Army. His mission with this unit at that time was to obtain all possible intelligence material dealing with the military, political and economic situation existing in the USSR and the south eastern European countries. He gave an able demonstration of himself until in March/April 1945 he was relieved of his post upon the personal order of HITLER.

GEHLEN reportedly has never been a member of any political party or faction. He has a fear and hatred for communism. According to the 7th Army interrogation report dated 21 June 1945 GEHLEN was reported to anticipate a Russian-allied conflict.

He professes to stand for a united Western Europe built around a Franco-German Axis, for collaboration with England and the United States, for social reform but not socialism, for the review of such occupation and post-war "injustices" as War Criminal Trials and some aspects of denazification. He does not favor the remilitarization of Germany, except as part of Western European Defense. In the intelligence field he believes that a small country such as Germany should have a unified service.
The General Staff of the German Army built up no illusions for itself concerning the scale of this offensive. General Gehlen, head of the Eastern Army, who consolidated the reports concerning the eastern foe, was both a skillful and a conscientious man in his work, whose estimates of the deployment of Soviet Troops and the Soviet plans for attack carried an incontestible weight. Onderian had no reason to question the reliability of his colleague. The Soviet dispositions were all the more alarming inasmuch as now only the remnants of the areas conquered during 1941 and 1942 separated the Soviet armies from Germany itself. In East Prussia, Russian troops already were on German territory, and the fate of the German civilians who were overtaken by surprise in the late autumn of 1944 in Kommersdorf ad Goldap, including murder, rape, looting and deportation, forced consideration of the imminent developments with anxiety...
The reports which Gehlen presented since November in regard
to the numerical strength of the Soviet forces and their artillery,
armor and planes, had at first impressed Guderian as improbable.
However, they were repeatedly demonstrated as being true and as early
as December 1944, the numerical ratio had risen to 9:1 between the
Russian and German divisions on the Vistula front; to 6:1 between the
Russian and German armor; to 10:1 between the Russian and German artillery
and in some sectors had even reached a ratio of 15:1. The ratio of air
power between the two could not any longer be gauged in terms of numerical
ratios...
page 32-33.

"Guderian was startled out of his trend of thought as the door of the compartment opened. In the doorway stood General Gehlen. He had come in once more to discuss the general presentation of the situation to the Führer.

"Gehlen's sharply chiselled face was pale, with a yellowish undertone. He suffered from stomach ulcers, the occupation disorder common to numerous overworked General Staff officers.

"Herr Generaloberst", he said, "I have completed an additional special report concerning the respective ratio of military strength of the area surrounding the Baranov bridgehead, which takes into consideration the very latest substantiating data. According to this information the enemy is deployed on a 90 kilometer front with five infantry armies, six armored corps, two self-contained armored corps and five armored brigades. The ratio of infantry strength now amounts to 11:1 in favor of the enemy; in armor it is 7:1 and in artillery it is 20:1. The Russian artillery deployment at many points amounts to 250 artillery pieces per kilometer. The conclusions are so evident that they should convince even the Führer of the fact that we are facing a catastrophe at the Baranov bridgehead unless something is done....

"Guderian looked square into Gehlen's face. Even Gehlen still judged the situation on the basis of reasoning. He had no contacts with a world in which decisions are reached on the basis of instinct, inspiration and moods. Guderian stood up and began to pace back and forth.

"Gehlen", he said, 'today is our last chance. If the armored
divisions in the West are set on the march as late as tonight, they
still could arrive in time to avert the worst....'

"In his mind's eye he still saw the Christmas Eve of 1944, in
which he had resumed the battle for the armored units in the Ardennes.
The Ardennes Offensive had begun December 16th. On the 22nd of December
it was already clear that the offensive had been floundered.

"For this reason, on Christmas Eve, the 24th of December, Guderian
had attempted to effect with Hitler the immediate transfer to the Eastern
Front, a move promised in this event, of the assault divisions which were
no longer required for a defensive action in the West.

"Hitler's attention, however, with the obstinacy of the frustrated,
had remained fixed on the Ardennes. He insisted that the initiative
remained in his hand both now as heretofore. He (Guderian) had mis-
represented the magnitude of the danger from the East. The statistics
concerning the Russian concentrations were simply invented. Allusions
to the fate threatening the East German populace he had at first ignored,
then refuted with a remark that the Prussians in the days of Frederick
the Great had also been called on to make sacrifices, and that he also
could demand that the Germans make sacrifices for his sake. The atmosphere
of that Christmas Eve still were vivid in Guderian's memory - along with
the willfully desired lack of familiarity with conditions in the East, not
only on the part of Hitler, but also in the case of Jodl, who had never
visited one of the fronts; their clinging to long obsolete concepts, and
- as Guderian felt intuitively - in Jodl's case, with a lack of comprehension
on the part of the South Germans for the fate of the East.

"During the same night, Guderian had returned to Zossen. Enraged he
received the news that Budapest had been lost. Arriving in Zossen, he received a further communication to the effect that the Panzerkorps Gille, which had been stationed as an assault reserve force behind the Vistula front in accordance with a direct order from Ziegenberg, had been ordered transferred to Hungary for purposes of recapturing a foreign capital. This, however, was the crown point of the defeat (for Guderian), to have a part of the Reserves, which had been painfully retrieved from the Eastern Front, simply transferred, by order originating above Guderian, to another position......
Then the contest had started. As on Christmas Eve, Hitler refused to acknowledge the threat from the East. He refused to recognize that his bitterly hated opponent, Stalin, had the power to order out such great forces. With the lack of restraint of someone who inwardly senses his error, he still expounded the illusion of the insufficiency of the Russian armies, which had been pursuing him since 1941. He had never relinquished the belief that Stalin's reservoir of manpower must someday run dry. Now he again was of the opinion that this had occurred. Again he spoke of the "randomly conscripted rabble" and of the "Plunderdivisions" which Stalin still could muster up. He screamed that General Gehlen, in company with his estimates, belonged in an insane asylum. He ignored Guderian's objections that Hitler, on that basis, could have him, Guderian, committed to the same asylum, since he concurred in Gehlen's opinion.
"Guderian stopped his pacing. 'We must achieve it today', he reiterated, 'This is the last chance left for us. Gehlen, don't let yourself be swayed by anything during our conference. Remain calm and collected, even if the Führer permits himself to be drawn into insulting the General Staff and you personally...!'"

"Gehlen understood. He spread out his cards and papers. While he was thus occupied, Guderian continued his pacing up and down. 'I repeat once more, the most important points of our presentation,' he said.

1. Immediate relinquishment of the Kurland Front.
2. Transfer of the armored forces from the West to the East before the night is over.
3. In event of refusal, a minimum of withdrawal of the over-extended sector of the 4th Army in East Prussia and saving of some divisions as reserves.
4. Operation "Schlittenfahrt" of Heeresgruppe A - withdrawal of our curved frontal position between the Vistula bridgeheads at Pulawy and Baranov and the Vistula, shortly before the Russian attack. Assault type defense before the Pulawy bridgehead. A holding off type of defense from the Baranov bridgehead to the Silesian border.
"Guderian, with a face revealing the inner emotion which now gripped him, took his place at Hitler's left side, a practice that had been adopted since the bomb explosion of July 20th, which had destroyed Hitler's right ear drum. During this time, Hitler gazed across at Gehlen, who just stood upright with an uncommunicative expression on his face. Hitler sensed in Gehlen the personification of cold, unyielding reality, which he did not want to hear or recognize, or to which he did not want to surrender before it finally engulfed him and his pans paid the price of his obstinacy in the East, South or West. His face took on an expression of rejection. Then he heard Guderian's voice....

"My Führer," began Guderian, "I came back here again today to present the facts to you personally, since it has been established with certainty, according to all our information, that the Russian winter offensive, target Berlin, will open in three days on the 12th of January. I should like once again, as on the 24th and the 31st of December, to report to you in full candour, the details of the situation on the eastern front and for this purpose, have brought with me General Gehlen himself, who can present to you all corroborating details you may desire........."
I, Friedrich-Wilhelm Ruebesamen, do hereby acknowledge that I have this
date received the sum of DM 10,024.00 (ten thousand and twenty-four Deutsche
Marks) from the Government of the United States of America. In accordance
with the agreement under which these funds were entrusted to me, I have purchased
with these funds on behalf of the United States Government one Opel Kapitän,
motor number 2,555-09000, license number B 55-3563. This vehicle
was purchased by me in the name of Sinduver G.m.b.H., located at Nikolaistr. 1,
in the city of München.

In consideration for the delivery of these funds to me and for the
subsequent granting of this vehicle into my custody, and in consideration
for such other benefits as I have received or shall receive from the
Government of the United States, its Agencies or representatives, I do
hereby agree as follows.

It is understood and agreed that this vehicle, although officially
registered in the name of Sinduver G.m.b.H., is now and will remain the
sole property of the United States Government; and that it is to be held
subject to the direction of the United States Government or its authorized
representatives and that I have no personal proprietary interest in or claim
upon this vehicle; and that in the event of my death or disappearance, or
at such other time as the United States Government or its authorized
representatives shall designate at its discretion this vehicle shall be
returned into the possession of the United States Government, and that
neither I, nor my estate, nor my heirs, shall have any claim upon it.

It is further understood and agreed that this vehicle may not be sold,
pledged, or otherwise obligated by me or my representatives or agents for
any reason whatsoever, without specific authorization in writing from the
United States Government or its authorized representatives.
It is further understood and agreed that this contract shall not be construed to grant to me, or my agents or representatives any rights or privileges not specifically stated herein; and that I shall be personally responsible and liable to the United States Government for the proper custody of this vehicle.

F.W. Rübesamen
Friedrich-Wilhelm Rübesamen

Dated:

Reinhard von Gehlen
Borg am Starnbergersee
1. GENERAL GEHLEN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, WAS CALLED TO BONN UNEXPECTEDLY ON THE EVENING OF 3 FEBRUARY FOR CONFERENCES ON 4 FEBRUARY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SCHROEDER AND OTHER SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS. THE TOPIC OF DISCUSSIONS IS GERMAN RELATIONS WITH EGYPT. GEHLEN WILL COUNSEL THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO AVOID ANY PRECIPITOUS ACTION IN THE PRESENT CONFLICT OVER ULBRICHT'S VISIT TO CAIRO.

2. GEHLEN TOOK WITH HIM A REPORT FROM A BND SOURCE IN EGYPT WHO IS CONSIDERED HIGHLY RELIABLE. THE REPORT STATES THAT NASSER DOES NOT INTEND TO RECOGNIZE EAST GERMANY AND WILL HANDLE ULBRICHT. THE MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
APPROXIMATELY AS HE DID GROTEWOHL IN 1959. NASSER PREVIOUSLY TOLD GERMAN AMBASSADOR FLEDERER ABOUT THE SAME THING, AND THE BND BELIEVES THAT THEIR REPORT CONFIRMS THAT NASSER WILL ACT AS HE STATED. GEHLEN WILL CITE THE BND REPORT TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE AS A REASON FOR FOLLOWING A MODERATE LINE WITH THE EGYPTIANS.

3. EVEN PRIOR TO GEHLEN'S TRIP THE FOREIGN OFFICE WAS DISINCLINED TO TAKE ANY SPEEDY ACTION ON THE EGYPTIAN PROBLEM AND IT IS VERY UNLIKELY THAT ANY IMPORTANT DECISIONS WILL BE MADE UNTIL AFTER ULBRICHT'S VISIT TAKES PLACE.

4. RECENTLY THE BND CONDUCTED A STUDY ON THE PROBABLE REACTION OF OTHER ARAB STATES IF GERMAN-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS WERE BROKEN. THE STUDY CONCLUDED THAT VERY FEW OF THE ARAB STATES WOULD FOLLOW THE EGYPTIAN LINE AND BREAK WITH GERMANY. THIS STUDY HAS BEEN SENT TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND MAY BE DISCUSSED DURING GEHLEN'S TRIP TO BONN.

5% FIELD DISSEM: NONE (ALSO SENT BONN, CAIR, GMMY, FRAN, BRLN)

END OF MESSAGE
The document is not readable due to the quality of the image. It appears to be a memorandum slip with a handwritten note. The text is not legible enough to transcribe accurately.
WANG, WEST GERMANY, MAY 17. (REUTERS) - THE WEST GERMANY MAGAZINE DER SPIEGEL CLAIMED TODAY THAT FORMER CHANCELLOR ADENAUER SUGGESTED IN 1962 THAT THE HEAD OF THE COUNTRY'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICE BE ARRESTED.

THE MAGAZINE SAID ADENAUER, SUSPECTING THAT A MEMBER OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAD TIPPED OFF THE SPIEGEL'S STAFF, A POLICE RAID ON THE MAGAZINE, SUGGESTED TO WOLFGANG STAMMBERGER, THEN JUSTICE MINISTER IN THE WEST GERMANY GOVERNMENT, THAT INTELLIGENCE CHIEF REINHARD GEHLLEN BE ARRESTED. GEHLLEN DENIES THE MAGAZINE'S STORY, BUT STAMMBERGER, SPEAKING IN PARLIAMENT FOR THE OPPOSITION SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, SAID TODAY "IF ADENAUER SAYS THAT THE SPIEGEL REPORTS TRUE, I SAY THAT IT IS CORRECT." 

STAMMBERGER ADDED THAT WHEN ADENAUER SUGGESTED HE ARREST GEHLLEN, HE REPLIED THAT THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR DOING SO.

THE INCIDENT WAS IN CONNECTION WITH THE "SPIEGEL AFFAIR" IN WHICH CHARGES OF TREASON WERE LAID AGAINST THE MAGAZINE'S PUBLISHER RUDOLF AUGUSTIN AND ETUPE CONRAD ANLERS FOR PUBLISHING ALLEGED MILITARY SECRETS REGARDING GERMANY'S DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS.

THE CHARGES WERE DISMISSED FRIDAY BY THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT OF EVIDENCE IN A CASE WHICH HAD THE GOAL OF PROVIDING THE FEDERAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WITH LEGAL RIGHTS.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3628 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE: 2001 2005
in the German government as an expert in the Chancellor, in the Ministers, on the
German Press, on the German Radio etc...

3. Utility considers himself a political realist who, though an Eastern German
himself and an officer whose formative years were spent under the von Seeckt
influence, considers Germany's integration with the Western Atlantic Community
an absolute prerequisite for negotiations with the Soviets. Also, he has always attached the utmost importance to French/German understanding and recognized
the need for cautious cooperation with the British. Utility is simply incapable for taking a detached and disinterested view of internal German events either
that touch upon the issue of (a) Germany's foreign policy or (b) communist influence
in the Federal Republic. Possessing a strong political conviction and
since he is a man with political ideas of his own and because he fears that the
Western cause should be lost in Germany through political infiltration,
Utility finds it difficult to stick to the business of quietly building a GIS that will eventually find a place
in an unpenetrated and integrated and unpenetrated Federal Republic.

4. In this connection, we have credited Utility with completely
accurate-reporting of recent internal political discussions. Independently we have learned of all the items reported. Utility's current views on the political advisers surrounding USHURST had not come to our attention is that
form; however, recently Utility offered a gratuitous analysis of the SPD foreign experts.

This seemed to be an appropriate moment to seek confirmation of the report; Utility's reply provided this, but did not include the fact that an independent approach via the Bavarian Catholics was involved. Recent intercepts available to us provided information of a meeting between
which may be related to this move.

5. Utility has in the past responded to our specific
recommendation in the political field. Nevertheless, I am not optimistic that
general reproaches and warnings on the dangers inherent in the UDRIZZLY, and related political matters will seriously effect his actions and might, on the other hand, result in our being denied information of his activities in this field. There have been and will be in the future specific political matters in which Utility will seek and probably be influenced by our information and advise.

6. Several years back in the KUBARK policy file on ZIPPER is a clear cut statement that we would never admit responsibility for ZIPPER's political activities. I think this was a wise decision at the time and one that should continue to govern our position. As Utility and his organization, I realize, of course, that there are very definite limits to our capability of shedding the political responsibility with definite political aspects that, in the final analysis, KUBARK does have an overall responsibility for both the direct and indirect effects of ZIPPER's existence. Recognition and acceptance of this fact does not, however, deny KUBARK the right to refuse either recognition or support to specific political activities which we feel are inimicable to our intelligence and political our own interests. Within the existing world political atmosphere at home and in Europe, a justification of KUBARK support of ZIPPER can, we feel, be made. The individual political acts of Utility and other Zipper personalities should be examined as they arise and supported or denounced as our own interests may dictate.
5. Not long ago Utility noted that several members of the U.S. Commissioners staff had expressed to Germans in Bonn their apprehension regarding Zipper. Utility recalled that, following his own meeting with Duke the deputy, Commission also noted that, some months ago, following Walter Dowling's visit to Munich and his dinner with Utility at a's home, a German acquaintance of Utility's quoted Dowling as having labelled Utility a "man who, under certain circumstances, might be dangerous." I pointed out to Utility that many intelligent Germans and Americans undoubtedly turned this thought over in their minds from time to time; that the political wisdom of KUBARK's ZIPPER policy had been a subject of continuing debate; that our support of ZIPPER as a project and Utility as an individual had not, however, wavered. While I doubted that Mr. Dowling had ever made such a remark, to a German, I could well imagine that his sentiments are as expressed.

6. Utility reminded me that I should not forget that KUBARK has in its files documents signed by him which unequivocally align him the West against the USSR and World Communism; that whatever other doubts we might have about him, he trusted that on this issue his position was accepted.

7. This seemed to be an appropriate moment to ask Utility just what his personal ambitions are and under what circumstances he hoped to achieve them. Previous occasions, the occasion of a strong GIS head, He replied without hesitation that his only personal ambition was to establish and for some years head a GIS.
SECRET 081159Z CITE VIENNA 4035
DIRECTOR INFO BONN, FRANKFURT, MUNICH

KEYWAY
FROM =  
CS. copy 8/32W-2-28/1

1. DISCUSSED DEFECTOR HANDLING QUESTION IN SOME DETAIL DURING THREE QUARTER HOUR MEET WITH UTILITY 7 NOV. ATTACHED BY ALIAS WENDT, ALIAS CAESAR AND .

2. KEY POINT WHICH EMERGED AND DOMINATED ENTIRE DISCUSSION WAS UTILITY'S VISIBLE PLEASURE WITH NEW STATE SECRETARY APPOINTMENTS IN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY CARSTENS IN CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE AND DUCKWITZ IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ALTHOUGH ALSO INDICATED PERSONAL SATISFACTION IN APPOINTMENT VON HASE TO DEFENSE. BROAD GRIN WITH WHICH UTILITY RESPONDED TO MY COMPLIMENTS ON THESE APPOINTMENTS SUGGESTS UTILITY MAY WELL HAVE HAD HAND IN THEM AND CERTAINLY ANTICIPATES GOOD SUPPORT FOR CATUSK.

3. ALIAS WENDT OUTLINED JOINT CATUSK/CAVATA/ASBW POSITION RE DEFECTOR HANDLING IN FEDREP TO BE THAT CATUSK SHOULD BEAR RESPONSIBILITY ON FEDERAL SIDE FOR CONDUCT OF PROGRAM JOINTLY WITH WOFIRM, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE AGENCY

SECRET
PAGE 2 VIENNA 4035 SECRET

FOR ISSUING VISAS TO DEFECTORS BROUGHT INTO GERMANY FROM
OTHER COUNTRIES IN ORDER MAKE THEIR PRESENCE ACCORD WITH GERMAN
LAW, AND FINALLY THAT PROGRAM SHOULD CONTINUE UNDER PRIMARY
AUSPICES OF AMERICANS FOR PRESENT. (IT MY UNDERSTANDING
FROM DISCUSSION WITH STATION OFFICERS BONN THAT THIS
RECOMMENDATION NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION AT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
LEVEL ALTHOUGH HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY KNOWN EXACTLY WHAT SUBSTANCE
OF JOINT RECOMMENDATION WAS).

4. IN DISCUSSING POLITICAL ASPECTS UTILITY STATED IT
HIS LONGSTANDING PRINCIPLE AVOID DEALING POLITICAL LEVEL
MORE THAN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. (HE CITED CASE AS
EXAMPLE NOTING HE TOOK RESPONSIBILITY UPON HIMSELF AND
DID NOT INFORM FOREIGN OFFICE.) IN RESPONSE MY REQUEST
HOWEVER, IN VIEW EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION DEFECTOR MATTERS WHICH
HAD ALREADY OCCURRED AT GERMAN AND AMERICAN POLITICAL LEVELS
BONN, UTILITY STATED WOULD UNDERTAKE TO HAVE DUCKWITZ, AFTER
HE HAS COMPLETED CURRENT ROUND OF EXTENSIVE BRIEFINGS INCIDENTAL
TAKING OVER NEW JOB, MAKE STATEMENT TO TO EFFECT THAT
FOREIGN OFFICE AWARE OF AND SATISFIED WITH DEFECTOR PROGRAM
IN FEDREP. UTILITY BELIEVES CAN GET DUCKWITZ DO THIS IN

SECRET
ABOUT SIX WEEKS TIME.

5. EXPLAINED TO UTILITY WE WISHED ELIMINATE TERM "CENTER" TO GET AWAY FROM IMAGE OF PHYSICAL INSTALLATION AND INSTEAD REGARD AS GROUP SKILLED INTERROGATORS CAPABLE HANDLING DEFECTORS ON AD HOC BASIS. INDICATED WE WISHING DISCUSS ANY CHANGES/RECOMMENDATIONS UTILITY MIGHT WISH MAKE AS AND/OR DEFECTOR HANDLING BUT HE INDICATED CATUSK DID NOT NOW HAVE QUALIFIED PERSONNEL TO ADD TO PROGRAM AND HE SATISFIED CONTINUE AS AT PRESENT WITH ALIAS LORING REPRESENTING CATUSK. MADE SPECIAL POINT OF EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND BOTH COB FRANKFURT AND CHIEF POSSESS IN DEFECTOR HANDLING QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED CATUSK STAFF OFFICERS REVIEW PROGRAM WITH THEM FOR ORIENTATION PURPOSES (WHICH UNDERSTAND ALIAS CAESAR PLANS DO IN NEAR FUTURE).

6. ON LEGAL/POLITICAL QUESTION OF ALLIED RIGHT TO CUSTODY SOVIET DEFECTORS ENTERING FEDREP DIRECTLY ALIAS WENDT STATED FEDREP LAW REQUIRES (UNDER PRINCIPLE OF FREIZUEGIGKEIT) THAT DEFECTOR WHO REQUESTS AMERICAN ASYLUM BE PERMITTED BE TAKEN OVER BY AMERICANS. IF HE REQUESTS FEDREP ASYLUM MUST UNDER GERMAN LAW BE SENT TO D.P. CAMP WHERE CATUSK WELL
SECRET

7. IN ADDITION STRONG SUPPORT FOR CONDUCT DEFECTOR PROGRAM IN GERMANY INDICATED ABOVE, IT OF INTEREST THAT ALIAS REICHLIN DURING SIMILAR DISCUSSION WITH C ON 6 NOV. STRESSED THAT FROM CATUSK'S STANDPOINT PRIMARY INTEREST LAY PRECISELY IN THOSE SOV BLOC DEFECTORS WHICH WERE BROUGHT TO FEDREP AFTER REQUESTING AMERICAN ASYLUM IN OTHER COUNTRIES AND WHICH REPRESENTED SOURCE OF INFORMATION CATUSK WOULD PROBABLY NOT OTHERWISE HAVE. (REICHLIN NOTED THAT CATUSK CLEARLY COULD OBTAIN ACCESS TO SOV BLOC DEFECTORS WHO CAME DIRECTLY TO FEDREP SO THAT COLLABORATION WITH WOFIRM IN DEFECTOR MATTERS PRIMARILY TO ACHIEVE DIRECT ACCESS TO CASES
SECRET

COMING INTO AMERICAN HANDS WORLDWIDE.

8. IN SUMMARY, OUTLINED TO UTILITY OUR INTENTION BE MORE SELECTIVE IN DEFECTORS WE PROPOSE BRING FEDREP FOR EXPLOITATION, AND AGreed WOULD DISCUSS HANDLING EACH CASE ON AD HOC BASIS TO INCLUDE ON OCCASION ULTIMATE RESETTLEMENT WHEN FEDREP APPEARED BE GOOD RESETTLEMENT POSSIBILITY IN SO FAR AS CATUSK MIGHT BE ABLE ASSIST. UTILITY LITERALLY EXUDED CONFIDENCE HIS ABILITY OBTAIN SUPPORT FOR CATUSK ACTIVITIES VIA DUCKWITZ AND CARSTENS AND CLOSED MEETING ON NOTE THAT HE EXPECTED "BE AROUND FOR NEXT YEAR OR TWO."

SECRET
ERLEDIGT

den Chef des Generalstabes der vorgesetzten Edo.-Behörde:

Herrn/Senator/Generalleutnant, Herrn

mit einem

auf dieses Schreiben und Frankfurter Empfangskontakt

nachgeholfen und besorgt

zugeführt.

Unterschrieben

vorgesetzter Dienststellen:

Herrn/Senator/Generalleutnant

vorgesetzter Dienststellen:

Herrn/Senator/Generalleutnant

Unterschrieben

vorgesetzter Dienststellen:

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Herrn/Senator/Generalleutnant

vorgesetzter Dienststellen:

Herrn/Senator/Generalleutnant

vorgesetzter Dienststellen:
He was promoted to "Bag" General in 1944.
Größe
in
3erfonolathen

Hoyreselhing: Personallalt
Personal-Nachweis

Gehlen, Johann

geb. 3. April 1902 in Erfurt

Land: Preußen

Vater: Walter Gehlen
Mutter: Klara Gehlen geb. Weidmann

Best. Stand: 1925

Ehrentag: 1917

Best. Arbeitsstätte: Chemische Fabrik Stadt Erfurt

Geb. 27. 1. 18
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<td>473/39 97-26:</td>
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**Beurteilung**

(für Offiziere in Gen.Stellungen)

über den

Oberleutnant i.R. (akt.) Gebrüne Reinhard, Operationsabteilung

Geboren am 3.4.02. Letzte Friedensdienststelle: Art. Sgt. 16.

Laufbahnoffizier mit Kriegsschul-B.D.A. 1.7.41 (2) ausbildung

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Kurze Beurteilung:

(Erfolgsrelevante Beurteilung vor dem Feinde, dienstliche Leistungen)


Sprachkenntnisse:
(dabei abgelegte Prüfungen [Jahr])

| Französisch-Jahrkennung |

Wie wird jetzige Stelle ausgefüllt?

| Ausgefüllt |

Eignung zur nächsthöheren Verwendung:

| nachhaltig |

Eignung für besondere oder andernweitige Verwendung:

| für selbständige Aufgaben in besonderen Fällen |

Wann und zu welchen Punkten einer etwaigen ungünstigen Beurteilung ist Eröffnung erfolgt?

|             |
Beurteilung
(für Offiziere in Gen. St. Stellen)
über den

Major i.G. Sehle Reinhard
(St. Truppenoffizier)

Geboren am: 5. 3. 1903

Abfahrt: Offz. mit Kriegsschulausbildung

R. D. M. 1. 6. 36 (14)

Verwendung: Gruppenleiter

Eigene Beurteilung:

Vorläufige Beurteilung:
Verantwortung, Bewährung vor dem Fernrohr, hervorragende Leistungen.

Vorläufige Beurteilung:

Nach Persönlichkeit, Energie, kooperativer Begabung und verantwortungswürdigen Denken.

Vor dem Feinde voll bewährt.

Schulkenstritt in Frankreich

Sehr gut.

Korpschef oder Abteilungschef

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Antrag

bei Oberleutnant und Adjutanten der 1./Art.3 Reinhard v. d. d. l. m.
auf Erteilung der Heiratserlaubnits

1. Geburtsdatum des Antragstellers
   3. 4. 02 zu Erfurt, vgl.

2. Vornamen der Bräute
   Herta Charlotte Agnes Helene v. Seydlitz-Kurzbach
   geb. 17. 4. 04

3. Vornehmen
   Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz-Kurzbach
   Oberstleutn.a.D., Glogau, Neue Wallstr. 18.

4. Geschäft und Berufsbezeichnung der Vater und Bräute
   Ich erkläre pflichtig, dass
   a) ich und meine Darstellung zur Braut hofjüngfreigeworden sind, den 7. August 1871.
   b) ich und meine Braut der Frage des Eheschatens selbst verbunden.

5. Erklärung
   Ich erkläre, dass ich nicht von der Erfassung der Verlobung eingestellt.

6. Unterschrift
   Schwerin, den 1. August 1871.

7. Unterschrift
   den Kommanz des 1. Abteilung 3. (Preuss.) Art. Regiment

8. Unterschrift
   Herrn Oberst vom O n d a r z a, Hochwohlgemohren
Berlin, den 15. Juni 1937

Anliegend wird ein Urlaubsantrag des Hauptmanns Geilen behandelt und weitergereicht.

[Signature]

über G. Z. an
P. A. mitgeteilt.

Ja.

Maulpfeil.
Best Available Copy

Frankfurt (O.), den 5. August 1934.

Heiratsurkunde. Oberleutnant Gehrig. Artillerie-Abteilung III.


Geheim!

Befürwortend vorgelegt,

Die Voraussetzungen der Ziffer 3 der Heiratsordnung sind als erfüllt erachtet.

Nach den persönlichen Verhältnissen der Verlobten hinsichtlich ihrer Verwandtschaft, ihrer Einstellung, Lebensfreunden und Charakterzügen in Zusammenhang mit den örtlichen Lebensgewohnheiten bestätigt die Antritt, dass die beantragte Ehe der Belange nicht missfällt.

[Signatures and stamps]

Oberst und Regimentskommandeur.

[Handwritten notes and signatures]
Inhalt:

Mit Wirkung vom 1. Mai 1942 werden ernannt:

1. Oberstleutnant (Operationsabteilung), zum Abteilungschef im Generalstabe des Heeres (Abteilung Heer Ost).

H. Qu. O. L. H., den 28. April 1942
Oberkommando des Heeres

J. A. gen. Keitel
Aussage

Mit sofortiger Wirkung werden ernannt:
die Obersten

Allmendinger, Abteilungschef im Generalstabe des Heeres (Abteilung Landesverteidigung), zum Chef des Generalstabes des V. Armee-Korps

Rüblis, Chef des Generalstabes des V. Armee-Korps, zum Abteilungschef im Generalstabe des Heeres (Abteilung Landesverteidigung)

Mit sofortiger Wirkung werden versetzt:
die Obersten

Krebs, Abteilungschef im Generalstabe des Heeres (Ausbildungsabteilung), in die V. Armee-Korps des Oberkommando des Heeres; seinen Dienst regelt der Oberquartiermeister IV.

Gehlen, im Generalstabe der F第七Infanteriedivision, in den Generalstab des Heeres, als Leiter der Gruppe Landesverteidigung

Haus, im Generalstabe des Stellvertretenden Generalinspekteurs der F第七Armee-Korps, in den Generalstab der F第七Infanteriedivision

H.Q., O.K., am 5. Oktober 1939
Der Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres

Vorsteher des

Beitrag zur Vermehrung der Wissenschaft von 19/39

Best Available Copy
Auszug

A Truppenoffiziere
Mit Wirkung vom 1. Dezember 1942 werden befördert:

Name

zu Oberstleuten;
die Oberstleutnante:

Gehlen

in Gen. St. d. H.
(RDA, le ObuItt.1.7.41(2))

Würpauquartier, den 18. Dezember 1942
Der Führer
ges. Adolf Hitler
Oberkommando des Heeres
Im Auftrag
Gen. Schmundt
Genordmajor
und Chef des Heerespersonalsamts

Nr. C768/42 Fr/Af. P 1/1, Abt. (a)
Pera. Akte

Geh. h. m.
Mit dem 7. Oktober 1942 wurde der Major

Geh. h. m. Leiter der Truppenoffiziere und Adjutant der Obersteleutnante

Verteiler pp

Ar. 21c PA/324(1) gen. 81 d. H.
Nr. 2396/40 gen. (1. Staffel),

prf. Akte
A Truppenoffiziere

Mit Wirkung vom 1. Dezember 1942 werden befördert:

Friedensbr. 42 A 142

Name

zu Oberstenten

Oberstleutnant:

g.zt. im Gen.St.d.H. (144 a)

Gehlen

(i.Art.Rgt.18)

(170, d.Obst.l 17.1.41(2))

Mührerhauptquartier, den 18. Dezember 1942

Der Führer

O.K. A.1

Schmidt

Generalmajor

und Chef des Heerespersonals

Er. St. 769/42 V /4: P 1/1 Abt. (g)

Pers. Akte

Auszug

Gehlen

Mit dem 1. Oktober 1942 wird

Mehr der Major

Gehlen, Leiter der Gruppe Landesverwaltung

Adjutant des Chef des Generalstabs

Operationsabteilung im Kriegsministerium

Verteiler pp

Bestätigt mit Ehrerbietung

R. D. A.

Der Oberstallmeister

Gen.St.d.H.

Az. 21o PA/621(1) Gen.St.d.H.

Fri. St. 2396/40 geh. (1.Staffel)

Vert. Akte
TO:  SAINT, Washington
FROM:  SAINT, AMERICAN'
SUBJECT:  Russian Experts of German Intelligence Service

1. In October it was learned that the Office of the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, USFET, had in protective custody several former
staff officers of Fremde Heere Ost. This office was naturally in-
terested and through discreet inquiries learned some details of the
situation.

2. It appears that the Fremde Heere Ost staff under General
von Gehlen retreated successfully from Warsaw through Eastern Germany
south to Hamm and thence to the vicinity of Oberaden near the
Austrian frontier. Von Gehlen, having had control of Fremde Heere Ost
intelligence echelon responsible for German intelligence on the Eastern
Front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, decided to turn himself in to
the American forces rather than risk capture by the Russians. This
he managed to do, together with seven of his staff officers, most of
whom were experts on Russian order of battle both of the Ground
Forces and Air Forces.

3. When his American captors suggested that he leave Germany and
come to the United States to work with the experts on the Russian Army
of the War Department in Washington, he promptly agreed to do so, recom-
manding that the chief of his secret intelligence operations, Major
Hermann Baum (subject, unnumbered ESTATE card, copy attached), who had
become separated with a few other officers from the old Stab Walli, be
contacted to join the party. Active efforts were made to locate Baum
to no avail and the original group set off with von Gehlen for Washington
where it is presumed they still are.

4. Baum and meanwhile escaped to the area of southwestern Germany
which ultimately became the French Zone. When he realized this, he
arranged through a contact with the American Consular authorities in
Switzerland to turn himself in to the CIC in AMERICAN. This was done and
the CIC processed him like a normal automatic arrestee through the
Third Army cage at Freising, publishing his name on the daily arrest
sheets and giving the FTR the normal dissemination.
5. The arrival of the PIR at USFET caused a considerable uproar and immediate efforts were undertaken to get Baun to Oberursel under an assumed name and to cover what was from G-2 USFET point of view a breach of security involved in publication of the news of capture. The damage, however, had been done and it is understood that the Russian Liaison Officer was immediately instructed by his superior officers to ask for transfer of Baun, von Gehlen and several other members of the same command, to Russian custody for interrogation. Needless to say, this request was not granted.

6. Baun had with him a Lt. Colonel Fessel (FW) and three or four minor non-coms formerly belonging to Stab Paili. These men are now living at Oberursel in a private house under cover names. They have not been interrogated by any CI personnel and every effort has been made to keep their presence a secret not only from outsiders but also from officers of Counter-Intelligence Branch, USFET. They are in the custody of three junior officers of the G-2 Section, who are using them as advisors on incoming intelligence which concerns the Russian Army or intelligence structure.

7. Also at Oberursel but strictly apart from Baun and his colleagues are several other former Russian officers, including General Malishkin. Malishkin is likewise giving “expert” advice on the Russian military situation. An example of the type of material being provided by Baun is the attached Appendix A, which was furnished at the request of G-2 as a check on Malishkin by Baun himself.

8. It seems apparent from frequent conversations with the officers responsible for Baun, that G-2 originally contemplated setting him up with funds and personnel to run an intelligence net against Soviet Russia. They soon realized, however, that they had neither the facility nor experienced officers competent to run such an enterprise and have therefore asked on a very informal level for the advice of X-2 Branch as to what they should do next. Since the whole situation was a delicate one, we have kept our contact with the responsible officers in G-2 in this manner on an informal level and have advised them to interrogate Baun at length and have nothing to do with his schemes for further intelligence activity. G-2 has so far not followed the first of our recommendations but I believe they will follow the second. We have further recommended that Baun draw up a list of his principal assistants whom he now believes to be in AMON and that efforts be made to contact these men with a view to interrogating them and discovering if they have any documents. This was done in early December but the results so far are not known here.

9. From the point of view of the X-2 Branch, the most important member of Stab Paili was not Baun nor in fact any of his colleagues but rather Oberstleutnant MECHLEGER @ Dr. BEUER (subject CHASE card #4056), who was head of Section 3 at Stab Paili after August 1941. Frequent rumor stated that he had been captured by the British, but through contact in the Munich area he was discovered living under an assumed name in Nurnberg. He was taken to Munich where he was interrogated at length by Col. Holtsman and a good deal of valuable information
was extracted. (See MALT material.) Schmalschlaeger has now been arrested by the CIC owing to an indiscretion of his in visiting his home in Nurnburg, and he is now in an internment camp in the Nurnburg section. Efforts are being made, however, to obtain his transfer to Oberursel where he will be subjected to a thorough interrogation. The reason for his not being sent to Oberursel in the first place was that we were anxious not to get him mixed up with the Baun group, and that the original contact with him was made with the understanding that he would not be immediately sent to an internment camp; it was felt that certain documents belonging to Fremde Heere Ost, which have been recovered and are mentioned in the MALT reports, might be jeopardized if he were not carefully handled.

Encs: 2 cc Appendix A
2 cc Baun SHAEP card
APP. NO. 7 A

General MALTSHIN was Chief of Staff of the 6th Soviet Army, in which VLASHOV held the position of Commanding General. After the VLASHOV Army had been activated, MALTSHIN became VLASHOV's adjutant and G-3 of the army. While he travelled for the purpose of organizing the VLASHOV Army, he made preparations for the re-activation of the Communist Party in PARIS.

An agent who might be able to give more detailed information on this subject is at present detained in an American prison in SALZBURG; this agent could be approached if so desired.

While General MALTSHIN held important staff positions in the VLASHOV Army, he was in constant contact with GCCW. He used the following channels:

1. Through General TRUCHIN, Chief of Staff of the VLASHOV Army and former head of the recruiting army (BADINOY). General TRUCHIN has been a member of long standing of the N. T. E. (usually referred to as Tsentralniy Komitet, National Congress Association); this organization was formed by General KUTEPIN in 1923-24. He was kidnapped in PARIS in 1939 and taken to Leningrad — with the purpose of unifying the youth of the Russian emigrants in the U.S.A. Headquarters of the N. T. E. was in BELGRADE. The GPU built its own organization into the N. T. E.; headquarters of this branch of the GPU was in Belgrade. It was the task of this branch of the GPU to control the Russian emigrants and to build up an additional intelligence net in Europe. Through the N. T. E. the GPU had its agents in all important German government offices where Russian youth was employed as interpreters (Oberstinsinisterium, RSHA; see [REHELLEN] report by CCWIC MM). MALTSHIN was a leader of the GPU within the N. T. E. in LONDON.

2. Through VLASHOV, Chief of Propaganda of the VLASHOV Army and former 2-A in the Soviet 6th Army (see above); also through GRIN, Chief of Civil Administration of the VLASHOV Army. VLASHOV's uncle is one of the outstanding personalities in the defense council in KOLOMSK. VLASHOV, his uncle and his UNUMI were regional commissars in ALEXANDROV in 1915, when only persons considered absolutely trustworthy were admitted to such positions. Communication between VLASHOV and his uncle was maintained through MALTSKOVNIK in PARIS. However, not the Soviet Embassy but the Soviet Intelligence in PARIS was the agency in this operation. A Soviet agent by the name of MALTSKOVNIK in PRAGUE is MALTSKOVNIK's minibon in this connection.

Contacts with PRAGUE are available through a person detained by the American Army in PRAGUE.
NAME: BAUN  (Ger)  A  GERMANY

STATUS: Major at Ast Warsaw I H. (Apr 44)

ADDRESS

DESCRIPTION

MISC.

CAREER: Promoted Hauptmann. (1 Jul 34)
At Ast Warsaw, directing I H activities on the Eastern Front, under SCHMALSCHLAEGER (o.v.) (from Jul 41)
At S. Eia. (May 43)
In Berlin. (Jun 43)
Back in Warsaw. (Aug. 43)
SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT DETACHMENT
APO 777 - US ARMY

WASSEN, Germany, Dec. 19, 1944

To: Head, German Liaison

The following reports are of varying interest and reliability. They are passed to you in accordance with our SOP, HRT 15, as hoped that they will be of some value in controlling current operation.

1. A report dated 1 December and evaluated B-2 states that a former German foreign office official had expressed himself as follows:

"German public opinion is severely affected by evidence of anti-Finch on the part of the United States in demilitarizing the country. Responsible politicians are fully in agreement with demilitarization and feel that Germany has been treated with great leniency. If Germany returns to the US and the US, and especially if she keeps an entirely neutral position toward the problem of a future armistice, responsible Germans are therefore shocked to find the American armed service using the services of a large organization of former German Abwehr officers in what to them seems as the preparation for the next war. The facts of American use of the Abwehr for espionage are generally known among Germans, and are kept out of the press by some group or action against responsible editors.

An American's own experience was that an young Abwehr to recruit him, and three others boasted to him of their new job, even mentioning the chief of their organization by name. No details concern the chief of their organization by name, no details concern the chief of their organization by name. An himself fears exposing himself by having his facts about this subject, but is planning to discuss the matter with Mr. Stahlschwer at the next opportunity, from the point of view of the effect of this action on German opinion and political intentions."

2. A report dated late December and evaluated C-3 states that a German liaison officer located at Flak Test 4,
Berlin, Germany, has in his possession through Communist influence information to the effect that the German General von...

Gordon M. Stewart

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
Von Gehlen

KCL-A-139  Subject offered Bavrens of sub-organization 102 the position as coordinator or actually leader of 101, 102, and 103. Since Bavrens was reluctant to accept, subject suggested that he take over the three groups, but for the present continue to spend nor of his time with his own group.

** 1837 XX 9667  Until 2/45 Subject was "Chef Frende Herre Ost", SCHELLENBURG'S STRONGEST SUPPORTER IN THE army. Subject lost his post because he failed to form a correct estimate of the attack of the XI Ukrainian army from the direction of Posen

** 2014  The "Frende Herre Ost" staff retreated successfully from Warsaw through E. Germany to Memmingen and thence to the vicinity of Oberdorf. Subject, having had control of the intelligence echelon responsible for German intelligence on the Eastern front decided to turn himself in to the American forces rather than risk capture by the Russians. He agreed to leave Germany and come to the U.S. to work with the experts on the Russian army in the War. Dept., Washington, where he is now presumed to be.

JLX-003-110  Subject was last heard of by SCHMALSCHLAGER shortly before the end of the war at Cham/ Bavaria where he stayed with his relatives. Subject stated that he wanted to try to make some kind of a deal with the British (not the Americans). Might have left his papers with his relatives.

IN 43507  Poss. Id/w Subj. this cable: "Please contact soonest Capt. MALLMAN-WALDMAN", MISO Frankfurt 22856 Interno 133 regading Hans GEHLEN or GEHLENBAHN arrested by CIG in Gorizia 16 October. GEHLEN says WALTMAN will vouch for him. If WALTMAN does not remember mention Berndt and VON LOSSOW to him.
26 May 1949

SUBJECT: Application for Temporary Travel Document in Lieu of Passport and/or Military Exit Permit.

TO: 23.3

It is requested to procure a Temporary Travel Document for the following person:

Reinhard GEHLEN van VAENNEWYCK.
INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP
HEADQUARTERS, EUROPEAN COMMAND

FILE NO: Request for Temporary Travel Document
DATE: 31 May 1949

(HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?)

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1. Request a Temporary Travel Document be issued for Mr. GRAHAM VAN VAREMONT, whose application is inclosed.

2. This document is required in order that necessary travel be performed in connection with this operation.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

EDWARD BRAY
Capt Gav
Adjutant

Temporary Travel Document, requested in Minute 1, handcarried by Captain Risden, your organization, this date.

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
6 July 1949

SUBJECT: Allied Forces Permit

TO: Combined Travel Board Münich

Attn: Mr. PHILL

1. It is requested that an Allied Forces Permit of the American Forces of Austria be issued for

GUARD, Robert Passport No. 166070

[Signature]

[Stamp: MGKA 28544]

[Stamp: 8 Feb 57]

[Stamp: Composite Group]

[Signature: Reinhard Gehlen]
Ich bin im Besitz folgender Auslandspässe:

Pass No. 186070 auf den Namen Robert GONTARD
Pass No. 0006329 auf meinen Klarnamen

Saemtliche Reisen habe ich bisher auf den Namen Robert GONTARD durchgefuehrt, den Pass auf meinen Klarnamen bisher nicht benutzt.

Außerdem bin ich im Besitz einer AGO Card No. D-147996 auf den Namen Hans HOLBEIN, die jedoch nicht im Ausland benutzt werden kann.
Ich benutze folgende Decknamen:

1. In Verbindung mit deutschen Papieren:
   a. Dr. Richard SCHNEIDER – geboren 4.3.1905
   b. Richard GARNER – geboren 3.4.1902
   c. Robert GONTARD – geboren 4.3.1905

2. In Verbindung mit einer AGO-Card (D-147996):
   Hans HOLBEIN – geboren 21.1.1905
   Diesen Namen benutze ich nur in Einzelfällen, z.B. bei den äußerst seltenen Reisen nach Österreich.

3. Gelegentlich ohne Ausweispapiere:
   Dr. GROSS
   Dr. ERNST
   Beide Namen werden dort benutzt, wo besondere Vorsicht notwendig ist und gegebenenfalls Verwechslungen mit einer Reihe anderer Persönlichkeiten, welche die gleichen Namen benutzen, erwünscht sind.

7 July 1949
Von einer Seite, deren Glaubwürdigkeit schwer zu beurteilen ist, gingen Nachrichten über die Errichtung eines sowjetischen ND-Netzes in ÖSTERREICH ein.

Mit Feststellungszeitraum Mitte Mai bis Ende Juni 1949 wurde berichtet:

A. Die Sowjets errichten in ÖSTERREICH eine ND-Organisation aus solchen Deutschen und österreichischen Abwehrangehörigen, die noch nicht ND-mässig gegen die Sowjetunion tätig waren.
Ziel dieser Organisation: Bei einem etwaigen Abzug der sowjetischen Besatzung eine ND-Organisation zu heben.
Personen, die Agenten anwerben, machen angeblich folgende Angaben:
Die "PAULUS/SEYDLITE-Armee" hat das Recht, eine besondere ND-Organisation aufzustellen, die in ÖSTERREICH und über ÖSTERREICH in DEUTSCHLAND, JUGOSLAVIEN und ITALIEN tätig wird.
Angeblich sind die Mitglieder dieser Organisation verpflichtet, ihre Meldungen mit richtigem Namen zu unterschreiben.
Die Tätigkeit der Angehörigen dieser Organisation wird durch Mitglieder des geheimen ND der KP kontrolliert.

II. Sowjetische Direktionsgruppe:
Diese hat folgende Mitglieder:
1.) JELLAGIN, sowjet. Oberleutnant, ca. 60 Jahre alt, 178 cm groß, mager, dunkle Augen, graue Haare, spricht fließend deutsch.
2.) ----- sowjet. Major, ca. 54 Jahre alt, 175 cm groß, kahl, graue Augen, spricht perfekt deutsch.
3.) GRIGORIAN, Adjutant, ca. 35 Jahre alt, etwa 173 cm groß, schwer, helle Augen.

III. Österreicherische Gruppe:
1.) Mitglieder:
a) Dr. RIEDL, ehem. deutscher Abwehrangehöriger, ca. 55-60 Jahre alt, mittelgroß, beleibt, schüchternes Haar, graue Augen, hat viele Decknamen, u.a. Dr. PAULUS. Wird als Fachleiter der Gruppe bezeichnet.
b) Dr. POSCH, ehem. deutscher Abwehrangehöriger, Rechtsanwalt, wohnhaft WIEN I, Schwarzenbergstr. 8/1.

2.) Aufgabengebiet
a) Allgemein:
Durchführung der ND-Fachaufträge,
Deckung der materiellen Bedürfnisse der österreichischen und jugoslawischen Gruppe,
Bezahlung und Belohnung.
b) Spezielle Aufträge der österreicherischen Gruppe:
Feststellung der amerikanischen ND-Gruppen,
Feststellung der Agenten dieser Gruppen, welche aus Raum SALZBURG nach WIEN und in die Satellitestaaten arbeiten.
Verbindungsaufnahme mit diesen Agenten, sie entweder zur Mitarbeit gewinnen, oder vernichten (es soll Agenten geben, auf deren Kopf 100000 Schilling gesetzt sind).
Feststellung und Klärung der Agenten, die nach Abzug der Westmächte aus ÖSTERREICH zurückbleiben. Klärung der Aufgaben dieser Agenten.
Einbau einer ND-Gruppe in OBERÖSTERREICH für die Führergruppe.
Klärung der in die KP und in die sowjetischen Dienststellen eingebauten Agenten.
Klärung der Verbindungsleute der amerikanischen und britischen ND-Stellen.
Klärung der in NIEDEROESTERREICH arbeitenden "Großagenten".
Einbau von Mitarbeitern bei CIC.
Klärung der Tätigkeit des CIC hinsichtlich Erfassung von Agenten.
Klausaktionen

Auf die Tätigkeit der Franzosen wird weniger Wert gelegt, da deren Tätigkeit durch sowjetische Agenten geklärt erscheint.

IV. Jugoslawische Gruppe:
1.) Leiter: Dr. BOEHM, ehem. deutscher Abwehrangehöriger, ca. 180 cm groß, schwart, dunkle Augen, trägt ständig einen Ledermantel. Jurist, hochintelligent, hat angeblich in MOSKAU an einem dreijährigen Ausbildungskursus teilgenommen.

2.) Aufgaben: ND-Tätigkeit in JUGOSLAWIEN.

V. Spezialkommando
1.) Leiter: Major FUEHRER, ehem. deutscher Abwehrangehöriger, wohnhaft in WIEN, sehr intelligent und sehr gefährlich.

2.) Aufgaben:

a) Ausbildung von Partisanen aus deutschen und österreichischen Abwehrlieuten. Umstellung dieser nach Deutschland, damit diese im Kriegsfalle die Partisanenarbeit leiten und Sabotageaktionen durchführen können.

b) Aufbau einer ND-Gruppe in OBERÖSTERREICH; die Angehörigen dieser Gruppe sollen sich nur aus deutschen und österreichischen Abwehrangehörigen und SD-Angehörigen mindestens im Range eines Hauptmannes zusammensetzen.
VI. Trefforte mit der Führungsgruppe:
Die unter II genannte sowjetische Direktionsgruppe trifft am 7. und 24. jeden Monats mit dem unter III/la genannten Dr. RIEDL in WIEN I, Opernring 12, II. Stock rechts in einer Zweizimmerwohnung.
Verhandlungsort: 11 - 16 Uhr und von 19 Uhr bis in die Morgenstunden.
Bei diesen Treffen waren bisher nur die Mitglieder der sowjetischen Direktionsgruppe und Dr. RIEDL anwesend.
Ein weiterer Treffort ist WIEN II, Praterstr. (Hausnr. unbekannt).

VII. Hauptagent:
Als einer der Hauptagenten der österreichischen Gruppe in WIEN wird ein gewisser Kriminalkommissar (Hauptmann ?) MATTL genannt.

Mit Feststellungszeitraum Anfang bis Mitte Juli 49 werden ergänzende und weitere Angaben mitgeteilt.

I. Das Kontor des Dr. POSCH befindet sich ebenfalls in WIEN I, Schwarzenbergstr. 8, Tel.: R-26-4-19.
Am Telefon meldet sich die Sekretärin, eine Frau namens SVORODA.

II. Dr. RIEDL:
1.) Im Kontor des Dr. POSCH heilt sich auf und verhandelt Dr. RIEDL unter dem Decknamen Dr. BOUKOV.
2.) Dr. RIEDL ist bestrebt, mit der Zentrale des Westeuropapischen Nachrichtendienstes Verbindung aufzunehmen. Er beabsichtigt, einige Agenten in die ND-Organisation der Westmächte einzubauen, oder bereits arbeitende Agenten zu gewinnen. Diese sollen dann ihre Mel-
dungen ueber JUGOSLAWIEN ihm, Dr. RIEDL, uebergeben und die MD-Organisation der Westmacht sollen aus aus diesen Meldungen nur das erhalten, was er fuer notwendig erachtet.

3.) Dr. RIEDL ist bestrebt, in TRIEST eine Exportfirma zu errichten. Sie ist als Tarnfirma der gegen JUGOSLAWIEN arbeitenden Spionagezentrale gedacht.

4.) Ein Treffpunkt des Dr. RIEDL mit seinen Agenten ist in WIEN, Cafe "Prucekel" (naehere Anschrift unbekannt).

III. Aufgaben der Gruppe des Dr. RIEDL:

1.) Feststellung der genauen Anschriften, Lebensverhältnisse und Gewohnheiten folgender - wahrscheinlich im amerikanischen ND stehender - Personen:

   a) in OESTERREICH:

   /ORTNET', Karl
   Baron Dr. SAAR,
   /JURANKA, Aristet,
   Dr. KITTL,
   Eleonora NAGI,
   /HARSHEGYI,
   Ing. KAUFERS
   (Deckname KLATT), wohnh. ST. GILGEN, Leim 88 und Kontor in SALZBURG, Schwarz-Str. 30.

   b) in DEUTSCHLAND:

   Oberst SENSBURG, wohnh. WIESBADEN, leitet eines angeblicheren ND-Netz,

   KRASSO, angebl. Hauptagent von SENSBURG, wohnh. TRAUNSTEIN (?)

2.) Aufklarung der Anlaufstelle der nach der GSR arbeitenden CIO-Agenten. Die Anlaufstelle soll angeblich
in MARKTREDWITZ sein.

IV. Mitarbeiter des Dr. Riedl:

Ein Mitarbeiter des Dr. Riedl ist ein Gutsbesitzer Josef Düerfeld, wohnhaft Moritz bei Salzburg, etwa 40 Jahre alt, 174 cm groß, graue Augen, spärliche blonde Haare, mager, schlechte schwarze Zähne. Trägt dauernd kurze Lederhose und fährt immer mit Fahrrad.

Von anderer, zuverlässiger Seite ging mit Feststellungszeitraum Ende Juni, Anfang Juli folgende Nachricht ein:


3. Der Verbindungsman zwischen Kominform-Büro und Professor GRIMM ist der Jude GRÜNGER, dessen Sitz in Wien ist, der aber viel im Ausland, wie z.B. Schweiz und Frankreich herumkommt.


text: Neue Bohrungen in Zistersdorf


1./ Landesleiter der VDU in Tirol, kapazite auf Seiten der Franzosen gegen Deutschland, ist heute V.M. der Franzosen und als solcher in den VDU gegangen. Die Suche flog auf und Hitsuchnau mutte gehen.

Re: Dr. KRAUS

1./ Dem Russen ist bekannt, daß Dr. KRAUS mit den Amerikanern arbeitet. (siche Dr. HÖTTL)

2./ Die Russen werden Dr. KRAUS nicht unterstützen, wenn er seine Berichtigungen zum GIC nicht aufgibt. Der Versuch des Dr. KRAUS auch mit den Russen auf einen guten Frieden zu kommen, ist vorläufig gescheitert.

3./ Die Russen wollen die Verbindung des Dr. KRAUS zu Otto von Habsburg kennenlernen.

Re: Dr. Willi HÖTTL

1./ Dr. Willi HÖTTL, "Sturmbannführer, Leiter des Amtes VI E (Ungarn und Balkan). Chef des Hötting war KERMEYER vom Reichssicherheitshauptamt. Hötting ist politischer Ratgeber des Dr. KRAUS. Sein Sitz ist Gmunden, Villa LOI E. Hötting hat das Bestreben, die deutschen und österreichischen Gruppen, die nachrichtendienstlich arbeiten, in einen europäischen N.D. zusammenzufassen. Engster Mitarbeiter des Hötting ist Bernd KERMEYER. Kermeier hat im Jahre 1945 viele Nazi denunziert und ist heute ein sehr unverlässlicher, aber sehr gut bezahlter Agent des GIC.

2./ Wie der russische N.D. 61 mitteilte und wie auch 61 von Agentenkollegen in Wien weiß, fahren russische Agenten des Öfteren nach Gmunden und erhalten dort das für den Amerikaner bestimmte Material in Durchschrift für Geld!

3./ Hötting ist mit DULLES in Verbindung, den er hin und wieder an der Schweizer Grenze trifft. Hötting wird bei diesen Gelegenheiten vom französischen N.D. beobachtet.

Re: Legitimisten

Der Russe will wissen, was LOVNEK macht, wie oft er nach Paris zu Otto von Habsburg fährt und was dieser macht und welche Verbindungen er hat?

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Betreff: Österreichisches Bundesheer

Der Personalreferent des Bundesheeres soll Major JEDLICKI sein?? ehemaliger Adjutant General VAUGOIN. Die Russen interessieren sich für die hier bekannten Leute, die für das Bundesheer arbeiten.

Betreff: Pole nennens ??

61 hat Auftrag einen bedeutenden Polen, der zurzeit in Salzburg ist, dem Haus auszuliefern, er hofft, dass er diesen mittels Hilfe seines CIC-Verbindungsmannes und des französischen ND (Die werden aber falsch unterrichtet) fassen kann.

Betreff: Triester Firma

61 arbeitet zurzeit an der Triester Bache, einer Im- und Exportfirma des Dr. POSCH, welche von den Engländern finanziert wird. Besprechungen finden zurzeit in Innsbruck statt.

Betreff: Ing. KAUNER (KLATT), Salzburg, "Schwarze Straße 30, Wohnung
St. Gilgen, Leim 38 mit seiner Freundin Ibyola KALYANO.

KLATT arbeitete bis April dieses Jahres mit den Amerikanern, wurde aber dann von diesen herausgeworfen.

Sein Chef war Oberst WAGNER (DELTUS war damal. sein Deckname). Auf diese haben die Russen besonders viel gesetzt.

Grund: KLATT war derjenige, der mittels Rundfunk in russischer Sprache die Russen in Rumänien und Bulgarien zum Krieg gelockt hat. Er gab russische Ordnungsdurchwachen, die Russen in Mitteleuropa denkbar falsch in die Hand hatten. Man weiß, dass er mit einem ND arbeitet und russischen Codes verwendet, dass er jetzt wieder mit Oberst WAGNER arbeitet, der in LORACH in Baden sitzt und mit den Franzosen arbeitet.

Betreff: Siegfried KAHN, geb. 17.8.1920 in Lochheim, Deutschland
neutral. Amerikaner

KAHN will größere Position im CIC erringen. Auf Grund einer sehr vagen Äußerung des 61 (war schon betrunken) arbeitet Kahn über 69 mit den Russen zusammen.

**Betreff: Dr. Hugo KITTEL, ehemaliger Adjutant Mjr. FEY,**

KITTEL lebt in Salzburg, hat Bierhandel, arbeitet mit den Engländern und trifft sich mit Dr. ALTMANN, englischer Offizier bei der Kontrollkommission Berlin, in London. Sein Mitarbeiter ist ein gewisser Franz GROH ?, bis vor einem Jahr noch russischer Agent, der heute noch via Kittel mit den Russen arbeitet.

**Betreff: Ersuchen des 61 an Rudolf**

61 ersucht Rudolf Herrn BAUER (Dr. BOHM) vor 69 zu warnen, könnte zwar mit 69 zusammenarbeiten, jedoch solle er ihn nicht in alle Jene Sache einweihen, die 61 mit Rudolf bespricht.

61 behauptet nicht zu wissen, wo sich 62 zurzeit befindet. (Vergleich Bericht 83)

61 betrachtet Rudolf zurzeit als seinen Verbindungsmann zu BAUER Deutschland und will ihn dann überhaupt ganz in seine Triester Organisation einbauen.

**Betreff: Philipp GARON, nicht KORON (76)**

61 behauptet, der jener einer der besten Bearbeiter der östliche Staat und der DP-Lager ist, auf den er sehr viel hält. Es dürfte sich dabei um den Mann handeln, über den auch 69 seine guten Beziehungen zu Prag etc. halt. 61 behauptet, dass 76 ebenso wie 62 für die Kominform arbeiten. Wenn 76 im Westen eine Russland-feindliche Organisation ausfindig macht, die noch Verbindung mit Personen im Osten hat, so führt er selbst dorthin und lässt sie dann hochgehen. Hier in Salzburg arbeitet 76 mit einem unbekannten CIC-Mann zusammen.

**Betreff: 61 und CIC**

Im Gegensatz zu 69 (der Rudolf sagte, der CIC-Mann des 61 sei Herr LEHN R von CIC Salzburg, behauptet 61, dass er nur mit den CIC Wien arbeitet und sein Kahn auch nach Salzburg kommen mit ihm Aktionen zu besprechen und Material entgegenzunehmen.
Graf protestiert gegen Wahlfehler

Wien (APA). Staatssekretär Graf protestierte energisch dagegen, daß gewisse sowjetische Besatzungskommandanten eine Zensur über die Wahlbezirke, -büroschiften und Versammlungen der ÖVP ausübten und erklärt: „Österreich muß freie Wahlen haben“. Nachdem er auf die „Gefahr“ hingewiesen hatte, die durch das Bündnis der Linkssozialisten mit den Kommunisten entstanden, warnte er den VVD, den „Beauftragten jener Kreise, die sich um den ehemaligen Reichsbesatzungsdiensst scharfen“ zu rufen, sei ein „Zähmung der NS-Problem könnte dadurch geregelt werden, daß die sich in einer Partei sammeln“. 
61 behauptet Rudolf gegenüber Staatssekretär GRAF für Geld eine wichtige innenpolitische Nachricht gegeben zu haben.

In seiner Rede vom 2.5.49 warnte Staatssekretär GRAF den VdU vor der Zusammenarbeit mit Menschen vom ehemaligen Reichssicherheitsdienst. Diese Redewendung ist unrichtig. Am 30.7.49 war 61 mit Dr. Gustav CANAVAL zusammen im Cafe "BURGUND". Bei dieser Gelegenheit erzählte er einem Chefredakteur der "Salzburger Nachrichten", dass KRAUS mit Dr. HÖTTL, dem ehemaligen Leiter des Amtes VI E vom Reichssicherheitshauptamt zusammenarbeitete, und Höttl der politische Ratgeber von Dr. Kraus sei. Dr. CANAVAL hat darauf noch in der Nacht seinen Mitarbeiter in Wien in Kenntnis gesetzt mit dem Auftrag Staatssekretär zu benachrichtigen. Hörfehler im Telefon ergab, dass Graf vom Reichssicherheitshauptamt gemeint war.

Interessanter: Die Nachricht eines russischen Agenten kommt durch einen russischen Major an 61 und dieser wiederum übergibt sie an den Chefredakteur einer unabhängigen Zeitung und der wiederum an den VfP Mann Staatssekretär für die Sicherheit GRAF.

Es wird auf die Behauptung des 69 verwiesen, dass KRAUS drei Unterredungen mit General XX in Wien hatte.

61 be treibt dies und spricht von untergeordneten Organen der Russen.

Jedensfalls ist KRAUS von Agenten aller Richtungen umgeben, die teilweise sogar sehr maßgeblich den Kurs bestimmen, wahrscheinlich sogar ohne Wissen des Dr. Kraus selbst.

Betrifft: 83

Salzburg, 7.8.1949
Betr.: W I S
Fuehr: Rudolf.

Die Leitung des Westeurop. Gen. St ab. hat unter dem Namen
MIS (Montgomery Intell. Service) für ihren Zweck einen Nachrichten
dienst aufgezogen, der hauptsächlich unter Leitung von Franzosen
und Engländern bestehen soll. Dieser ND besteht aus 2 Abteilungen
a) Abwehr (setzt sich aus ehem. deutschem Absch. zusammen: wie
Oberst Sensburg, Oberst Wagner (Dellus) z.T. noch sehr im franz. ND)
Raabe, etc. b) pol. Polizei (setzt sich aus ehem. höheren SS-
Pächtern im SD zusammen. Der Leiter des deutschen Abt. scheint der
bereits bekannte Böhm (Bauer) zu sein. Dieser ND arbeitet auch
nach Osten, herein und zwar hauptsächlich über den franz. ND nach Tirol
und Vorarlberg. Bauer versuchte jedoch über die Gruppe 61, 62 und 69
einen Stützpunkt in Salzburg zu errichten. Es wurde ihm jedoch, wie
diese Gruppe wieder bekannt wurde, mitgeteilt, dass er sich bei
der Gruppe um rein komm. Agenten handelte und so dürfte er es vor-
gezogen haben diese Verbindung abzubrechen. 61 nimmt zwar an, dass
er sicherlich auf Rudolf zurückkommen wird, doch stehe auch dies
in Zweifel, da ihm Rudolf ja durch 62 gebracht wurde. 61 versucht
einen über den franz. ND wieder an diese Gruppe heranzukommen.

Betr.: franz. ND (Sensburg)

Wie 61 an 69 vertraulich weitergab sollen nun auch Oberst
Sensburg und Raabe Verbindung mit seiner russ. Dienststelle auf-
genommen haben und sich dort angefragt haben besondere Nachrichten
der Franzosen zu verkaufen. Aus den nicht zur Gänze vernommenen
Gesprächen zwischen 61 und 69 dürfte hervorgehen, dass 61 von Russen den Auf-
trag erhalten hat Näheres von Sensburg über seine Verbindung zu der ND
ein Erfahrung zu bringen.

Betr.: Dr. Höfft – Oberst Sensburg.

Zu den Nachrichten der 61 über die Verbindung dieser Perso-
nen zu den Russen wäre in Erwägung zu ziehen: entweder

1. Höfft und Sensburg arbeiten tatsächlich nur des Geldes wegen in
Abwehrorganisationen und beziehen daher von Osten und West

2. Höfft und Sensburg versuchen nur auf Grund ihrer westl. Tätigkeit
mit dem Osten in Verbindung zu kommen

3. 61 und seine Auftraggeber erhoffen sich durch diese Gerüchte

und durch LS 15.8.49
dtliche Leiter westlicher Nachrichtenorganisationen bei ihren vorgesehenen Dienststellen in Minskredit zu bringen und dadurch von diesen fallen gelassen zu werden.


Betr.: Jugosl.ND.


Betr.: \( \mathbf{61, 62, 69} \) und Rudolf.

Zeitpunkt zu haben, damit dieser keine Dummheiten mache. Ferner
mit 61 ein Abkommen getroffen, dass 62 und Rudolf nicht über
informiert werden, aus diese dem Westen melden bzw. verkaufen.
Die Gehälter sollen folgendermaßen festgelegt werden:
61 4.000, 62 3.500, 62 und Rudolf je 3.000. Alles
was über dieses hierinkommt wird in eine gemeinsame Kasse gegeben und
aufgeteilt. Vorläufig bleibt auch 61 der Chef für den Osten, da er
auf den Wunsch von 62 noch 1/2 Jahr dort bleiben soll. 61 selbst
will aber nur noch kurze Zeit untenbleiben und sich baldmöglichst
auf Krankenurlaub begeben.
Über 69 kann nur festgestellt werden, dass er wohl die "schlafbräkant
in Wien gewesen ist. Er war Vertreter und nach eigener Angabe einmal
Direktor in einer Kärntner Fabrik. Er beherrschte Tschechisch voll
und ganz, ist beliebter Nazi und hat dieses Monat eine Volksgerechts-
verhandlung. Aus den Gesprächen ist zu entnehmen, was er den 69
Major und den Kom.-Petter (bei Scherers) viel besser kennt als 60
und mit ihm auf einen geradlinig freundschaftlichen Pfad steht, auf dem
aus einem Schreiben, dass er ihn nach Wien mitgegeben hat (Lieber
Major.... und bitte Gro:se Ihr ....) hervorgeht. In die Schreiben
hat er dem Major errichtet, der der Gruppe entsprechende Geldmittel zur
Verfügung zu stellen, damit die Arbeit flott Vorsitzige gehe. Aus
diesem Gespräch ließe sich auch entnehmen, dass 69 für die Agenten-
und CIC Listen 800.-- bereit hat, aus seiner Tasche als Vorstand dem
VM ausbezahlt hat.
Die im Verbindungsoffiz. sind wie vor für 61. Lehner aus Zell a.
See (Hierzuzu ist zu beziehen, dass Rudolf tagszuvor gegenüber be-
haupptete, dass er nur mit den CIG zusammenarbeitet, der
fast immer gleichzeitig mit ihm aus Wien nach Salzburg kommt, in
Wirklichkeit kommt der Herr scheinbar bloss aus Zell a. See und
dürfte am dortigen Sender beschäftigt sein, da davon gesprochen wurde,
dass er um die und die Zeit kommt, da er vorher noch die "Russische
Briefenverw. über den sich 69 sehr beschwert hat, da er so lächer-
lichen Spielmaterial gibt, dass er es jedenmal in den Papierkasten
werfen muss. 52 sucht wieder die Verbindung mit Dr. Preischoke, 53 Dr.
erzählt, von dem er schwört alles was er braucht zu bekommen
da dieser innerlich sehr russophil sei, da er auch eine...
Betr.: Wien-Fahrt 61, 62 und 71.


Betr.: Verschleppung eines Sohnes aus Zell a. Ste.


Betr.: Kauders.


Betr.: Wittn Lichtenstein und Einkaufsgesellschaft.

Dem Russen ist bekannt, dass angeblich der reg. Lichtenstein eine Einkaufsgesellschaft in Österreich gegründet hat, die alle kriegswichtigen Dinge, die in Betr. hergestellt werden kauft und über
sein Land an die Amerikaner weiterverkauft. Für Salzburg sei ein Graf Meran beauftragt. Der Russe interessiert sich für Name und Umfang dieser Organisation, da er selbst in OÖ eine derartige Genossenschaft aufgestellt hat und diese auch in Westösterreich Russ fassen will, jedoch zuerst den Münchsteinischen Konkurrenten ausschalten will und muss.

Betr.: Russ. Abwehrorganisationen:
In Wien sind zu der Konstrukt und ihren Agenten und dem ZK und den Agenten noch folgende russ. Abwehrorganisationen tätig:
MVD = III
MGB = I
Sicherheit = II
Angenommen war dabei, dass in Wien ein ca. 55 jähriger Russe vorsteht und ihm zur Seite ein ca. 30 jähriger bestgeschalteter Kommisar (Peter) aus den Lagers. Zimmer 161. Verhört seit 5-8 Stunden, zu trinken und zu rauchen, was man will, auch innerhalb einer halben Stunde. Bei Eintreten in das Zimmer wird man angeleitet fotografiert. Zwei durch die alleingelassenen und doch beleuchtet. Plötzlich wird man auf den in eine Dunkelkammer geführt, während dieser Zeit serviert ein deutsches Mädchen von Bed. des Hotels des Russen.

Betr.: Spionageschulen der Westzonen

Betr.: Lilo Wohll.

Wurde eben als Todesfall, verlie. diesen, war jetzt lange in einem ital. jud. DP-Lager, ist jetzt hier und Agentin einer der Gruppe 61 unbekannter Macht.
Betreff: Nachrichten aus der KPÖ

Anlieger Rudolf,


2. Verbindungsmänner zur Kominform: Leo Fischer, Hans Frohlich, (Redakteur der ÖZ) Dr. Fischer, Lucker-Thilling, Dr. Bruno Frey (Benedikt Freiplatz) von Aml. Verbindungsmänner werden teilweise ge wechselt und dürfen nicht Mitglieder des ZK sein.


zu kämpfen, obwohl bereits im Jahre 1947 der Befehl von Moskau kam, die Schulungen nur mehr im lenin-stalinistischen Sinne zu halten.


Selbst im ZK kam es zu Gegensätzen, bis 1948 der Befehl von Moskau kam die nation. Opp. in der KPÖ auszuschalten. Daraufhin fuhr Fritz Heinrich, Chef der Parteikontrolle nach Moskau und gab dort den Kominformvorschlag eindeutig zu verstehen, dass dies nicht möglich sei und zur Beege zur Rettung des öst. Kommunismus gegeben wären:

a) Besetzung Osteuropas durch SU und Volksdem. 
b) oder bis zu den Wahlen Ernst Fischer und Gen. zu belassen.

Heinrich teilte den Kommunisten mit, dass der SU Kurs gleichbedeutend mit der Verleugnung der KPÖ sei. Darauf entschloss sich Moskau Fischer weiterhin die Propaganda zu überlassen, Pöurnberg war damals sehr beleidigt.


6. Die Stimmung in ZK ist in der auf die Wahlen sehr derprimiert.

7. Mit 25.7.49 wurde Velhurter Tischkonz (Ihr) Verbindungsmann zur Kominform.


9. Weitere informelle Mitglieider des ZK sind: Der Verbindungsmann zur Schwarmgruppe Wadi und der Verbindungsmann zum SSI Dr. Walter Zuna.

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**
1. Die Anweisungen der Kominfor ergeben über ÖZ an Buckel-Schilling und dieser gibt sie im Kurierweg an die Landesleitungen weiter.

11 Z.Z.T. sind wieder einige Landesleitungen mit dem ZK sehr unzufrieden. Man beschwert sich, dass ZK zu viel in Angelegenheit der LL hineinfunkt, sagt dass das ZK aus 70% Emigranten sich zusammen- setzt, die weder ZK noch sonstige Verfolgungen hier mitzuwirken und doch wieder abhauen, wenn es schief geht. In dieser Hinsicht tut sich besonders die Tiroler Landesleitung, aber auch Graz und Salzburg vor. Von Seiten des ZK wird die sowjet.-ost.Ges. in Innsbruck stark angegriffen und deren Auflösung verlangt, da sie alle sehr westl. Manieren an den Tag legen (Tees, und Cocktailparties.)

Anweisungen der Kominfor an LL.


2. Fall Leo Lepsky: L. veröffentlichte vor einiger Zeit im Kursir einen Artikel "Ich war Kommunist". Dieser Artikel wurde von Seiten des ZK veröffentlicht. L. tritt nun der SPO bei. (Der leiter der Spionageabwehr der KP war bei dieser Besprechung dabei.)

3. Es erging die Anweisung an die LL und Presse, dass offiziell mit Burgfrieden mit dem VdU zu schließen sei und diese Partei mit verlässlichen Kommunisten (ehem.39 und 39 Leute, die der Partei angehören oder eine Schulung in Russland durchgemacht haben) zu durchsetzen.


4. Anweisung an die Partei: Wenn sich Wähler nicht entscheiden, können die KPD zu wählen, so sollen sie aufgefordert werden, die KPD zu wählen, den VdU, Landkern oder den Union zu wählen. Auf keinen Fall aber ÖVP oder SPO. Wenn aber beiden Parteien müssen geschwächt werden.


Alle Volks- und Suddeutschen, die sich 1/2 Jahr lang der KPO bei der CSR zur Verfügung stellen und 10 Mitglieder angeworben haben, erhalten die Erlaubnis zur Heirat und werden dort wieder in ihre Berufsgruppe untergebracht. Aus Salzburg sind auf diese Art 61 Suddeutsche aus dem Lager Maria Berg bei Langfelden wieder in die CSR zurückgereist.


PS: Verb. M. zur It.KP ist Felix Aran, Innsbruck.
16.8.1949
Betreff: Beratung mit 62 und Rudolf über CIC-Listen
Quelle: Rudolf

62 erzählte Rudolf, dass 61 die CIC-Listen auf der Fahrt nach Wien abgeschrieben hat, ferner hat er sie im Bericht an die Russen seiner Sekretärin diktiert (Fräulein WOBODA) und drittens hat er die Originallisten des 62 während der Beratung mit dem russischen Major dem 62 abgenommen und nachher behauptet, diese nicht abgegeben zu haben. 62 schenkte aber letzter Aussage keinen Glauben.

Neue Liste von Amerikanern: IV. Verwaltungsteam: Salzburg

1. BUSH Blanka A - 410356 CAF 7
2. BROMBERG Christian D - 096712 CIV 5
3. BROWN Magdalena D - 045712 SP 5
4. COWEN Ruth B - 279642 CAP 5 7721 Claims
5. COCKE Edward D - 105100 CAP 8 Real Estate
6. CHASE Micaela B - 211950 CAP 4 ZC/A
7. DEWAN June D - 142229 P 5 CIV Affaire
8. end wife
9. DRAHMER Mathilde D - 167571 Civ 430th Det
10. FIERTNER George B - 096638 CAG 6 I-B
11. FRANK James D - 070021 CAF 12 ZC/A
12. GREGORY Evelyn A - 407817 CIV Civil Affaire
13. HINZELTHAUFETRISCHIUS Francis A - 0775 CAF 12 ZC/A
14. KAHL Virginia A - 410791 Civ
15. KURZCHECK William D - 434935 CAF 10 ZC/A
16. KURZCHECK Peter A - 074889 CIV ZC/A
17. KURZCHECK Ted D - 022215 CAP 12 ZC/A
18. KURZCHECK Herman C - 282315

62 hat noch ca. 50 Namen von Amerikanern und 25 Namen von CIC-Agenten.

Betreff: Unterhaltung mit 61 und russischen Major

61 war 2 Stunden beim Major. 62 war nicht eingelassen und der Major verlangte 69 zu sprechen. 62 verlangte baldige Erledigung der Sache "Klett und Holy". In würgen war die Besprechung nicht sehr erfolgreich, da der Kollaborator auf Urlaub ist. Major betonte nur, dass er 69 sprechen muß, den er besonders gerne habe, da er ein so offener, ehrlicher Charakter sei.
Betrifft: 61

61 sagt Gd., dass er nicht länger mit den Russen spiele, da ihm dies zuwider sei und beide gehen sich in Wien das Versprechen 69 auszuschalten und mit LEHNER (CIC) ehrlich zu arbeiten. Im Übrigen wollen die sämtliche NB auseinanderbringen.

Betrifft: 62

62 erhielt von 61 nur S 200.-- und ist böse. Er wird von Rudolf aufgefordert mit ihm und 70 direkt mit den Russen zu arbeiten, was dieser wiederum sagt zu tun, wenn LEHNER nicht genügend Geld gibt. 62 allein hat die guten KP-Verbindungen und sowohl 61 und 69 sind ohne ihn erledigt. Er möchte aber aus beinem Grund mit 61 zusammenarbeiten und lässt dafür beteiligt von 69 fallen. 69 wird mitgeteilt, dass die Verbindung zur KP abgebrochen sei.

Betrifft: Eleni GREGORIAN

Der Bericht wird an Rudolf zur Auswertung für XI. übergeben.


62 nimmt an, dass 69 die Sache bei den Russen gut machen wird. Wenn er wieder Geld bringt, wird er auch an 69 wieder Sachen liefern, die auch gegen den Befehl von 61.

Betrifft: 61

62 sagt, wenn 61 tatsächlich seine russischen Verbindungen aufgeben wird, wird er auch von LEHNER, Engländer und Franzosen fallen lassen. Für den Fall, dass 61 seine Verbindungen aufgibt, wird er, Rudolf und 70 eine eigene Sache aufbauen.

Betrifft: CIC-L 18 ten

62 nimmt an, dass 61 die Listen noch in Abschrift den Russen abgeben hat. Das Original aber LEHNER geben wird und diesem sagen wird, dass er es gewesen sei, der die Listen an sich gerissen hat und vor der Übergabe an die Russen geblieben habe.

Betrifft: 61 und 70.

Beide wohnen an der Gorte der KfI bei Professor SKIDZ, albanier Bayramamstrasse 4l. Angeblich wurde LEHNER davon unterrichtet.
Betrifft: KPO-Nachrichten


Betrifft: GELLNITZER Han.

GELLNITZER 1 t wegen Schiebereien aus der KG hinausgeworfen worden, er ist KPD-Kommunist. Er verfolgt die Linie 71 GHR. (Lt. GRIM.)

Betrifft: 70


Betrifft: Briefmarkenhandlung | STÖCKL, Salzburg, Linzergasse

70 und 62 verkehren dort sehr oft. Entweder ist das Geschäft eine Nachrichtenkreise, oder Stöckl Schleihhändler.

Betrifft: KPO

GRIM behauptet, das Anzeige gekommen sei, nach der die KPO bei den Zahlen mindestens 15. %geführte zu bringen müsse, da sie sonst keine finanzielle Unterstützung von der Komintern erhalten werde.


BEST AVAILABLE COPY
Betreff: Einladung für Rudolf

Vorar: ichtlich wird Rudolf zusammen mit 6. und 70 am 19.8.49
zu einem Zeugenausnahm bei GRTM' und Fräulein N. LFR eingeladen.

Betreff: Dr. LOO

Laut Mitteilung 61 hat Dr. LOO am 19.8. eine Besprechung
mit erstem. Dabei wurde festgestellt, dass Dr. Loos ND-Mann von Erz-
bischof ROHRACE ist und Herr v. vINCKLER ND-Mann des staatssekt.
GRAF. Beiden wurde mitgeteilt, dass sie von den Hus en beobachtet
wer-
den. Einbau des 61 in diese beiden ND bevorstehend.

Betreff: Verkehr des 62 und 70 mit Adligen

62 und 70 ersuchten Rudolf ihnen den Weg in die Gesellschaft
zu ebene. (Siehe Ausweisbestätigung über Anamnese solcher Verbindungen
mit russischen Agenten.)
23.6.49

Betreff: Gespräch des Rudolf mit 62
Quelle: Rudolf

62 wurde von Rudolf wegen seiner Verbindung zum OIG hart angegriffen und ihm die Gefährlichkeit seiner Tätigkeit vor Augen geführt. 62 hat auch Angst, und will das Verhältnis mit LEMMER nur 1 - 2 Monate aufrecht erhalten, wenn er nur erst einmal die Verbindung zu den Oberkommunisten BENDIKT und Gustav FRÖLICH hergestellt hat. Durch diese hofft er dann von der KP so viel Geld zu verdienen, dass er den Lehner ohne weiteres fallen lassen kann. Dieser könnte dann nur mehr ab und zu ein paar Nachrichten für Geld erhalten.

Betreff: 69

61, 62 und 70 chimpften alle madlos über 69. Er sei ein Verräter auf allen Linien und werde kaltgestellt werden.

Betreff: MIG

Oberster Chef des MIG soll ein ehemaliger SS-Brigadeführer FELDNER sein, Chef der Gestapo und des "C" im Jahrkreis VIII (Protokollrat), bei Zusammenbruch aus der C" geflüchtet.

Betreff: GLINGMANN - RITTER

61 sucht Verbindung zu einem Mann namens GLINGMANN - RITTER, der bei den USA in der Spionage 1 und 2 tätig sein soll. Durch diesen Mann hofft man auch für eine hierer beiden Abteilungen arbeiten zu können; nur endlich die Menschenlieferungsabteilung III (Schnurbruch) loszukommen.

Betreff: Wohnung 62 und 70

62 und 70 wohnen nicht bei Professor GRIND, sondern bei einem kommunistischen Ehepaar die einen Artikel erst ausgesucht wird.

Betreff: 61 und 62


Da LEMMER angeblich die Adresse von 62 weiter hat, leitet er kommissarisch die Arbeiten ab, bis er einen neuen Standort findet.
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TOD: 1757Z  20 SEPT 49

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IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE
MEMORANDUM: GHELEN, Reinhard

In case of inquiry regarding attached paper concerning subject individual, information can be obtained from the files of the Intelligence Division by contacting the Operations Branch Chief. The basic paper and its contents are classified and for US eyes only.

W. R. PHILP
Colonel, FA

Telephone: Stuttgart 19002

NOTE: The above to be filed in Office of the Adjutant General, EUCOM together with their file copy of Gehlen letter.

O-30/15
TO: Chief, POB
FROM: Chief of Station, Karlsruhe
SUBJECT: General—Specific—Reinhard GEHLEN—Direct Correspondence to EUCOM

REF: MGH-A-3780

1. In this pouch you are being sent MGH-A-3780 which returns 0-3014 and 0-3015 from Colonel Philp to EUCOM and a statement that Mr. Gehlen is employed by the United States Government with permanent residence in Washington from 12 July 1946 to 30 November 1949.

2. As you know, all correspondence from your unit to EUCOM is supposed to be carried on through this Headquarters. An exception was made for travel document requests, in which case an information copy would be simultaneously sent here. Since this is not such a routine matter, it should be handled in the normal channels through this office.

3. Please explain the necessity for such a statement concerning Mr. Gehlen.

Distribution:
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COS 2

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

1. This is to certify that Mr. Reinhard GEHLEN was employed as a specialist for the United States government with permanent residence in Washington from 12 July 1946 to 30 November 1949.

2. Mr. GEHLEN finished his employment in order to enter private business with permanent residence in Povo, Italy, as well as in Berg, Kreis Starnberg, Germany.

3. In the event further information is desired, it is requested that the undersigned officer be contacted.
OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO.: MGK-A-1275

TO: Chief, POB
FROM: Chief of Station, Karlsruhe
SUBJECT: General —
Specific — Reinhard GEHLEN (No. 1)

F: MGM-A-370

DATE: 9 December 1949

1. There are no traces in CIC or our files.

2. EUCOM files give the following:

BORN: 3 April 1902 Erfurt
Commissioned 2nd Lt December 1923, 1st Lt 1928, Capt 1934
Attended War Academy Berlin Fall 1933 to Jan 35
First Gen Staff Officer, 10 Dept Fortifications 1937-38
Major March 1939, Lt. Col July 1941 Col Dec 42, Brig Gen Dec 44
Ia (G-3), 213th Div Sep 39-Nov 39
OKH, GRUPPE LANDESBEFESTIGUNG Nov 39-July 40
Aide to Chief of Gen Staff, Gen Halder July 40-Nov 40
Chief Gruppenleiter I, Ost Nov 40-Apr 42
Chief ABT Fremdeere Ost April 42-Apr 45

His highest command function was that of a company commander. According to a 7th Army interrogation Center Interrogation report dated 21 June 1945 subject is anti-Communist and anticipates a Russa-Allied conflict. He arrived at the 12th Army Group IC on 27 May 1945, later sent to the USA, date not shown, and returned 5 June 1946. No later trace of him could be found.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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POB 2
FDM
COS

CLASSIFICATION
4 January 1950

Chief, Foreign Division M
Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

ODEUM - Travel Document for Reinhard GEHLEN

1. During the past four years Subject has had a complete cover existence with no legal records under this name. We are now involved in the very complex problem of legalizing him in Germany under his real name and establishing his family (wife and four children) in a small village south of Munich.

2. Upon return from the U.S.A. in 1946, GEHLEN assumed a false identity and with many former friends developed the story that he was still in the U.S.A. We are now working on the notional return of GEHLEN from the U.S.A. to Germany where he will take a position with the Bavarian Light Metal Works. We have been able to work out all details of the cover story here but require a Military Permit issued in Washington and bearing the necessary stamps showing departure by air from the U.S.A. If this can be arranged and posted to us, we will obtain the necessary stamps at the German air terminal where the notional flight will end.

3. Note that the attached forms are issued by the Munich Police Presidium; however, it is assumed that the data is complete and adequate.

4. The Washington address which is given under item No. 11 was provided to GEHLEN by Captain Eric Waldman, and is that of his mother-in-law.

5. It will be appreciated if this can be given some priority since completion of this step is prerequisite to making other arrangements.

6. The notional trip from the U.S.A. to Germany should occur in late November 1949.

Attachment: Application for Temporary Travel Document in Lieu of Passport; 3 copies with 5 photographs.
6 March 1950

TO: [Redacted]

FROM: [Redacted]

SUBJECT: German Emigres in South America

1. It is requested that a check be made with the appropriate stations for any traces on the following individuals:

A. TIECK, Franz Carl or Carl Franz O MULLER, Otto - born 23 March 1912 in Aruga Romania. Last known address given as Seefeld, Land Tirol, Austria. Reportedly now in Argentina, city unknown.

B. von GEHLEN, Barbara - born in Germany in 1912. Married distant relative, Walter von GEHLEN, a former lawyer and civilian official of the German Navy. In 1947 he was employed by the British in Kiel, Germany. Both are now said to be living in Brazil. Barbara-von GEHLEN is the daughter of Walther GEHLEN, a former German Army officer born in Koblenz, Germany in 1870 and who died in 1945. The mother Katharina, née von WARMÈTICK, died in 1922.

C. KETH, Iza - Hungarian national who went to Italy from Transylvania as a war refugee and founded the firm of KERSTD-KREIT Co. in Bolzano, Italy in 1945. KETH and family emigrated to Argentina on 22 February 1949.
Chief, Foreign Division M  
7 March 1950

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

News Story - GEHLEN Possible Candidate to Head Verfassungsschutz

1. The Frankfurter Neue Presse for 17 February 1950 carried a UP story and an editorial entitled "Amt für Verfassungsschutz" and "Politische Polizei" respectively, and on 16 February the Frankfurt Abendpost also carried a UP story under the title "Der Bock als Gärtner?"

2. In all three articles GEHLEN, HAHN and BEHNKE were mentioned as possible candidates to head the new organization which was to be considered an "Admiral Canaris Abteilung" instead of a "Neue Gestapo".

3. Although we presume that and also noted these items, we are attaching photostatic copies since the editorial in particular contains several interesting statements, including a reference to an American source of this information.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE
DATE 2001 2005

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2 - FDM w/3 photostats  
1 - CCS w/3  
1 - FOR w/3  
2 - File w/3 clippings


Politisiche Polizei

Der Chef als Guter? Heißbod für Verfasschutz


Das Ziel der „Nationalen Front“ ist es — so sagte der der SED ergebene Nuske —, Westdeutschland zurückzugewinnen. Dutzende von Agenten aus der sowjetischen Zone kommen, findet, wie in Bonn propagandistische Vorarbeiten zu leisten, Spione sitzen in öffentlichen und privaten Kanzleien, das ist die organisation der „Verfassungsschutz“ wird auf beide Seiten zu achten haben, um das zu schützen, was im Gesetz festgelegt ist. Und nur das. Es liegt an der lebendigen Kraft der Demokratie, ob er sich dabei als „Nachtwächter“ oder „Verfassungsschutz“ ausführen wird, was im Gesetz festgelegt ist. Und nur das. Es liegt an der lebendigen Kraft der Demokratie, ob er sich dabei als „Nachtwächter“ oder „Verfassungsschutz“ ausführen wird.
Lebenslauf.

Reinhard Gehlen
18. März 1950


DEC classifed and released by central intelligence agency sources methods exception 3828
NAZI war crimes disclosure act date 2001 2005 best available copy
Heute Tätigkeiten nach Kriegsende ist bekannt.

An politischen Angaben habe ich zu machen: Ich war nie Mitglied irgendwelcher politischen Partei, insbesondere nicht der NSDAP oder einer ihrer Ableger; in Verfahren vor der Spruchkammer (Urteil anliegend) wurde ich als nicht belastet bezeichnet.

TO: Mr. Benjamin Shute  
Director of Intelligence  
NICOG, APO 757  
U.S. Army  

FROM: Gordon H. Stewart  

SUBJECT: Reinhard Gehlen  

We believe that Gehlen is chiefly motivated by a desire for personal success and personal security, a sense of duty, patriotism, and a fear of and hatred for Communism. These characteristics are common to many former German officers, but in Gehlen's case they play a singularly important role. He is intensely and self-consciously "ideological" in his outlook. A surprising amount of his time is devoted to reading and discussing social, political, moral and religious issues. He keeps himself very well informed. Unfortunately, his lack of academic training deprives him of critical judgment, with the result that he is sometimes taken in by those warmed-over and carefully garnished variations of fascism, corporate democracy, and the like, so popular in Western Europe at the present time.

We suspect that his decision to save his organization by collaboration with the Western Allies (taken before the end of the war) and his subsequent position as the leader of a German organization, acting on behalf of the Americans, have had a lot to do with the development of his strong ideological bent. He has had to justify his position to the Americans, to the Germans who work under him and to himself.

The political position which he has worked out is quite unexceptional despite the occasional flaws noted above. He professes to stand for a united Western Europe built around a Franco-German axis, for collaboration with England and the United States, for social reform but not socialism, for the review of such occupation and postwar "injustices", as war crimes trials and some aspects of denazification. He does not favor the remilitarization of Germany, except as a part of Western European defense. In the intelligence field, he believes that a small country such as Germany should have a unified service.

The question now remains whether, once in office, Gehlen would serve the interests of the government and remain loyal to the Western Allies. It is our firm opinion that he would serve Adenauer loyally. As an officer, he is extremely well disciplined and has a strong respect for
properly constituted authority. He is horrified by the romantic nationalism and indiscreet behavior of some of his former colleagues. He is not one to become involved in the cabals of officers and senior bureaucrats. He is cautious in political matters to a fault.

We think he will take direction well. He is a man of independent mind, more by force of circumstances than by choice. Adenauer and other senior German officials will experience no difficulty in handling him.

He will not be an American or Allied puppet in office. If he thinks that it is in the German interest to resist the Allies, he will attempt to do so. We are convinced, however, that he is sincerely interested in harmonious cooperation between the Germans and the Western Allies, and that he is capable of rising above petty dogmatism when the broad issues at stake are properly presented to him. We have always found him to be tractable.

We believe that he will try to avoid becoming involved in party politics. This does not mean that he is indifferent to politics but, rather, that he is ambitious only as an intelligence official. A review of his record shows that his most impressive trait is his ability to survive the storms around him in this capacity. During the war he managed to keep his organization intact and relatively undisturbed despite the furious vendetta which developed between the Abwehr under Canaris and the SSNA under Kaltenbrunner. The defeat of the Abwehr left Gehlen untouched although he certainly was a Canaris man. In 1945, Gehlen converted Germany's defeat into an intelligence alliance with the Americans in short order. In working with us under the occupation, Gehlen has made no secret of his desire to survive the end of the occupation as the head of an important intelligence activity.

One final word. Gehlen is an intelligence operator. The means he employs to achieve his ends are not always straightforward. Like all other operators of any importance, he has a high regard for the security of his own operations and will act like a gentleman, if need be.
HEADQUARTERS
SPECIAL DETACHMENT EUCCM
Munich Office
APO 407, US Army

23 March 1950

SUBJECT: Extension of Temporary Travel Document

TO: Director of Intelligence
European Command
APO 403, US Army
Attn: Operations Branch

It is requested that the enclosed Temporary Travel Document of Reinhard GEHLEN be prolonged and extended to include SWITZERLAND, AUSTRIA, ITALY, SPAIN, and FRANCE.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

EDWARD BRAK
Captain CAV
Adjutant

Incl: 1
Passport No. 0006440
Tel: Munich Mil 4821
S No. R-192 Copy / of 4 Copies

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

SECRET

1701
3 April 1950

Chief, Foreign Division "M"
Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Intelligence Directors' Comments on Gehlen

Attached hereto are the comments by the Allied Intelligence Directors on the candidacy of General Gehlen at the meeting of 23 March 1950 at Mainz.
SUBJECT: Comments by the Allied Intelligence Directors on the Candidacy
of General Gehlen at the Meeting of March 28, 1950 - Mainz

French: We are convinced that Chancellor Adenauer took all precautions
that the man he is placing in charge of this Agency (Federal Agency for
the Protection of the Constitution) meets with our requirements. We
consulted the names proposed have been submitted after severe selection.
Aside from the personalities of the candidates, I would like to examine
if they do not give rise to questions of principle. First of all, I
would like to examine the personality of Gehlen. Isn’t this candidate
in opposition to the principles of our directives? We are faced with a
General who did not participate in the NSDAP, but who nevertheless belonged
to Section III Gct. Do you think that his participation in this Organi-
ization, and his connection with Intelligence, might bring forth opposition
from the German public? I would like to know your opinion so that after
exchange of information, we can let the Central Committee know what our
views on this candidate are. The Germans gave us no background information
on this personality. Ritter Von Lex merely told us that he was an ex-General
of the General Staff of the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres). The inquiry
Lex made reveals that he is above all suspicions of having tendencies to
the extreme Right or extreme Left. He adds that he is absolutely incor-
ruptible. He is also above all political parties. This is a very impor-
tant point, because as the Germans and the Allies are concerned. Our atti-
ude with regard to him is, of course, important, because the other six
candidates may have already been approved by Gehlen. Two of them have also
belonged to the Abwehr. This, in itself, is not a crime or a particu-
lar obstacle. But to put at the head of this Agency, three members of the
Abwehr inspires some fears as to the possible reorganization of the Abwehr
in another form. What do you think of General Gehlen and of his applica-
tion?

British: We do not support his application. We agree with you that the
appointment of a General who for some years was a member of the Abwehr
staff of the youngest Generals would give rise to adverse public opin-
on. Further, and this is an important point, his was never concerned
with the field of External Intelligence. It is in that field that he is
more expert than in others. He is suggested as the head of an Agency which
is to deal with internal affairs and is to be of a defensive character.
Taking into account his past record and the work he would do in the future,
we think there is danger at some time in the future—if he got this appoint-
ment—from the development of combined internal and external intelligence
services. It would be entirely contrary to British practices and principles
to permit the concentration of both internal and external intelligence
services to be concentrated in one pair of hands. It is on these grounds
that we object to the proposal made by the Germans.

German: We are faced with a firm and clear position on the part of the
British.

First, General Gehlen, and we have known him for some time. We
believe that personally he would be a very able man in this position.
The only possible disqualification in our mind is the point raised by our
British colleagues with reference to the placing in this position of a
man whose past experience has been in external intelligence. We recognize
the force of this argument and are inclined to weigh it against a very
able
for a good and experienced man in that position. In our view, because of our primary principles (which I'll state in a minute) on this matter, I do not think it would be necessary to weigh these two arguments. This German Agency is one of the most sensitive and one of the most delicate problems which the three Allies face. Therefore, we believe that no person should be entrusted with the all-important job of the head of this Agency to whom any of the three occupying powers has a serious objection. Therefore, the American view is that the strong British objection as stated by General Haydon is one with which we do not agree.

French: I take note of the U.S. point of view, and for the same reasons—although the British would not oppose Gehlen's application—we believe that a man to be entrusted with a job of that importance cannot be taken on if any of the Allies object to his being appointed. The only solution is to refer it to the General Committee, stating the respective positions of the Allies. Would the British be equally opposed if Gehlen was to be merely in the Agency (i.e., not as its head)?

British: I think we have the same objections. May I make a comment on the next step? I spoke to my High Commissioner on Gehlen on Saturday. I feel that it would be an inappropriate subject for the High Commissioners themselves when they next meet the Chancellor. I would like, therefore, to suggest that in addition to reporting to the General Committee that we should each inform our High Commissioner of the conclusion we have reached today.

French: I agree. I think the High Commissioners have already had a conversation on this with the Federal Chancellor. That is what I understood as a result of a conversation with my High Commissioner.

British: Yes. They had a general discussion but they have reached no decision. The fact that they have had this discussion is good reason why they should raise it again with the Chancellor. When we last met, the Germans were most anxious that we should give them an early decision. I believe that the High Commissioners may not meet the Chancellor again until April 15th. That is a long way off. I would like to suggest that when we inform our High Commissioners of the decision we have reached today, we should ask their authorization that at our next meeting with the Germans before the 15th merely to say to the Germans: "General Gehlen is unacceptable, but the subject will be discussed by the High Commissioners when they meet the Chancellor." This solution means that we can go on with our normal business with the Germans when we meet them before April 15th.

French: I find this solution very wise, and I agree.

British: I agree.

When the French Chairman summed up the decisions reached by the Intelligence Directors, the British delegate brought up again the subject of Gehlen.

British: When you pass the information (regarding the six candidates submitted by the Germans) to the Germans, will you tell them anything concerning Gehlen?

French: In accordance with our decision, we shall let the High Commissioners resolve the question with the Chancellor.

British: On General Gehlen, we are not in a position to tell the Germans anything until the High Commissioners have come to a decision.
3 April 1950

Chief, Foreign Division "K"
Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Meeting of Allied High Commission with Chancellor

Attached hereto is the verbatim report of the meeting on 23 March 1950 of the Council of the Allied High Commission with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, in which General Gahlen was discussed as a candidate to head the Federal Verfassungsschutz.

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 382B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURES
DATE 2001 2005
THRBATIN 01, Ta MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF THE ALLIED HIGH COMMISSION with the CHANCELLOR OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

DEUDERSCHAFT

Now we come to another point in respect to that organization - a lot has been said about it - the Bruderschaft; whether you have any information which could give us some clarification on the matter. It is rather difficult to form an opinion of an organization which is composed of some good elements and some not so good. This organization in taking up some ideas which have unpleasant memories - that is, the formation of an order of a chivalrous type or something of the kind. Have you any information in this respect?

GER: I have no information on this matter. The statement made by Major General von Manteuffel has appeared in the press. I don't know any more about that myself than what has appeared in the press.

FR: You are probably aware that some statements have appeared in the press. I believe the Sud Deutsche Zeitung; those statements are in absolute contradiction with statements made by von Manteuffel in that respect.

GER: I have read this newspaper cutting and I must say that such a lot of very precise information about my own person is circulated which is completely incorrect that under the circumstances I prefer to believe what General von Manteuffel has said.

FR: The reason why we are raising that subject is because, rightly or wrongly, public opinion in our respective countries has noted its existence and it might be useful to have some clarification. (French, not translated)

GER: Before we go on to the next point, may I ask the Ambassador how he imagines that the Federal Government could clear this matter up? We are not entitled to institute any enquiry; and, in view of what I know about the Land institutions which could be charged with such an enquiry, I really wouldn't like to ask them to do it because I feel that I am pretty sure that there is some KPD influence there. Particularly if my information is correct that the wife of one of the members of this institution in one of the biggest Land in the Western Zones is one of the registered members of the KPD, then I do hesitate to put the matter in the hands of one of these Land institutions.

FORMATION OF FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY

FR: Of course, Mr. Chancellor, we are not expecting Bonn to give us official notification about a thing of that kind, but nevertheless we think it sufficient to remind you that we have already agreed on the establishment of an agency for the suppression of activities contrary to the Constitution. I suppose this office is already in existence, or I think it will be soon, and this is a particular case where this agency might deal with this matter in liaison with our own services in this respect.
I would like to say here that the establishment of such an office is a difficult matter, none the less we will do it; we will set one up. Much, of course, will depend on who is put at the head of this organisation, and I myself am looking into this matter very carefully. After a great deal of enquires and searching, we have decided to appoint General Gaylund (†); this appointment has already been discussed with the gentlemen of the Allied High Commission. On the American side, where Gen. Gaylund has been well known for a long time, this appointment is welcomed. The French delegation was not so enamoured of the idea and, as far as the British were concerned, they said that they would first have to ask Dr. Schumacher.

I don't think I support the idea that we should first have to ask Dr. Schumacher, for whom I have the greatest respect. But I don't think that's a matter of very great interest to us, and I was aware of this proposed appointment.

Of course, no confusion should be made between the opinion expressed by the Committee and a opinion expressed by the High Commission to which the Committees have to report. That is where we stand; the High Commission has not talked on the subject, and as far as I am concerned I never heard about Gen. Gaylund. Although this agency doesn't yet exist, they give you an idea of what they will be able to do in the future as long as they have already informed you that the wife of one of these members is a Communist.

Perhaps I can be allowed to say a few words about this Gen. Gaylund. I have not met him so far personally. I have asked him to come and see me next week. I think he contacted my staff on the suggestion of the Americans. The enquiries I've made about his person, especially what I have been told about him by the Bavarian Minister President Barhard who knows him very well personally, have been very good and have had a very good result. Evidently if he is appointed and if his appointment becomes known abroad and at home, immediately the argument of remilitarization will arise. For several months now, and I can safely say that for several months we have been looking for a civilian who would be suitable for the appointment, and we have been unable to find one.

Also, I am not too ready — and I hope that Gen. Hays won't take this amiss if I say this — to appoint a man who has too close contact with American officers. But I don't think that any objections need really be raised, because I've heard that if Gen. Gaylund were really appointed to this post, then any future return to his American associations would be precluded.
TO: Chief of Station, Karlsruhe
FROM: Chief, Foreign Division M
SUBJECT: GENERAL OPERATIONAL SPECIFIC: Interrogation of Dr. Walter Friedrich SCHELLENBERG

Extracts of the Final Report on SCHELLENBERG relating to his negotiations with General von GEHLEN are inclosed. Reference is made to these extracts in MGK-W-4705.

Enclosure: 1
(3 copies)

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XX-11685

Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich SCHELLENBERG
Appendix VI

Art VI - Post Defeat Plans

"The sudden deterioration of the military situation of Germany in the last months before defeat did not, according to SCHELLENBERG, allow German leadership to develop any post defeat plans. SCHELLENBERG maintains that the whole working method of the National Socialist system prevented any such premeditated schemes taking shape. ******

"Of great importance in this connection were SCHELLENBERG's discussions with Major General von GEHLEN. GEHLEN was until February 1945 "Chief Foreign Army Ost". He was an excellent general staff officer who enjoyed all round esteem. He possibly possessed the greatest understanding amongst the members of the "Wehrmachtshauptamt" for the "Geheime Felddienst". He was SCHELLENBERG's strongest supporter within the army. This was shown by the acceptance of SCHELLENBERG's suggestion that all military attaches and i.c.e. of the Wehrmacht were to pass through the school of the "Geheime Felddienst". The preparations for this were complete when GEHLEN was deprived of his post because he failed to form a correct estimate of the attack by the XI Ukrainian army from the direction of Berlin as well as Pomerania. Hitler had one of his usual attacks of rage and KALTENBRUNNER was delighted when he was able, addressing himself to SCHELLENBERG to declare in the course of a lunch party: "This little sausage of von GEHLEN now has got to go west too - he probably relied too much on your poor intelligence service. Don't forget I don't dream of courting one day reproaches by the Fuhrer owing to your reports. In that case you would be most speedily dismissed". SCHELLENBERG describes this particular performance as one of the many attacks of KALTENBRUNNER against him.

Major General von GEHLEN in March 1945 asked SCHELLENBERG for a quiet talk in private. One evening he spent three hours with SCHELLENBERG. In the course of this talk GEHLEN estimated that military resistance would last another two months. Then the end had to be counted with. GEHLEN said that preparations had to be made for this case. The only man with the necessary imagination and energy to undertake this task was HIMMLER. HIMMLER, should, as Commander of the home Army, authorise SCHELLENBERG to build up, together with GEHLEN and the best general staff officers, a resistance movement and army on the lines of the Polish resistance. GEHLEN said that the army had the fullest confidence in SCHELLENBERG as an organiser and he, GEHLEN, and his best general staff officers, as well as many whom SCHELLENBERG did not yet know, would put themselves voluntarily under SCHELLENBERG's command. GEHLEN added that he would now pretend that he was taking four weeks holiday, but in reality he was going to 'Frankensteinhügel' (a cover name standing for a prepared evacuation quarter of the OKW) in order to prepare his plan quietly. He had already asked for a comprehensive survey regarding the Polish resistance army. GEHLEN requested SCHELLENBERG to prepare the same on his side. The evening ended with SCHELLENBERG's assurance that he would think it all over thoroughly and then secure the decision of HIMMLER.

SCHELLENBERG promised GEHLEN strictest secrecy. GEHLEN attached above all great importance to KALTENBRUNNER not being put into the picture. SCHELLENBERG discussed the matter with Dr. RAPP and asked for a report on the whole issue.
Not more than ten days after SCHILLER's talk with GEHLEN RAPP brought with him an excellent survey of the whole structure of the Polish resistance army, together with GEHLEN's request to transmit as soon as possible, preferably by the same courier, the written consent of HIMMLER. The courier explained orally that as GUDERIAN was no longer chief of the OKH and as WENK was his successor, it would be a good thing if HIMMLER initiated WENK into the plan.

"SCHILLER explained the whole plan to HIMMLER who declined it abruptly. He said verbatim to SCHILLER: "This is complete nonsense, if I should discuss this plan with WENK I am the first desertist of the Third Reich. This fact would be served boiling hot to the Führer. You need not tell this to your GEHLEN. You need only explain to him that I strictly refuse to accept the plan. Besides - it is typical of the high class general staff officer to sit in Frankenstrupp nursing post war plans instead of fighting". SCHILLER quickly changed the subject; otherwise he thought, HIMMLER would not have stopped talking and no-one could have predicted what orders HIMMLER might have given inspired by a momentary mood. SCHILLER informed GEHLEN and Dr. RAPP of the negative attitude of HIMMLER. As far as SCHILLER knows no further development occurred."
1. A check of the British allegation (FALL 8018) that UTILITY had offered his services to KESSLER in setting up post defeat resistance turned up SCHILLERHOF's account of the incident. An extract is being punched separately of that part of the final report on the Case of Walter Friedrich SCHILLERHOF (XI-13955) which relates the story of UTILITY's offer. Despite SCHILLERHOF's unsatisfactory mental condition while under interrogation, his account of UTILITY's offer is both lucid and credible. Certainly we would seek justified, on the basis of SCHILLERHOF's statements, at least in assuming that the two were well acquainted. Since UTILITY has never to our knowledge mentioned this connection, and had even once in conversation with Donald G. Hood conveyed the impression that he did not know SCHILLERHOF, we were mildly disheartened.

2. In considering how we might best verify SCHILLERHOF's story and tying with the idea of at some point confronting UTILITY with SCHILLERHOF, we read with new interest certain references to "SCHILLERHOF" found in operational correspondence. Possibly the most startling vistas opened by the assumption of an acquaintanceship between UTILITY and SCHILLERHOF is that presented by the involvement of an unidentified SCHILLERHOF in SCHILLERHOF's activities. Is it possible that the assistant advisor of SCHILLERHOF is Mr. Walter Friedrich. We would like, if possible, to have a preliminary report from other than ODEK sources on the routine aspects of the TNZI affair. For example, in the SCHILLERHOF concerned identified in the articles of incorporation or related papers, or in the rent agreement with Prinz and Company, and, in the form of a neighborhood check, who is the occupant of the 3rd room apartment at the disposal of SCHILLERHOF.

3. Could we, in addition, be brought up to date on the current overt situation and activities of Mr. Walter Friedrich SCHILLERHOF? reference in U.S.A-548B to the possible advisability of querying Mr. Prinz about SCHILLERHOF on the background of a person of possible operational interest indicates him to be more or less available.
I. Intelligence Estimate

1. Part one of the following speculations constitute an attempt to evaluate the significance to our intelligence interests in Germany of the possible appointment of UTILITY to head the Verfassungsschutz, or Office for the Protection of the Constitution, of the Bonn Government. This memorandum is admittedly reflective and introspective, dealing as it does with imponderables which cannot successfully be removed from their context of the fluid situation created by the emergence of a strong German government, the field of reference must be arbitrarily selective. We have attempted to resist exploring the enticing vistas opened up by viewing the present problem in all its global and long range implications, and, believing the strategic consequences to be largely unpredictable, have considered the tactical pros and cons. Part two is a consideration of the probable political implications of UTILITY's appointment, and will be passed to the Office of the High Commissioner in Germany for their decision on the political advisability of the appointment.

2. By the act of assuming the responsibility for the maintenance of this operation in July 1949, CIA also became the responsible custodians of the major assets of post-war German intelligence. It was recognized that CIA thus put itself in the strategic position to assume control of future German intelligence as a major instrument for the long-range fulfillment of its mission in Europe. At the same time it was understood that the success of this strategy would depend upon satisfactory completion of the OSO counter-intelligence mission with the operation before the Western German Government was empowered to create an official intelligence service. By official recognition of any individual or element of the Odeum operation before the proper counter-intelligence controls were firmly established the Western German Government would find itself able to rob us of our intelligence assets and with serious strategic or political consequences turn them against us.
3. It has been, therefore, our operating principle as intermediaries to control and coordinate to our advantage the demands made upon Odeum assets through the development of official German security organs with the determination of Odeum to become independent of our authority and achieve official recognition. This tactical plan was conceived as the only means of allowing time for a thorough investigation and identification of Odeum assets. This entire process has been accelerated and intensified by the rapid rehabilitation of German economic and political life. These forces have in turn acted in such a way as to complicate and impede the satisfactory fulfillment of the counter intelligence mission within Odeum. In the light of our strategy to date the present candidacy of UTILITY as chief of the Verfassungsschutz must be treated as premature and strategically undesirable since we can at this time claim only partial control over Utility and his organization. At the same time, it has become increasingly evident that our ability to control and hold the loyalty of German intelligence workers, to the extent to which it was hitherto possible, is weakened in direct proportion to the progress of the reestablishment of Germany. It is most doubtful whether we could, under the best of circumstances, go farther in the establishment of control of the future GIS than the gathering of accurate data on personalities and operations within the ODEUM complex. We are not inclined to believe UTILITY after appointment as head of the Verfassungsschutz would attempt secretly to impede us in this endeavor. It will continue to be in the interests of a strong future German intelligence, and hence, at least in UTILITY's eyes, in his interest, that ODEUM be maintained and improved as a cohesive, effective intelligence organization. We have by now made our point with a large fraction of the ODEUM personnel that operational and personality data is our minimum price for support and trusteeship. Thus, even the extent to which the premature official recognition of UTILITY will handicap us in this respect is problematical.
4. UTILITY has risen since 1945 from the position of a relatively obscure member of the German General Staff to the position of a prime political strategist enjoying both the support of conservative political factions and of certain German industrialists. At the same time he enjoys semi-diplomatic relations with the major intelligence services of Western Europe. There is nothing in his past political record or career nor in the course of his operations under our supervision which would promise us any control over his career in the future. At the same time he has the advantage of his prolonged association with American intelligence which has given him the opportunity to make an accurate estimation of our major strategies and our strength. Clearly from the standpoint of German nationalist interests, he would become a most desirable political asset within the Bonn Government. It should also be borne in mind that he enjoys cordial relations with ranking members of the German military and could easily become a focal point of German planning in that direction. It is not unlikely that in the long run this combinations of qualifications and resources could make of UTILITY a more powerful political figure than any present member of the Bonn Government. It is our impression that he would be quick to realize these opportunities and soon range beyond the normal duties assigned to him as chief of the VS. From the standpoint of our control of future German intelligence, UTILITY is too powerful in his own right to be allowed to accept the position.

5. Should UTILITY be offered and accept the position of the chief of the VS, he will accept with the clear understanding that we recognize the act as a clear severance of his relations with an American sponsored intelligence operation. And moreover, his future relations with us will be governed strictly by the regulations affecting his position agreed upon by the High Commissioner and the Western German Government. We must, however, face the fact that although we may formally prescribe a total severance of the ODEUM-UTILITY ties on his
Appointment, it will in practice be an impossible dictum to enforce. The opportunities for clandestine, or unreported, contacts between the two, as well as legitimate excuses for official contact will be far too many for us effectively to monitor. This means that with the official status and facilities provided him as head of the Verfassungsschutz and the comparative intelligence wealth of ODEUM more or less available to him UTILITY could, and almost undoubtedly will, become immediately the de facto head of German intelligence. It should be recognized also that to become the de facto head under these circumstances would not be an empty honor, but would put UTILITY in an operationally effective position in which he would hold most of the cards vis-a-vis allied intelligence in Germany.

6. On the other hand his political prestige is such that he represents an operational obstacle in our command of the Odeum operation. It would, however, for the time being, be to our advantage to hold him in our employment rather than to allow him to act independently on behalf of the Western German Government in intelligence matters. It would be to our immediate tactical advantage to place in the position of chief of the VS a highly qualified technician with no political attachments, even though we acknowledge the fact that such a man would soon find himself under the influence of UTILITY. Since ODEUM was founded on the principle of collaboration rather than on that of the paid agent relationship, we are compelled to treat UTILITY's candidacy or similar candidacies ostensibly as a matter between the Western German Government and a private German citizen. It is not our intention to hold UTILITY in Odeum by arguments of indispensibility to the operation, nor do we intend to suggest to him or to any other parties concerned that we will interfere in this matter with the authorities of the High Commissioners or members of the Western German Government.

7. Once UTILITY has assumed this position we are prepared to renegotiate
our relations with the remaining German operators in Odeum in a further attempt to reduce them from collaborator to agent status and to insist upon that agent control data which is necessary for the expedition and completion of the OSO counter intelligence mission within the operation. All existing relationships with political representatives and private industry will be subjected to our review and approval. Furthermore, all nominations to key positions within the ODEUM operating staff will be subject to our approval. It will be our intention to treat Odeum from that point onward as any other operation conducted by this organization in Germany. Our success in this program will depend to a very great extent on the degree to which UTILITY maintains, or attempts to maintain, an influence on the organization. It seems fair to assume that ODEUM will represent too big a plum, both for UTILITY personally and for the future GIS, for UTILITY to relinquish meekly all control over it. That UTILITY could, through intermediaries, continue to exert a considerable influence over ODEUM is most probable. It seems likely, that were UTILITY to continue to make his influence felt in ODEUM, our only course of action would be to follow up leads which would take advantage of disaffection and separatist tendencies within the organization. Although in this way we could probably neutralize UTILITY's support within the organization we might find that in the process we had lessened the efficiency of ODEUM by lending support to rival factions.

II. Political Estimate

1. UTILITY: Judging from his social background, career, and actions since 1945 UTILITY presently or potentially represents the conservative German nationalist cause. He is on record as believing in the closest possible political and economic collaboration between Germany and Western Europe, particularly with France. Although a Protestant he has allied himself closely with influential Catholic factions both inside and outside Germany. As a
former German general he is closely associated with other prominent members of that class although he has not directly associated himself with what we know of present German militaristic ambitions. It is a fact that with UTILITY’s appointment to head the Verfassungsschutz both the Verfassungsschutz and ODSEM would be in the hands of German General Staff types. Regardless of who succeeds UTILITY as head of ODSEM, an sufficient number of general officers will remain in the top staff to exert a definitive influence on the character of the organization. Although he is apparently not closely associated with what we know of present German militaristic ambitions, he does have a direct connection to General SPREIDEL and an unclarified connection with Federal Reconstruction Minister Eberhard Wildermuth. The first of these is viewed, at least by Schumacher, as a protagonist, and the latter as a tool, of resurgent German militarism. He has not shown open antagonism toward leftist political factions with the exception of Communism, but he has ambitiously cultivated prominent German industrialists and members of the landed aristocracy.

2. Political Position within Germany: It is our belief that the appointment of UTILITY to the position of chief of the VS will be immediately interpreted by the leftist opposition to the Bonn Government as a political appointment. There is no reason to believe that UTILITY will find support within the ranks of the SPD. It is much more likely to suppose that he will be branded as a representative of neo-Fascism in Germany. In recent conversations with an OSO representative, Kurt Schumacher inquired as to the internal political ambitions of ODSEM and especially of UTILITY. He explained that regardless of the professional intelligence qualifications involved the SPD could not agree to the establishment of ODSEM as an official CI agency. This view, he said, was due to his conviction that their activities would be aimed against the left only. This alone would seem clear cut evidence that the SPD will oppose UTILITY’s candidacy to head the Verfassungsschutz, but we cannot ignore the possibility that Adenauer has
made some sort of deal with the SPD to secure its approval. Vigorous and outspoken opposition to UTILITY in Schumacher's customary fire breathing style could well develop into a diatribe against the Americans and American intelligence methods in Germany. The charge could be made that UTILITY had been chosen for this particular position as an instrument of political oppression in Germany. He is even more vulnerable to collaborationists' charges. If it appeared to be a rewarding step in party strategy a personal attack could be launched against him from the standpoint of his collaboration with American intelligence, former German generals and members of the Abwehr and even the SD and the SS which might result in a complete exposure of the Odeum operation and grave embarrassment to our foreign policy.

3. French Political Position: Through our investigations of the Odeum operation, it has become evident that UTILITY would be supported as a candidate by the rightist factions of French intelligence and therefore most likely have the approval of French rightist politicians who were concerned. UTILITY himself has made a consistent effort to ingratiate himself with French intelligence and to advertise his strong faith in a German-French entente. In addition to this we have collected evidence to show that French intelligence has been successful in the clandestine penetration of certain aspects of the Odeum complex. This penetration should have supplied enough information to allow French authorities to come to an independent estimate of the extent of the operation and UTILITY's qualifications for a position in the VS. It is worth noting that in contrast to the British the French have made no official representations to American authorities against the operation.

4. British Political Position: The British have repeatedly since the inception of the operation expressed misgivings about the security and political consequences of the operation. We have received these representations officially and unofficially through British military channels as well as through the Foreign
Successful British penetrations of the operation have allowed them to conclude that the elements of Odeum are to be treated as powerful forces toward German nationalism or the renascence of Fascism. It is also the British contention that elements of the former German Abwehr are to be treated as constituting present day German intelligence which is primarily aimed at the penetration and neutralization of British and American intelligence in Germany. If these allegations are sincere, it can be expected that the British will strongly oppose UTILITY's candidacy. This would also be in line with their policy toward the SPD. To the best of our knowledge the British are not prepared to propose an alternate to UTILITY which suggests also that the British have not attached great importance to an appointment to this office at this time, but will rely on their right to disapprove any candidate.

5. Establishment of GIS: In all probability, the official recognition of UTILITY, together with his continued, if unofficial, connection with ODEUM, will establish him as the de facto head of German intelligence, and very likely, as one of the most powerful men in Germany. If we regard such a development as inevitable, then we might well welcome UTILITY as the selection. Although he will probably not be unduly swayed by gratitude toward us, he is unquestionably Western oriented, and all three of the Western Allies have penetrated his operations to a degree sufficient to afford at least a window into his future activities. The other side of the coin may or may not be politically more attractive—in setting up UTILITY as the de facto head of German Intelligence, we are taking a long step toward the creation of a strong, effective, friendly intelligence service capable of playing an independent though allied role in the security of Western Europe.
REQUEST CLEARANCE UTILITY TO GO ITALY CIRCA 22 MAY.

PURPOSE: RECREATIONAL; TAKING 16 YEAR OLD DAUGHTER ON HOLY YEAR VISIT ROME.

Wash 4701, 15 May 50 - Trip approved for rec. purposes only. Consider unlikely will actually avoid intell contacts, especially in view of involvement brother, but for record should understand intell negotiations not authorized in absence prior clearance.

Of what duration will trip be? Notify us when UTILITY returns.

Under what name will he travel?

Pull 612, 17 May 50 - Ref para 2, (Wash 4701), duration about 8 days, departure probably 26 May but depends on receipt TTD.

Ref para 3, we obtaining TTD under name REINHARD GEHLEN VAN VAERNEWYK. He will use VAN VAERNEWYK.

Pull 685, 9 June 50 - ref: Wash 4701, Pull 612
1. UTILITY departs tonight w/ daughter for Rome via Switzerland. Returning 18 or 19 June.
2. Sat and Sun sightseeing Zurich Bern for daughter’s benefit
3. Mon will pay social visit ULLRICH whom he has not seen since Dec. Will visit MERCIER as courtesy due long absence.
4. Says he definitely on vacation and will not talk business. Says his only reason remain Bern Monday is make these contacts in view of six month interval since last visit. Believe we can depend on this.
5. He departs Bern for Rome Mon night
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

From: PULLACH
To: SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Action: FDM (1-2)
Information: ADSO (3-4), STC (5), 11D (6), S/C (7-8-9)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-3

TO: WASHF  INFO: KARLF  CITE: PULLF

REQUEST CLEARANCE UTILITY TO GJ ITALY CIRCA 22 MAY.
PURPOSE: RECREATIONAL! TAKING 14 YEAR OLD DAUGHTER ON HOLY YEAR VISIT ROME.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3829 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005

TOR: 1230Z 10 MAY 50

SECRET

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OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
SECRET

To: PULLACH, KARLSRUHE
From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS
CONFIRMATION: FDM (1-2)
INFORMATION: AOSO (3-4), STC (5), FDP (6), ID (7), S/C (8-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Par. 51 (1) 60A AR-389-5

WASH 4701
TO: PULLF
FO: KARLF
CITE: WASHF
RE: PULL 579 (IN 25347)

1. TRIP APPROVED FOR RECREATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. CONSIDER UNLIKELY WILL ACTUALLY AVOID INTELLIGENCE CONTACTS, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OPERATIONAL INVOLVEMENT BROTHER, BUT FOR RECORD SHOULD UNDERSTAND INTELLIGENCE NEGOTIATION NOT AUTHORIZED IN ABSENCE PRIOR CLEARANCE.

2. OF WHAT DURATION WILL TRIP BE? NOTIFY US WHEN UTILITY RETURNS.

3. UNDER WHAT NAME WILL HE TRAVEL?

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE: METHOD CORRELATION 38262
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
RELEASING OFFICER

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
SECRET

Copy No. /
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

To: ROUTINE
From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Confirmation: FDP (1-2)
Information: ADSO (3-4), STC (5), FDM (6), IID (7), S/C (8-9-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) SCAR 380-S

TO: CITE: WASHF

FOR YOUR INFO ONLY. ODEUM GERMAN CHIEF PLANNING VISIT ROME WITH DAUGHTER 22 MAY. PURPOSE HOLY YEAR VISIT. HE IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO MAKE INTELLIGENCE CONTACTS.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3BZE NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005

HTC DH

RELEASING OFFICER ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 0136Z 13 MAY 50

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

From: PULLACH
To: SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Action: FDM (1-2)

Information: INF (3-4), STC (5), FDP (6), IID (7), S/C (8-9-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-580-5

PULL 612

TO: WASHF INFO: KARLF CITE: PULLF

RE: WASH 4701 (OUT: 55399)

1. RE PARA 3 DURATION ABOUT EIGHT DAYS DEPARTURE PROBABLY
   25 MAY BUT DEPENDS OUR RECEIPT TTD.

2. RE PARA 3. WE OBTAINING TTD UNDER NAME REINHARD GEHLEN
   VON VAERNEWYK.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 382E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

TOR: 212 18 MAY 50

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

To: ROUTINE
From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 22 MAY 50
CONFIRMATION EDP (1-2) OUT 56155
INFORMATION ADSC (3-4), STC (5), FDM (6), IID (7), S/C (3-9-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-300-5

WASH 5421
TO: CITE: WASHF
REF: WASH 4824 (OUT 55527)

1. SUBJECT USING NAME OF REINHARD GEHLEN VON VAERNEWYK.
2. DURATION OF SUBJECT'S TRIP ABOUT EIGHT DAYS WITH DEPARTURE FOR ROME ABOUT 26 MAY.
3 June 1950

Chief, Foreign Division

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

UTILITY Visit to Bonn

1. I was informed on 1 June by Calhoun Ancrum, NICOC employee of the Foreign Relations Division, Office of Political Affairs, Bonn, that UTILITY, accompanied by Johnny Harrath von Bittonfeld, chief of the Protocol Office of the German Chancellery, had visited him at his home in Bad Godesberg about six weeks ago. Although Ancrum could not recall the exact date, he remembered that it was about a week after UTILITY’s name was first mentioned in the Intelligence Committee, NICOC, for chief of the Verfassungsschutz.

2. Ancrum, who, as you know, CL-knew UTILITY some years ago, and Ancrum also knew Harrath von Bittonfeld, who did not say much during the UTILITY visit. UTILITY appeared under a pseudonym which Ancrum did not recall, and the purpose of his visit was to make clear to some NICOC official his position via-a-vis the Verfassungsschutz post. He told Ancrum that he did not covet the post, but would accept it if he were offered it, realising that it was his duty to serve if called.

3. On the basis of UTILITY’s statements and at his request, Ancrum wrote an EYES ONLY memo to General Hays on the subject a few days later and delivered it in person. Ancrum’s offices adjoin Hays’ suite.

4. Ancrum is evidently under the impression that the Army still runs UTILITY and is also aware that I am reporting this minor incident. He will let me know if he sees UTILITY in Bonn again.

Karl Hart Page 12 June

Dist: FUL-2
COS: FVS(2)-1
Page 2

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 382B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2001 2005
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

FROM: PULLACH ROUTINE
To: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 9 JUN 50
ACTION: FDM (1-2) 111-28694
INFORMATION: ADO (3-4), STC (5), FDP (6), IID (7), S/C (0-9-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 604 AR-380-5

PULL 685
TO: WASHF INFO: KARLF CITE: PULLF
RE: WASH L701 (OUT 55399), PULL 612 (111-21265).

1. UTILITY DEPARTS TONIGHT WITH DAUGHTER FOR ROME VIA SWITZERLAND. RETURNING 18 OR 19 JUNE.

2. SATURDAY AND SUNDAY SIGHTSEEING ZURICH BERN FOR DAUGHTERS BENEFIT.

3. MONDAY WILL PAY SOCIAL VISIT ULLRICH WHOHE HAS NOT SEEN SINCE DECEMBER. WILL VISIT SERCER AS COURTESY DUE LONG ABSENCE.

4. SAYS HE DEFINITELY ON VACATION AND WILL NOT TALK BUSINESS. SAYS HIS ONLY REASON REMAIN BERN (Rome) MONDAY IS TO TAKE THESE CONTACTS IN VIEW OF SIX MONTH INTERVAL SINCE LAST VISIT. BELIEVE HE CAN DEPEND ON THIS.

5. HE DEPARTS BERN FOR ROME MONDAY NIGHT.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3829 EVER NASHI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT 6-5-2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

TOR: 17312 9 JUN 50
SECRET

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

FROM: PULLACH

To: SPECIAL OPERATIONS

ACTION: FAX (1-2)

INFORMATION: AO30 (3-4), STC (5), FDP (6), IID (7), S/C (8-9-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. II (1) 60A AR-380-5

IN PARA 4, LINE 2 THE WORD BERN HAS BEEN CONFIRMED.
TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS

FROM: FDP (1-2)

CONFIRMATION: OUT 3734

INFORMATION:

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 604 AR-400-5

TO: C

CITE: WASHF

REF: 

SUBJECT: REF DEPARTED BERN FOR ROME NIGHT 12 JUNE. WILL LEAVE ROME 18 OR 19 JUNE.
1. According to referenced Vienna reports, UTILITY recently was contacted by representatives of a movement in Southern Germany which seeks closer rapprochement with France and has as its ultimate goal the establishment of a union of Germany, France and Italy in an anti-Communist front. The group is led by Fürst Erich WALDBURG-ZELL and Dr. Gerhard KROLL and is primarily composed of members of the Christian Democratic Union, the Catholic Youth Movement, clergy and politicians, and is as yet not sponsored by any organized group. KROLL arranged a meeting between WALDBURG and UTILITY early in May 1950 for the purpose of obtaining UTILITY's views on German-French rapprochement and to enable WALDBURG to describe the movement and to request for it the support of UTILITY's organization.

2. At the meeting UTILITY stated that he approved of the movement and that he would be willing to supply WALDBURG with information and contacts, but that his organization was not equipped to give the propaganda support that WALDBURG had indicated he wanted. He warned that the movement would not succeed without German government support and suggested that WALDBURG contact Chancellor ADENAUER as soon as possible. In a thirty minute exposition on the European situation UTILITY then predicted that there would not be a war for at least five years, barring some unforeseen event, and further stated that what Western Europe needed most was a spiritual or ideological concept or weapon which
would help to unify the various Western European states and groups.
UTILITY indicated that he had submitted the substance of his exposition to his American contact.

3. The above mentioned meeting with UTILITY followed almost immediately after the return of WALDBURG, KROLL and HR from France, where WALDBURG promotes the movement through Archduchess ADELHEID, sister of Archduke Otto von HAPSBURG. While in France WALDBURG and KROLL met secretly with a more or less clandestine group of Catholic conservatives, many of whom are members of the de GAULLE and PETAIN factions and are wanted by the French police as former Nazi collaborators. The group of Catholic conservatives apparently believes WALDBURG to be the leader of a potential resistance movement which they, as a clandestine group, could join in a war against the Soviet Union. They informed WALDBURG that they could not offer his movement any political influence in France but could introduce him to General HAYARD and leaders of the young Catholic labor group. Colonel OLIVIER, leader of the group who has been identified as Colonel PARRY, former chief of de GAULLE's Intelligence Service, claims to maintain high official contacts with the British and the Americans which were developed during the war, contacts with the Vatican, and with Swiss (or former Swiss) Intelligence circles. His French Intelligence connections are not known but he evinced a particular interest in economic intelligence on the USSR and on Soviet war potential.

4. On 8 May 1950 LR met Prince Henrich LIECHTENSTEIN at Vaduz and drove with him to Berne. Two days later LR proceeded to Lugano for a meeting arranged by the Italian MA in Berne with a Mr. "TOMAY", identified as Lieutenant-Colonel TESSITORE, head of the Italian Army IS branch dealing with Eastern Europe. During their conversation LR asked TESSITORE point-blank if the Italian IS had OFFSPRING connections and was told that there were none. A few days later LR asked UTILITY whether OFFSPRING maintained contact with the Italian IS and UTILITY also replied in the negative. UTILITY admitted, however, that he had good personal contacts with high Italian military figures, such as RAY (phonetic), but stated that he had not made use of this contact for intelligence purposes.
6 July 1980

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Chief, Foreign Division II
Attn: Fulmek

Operational
Barbera and Walter von CSELEK

Some months ago, I was informed that a sister of Carlheinz von CSELEK was living in Brazil. I believe that the interrogation of Frau Carlheinz (CSELEK) also referred to this sister who allegedly had carried a distant relative by the name of Walter CSELEK. A check of all available sources and records in Sao Paulo proved negative on both Barbera and Walter.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2E NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005
Interview with UTILITY, 26 June 1950

1. The interview had been set originally for 26 June at 1600 hours in UTILITY's office in the compound at Pullach. I was visited an hour before the appointed time, however, by Mr. HERDING, who said that UTILITY had changed his mind in favor of tea at his home on the Starnbergsee. And so it was.

2. As with everything that UTILITY does, this interview had been carefully prepared, even down to the brief participation of his wife, a personable woman whose native volubility has obviously been cramped by years of anxious suppression in favor of the more purposeful volubility of her husband. Her arrival coincided roughly with the completion of UTILITY's detailed account of the history of OFFSPRING. After she had joined us, I switched the conversation to the general observations of one who had just come to Germany from Austria and had remarked certain not very subtle differences between the attitude of Americans towards Austrians and the attitude of Americans toward Germans. This prompted Mrs. UTILITY to express herself in rather uninhibited language about categorical de-Nazification and sensational reporting in the German and American press on German nationalism and militarism. Her points were well taken, although made with that uneasy intensity common to European wives of forceful Europeans, and deriving from a well founded uncertainty as to whether and when they will be advised, more or less gallantly, to shut up. Although her language was less guardedly tactful than UTILITY's, she was, I have no doubt, expressing UTILITY's own thoughts on the subject. I pointed out the influence that American public opinion plays in such matters and the impossibility of expecting the American public to be able to distinguish between the Abwehr and the SD or, for that matter, between the Abwehr and Freunde Heere Ost. At about this point UTILITY nodded to his wife in a manner which seemed to say that it was time she got the hell upstairs — which she did.

3. Our amenities a trois had brought the conversation to the subject closest to UTILITY's heart — the problem of legitimizing OFFSPRING with URGROWTH and of stage managing the transmutation of OFFSPRING into the future OTS. He feels that there will be increasing popular pressure in Germany for a relaxation of occupation controls and for a corresponding increase in the sovereignty of the Bonn Government. He obviously feels that the Allies are moving too slowly in this direction, although he...
understands fully the considerations of public opinion in France and England, as well as in the United States, which make speed impossible, not to mention the human factors involved among the occupation bureaucracy who can be expected to resist the loss of any part of the authority to which, over a period of five years, they have become comfortably accustomed. But he also understands — and is driven by — the time element as it plays on the German side. He is openly concerned about the charges of collaboration to which he and his co-workers are certain to be exposed — he cited some minor examples to show that this is already in the wind — as the Government tightens up on the relations of its subordinate officials with the occupation powers and as resentment against Allied controls and "guidance" grows. He is therefore anxious to combat the time element — as it works against him — by securing at least tacit official legitimization with the government as soon as possible. This will serve, in addition to logistical and servicing considerations, the double purpose of paving the way for future incorporation as the GIS and of protecting his people from the charge of being American agents. UTILITY stated frankly that this has been for the past year his primary and almost exclusive preoccupation. And this is where WERKUR comes in. It is WERKUR's job to cultivate and maintain contact with key political figures and to keep UTILITY informed of political developments on the German side.

4. Although UTILITY admits that his contacts are almost exclusively with the CDU, he hastens to point out that this is simply the result of the fact that the CDU/CSU is the governing party. He stresses his personal political non-partisanship, pointing to the apolitical tradition of the German Army, and insists that the future GIS must stand above politics and enjoy the support of all the major parties and of all the western occupying powers. The organization would, he says, like to have contact with the Socialists, but has desisted thus far because of SCHUMACHER's known antipathy to officers and because of the closeness of the German Socialists to the British, with whom, UTILITY points out wryly, if not bitterly, he also has no contact. He seems to feel that the best way to the Socialists would be via the British, and he is accordingly very anxious to make personal contact with a representative of the GIS, — he mentioned General HADEN and Mr. HAUMON — with our approval. He is aware of our reservations on this point and seems to have no intentions of violating them, but he is at a loss to understand why we do not sanction the same relation to the British which we have previously sanctioned with respect to the Swiss, the Spaniards, the French, etc. The problem is not, he says, acute at the moment, but he expects it to become acute within a year, and we can expect continued pressure and a lot of carefully formulated persuasion from him in the months to come. As for direct contact with the Socialists, he is afraid of a rebuff. He points out that SCHWERIN was told off by SCHUMACHER in no uncertain terms, from which he derives the reasonable conclusion that any meeting between himself and SCHUMACHER must be carefully prepared and must not, in any case, take place until a favorable reception is guaranteed. He has not met KNOERINGEN, Socialist leader in Bavaria, because of the latter's known closeness to the British — not to mention SCHWERIN. His immediate concern, however, is Bonn, and he intends to go to Frankfurt this week to meet GLOBKE with a view to sounding him out as to the best procedural plan for legitimization.
5. As to my own sphere of activity, I told UTILITY that we were well acquainted and favorably impressed with him and his group on an operational basis, but that we felt considerably less completely in the picture with regard to his place in the German political picture. I told him that, in view of our common objectives with regard to the GIS, I thought it would be to our mutual advantage for us to know more about this aspect of his group, i.e., who their friends are, who their supporters are, what their general political orientation, etc. I pointed out that this was particularly important in view of the distance between Washington and Pullach and the suspicions about the German military which so actively influence American public opinion and, consequently, American policy decisions. He agreed wholeheartedly with this view, and promised to arrange a meeting a trio with MERKUR next week to discuss steps to be taken in this direction, including the revelation of a complete list of OFFSPRING's "special connections."

6. I had, on the whole, an excellent impression of UTILITY, better, indeed, than when I first met him on the occasion of C's visit to Pullach. MERKUR told me beforehand when I suggested that it might be well if MERKUR were present at the interview, that "the Doctor is at his best when alone." He was, in any case, frank, serious, intense, thorough and, I think, sincere. He took it very well, for instance, when, during his discussions of the political problems relative to the absorption of OFFSPRING in the Bonn Government, I asked him whether his interests were exclusively in the intelligence field or whether he was not also concerned with keeping the decent elements of the German General Staff together for future use. He was obviously taken by surprise and asked me to repeat the question, which I did in a manner designed to give him time to formulate an answer. He said, "Exclusively intelligence for the time being. It so happens that some excellent General Staff officers, such as HORN, have joined our group, and we also maintain contact with others, such as GUDERIAN and SPEIDEL." He also mentioned some "excellent younger officers" now active with his organization.

7. There was no suggestion of the political naivete reflected in reports of UTILITY's activities a year ago, and I suspect that the past six months have taught him much. He is an uncommonly intelligent man and is certainly capable of learning from political experience. He showed a detailed understanding of persons and issues in the German political theater, and he made no attempt to conceal the fact that it is in politics that his primary interest now lies, not because of personal political ambition, nor because of any native yen for the game of politics, but rather because he knows that the future of his organization cannot be secured without mastery of the political problems involved.

8. Although we did not speak specifically of the "third force" concept, popular with so many Germans and given lip service by ADENAUER, who can hardly believe in it, I derived a strong impression from his discussion of the American role in world affairs that UTILITY is completely committed to.
the concept of Western Europe as an American bridgehead on the continent. He spoke repeatedly of the obsolescence of any narrow nationalist concept and observed that even England, in the last analysis, must dance to the American tune. He seems, indeed, rather anti-British, although he realizes that he must make his peace with British intelligence if he is to survive within the framework of the German Government. His feeling toward the Socialists is similar. He is not anti-Socialist, and he has great respect for many individual Socialists, but he shares the suspicions of a largely mythical Socialist left wing which is common to conservatives in Europe generally and to conservative military men everywhere.
CONFIDENTIAL

AIR

Chief of Station, European

Chief, Foreign Division II

(Operational)

Barbara and Walter von GUELE

Ref. Reports UMB-45-6070; T.O.D. 2972

1. As the result of a request for a next of kin by L. Hecht, he has learned that Barbara von GUELE arrived in Brazil on 21 May 1945 and at the Service de Registro de Estrangeiros obtained an identity document, no. 18,205,258, giving as references Edgard

Ribeiro da Silva, 212, apt. 102, and R. Fernandes, 290 (on whom there is no information in the files of this office). Formerly she resided in Florianopolis where she had registration no. 57,650. At the present time she lives in Rio de Janeiro at Ram. Angelina, 102, apt. 101 (personal). She teaches music and works as a piano teacher, having many good pupils who are residents of that area.

2. Walter Carlos von GUELE, an accountant, lives at the same address and according to the apartment house register he carries an identity document, no. 54,332, issued in Joinville, on 12 July 1943.
19 July 1950

Chief, Foreign Division M

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

Information on UTILITY

REF : MGK-W-5212

1. In one of my first meetings with UTILITY I questioned him concerning possible connections to the WALDBURG Kreis. He admitted readily that he had connections to the WALDBURG Kreis and to Prince WALDBURG but that he had grave reservations as to WALDBURG's character. He intimated that OFFSPRING's attitude towards the whole WALDBURG was governed by considerable reservations.

2. Although he maintains a direct personal contact with WALDBURG through Colonel LANGRAU, an OFFSPRING known locally as Mr. LANGENDORF, the firm relationship here is Dr. KROLL, a member of the Landtag, Catholic Youth leader, and a politician with wide interest in the economic and constitutional fields.

3. Subsequent to this first conversation with UTILITY, the latter showed me a report which had been given to him by Mr. LANGENDORF, describing a meeting between LANGENDORF and himself which had taken place at the Bayrischerhof on the initiative of WALDBURG shortly after the outbreak of civil war in Korea. This report included a highly unfavorable assessment of WALDBURG by LANGENDORF in which WALDBURG was characterized as hysterical, fanatic, fantastic, and otherwise unstable. From the remarks attributed to WALDBURG in the course of this report, it was plain that he was hysterically pessimistic and extremely anti-American in the sense that he feels that the Americans cannot be counted upon for real support. (This meeting took place before American intervention in Korea.)

4. Generally speaking, it seems unlikely that WALDBURG may be considered a particularly close connection of OFFSPRING. KROLL is undoubtedly a close Special Connection but in spite of rather than because of his connections to Prince WALDBURG.
About 10 sacks of documents hidden by Gen. von GEHLEN, Rome, a British agent.

About 10 sacks of documents hidden by Gen. von GEHLEN, Rome, a British agent.

MGLA 7592/60 STAFF { MGLA-7526 BAUN Diary BAUN Diary BAUN Diary MGLA 12873

Cover Name: SCHNEIDER

MGLA-997 More or less carried on BAUN's work as Director of Operations after latter removed.
18 Nov 48 Official tie-up with Swiss police probably results from Subject's contacts. Vatican contact apparently originated with Subject's brother in Rome.

MGLA-5270 Brigadier General GSC. Until 9 Apr 45 leader German Eastern Military Intelligence.
17 Dec 48 Chief Fremde Heere Ost. 9 Apr 45 dismissed special order Hitler. No party member. Connected July 20, '44 plot. Formal denazification not possible without endangering cover.

Waldman Has sister in Brazil who is married to man by name of von GEHLEN?

MGLA 1419 22 March 1950
Possible candidate to head new org. called "Admiral Canaria Abteilung" instead of "Neue Gesta-
tapo".

MGLA 1386 3 April 1950 (Bernhard zur MUELENE) (7-11783
Subj. formerly under ODEUM member WEITZERHAUSEN of the Org. 97. Described by UTILITY as cousin of Dr. zur MUELENE. DROPPED.

MGLA-2562 UTILITY was aware that Hermann BAUN had Russian contacts, but never questioned his loyalty. Document contains additional data on UTILITY's role in the BAUN investigation.

von GEHLEN, Reinhard

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2001 2003

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
TO: Chief, Pullach Operations Base
FROM: Chief of Station, Karlsruhe
SUBJECT: GENERAL--
        SPECIFIC— Newspaper Articles of Interest.

The attached is forwarded for your information.

Dist:
2-FOB w/attach
2-COS
1-Reg

23.35 23:35
27III 11/83

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3826 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACI DATE 2005
VIA: Air

SECRET

DATE: 19 September 1966

TO: Chief of Station, Ke-kuh

FROM: Chief, Foreign Branch II

SUBJECT: General Operations, Specific Zipper and Donn

1. After reading full 1034, our only constructive suggestion is that someone should put a cold towel on Utility's head. His reaction to the official announcement of Castle's appointment gives eloquent support to the various appraisals of his character which have been written by the staff.

2. As nearly as we can analyze it, Utility seems to feel that by some divine ordination method should appear in the military or security fields in Western Europe without either his conscious or his direct participation. This peculiar perception, particularly well outlined in full 1034, is really creating an almost insurmountable problem for us. To the extent we would like to maintain Zipper as an intelligence agent for the WAC, we can go on that line, we want to the individuals as the sort of variety properly placed in any German renunciation effort simply on the grounds of motivation, capacity, and orientation toward the American viewpoint. On the other hand, we have Utility attempting to use in this the influence of his organization, not as an intelligence asset, but as a political grouping of former German officers.

3. To some hardly know how to suggest that you unravel this circular chain, but we do share with you a basic concern over what it is we are attempting to advocate with Section and Zipper. To certainly go as long with paragraph six of full 1034, just as we do with paragraphs three, four, and five of Karl 9705, but as we indicated in full 1034, there is a legitimate distinction between Zipper as an intelligence package and the use of certainZipper as an individual basis in the renunciation effort. Too, this distinction would not be difficult to work out if it were not for Utility's
personal ambition and desire to be the only "true prophet". It can be fairly said that a certain portion of Zipper is of little value to anyone except to utility and his political aspirations. Therefore, would it not be possible to suggest that we treat Zipper as an apolitical intelligence organization which deserves Dark support and legitimation, thus enabling us to back off from the advocacy of specific members of Zipper in their campaigns for political or military jobs? Stated another way, Hickey should discuss Zipper with distrust as an organization and not get into individual personalities. This would then leave him free to advocate in Allied councils specific German officers, whether Zipper or not, for any jobs he deemed best. In this fashion we could make our influence in individual cases felt through him without each time raising the question of whether or not the person wears the Zipper badge.

4. Possibly the foregoing suggestion looks realistic, but we have yet to attempt to make some sort of distinction. Otherwise we will find ourselves bogged down in the ring-around-a-rosy which is bound to continue until there is enough German remilitarization to provide jobs for all interested officers. Also this approach should help us in outmaneuvering the British and French on specific candidates for key posts whereas it is pretty hard to stand behind the scenes and pull strings with the large Zipper organization bulging out on every side and constantly giving our game away.

5. Frankly, on individual cases such as Horn, possibly Speidel, Poertner and others, we should not hesitate to request Hickey to use his influence to see that well placed American officials, both diplomatic and military, personally bend over backward to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of any country even an occupied one. Consequently they often find themselves outmaneuvered by the British and French who are much less conscience stricken at the use of pressures and under-the-table politicking. For this reason we as an organization should at least make our intelligence needs strongly felt with Hickey, and through him with Hickey and Hays, to see to it that a reasonable number of "safe" officers land in top jobs in any remilitarization effort. We would need such individuals regardless of the fate of Zipper.

6. I thought you might be interested in the attached clippings of newspaper articles on the roaming of West Germany.

Richard Helms

Attachment
EXTRACT

FROM: MNSA-23504, 20 October 1950, Subj: Weekly Letter from C.

6. I visited FOB on the morning of the 11th. I described a long and bitter conference he had had with UTILITY some days after the McCloy dinner. During the conference I took the position outlined in your MGKN 6425 and achieved good results. UTILITY, it appears, was practically isolated within his own organization in the matter of the McCloy dinner. All of his senior people were against it, and apparently he had had a bitter showdown with them prior to his meeting with C. Thus C was in a position to deal the final blow.

I decided that we would not return to the subject of the meeting on the occasion of my visit, but rather ask UTILITY to brief me for my discussions in Washington. The meeting was laid on as a final one before my return home. The discussion was cordial, and I must say not very revealing.

I will arrange another meeting with UTILITY before leaving the theater, at which time I will express to him your view about the McCloy dinner.
1. It should be borne in mind in reading the following that the writer has known UTILITY only as a politician and has had no experience in dealing with him in intelligence operations or organizational administration.

2. There is nothing about UTILITY to suggest that he is nearly 50. He has always reminded me of a precocious schoolboy politician, 16 or 17 years old, bright for his age and more daring than his fellows in initiating the manners of grown-ups, the kind of boy who tries his political wings as manager of athletic teams or as editor of high school papers, or as manipulator of elections for the student council. This essential boyishness, in view of the fact that UTILITY is actually 48, is an incongruous but important element in his character, sometimes charming, sometimes exasperating, sometimes a little pathetic. One is almost always somewhat at a loss in dealing with him, for it expresses itself in something hesitant and uncertain. When UTILITY, who always looks as though it were his first, is indulged in only in a brave effort to give an impression of adulthood, in performing his duties at best, particularly when celebrities and important persons are involved, UTILITY is all at ease but resolved, playing the haussere. He never leaves the part, and the act is unconvincing, however determined. Like the schoolboy politician, UTILITY is an inveterate self-salesman. He seldom says an unconsidered word, which is not to say that he doesn't utter many an ill-considered one. He is, indeed, a bad conversationalist. He delivers his canned briefings well and convincingly, but when he departs from the script, his discourse is troubled by countless "Is that what you mean" and searching for the discreet term or expression. And when the conversation touches upon anything but business, he is inhibited by excessive ignorance of the facts of all this, very probably, of his size. UTILITY is a small, and, even as small as a rather unimpressive one, as L. has put it, he suffers from a "front complex," which is consistent with the "elixir of the schoolboy" politician.

3. This is the background against which UTILITY's erratic, sometimes brilliant, sometimes disreputable behavior must be examined. It is easy to
assume that UTILITY has had his moments of memorable chagrin as a German Army officer. No one looks the part less than he, and it is inconceivable that he hasn’t been uncomfortably conscious of this fact all his life. It probably explains his extraordinary vanity, touchiness on matters of honor and prestige, – and his ambition. He must have worked very hard to get as far as he has, and, lacking physical stature and presence, if not actual strength, he undoubtedly survived by his wits, which are keen, and which would be really formidable in more stable man, less inhibited by the heebee jeebees of the adolescent boy tortured by suppressed doubts as to whether he can make a go of it in the adult world but determined to buttress a good try with a bold front.

4. Obviously, he doesn’t lack important assets. He has initiative, vision and a deal of native shrewdness. His accomplishment in creating ZIPPER is something no one can take away from him, and it is remembered and acknowledged even by his detractors. It took vision, initiative and a lot of nerve; not to mention a grasp of the essentials of organization and some diplomatic talent. But in the early stages of the post-war game, UTILITY had the advantage of dealing almost exclusively with military men, on the American as well as on the German side, and he is understandably more at home with military men than with civilians. More recently he has had to deal almost exclusively with civilians, or with military men in cahoots with civilians, so to speak, and it has been a tougher haul. Politically, he has had, probably for the first time in his life, to do his politicking without the protective rules of honor and convention which distinguish military from civilian politics, and socially he has had to mix with people with whom he shares no common ground of education or experience and who have a disconcerting habit of talking on subjects about which UTILITY knows no more than the subject headings.

5. Throughout this period, concentrated in the developments associated with the Verfassungsschutz and remilitarization, he has performed erratically. He has generally sized things up correctly in his moments of psychological equilibrium, and has made policy accordingly, but time and again he has been disconcerted and sidetracked by events which seemed to threaten his ambition or prick his vanity. At such times he has indulged in petulance, temper tantrums, petty intrigue, slander and deceit. His reaction to -- -- J’s emergence as U.P.R.’s military adviser was consistently petulant, colored by jealousy, resentment and frustration. It was climaxied by a disgraceful temper tantrum, touched off by the official announcement of J’s appointment and followed by a week’s sulk in Switzerland. An example of deceit and sharp practice was his wangling of an appointment with McCLOY. The campaign of intrigue and slander against J was, in the end, an undignified spectacle. It hurt J not at all, hurt UTILITY very much and contributed nothing to J eventual downfall.

6. This performance, as unpleasantly spectacular as it was, does not, however, represent the complete record of the case, and it shouldn’t be exaggerated in assessing UTILITY’s performance over the past year, although it shouldn’t be glossed over, either. The most-impressive aspect of the
counter case is UTILITY's demonstrated resiliency. He is a tough little fellow, volatile in his reaction to punishment, but astonishing in his powers of recuperation. After each of his emotional spasms and after each of his sometimes apparently crushing defeats, he has bounced back, with equilibrium restored, capable again of clear, objective thinking, and ready to go back into the ring. Even his repulsive performance in begging the American staff for help against X was balanced in part by his success in getting to McCLOY by an end run. This play represented a kind of double cross of UTILITY's American staff, but at least it showed persistence and resourcefulness.

7. If one were to summarize by compounding a glossary of pertinent adjectives, the result would read somewhat as follows: able, ambitious, bright, calculating, clever, devious, emotional, energetic, honorable, imaginative, impulsive, industrious, insecure (in the psychological sense), intelligent (but not intellectual), proud, resourceful, touchy, vain, volatile.

8. It will be noted that the above glossary includes some contradictions. They simply exist in UTILITY's character, and are usually explicable by reference to the factor of vanity and psychic insecurity which sometimes impels UTILITY to behave in a manner contrary to the dictates of his better nature and which often results, during moments of equilibrium, in tortuous rationalization. It would seem, for instance, that the attributes of deviousness and honor were reconcilable. UTILITY's honor and honesty have been the subject of much discussion and correspondence. Actually, it is the opinion of those who have worked closely with him over a period of time that he is essentially both honorable and honest. His vanity occasionally persuades him to lie to save face, often foolishly, sometimes even ridiculously, and his ambition sometimes impels him to employ devious means when others fail, but these are invariably courses of second choice, and adopted with the safeguards and modifications to be expected of a man who is, by tradition and personal preference, basically honorable. Both I and I are satisfied that in his reporting of major developments UTILITY has consistently told, if not the whole truth, at least little but the truth, and that at no time has he been deliberately deceitful in a substantial degree or on a substantial matter. As to his not always telling the whole truth, it must be remembered that UTILITY considers himself to be the head of a German organization and that, as such, he feels privileged to make his own decision as to what his relationship with his American sponsors requires him to tell them. In other words, he feels under no obligation to act as our informant on German military politics, although he is perfectly aware that an open exchange of relevant information is essential to effective and harmonious operations and as much in his own interest as ours.

9. The fact that UTILITY has emerged victorious and stronger than ever from this summer's political rough and tumble might reasonably be expected to go to his head and make him a more difficult partner in the immediate future than he has been in the past. It will certainly increase his confidence and bolster his position with his own organization, which was not unaffected by some of the blows he took during the early part of the summer. But UTILITY
is too intelligent to make it reasonable to expect the worst. If UTILITY has learned how strong he is, he will certainly not be blinded to the fact that a major and indispensable source of that strength is his American sponsorship and support. He may indulge his vanity here and there along the way, but as between UTILITY's vanity and his intelligence, the former wins a good many battles, but the latter wins the war.
10 November 1950

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Richard Holma

FROM: [Signature]

SUBJECT: General Reinhardt Gehlen

I made the statement in a recent dispatch that the only thing Gehlen lacked in his repertory was a sympathetic press. The opening pages of Jürgen Thorwald's "es begin an der Wiederschlag" indicate that Gehlen is, in fact, not suffering in that regard. Thorwald’s book, which is now in its third printing, portrays Gehlen in the first chapter as one of the unsung heroes of the German Army.

The book opens with Guderian tossing fitfully in his sleeping compartment as his special train takes him, on the night of 8 January 1945, across Germany to a fateful interview with Hitler on troop dispositions. Hitler has consistently and obstinately refused to withdraw the intact but isolated Army Group Nord or to release for the Eastern Front the reserve divisions of the broken Ardennes offensive. Guderian reflects: "The General Staff of the German Army allowed itself no illusions concerning the scale of the coming Soviet offensive. General Gehlen, head of Fremde Heere Ost, who consolidated the reports on the eastern foe, was as clever as he was conscientious, and his estimates of Soviet troop concentrations and Soviet intentions carried an incontestible weight. Guderian had no reason to question for a second the reliability of his colleague...The reports which Gehlen had presented since November had at first given even Guderian—despite all previous experience—an impression of improbability, but nevertheless they were repeatedly demonstrated as being true."

After a sleepless night, Guderian goes to his office car, and buries himself again in his thoughts. He is startled out of his concentration by an opening door:

"In the doorway stood General Gehlen. His sharply chiselled face was pale, with a yellowish undertone. He suffered from the occupational disorder of so many overworked General Staff officers, stomach ulcers."

"Herr Generaloberst," he said, "I have completed another special estimate of the strength ratio in the Baranov beachhead area, and have included the very latest information. According to this information, the enemy is deployed on a 90 kilometer front with five infantry armies, each containing self contained armored corps, and five armored..."
brigades. The ratio of infantry strength now is 11:1 in favor of the enemy, in armor it is 7:1, and in artillery 20:1. Soviet artillery is deployed at some points in concentrations of 250 pieces to the kilometer. The conclusions are so evident that they should convince even the Führer that we face a catastrophe unless something is done.

"Guderian looked squarely into Gehlen's face. Gehlen, too, judged on sober reason. He had no contact with the world in which decisions were based on instincts, inspirations, and moods. Gehlen, Guderian said, 'today is our last chance.'"

Only a few days before, Guderian had pleaded with Hitler and gone over the same ground, but Hitler "refused to recognize that his despised opponent, Stalin, could assemble the reported strength. He spoke again of the 'random rabble' and 'plunder divisions' remaining to Stalin. He had screamed that General Gehlen, in company with his estimates, belonged in an insane asylum. He ignored Guderian's objection that Hitler could put him in the same asylum, since he concurred in Gehlen's opinion.

"He said, 'today is our last chance.'"
Jürgen Thorwald, you will remember, is the nom de plume of Heinz Bongartz, a former special reporter for the German Navy, and a ZIPPER Special Connection. According to ZIPPER, the manuscript of Das begann an der Weichsel was read and toned down by ZIPPER before publication. Guderian's memoirs, currently in manuscript, have been subjected to the same moderating influence.
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

From: PULLACH
To: SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Action: AD50 (1)
Information: S/3 (2-2-4), FDM (5-6)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

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<th>INFO: KARLA</th>
<th>CITE: PULLA</th>
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1. On 29 December Utility, talking from prepared notes, indulged in three-hour harangue against American interference in Zipper internal affairs. Here viewed U.S. policy Germany, Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam and past five years; cited difficult psychological problem of Zipper; presented plan for reorganization of Zipper which will clearly minimize POB influence in Zipper and isolate pro-American staff members; flatly refused expand F-Net if additional funds contingent upon providing AIs identities Zipper agents; attacked POB for efforts push through administrative reforms in Zipper; labelled completely incorrect his relationships western is and upgrowth; denied he neglects intelligence matters in favor political intrigue; defended his own unethical approach to McClory; several times cited possibility of resignation; criticized our handling of Horn and Capote affairs; repeatedly attacked "Washington" policy.

2. Horn, I and J present.

3. I did not interrupt Utility and at end inclined to accept without comment; however, to exploit Horn's presence, made brief remarks for the record. Pouch version follows.

4. On 29 December I called to Utility's office. Utility in stronger, sharper and more explicit terms again rejected any AIs violation of Zipper integrity; stressed fact that Utility and Utility alone, responsible for success or failure of Zipper; returned to basic line of Seibert Utility contract oral agreement.

SECRET

Classified and released by:
Central Intelligence Agency.

REL: METHODS/EXEMPTION 3820
WAR CRIMES/DISCLOSURE
2000 2005

FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE
5. CONTEMPLATE NO ACTION NEXT 10 DAYS. US STAFF INSTRUCTED AVOID ANY NEGOTIATION WITH ZIPPER WHICH MIGHT AGGRAVATE SITUATION.

6. GOING ON LEAVE 1 JANUARY FOR WEEK. UPON RETURN INTEND CALL UTILITY IN, REFER TO HIS COMMENTS TO AND IN ATMOSPHERE OF NEGOTIATION REQUEST HIM SUBMIT IN WRITING HIS VIEWS APPROPRIATE RELATIONS HIS A1S-ZIPPER FOR OUR CONSIDERATION.

7. DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THIS:

A. IMPULSIVE REACTION AGAINST HARD POSITION POB TAKING ON SEVERAL CURRENT ISSUES OR,

B. CALCULATED BID FOR INDEPENDENCE BY UTILITY AFTER CONSIDERATION

(1) VITAL IMPORTANCE TO US OF ZIPPER OR IN CURRENT WORLD CRISIS

(2) BARGAINING POSITION OF UPGRWTH-ON REMILITARIZATION ISSUE AND

(3) SOLID BACKING HE COULD EXPECT FROM SUBORDINATES IN UTILITY-AIS SHOWDOWN COINCIDING WITH LANDSBERG EXECUTIONS WHICH RUMORED IMMINENT AND NOW SUBJECT OF INCREASING PUBLIC CRITICISM; PARTICULARLY AMONG FORMER OFFICERS.
The attached paper describes a recent outburst by Reinhardt Gehlan, the German head of ZIPPER, against US interference in the internal affairs of that organization, and outlines the nature of past US-ZIPPER agreements. It describes the way in which our interpretation of control, strategic operations, and of attaining future position for ZIPPER have conflicted with Gehlan's, and the reservations we would have on seeing him become the head of a future German Intelligence Service. The dispensability of Gehlan to ZIPPER, and the questions of removing him and of choosing a successor are discussed.
On 28 December 1950 Generalmajor Reinhardt Gehlen, German head of ZIPPER, speaking from prepared notes to our senior representative with ZIPPER, delivered a three-hour harangue against American interference in ZIPPER internal affairs. He defended all those activities of his to which we have taken exception in the past year and a half, attacked "Washington" policy, and several times threatened to resign. Our representative, beyond a few comments for the record, did not enter into a discussion with Gehlen. A record of this meeting is being posted. The following day Gehlen called one of the senior US assistants to his office and in another, sharper, more explicit terms covered the same ground. Our representative intends to allow a ten day cooling off period at the end of which he will instruct Gehlen to set out his views in detail and in writing for consideration in Germany and Washington. When those written views have been received and studied here, we believe that we should consider the advisability of a visit to Germany by a high-ranking CIA official for a detailed discussion with Gehlen leading to an unambiguous definition of our concept of the role which the German head of ZIPPER should play. Such a conference should lead to a showdown on whether Gehlen remains on our terms or resigns.

The following paragraphs sketch the background of our disagreement:

Although the tone of Gehlen's dissertation was unnecessarily tactless and embittered, the general strategy of an ultimatum from him was not entirely unexpected. It fits in with the attempts of leading Germans just now to bargain for position, and is not untypical of Gehlen's past approaches to his American superiors. Gehlen has risen since 1945 from the position of a relatively obscure member of the German General Staff to the position of a prime political strategist enjoying the support of conservative political factions, of certain German industrialists, and of the influential remaining portions of the German military. At the same time he enjoys semi-diplomatic relations with the major intelligence services of Western Europe, and he has the advantage of his prolonged association with US intelligence on which to base an accurate estimate of our major strategies and our strength.

Gehlen's present ultimatum, with its rejection of "American interference" harks back to ZIPPER's earlier contractual relationship with the United States Army in Europe. Gehlen's first working arrangement with the Army was based on an oral agreement between General Edwin Sibert and himself. This was an agreement which gave Gehlen broad personal responsibility for the organization and conduct of the operation, and involved a pledge by Gehlen that he would at all times assume full responsibility for the operation "vis-a-vis" the Americans. The agreement was reduced to writing in October 1948 in the form of a directive from EUCOM to the US military commander with ZIPPER which, although it placed ultimate direction and control in the hands of the Americans, granted a wide latitude of operational freedom to the German chief. In practice the US Element of the operation was viewed as there only to provide the German Element logistical and liaison support, and the loose control and minimal accountability of this period created a body of precedent against which Gehlen views our position, which is that our financial outlay alone entitles us to intimate knowledge and control of the ZIPPER operation.
Even when Army control of ZIPPER was from ZIPPER's viewpoint least onerous, Gehlen gave frequent voice to discontent and dissatisfaction with the degree and type of support and supervision. Administrative interference with ZIPPER's lower echelons by inexperienced US intelligence officers, inconsistent financial support, and lack of policy direction, were all criticized by Gehlen, and he frequently, particularly in 1948 and early 1949, supplemented his criticisms with threats to resign and dissolve the operation. It is clear that basically he was dissatisfied with the lack of timely financial planning and of trained US intelligence personnel. He at one point expressed himself as so disillusioned with the lack of US participation in the operational activities of the project that he threatened to resign unless ZIPPER were taken over by CIA. This desire for closer operational supervision had been expressed by Gehlen as early as 1947, when he was having some difficulty in consolidating his personal supremacy in the operation. He claimed at that time to distrust his first deputy's anti-Soviet fanaticism as the basic motivation for the operation, and promised to convert ZIPPER into a strict alliance of German with US interests. It was his suggestion then for the future that enough US personnel be assigned to the operation to supervise and guide it at every point.

In discussions with a CIA investigating officer in November 1948, Gehlen blamed Army pressure in 1946 and 1947 for stimulating unplanned and uncontrolled growth and the resultant violation of most sound operational rules. After our takeover, however, it became apparent that Gehlen intended to maintain the status quo both of organizational and operational procedures, and vigorously to defend ZIPPER practices of loose control, maximum delegation of agent and operational supervision, and minimum accounting and operational reporting. In defending these practices during the period of our examination of ZIPPER's proposals for strategic operations—which later were demonstrated to be more than ninety percent worthless—he bitterly attacked Washington "inflexibility, overcentralization, and lack of operational understanding". His first threat to resign came at this time when, despite previously consistent assurances that he wanted only a stable budget no matter whether large or small, he asserted that it was impossible to continue operations under the budget we proposed for the following year.

We had considered, when we took over ZIPPER on 1 July 1949, the advisability of supplanting the basic EUCOM directive with a written agreement or charter, and our senior representative with ZIPPER did in the summer of 1949 discuss with Gehlen the tentative draft of such an agreement. It was explained at the time that the draft was solely for purposes of exploratory discussion and had not been approved by Karlsruhe or by Washington. It was in any event an innocuous document, playing heavily on ideological and patriotic themes, and less specific than the EUCOM directive. It was decided in Washington that it would serve no useful purpose to reduce the terms of our relationship to writing, and would very probably put us in the legally and morally difficult position of a more binding legal and moral relationship than we cared to assume toward ZIPPER. As a consequence we have deliberately attempted to hold our directives to ZIPPER to questions of actual operations, organization, or administration, and have considered philosophical discussions of the US-ZIPPER relationship as unrelated to the main task.
Our insistent probing into ZIPPER operations and our pressure for administrative and organizational changes, as well as Gehlen's activities outside the ZIPPER framework, have steadily been building up to a major difference of opinion between ZIPPER, or more specifically Gehlen, and us. Gehlen's political aims have been to secure a measure of governmental recognition from Bonn for ZIPPER, to consolidate ZIPPER's position as the dominant contender to become a German Intelligence Service, and to secure positions of influence for ZIPPER staff members and friends in the impending rearmament of Germany. His activities in these directions have included continuance of ZIPPER's influential military contacts, direct contact with the Bonn Government and the US High Commissioner, intensified liaison with various Western intelligence services, and bitter opposition to Berhard Graf von Schwerin during the latter's tenure as Chancellor Adenauer's military advisor. Much of the impetus for these activities has coincided with our interests; we too have long range interest in the development of ZIPPER into a German Intelligence Service, and we have both long and short range interest in the eventual legitimisation of ZIPPER by the Bonn Government. Sharp disagreements have arisen only because of Gehlen's sometimes freewheeling methods, which have often appeared to be evasive and have certainly not considered the complexity of our many intelligence interests in Germany and in Western Europe. Our belief that Gehlen has interfered himself in the pursuit of these goals to the detriment of the intelligence mission of ZIPPER is shared by thoughtful top ZIPPER staff members.

ZIPPER's extremely low capabilities in terms of strategic, long range, high level, and deep penetration operations, in large measure the result of Gehlen's neglect of fundamental intelligence issues, were amply documented in the first year of our supervision of the operation. By mid-summer of this year it was the opinion of all US staff members working with ZIPPER affairs that the organisation was a creditable tactical collection and military evaluation agency, but that it was, with some exceptions, definitely second class in intelligence activities of a more difficult or sophisticated nature. This opinion, shared by many of the ZIPPER German staff, was conveyed to Gehlen by our representative with ZIPPER in July 1952, and he was bluntly informed that unless we were to accept and support ZIPPER only as a tactical agency Gehlen would have to institute radical changes in personnel, procedures, and attitudes. After some reflection Gehlen appeared to accept this decision with good grace, and even initiated some organisational changes for the improvement of strategic coverage.

Although his current outburst is the first strong resistance Gehlen has demonstrated for some time, it has long been apparent that Gehlen's frequent evasions and intrusiveness in the face of our guidance might at some point make it desirable to remove him from ZIPPER. We are in general agreement that, over and above the occasional difficulty in handling Gehlen, he would prejudice the quality of a future German Intelligence Service of which he might later be head. Although he has been a strong and effective leader of ZIPPER in those fields where his personal interests lie, he lacks an emphatic interest in controlled, strategic intelligence operations, and much of the administrative corruption still present in ZIPPER is directly attributable to Gehlen's neglect of that field. Clearly, also, it is Gehlen's desire...
as head of a future OIS to combine internal security coverage with external intelligence, and we have no desire to encourage such a development.

In December 1950 we exchanged views with the field on means of dispensing with Gehlen if the need ever arose, and decided then that we should overlook no opportunity to kick Gehlen upstairs into the service of the Bonn government. Particularly if such a post were military, there is little doubt that Gehlen would cheerfully accept, and in all probability would not continue to exert an undesirable influence on ZIPPER.

The question of his successor was also discussed, and it was decided that the best solution would be a temporary replacement by a forthright Army general with no political ambitions. There is such a general now on the ZIPPER staff who has impressed our staff with his direct and honest approach to certain administrative investigations he has conducted. The other possibility, General Adolf Heusinger, because of his impressive character and intellectual stature, a more obvious candidate to head ZIPPER, is not personally interested in a career in intelligence, and we believe he would serve Allied interests better in his new capacity as military advisor on German rearmament.
Lieber Herr Marshall!

Von allen Seiten hindein war es zahlreich
Väterliche und Töchter des Gedanks zum Teil
recht fest und zum einen Jahr zugegan,
luß es mir eurer fallt, meinem Dank durch
die zeigten den kurte ausdrucke zu geben. Ich
erwidere der ausgesprochenen Wünsche auf der
herzlichen. Möge das neue Jahr eine Über-
windung der Kernung beten bringen, mit denen
die alte Jahr abgeschlossen ist und möge es
hoch des Zeichen positiver Schwierungen,
unter denen es steht, die Grundlage für eine

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3824
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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für deine Entwicklung Lügen - traurig bleib.

Und persönliche Freiheit und die Dauer möge
es unter einem Regenbogen bleiben stehen.

Alle diese Wünsche mögen gleichzeitig etwas
höher klingen; aber keine Wünsche sind keiner
unerwünschte sein, denn eine Lösung zu haben,
bestimmt, ein Ziel und die Aufgabe aufnehmen.

Als letzter denter in Kürze, dass die mit
Gemeinsamkeit von allen eingegangene Vertrags-
zeichnung in der Erstellung unserer gemeinsamen
Aufgabe nützlich für mich der entscheidende Faktor
für den Erfolg unserer Arbeit leitet.

Mit besten Grüßen bin ich zufrieden mit
Empfehlungen in Ihrer Gehr.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

[Signature]
Draft of letter to be sent by 34 and to be handcarried by 017 to Mr. SHELL.

Office of the Denazification Advisor
SHELL, APD 407-A, W.G, Army
Attention: Mr. SHELL

Dear Mr. SHELL:

Since the end of World War II, I am residing in the United States of America. Since I do not know at what time I shall return to Germany, I request a trial in absence by a Bavarian denazification board. My home is in Munich, Bavaria, located in the Soviet zone of Germany to which I cannot return for obvious reasons. Therefore, I request this trial in absence by a Bavarian denazification board.

I am including two fragment of copies of all papers which I believe are necessary for my denazification.

I have also given authority to present my interests in this denazification trial to the lawyer Dr. Otto KRAHNS, residing at FRANKFURT/Main, 27910, who is also in possession of all documents, copies of which I include in this letter.

I deeply appreciate the assistance given to me already by American authorities in forwarding to me copies of the fragment and also advising me to write directly to you. I am most appreciative of all the assistance you can give this matter.

Very sincerely yours,

Distribution: 23

017 (for file)

FOR COORDINATION WITH DOD

8 Feb, 1957

COMPOSITE CO.
13 January 1949

SUBJECT—Demonstration of 34

TO 23 and 34, PERSONAL

To: Office of the Deminization

At the request of the undersigned visited
Mr. G. K. SHELL, and Mr. WOOD, both of the Office of the
Deminization Advisor, OME, with reference to possible
requirements for the deminization of 34.

2. Both Mr. SHELL and Mr. WOOD are known by the
undersigned to be in the Office of Time and it is the
general practice in those offices that these offices are
reluctant to destroy information, but that the
undersigned, after a long period of the investigation
of the case, did not believe that formally, the material
would have a bearing on the case in the United States.

3. All different possibilities were discussed, and
the undersigned, believing that the following method would be
best for the case, it should pretend in the undesignated
and Wood, should write a personal letter, (see below)
to the Government of the United States requesting a
trial-in-absentia, in the case of 34. The undersigned
will then present the documents directly to Mr. RANSB
of the Foreign Ministry of Deminization, requesting a
trial-in-absentia. If Wood should get in touch
with the undersigned before this, it is believed by Mr. SHELL
that the undersigned could notify him of any publicity.

I am most appreciative of this matter.

1 Doll a/s

DISTRIBUTION: 23

Case of 34.

Deminization

Case of 34.

Available Copy

MCKA 70644

8 Feb
Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Chief, Pullach Operations Base

Attn: Executive Office

ZIPPER — Operational

Request TTD for Herta GESLÉN van VAGHENWICK and Children

Enclosed is the application and photos for subject and three
children. We have also enclosed ZIPPER's reason for this request.

[Attachment]

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3821
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
TO : 27.0
FROM : 30 (32)
SUBJECT : Application for Temporary Travel Document in lieu of Passport and/or Exit Permit.

It is requested that a Temporary Travel Document to Switzerland, Austria, Italy and Spain be procured for:

Herta Gehlen van Vaernwyck.

Reason : Mrs. Herta Gehlen van Vaernwyck is the wife of 30. She will not travel on behalf of this organization but requires the passport for recreation purposes.

Incl.:
2 Applications
16 Photos
11 March 1904

Gehlen von Vaernewyck

von Seydlitz-Kurzbach

Herta, Charlotte, Agnes, Helene

Leobschnitz, Silesia

Keto v. Seydlitz-Kurzbach / German

17 March 1904

German

married

Berg near Starnberg

50, 65

housewife

_159 cm_ gray

_54 cm_ blue-gray

_12 cm_ none

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
daughter of Reinhard OHLIE
b. 19 Jan 34, Berlin
photo prob. prior to 1951

Christoph
Marie Theresa

b. 28 Feb 43
daughter of Reinhard

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET
SECRET (When Filled In)
SEE 207 FOLDER FOR ORIGINAL PHOTO(S)
BEST AVAILABLE COPY
TO: Chief, Pullach Operations Base
FROM: Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, Germany
SUBJECT: General - Operational
Specific - TTD - No. 006935 - Herta GEHLEN VAN VAERNENICK

Ref: W-4-4797

1. Re your request in referenced memorandum, enclosed please find Temporary Travel Document(s) in Lieu of Passport, valid for a period of 2 years, as listed below:

No. 006935 - Herta GEHLEN VAN VAERNENICK

2. Please see that subject fills in all the information asked for on the inside cover of the document and signs his name beneath his picture on Page 1 before using the document.

3. Before this document can be used for travel to a foreign country, subject must obtain visas from the appropriate Consulate or representative of the countries he desires to visit.

Encl(s) - 1
Dist: P0B: 2
C0S(O) Files: 2

SECRET

Date: 17 January 1951
SECRET

GEHLEN van VAENENWYCK, Herta. (nee: von SEIDLITZ-KURZBACH)

NAME: Charlotte, Agnes, Helene

TITLES: ALIAS

(last name, first et al)

BORN: 17 March 1904; Leobschütz, Silesia

(city/prov.)

Age:

Photo (if yes, date & file):

PERSONAL DESCRIPTION:

Ht:169 cm. Wt: Hair: Grey Eys:Blue-grey Teeth:

Face-shape: Complexion: Sores: Build:

Prominent/ident. features:

FATHER: SEIDLITZ-KURZBACH, Friedrich Wilhelm von

(last name, first et al) (titles) (birth day-mo.-yr.; city/prov.)

OCCUP.: RESIDENCE:

MOTHER: (maiden name): SEIDLITZ-KURZBACH, Meta v.

OCCUP.: RESIDENCE:

SPOUSE: GEHLEN van VAENENWYCK, Reinhard Married 1931


2. Christoph GEHLEN van VAENENWYCK, male, 11 Feb 1937, Berlin, Germany.

3. Harle Therese GEHLEN van VAENENWYCK, female, 4 Sep 1940, Liegnitz, Germany.

RESID.: Bergstrasse, Starnberg, M. 68, house #: street (city-suburb/province)

BUSINESS: Housewife

TDD #: 0446935 issued 17 Jan 1951 for countries: Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain

PASSPORT #: issued for countries:

K# (true): D-31744a issued: 23 May 1949, Starnberg

CA: (date)

K# (0 #): issued: COVER UNIT:

ORD.: POSN.:

V# S.# Payroll Cryptonym:

CARD # ID Card Emergency #

SPECIAL DOCUMENTATION:

SUMMARY OF QUALIF., ACTIV.:

1. Jan 51, MGKA-4497, TTD for Herta + 3 children

5. 1. MGKA-25927, TTD 0446935, Herta G. van Veldhuizen
It seems clear that we have reached a point in our relationship with ZIPPER and in the conduct of our affairs vis-a-vis URGROWTH, where a general review of a number of related factors is necessary if we are to avoid mortgaging our future relationship with German intelligence ** * * *.

Both [name redacted] and [name redacted], the only other members of PDB who have had a great deal of contact with UTILITY in political matters, are completely convinced that we should, without further consideration, fire him. ** * * * Even considering the consequences, it may be the solution and this may be the time for it. First, however, I feel obligated to summarize what I feel are considerations directly relating to this issue.

* * * * *

* * * * *

NOTES: Annotated by WASH 31871 (OUT 87802), filed ZIPPER-Western German Government.

1. ONLY ELEMENT MISSING TO ROUND OUT BASIS FOR DETERMINING UTILITY'S FUTURE IS RELIABLE ESTIMATE WHAT UPTHRUST KNOWS AND THINKS OF UTILITY AS HEAD OF ZIPPER ** * * *.

2. CABLE YOUR SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW WE COULD PROCES UPTHRUST'S VIEWS THIS DELICATE MATTER. ** * * *
PULL 1872

TO: WASHE
INFO: KARLA
CITE: PULLA

IMMEDIATE ACTION.

RE: WASH 31871 (CUT 87809)

1. AGREE PARA 1 REF; FRONTAL APPROACH UPTHRUST VIA MCOLOY COMBINED WITH MORE DISCREET SOUNING OUT UPTHRUST AIDS VIA THAYER AND SHUTE RECOMMENDED.

2. UTILITY INCREASINGLY CONCERNED EMERGENCE OF OFFICE IN INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS; CONVINCED NOW TIME FOR UTILITY AND ZIPPER MOVE INTO UPGROWTH WITH US FOOTING BILL. WE ADVISED UTILITY PREMATURE MOVE ZIPPER INMASSE INTO UPGROWTH AND SUGGESTED HE CONSIDER INTERIM SOLUTION INVOLVING (A) UTILITY SELING HIMSELF AND SMALL STAFF TO UPGROWTH AS THE OFFICIAL UPGROWTH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE (B) VESTIGIAL SEPARATION UTILITY GROUP FROM ZIPPER EMPHASIZED ZIPPER UPGROWTH RELATIONSHIP GERMAN PROBLEM AND UTILITY MUST SUCCEED OR FAIL ON OWN MERITS WITHOUT OVERT AMERICAN INTERVENTION.

3. THIS INTERIM SOLUTION WOULD GO LONG WAY IN SOLVING LEGALIZATION AND SUPPORT PROBLEMS, WOULD EXTEND PERIOD OUR MAXIMUM CONTROL ZIPPER OPERATIONS, WOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE TEMPORARY SOLUTION POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS CITED MGLA 5259.

4. UNLIKELY UTILITY CAN OBTAIN NECESSARY SUPPORT THIS PLAN FROM BOTH UPTHRUST AND (C) WE PROPOSE ENCOURAGE UTILITY SALLY FORTH AND TEST OWN STRENGTH. FAILURE ON HIS PART TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM WOULD CREATE MORE OPPORTUNE CIRCUMSTANCES TO CONSIDER DISMISSAL.
SUCCESS WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT INDICATION UPTHRUST ASSESSMENT
UTILITY.

SUGGEST WE DELAY FRONTAL APPROACHES PARA 1 SEVERAL WEEKS;
TAKE WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE ON UTILITY EFFORT SOLVE ZIPPER-UPGROWTH
PROBLEM.

UTILITY BRIEFED UPTHRUST 13 MARCH OTTO LENZ PRESENT LATER
UTILITY DISCUSSED BROAD ASPECTS G 1S PROBLEM WITH GLOBKE. POUCHE
ING DETAILS.

16 MARCH REQUESTED UTILITY PROVIDE US SOONEST WRITTEN COMPRE
HENSIVE PROPOSAL THIS MATTER.

TOR: 16502 18 MAR 51

SECRET
From: FRANKFURT
To: SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Action: FDM (1-2-3)
Information: AD/SO (4), STC (5), 110 (6-7), S/C (8-9-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (g) 60A AR-380-5

FRAN 2509

TO: WASHF INFO: KARLF, PULLF CITE: FRANF
RE: WASH 31871 (OUT 87809)

1. CANNOT THINK OF ALTERNATIVE TO PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED PLAN. MCCLOY-UPTHURST DISCUSSION OF ENTIRE ZIPPER COMPLEX, INCLUDING UTILITY'S PERSONAL STANDING, PREFERABLY IN J AND SHUTE SHOULD ALSO ATTEND DISCUSSION.

2. UTILITY CANNOT POSSIBLY TAKE EXCEPTION TO ANY DISCUSSION ON THAT LEVEL.

3. IF DESIRABLE, COULD ASK C DIRECTLY. NO REASON TO BELIEVE UTILITY WOULD FIND OUT ABOUT SUCH QUERY.
DESCRIPTION:

Age: 39
Weight: 53 kg
Height: 174 cm
Hair: dark blonde
Eyes: blue

Yes

(Ammunition auth.)

25

(No. of rounds)

Yes

(Concealed weapon)

Yes

(Retention in qtrs.)

REGISTRATION NUMBER:

D.O. VERDIE, Lt.Col 0-1007235

(NAME, rank, ASN, typed)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>50</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height</td>
<td>5'10&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight</td>
<td>143 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hair</td>
<td>dark blonde</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eyes</td>
<td>blue</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ammunition Authorized:</th>
<th>Class A and B Permits:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard Authorization</td>
<td>Yes or No</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Authorization</th>
<th>Class C Permit:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Quantity)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class D and E Permits:</th>
<th>Quarters Authorization (Not in excess 31 Rds)</th>
<th>Class F Permit:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Number Rds)</td>
<td>(Yes or No)</td>
<td>(Yes or No)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity Authorized</th>
<th>25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Ammunition in excess of authorized quantity will be held in custody of Provost Marshal or other appropriately designated official.

- For Class F Permit: Carrying of concealed weapon authorized (Yes or No)
- Retention in Quarters Authorized: (Yes or No)

Permit Expires: 

This Registration Form must be retained with the firearm.

AC1. (I) 341-705-1722

---

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**
To: KARLSFUHE, PULLACH, FRANKFURT  
From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
CONFIRMATION: (1-2)  
INF: (SOG (3), STA (4), STG (5), LID (6-7), S/C (8-9-10)  

OUT 91561

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para 81 (1) 60A AK-180-S.

1. INTEND PROCEED PER PARA 1. FRAN REFERENCE. I WILL BE FULLY BRIEFED WASH VIEWS PRIOR ARRIVAL. SUGGEST YOU MAKE TENTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS SUCH MEETING EARLY APRIL. AT FRAN'S DISCRETION PROCEED DISCREET SOUNDING OUT W/ TRUST AIDES VIA C AND SHUTE, DIRECT QUESTION CACKLER.

2. CENTRAL ISSUE OUR INTENTIONS RE. UTILITY AS HEAD ZIPPER MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE CONSIDERATION PARA 2 THROUGH 7 PULL REFERENCE.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

J. ANGLETON USN  
R. HELMS  

US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY  
ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICIALS  
APPROVING OFFICIAL  
SECRET  
CoP No. 1

NO COPY/NO REPRODUCTION/NO COPIES/NO REPRODUCTIONS ALLOWED WITHOUT PERMISSION

05212 624 HR IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE.
1. With UTILITY presently in Bonn with a note from us in one pocket telling him to avoid any commitments to GLOVER and a telegram from BORN in another telling him to make his peace with USANCE, it may be appropriate to undertake another look at UTILITY the politician, if only to bring the sorry record up-to-date.

2. A careful study of the files, beginning with the emergence of the US problem in the summer of 1949, reveals certain patterns of behavior and performance which have been so consistent over a period of almost two years that their reappearance in any political crisis in the future may probably be anticipated with near certainty. These are:

   a. A tendency to make enemies of persons with whom he is trying to make a deal. This has occurred successively in the cases of CAPILA, CAPOTZ and C__, and has derived in each case from UTILITY's failure to decide whether he wants to join, take over or destroy the party of the second part. He has invariably tried to cut a deal, usually simultaneously, and the result, inevitably, has been disastrous, sometimes even ludicrous. There is not the slightest doubt that UTILITY, when he was courting CAPILA or trying to persuade CAPILA to court him, was simultaneously slandering him behind his back. This slander was not only ill-advised but also highly indiscreet, with word of it getting back to CAPILA and also to C__, about whom UTILITY was broadly hinting that he was CAPILA's case officer for the British. Similar intriguing has been established with respect to CAPOTZ, C__, and LENS. Even UTILITY's courting has been inconsistent, punctuated as it is by failures to keep dates and by spells of truculence in dialogues, supposed to be conciliatory. This pattern has appeared with CAPILA, CAPOTZ and C__, including the spectacular stand-up of CAPILA on 23 September, of CAPOTZ on 10 and 11 December 1950 and of C__ on 1 February 1951.
b. A tendency to run around end, often when a line plunge is clearly in order. The most spectacular example was the MacLOI meeting. Others were his repeated efforts during the summer to circumvent CAPILA via WILBERMOUTH, and his more recent efforts to circumvent UTILITY via GLOBES. These have not invariably been unsuccessful, but the yardage gained has been mostly lateral.

c. A tendency to self-deception. This is revealed most convincingly in his reporting. The list of meetings of which we have received one version from UTILITY and a highly divergent one from the party of the second part is too long and too well known to require enumeration. On the basis of a recent review of the record on this score covering a period of a year, I am prepared to accept the probability that in the majority of cases the version offered by the party of the second part is right and UTILITY's wrong, or at least that the former is more nearly right than UTILITY's. This is not necessarily proof that UTILITY is a congenital or pathological liar, although he is certainly neither incapable of nor particularly averse to lying when it suits his purposes. It has always seemed to me that UTILITY, since he is by nature both vain and stubborn in high degree, is inclined to blot out or simply forget facts which are uncomfortable or inconvenient to remember and to arrive, by complex but automatic and probably subconscious processes of rationalization, at versions compatible with his original hopes and intentions. If UTILITY were really lying according to plan and premeditation, it would be easily explicable that he should lie to us, however foolish, but we know that what he tells us he also tells his staff, and this would seem to be not only superfluous but also dangerous. Even lying to us would seem foolhardy where such characters as CAPILA and CAPOTE are concerned, since UTILITY well knows that we have the means of checking on him and that we use them.

d. A tendency to react para-noidally to any challenge to his exclusive dominion of the intelligence field in Germany. This has been demonstrated time and again with respect to CAPILA, CAPOTE, etc., and has resulted in UTILIY's tenacious insistence upon the malevolent designs of the British, CAPILA, CAPOTE, and UTILITY. The fact that in the case of CAPILA he was able to procure documentary confirmation of his suspicions has not eased the tendency, although the fact that half of URBRETH, including CAPOTE and UTILITY's own, seems to know how he got it has not helped his reputation. This tendency is probably related also to UTILITY's penchant for exclusive management.

3. UTILITY is not really interested in establishing a modus vivendi or a modus operandi with CAPILA or CAPOTE, any more than he was really ever prepared to deal with CAPILA. What he wants, and the only thing which will ever satisfy him, is to destroy the rival and take over on his own terms.
This also explains his simultaneous employment of mutually destructive tactics. He pays lip service to the devices of negotiation and compromise, and is encouraged in this direction by his own and the American staffs. He makes elaborate plans and goes through the motions, including a lot of strenuous travel, but his heart is not in it, and his hopes of success are artificial, essentially a delusion. He is really bent on destruction, and the objects of his jealous malevolence sense it, which is not remarkable under the circumstances. UTILITY's destructive impulses are genuine and intense, and he finds it impossible not to translate them into action. The action is usually conspicuous, as, for example, his campaign against CAPFIL and his present tireless efforts to prove CARPE's oriental orientation. All this is not incompatible with UTILITY's rather successful record in dealing with foreign intelligence services. They are not rivals, and when UTILITY's histrionics are not agitated, he is capable of negotiating effectively and of making a good personal impression.

4. So much for the debits. The credit side is hardly less impressive, and it explains why he has survived for so many years, both in the German Army and under American sponsorship, while surrounded by men of such stature as GUDERIAN, MATTZKY, SPEIDEL, FOERTSCH, KERNIC, HORN, MESSER, and WOLLMANN, most of whom outrank him. I do not believe that UTILITY is very well liked, and it is a fact that many of his colleagues recognize his faults and disapprove of his politicking, if not of his policies; which, in his case, are by no means the same thing. But, one and all, they acknowledge his accomplishment in the creation of ZIPPER and his foresight, initiative and diplomatic skill which made it possible, not to mention the courage which it must have required for a German General to make such a deal with the late enemy so soon after the termination of hostilities and at a time when, particularly in France, a good many people were being shot or locked up whose only crime was that of having collaborated, under somewhat similar circumstances, with the Germans only a few years before.

5. Another important factor on the credit side is UTILITY's reputation as the outstanding authority in Germany on the armed forces of the Soviet Union. This derives from his former position as Chief of Fremde Heere Ost, as well as from his present position as the head of an organization which is referred to, by those numerous Germans who know about it significantly as the "Organization UTILITY" or the "UTILITY Organization." UTILITY's great reputation is certainly based on legend as well as on fact, but the one is as important as the other in assessing UTILITY's status. Indeed, for a position of such altitude as that of Chief of the G.S., to which UTILITY unquestionably aspires, the legend is more useful or more inhibiting than the fact, depending upon whether we want to help him or to stop him. Nobody in Germany is as good or as amiable as many Germans think UTILITY is, but the mere fact that they think so must have a strong bearing on his future. EISENHOWER, for instance, was not chosen for his great office because he is the greatest General in the Western World, although he may be, but because so many people think he is. The same circumstances, on a smaller scale, will influence UTILITY's present and future in Germany and must be taken into serious consideration in any decisions we may make.
6. With respect to UTILITY's administrative, executive and operational abilities, they are admittedly not inconsiderable, although certainly influenced for the worse by those aspects of his character discussed in l-d, above, as reflected in his penchant for exclusive management, his habit of concentrating on matters pertinent to his own career rather than on the operational details associated with career objectives already attained, and a perceptible if not dominant predilection for byways and his immediate entourage. These are not, however, elements of primary importance in speculating on UTILITY's future. He can probably handle adequately any job he gets. His problem is to get the job, which is a problem of politics.

7. As to his prospects? It would be easy to demonstrate that UTILITY is a bad politician, which would seem to augur ill for a man whose career objectives are essentially political. But political talent is not the only prerequisite for political success; least of all for a man whose enthusiasm is power rather than politics as art and science. UTILITY is not interested in the rules. His only concern is results, and his assets of ambition, determination, toughness, resiliency, persistence, single-mindedness, ruthlessness and cunning may pull him through many rough-and-tumble and enable him to survive occasional defeat. If he succeeds, it will be at a greater expense of effort than a more skillful politician would have required. But his triumph will be absolute, and he will share with none the privilege of determining the fate of his numerous enemies.
MEMORANDUM TO: Lt. General Lucian K. Truscott


1. We thought you might be interested in reading the attached memorandum on the current status of ZIPPER relations with the West German Government, as well as the appraisal of Gehlen as a politician and a leader. We realize that you have many things to do before your departure on Tuesday, but we know that this is a matter of considerable interest to you and felt that you would want to be kept up-to-date.

2. The attachment is written by Henry Fleissner and is countersigned by James Critchfield. As you know, both of these men are on the Pullach staff.

There is another cable handled to day that you should see. KDM will get in touch. Williams,

W. G., WITMAN
Assistant Director
Special Operations

1 Attachment

MIPA 4382. Meeting with test. West Germ Govt.

Discussion of with test in Bonn on 4 April 51, during which test outlines in some detail his objections to UTILITY, his views on ZIPPER, ZIPPER penetration of GROWTH, and so forth.
SUBJECT: Conversation with AUNER

Time: June 5, 1951
Received: June 5, 1951

CC 2

1. This date, at 11:45 hrs., AUNER called CC 2 by telephone, and informed that he urgently wanted to see him. CC 2 - who had not seen AUNER for several months (more specifically in fall 1950) - was surprised, but accepted to meet AUNER at 12:15 hrs. at the office Angela HEIMBERGER, 17, Neutorstrasse (which is directed by Franz STEINDL).

2. After a brief introduction concerning generalities, AUNER informed 'he had closed down his shop'. The majority of his collaborators had emigrated, since they had not agreed to the new conditions of a strict centralization in Germany. He himself had declined his move to Germany that had been requested. He had already for some time been requested to return the Volkswagen used by him and would now be obliged to comply. He explained that he was rather glad, since he had no actual use for an automobile in Salzburg.

3. In a vague form AUNER explained that the Gartenstrasse organization had been completely dissolved, but that some functionaries, who named in detail MALLNER, MANDL and OFFZAREK, would carry on intelligence work, this in direct connection with the German Centre. It appeared from this conversation that MANDL and OFFZAREK would be engaged in field intelligence (probably remaining in Austria), whereas MALLNER would move to Germany.

4. Upon AUNER's question regarding CC 2's activity, he was informed that CC 2 and CC 1 were acting as correspondents for US provincial newspapers, and that NN 1 for some time had participated in this work. Since the economic results could not be called brilliant, NN 1 had left some time ago.
AUNER did not seem satisfied with CC 2's reply and repeated his questions from other angles. He specifically enquired about Mr. BROMBERG, and whether he was still with MIS. When CC 2 replied that he did not know, AUNER stated that since CO 1 had been on friendly terms with Mr. BROMBERG, he supposed that this would still be the case.

From above conversation CC 2 won the impression that AUNER may have had two reasons for taking up former contacts:

a- to possibly find out, whether intelligence activity existed here, and to further feel, whether he would possibly find a friendly reception;
b- to give publicity to his former comrades.

AUNER asked CC 2 for a new meeting on June 6, 1951, at 17:30 hrs (same place) to discuss matters more in detail.
Chief, Foreign Division M

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

UTILITY's Visit to the USA

Reference: MKW-8395

7 June 1951

1. Para 6c of reference indicated that your views on UTILITY's trip to the USA would be discussed in a later memorandum. Since this has not arrived here and because time is passing I feel that we should give you our views on what could become a rather sticky problem.

2. In suggesting that selected ZIPPER staff members might have the opportunity to visit the USA, we offered UTILITY, for obvious reasons, the first opportunity to accept such an invitation. E and I had discussed the matter and felt that UTILITY should be the first member of ZIPPER to make the trip. When confronted with our offer, UTILITY waived aside the prestige factor implicit in his preceding any of his subordinates and urged that we go ahead and plan their visits; that he would be happy to go as soon as the ZIPPER-UPGROWTH problem appeared to be under control. We thought this and told him to let us know when he felt he would be able to accept our invitation.

3. UTILITY has now accepted our invitation. He felt that late June or early July would be an excellent time for the trip. I've urged that he not make any definite plans at this point until I'm able to examine all factors. However, I indicated that the time he suggested would probably be very satisfactory.

4. At this point the chances that ZIPPER will emerge as the GES, and a strongly established one at that, are better than they have been at any time since we first became associated with ZIPPER. During the past few weeks both E and I have had the opportunity to meet Otto LENZ and GLOKE in the presence of UTILITY. There was nothing in the substance of what they said, or the manner in which they treated UTILITY to suggest that they were hedging on accepting either ZIPPER as an organizational unit, or UTILITY as its head. Thus I think it would be politically inept of us to squander the opportunity in the treatment we give UTILITY in the USA, simply because of our well-documented reservations about him. I think it is reasonably safe at this point to estimate that UTILITY will survive as a dominant figure in German affairs for some time to come.

5. UTILITY will be somewhat difficult to control on this jaunt and I would like to first present what I think UTILITY will want to do and what he will expect and then let you state the limitations which I will pass on to him.
6. UTILITY has stated on numerous occasions that he hopes he will have the opportunity to shake hands with C. This meeting can be limited to almost just that. If he does not meet C he will consider it a brush off. As you know, on his last trip to Spain he was received by General Vigon, C/S the Spanish Army, in spite of a temporary illness which made it necessary to see UTILITY in his home. On several occasions he has met the heads of the French, Swiss and Danish Services and a senior member, if not the head, of the Norwegian Service.

7. UTILITY has stated that he hopes that he will have a little free time in New York since he would like to see John Baker, Eric Warburg and his old friend, Eric Waldman whom UTILITY continues to regard as one of his greatest benefactors.

8. Then there is a certain Ruscheweih (phonetic) who is the American representative of the German-Swiss-American group which controls the patents related to the development reported in FULL 1899. UTILITY has promised full details on this entire matter within a few days. However, I do know that Ruscheweih is a member of a firm called American Technological Development Corporation of New York which is involved in this matter. UTILITY expressed dissatisfaction with Ruscheweih and indicated that he hopes that John Baker could replace him in the American end of the group. More about this in the next few days when I will get off a report on our visit to Bonn (WASH 35442) which took place ten days ago.

9. Regarding the Baker connection, UTILITY feels that if our organization in Washington established a connection with Baker and Baker were to replace Ruscheweih in the German-Swiss-US group that is continuing further developmental work of the type which resulted in FULL 1899 it would ensure closest cooperation in this field in the future and would provide a suitable business channel instead of an official channel for the conduct of these affairs.

Comment: At this point I'm merely reporting the conversations on Ruscheweih, Baker et al without attempting to comment or interpret them since the picture is quite incomplete and many of the remarks made by UTILITY do not, at this point, appear to make too much sense to me.

10. UTILITY would unquestionably like to see something of our Armed Forces, including the Pentagon. This, I imagine, depends on whether the Department of the Army is taken into confidence on these visits (as was intimated in WASH-43398) or kept completely in the dark.

11. UTILITY will, of course, measure the success of his trip in terms of how many important people he meets and how many professional conversations he can participate in. Anyone meeting UTILITY need not be concerned about what they can do to get the conversation started. A simple and very general question on any of two or three dozen general topics of intelligence or world political interest will start his off on a presentation of his own views which can be counted upon to occupy all the available time. I have observed this type of performance by UTILITY many times—most recently when ___ visited us.
12. Parenthetically I may state that I do not think that any of the above applies to the rest of the ZIPPER staff scheduled for visits to the US. They are all coming primarily to see something of the US; do not expect to meet anyone of great importance; do not expect to see anything of our organization; and will measure the success of the trip in terms of their own observations of the life, people, cities, geography and industry of the US.

13. As a cover for UTILITTY, I suggest either a straight research (Historical Division) cover or an investigative and research cover in the field of international patent rights. UTILITTY's working cover in Germany is a patent office connected with the Bavarian Light Metal Works owned by his friend Kaiser. This is a field in which UTILITTY has an actual interest (para 8 above). He is an interesting enough figure that his cover story might actually be checked back to Germany. If so, the patent cover would hold up best under examination. Also, I imagine that the patent problems that exist between Germany and the United States are complicated enough to make a US visit quite normal.

14. I think the UTILITTY trip should be limited to 14 days. The problem of escort has been discussed here at length. UTILITTY has expressed the hope that I can accompany him. I feel that I should. I'm not personally anxious to do so, but can see where it makes sense that I do. I would, for future reference, like to be present to hear what anyone of any importance professionally says to him and what he says to them. Also, I already have a fairly compact program planned here infallach this summer before I come home in August. Related to this is the fact that the developments in the ZIPPER-UPGROWTH and Remilitarization fields have been so complicated during the past six months that a Washington debriefing may and an exchange of ideas with the Washington staff would be very helpful in bringing the Washington and Germany points of view into line. We believe that it would be desirable if I flew to Washington several days in advance of UTILITTY and C and completed his debriefing and arrangements for any meetings for UTILITTY before the arrival of UTILITTY and me. I has worked closely with UTILITTY for a year and would be the ideal individual to act as interpreter and necessary. As soon as the Washington end of the visit had been completed (including sightseeing in Washington and vicinity) C or D could return to Germany and the other could accompany UTILITTY on any travel undertaken. I do not think that more than four or five days in the Washington-New York area would be necessary. I then suggest a train and plane trip Westward and back to New York to catch the plane to Frankfurt.

15. I will continue to delay giving UTILITTY a firm answer on the trip to the US until I hear from you. His trip, more than any of the others, can obviously produce a variety of political embarrassments unless properly handled. I hope that a cable reaction on this problem will be forthcoming soon after the arrival of this memo in Washington.
TO FROM SUBJECT: REF: No. 25.37
Application for the Purchase of a Motor Vehicle.

MEMO No. dated 30 July 1954.

It is requested that approval be given for the purchase of one Opel-Kapitän.

The corresponding indications read as follows:

1. Intended place of location: Frankfurt
2. Other: 30
3. Job description of member to whom vehicle will be registered:
   - *a*) Organization or Agency to which vehicle will be registered
   - *b*) Name of member on whose name vehicle will be registered
   - *c*) Intended purpose for which vehicle will be used:
     - *Official trips*
4. Intended place of registration: Frankfurt
5. Other: 30
6. Intended purpose for which vehicle will be used:
   - *Official trips*
7. Other: 30
8. Org.-member or Agency to which vehicle will be returned: Frankfurt
9. Other: 30
10. Type, make, registration number, and exchange: Opel, Kapitän, 1954, 1955
11. Reason for exchange of vehicle: "No additional vehicles"
12. Monthly kilometers (approximate): 1,000 kilometers
13. Duration of indication: 1,000 kilometers
14. Date: 2005
15. Additional information: 30 (30c.)

From 2005

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED
Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Chief, Pullach Operations Base

Attn: Executive Office

ZIPPER - Operational

Request TTD for Reinhard GEHLEN

1. Attached is an application for a TTD for Reinhard GEHLEN. As you know, he is already well documented. However, this request is for UJ-DRACO, and in keeping with our intention to obtain and use one special TTD for UJ-DRACO only.

2. Unfortunately, time is pressing and GEHLEN will not be personally available for over a week. For this reason we have forwarded the application unsigned. However, your files should already contain a previous signed application in this name.

3. Please complete the TTD and forward by return pouch.

Attach: 1
Dist:
2 - COS w/att
1 - FIN
1 - SRPG
2 - File

14 June 1951
MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit of German Chief of ZIPPER to United States

1. When it was decided some six months ago that selected ZIPPER staff members have the opportunity of visiting the United States, our senior representative with ZIPPER, James Critchfield, offered Reinhard Gehlen the first opportunity to accept such an invitation. Gehlen declined this offer and stated he would be happy to make the trip as soon as the ZIPPER-West German Government problem appeared to be under control. At the same time he urged that planning proceed for visits to the United States by his subordinates.

2. Gehlen has now suggested that he visit the United States in September. Since his trip can obviously produce a variety of political embarrassments, I recommend that you discuss the advisability of it with General Truscott and Gordon Stewart during your forthcoming trip to Germany.

3. Attached hereto is a summary of James Critchfield's views on the proposed visit of Gehlen to this country.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2001 2005

Assistant Director
Special Operations

Attachment: 1

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET
From: PULLACH
To: SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Action: ADM (1-2-3)
Information: 11D (4), AD/SO (5), STA (6), S/C (7-8-9), DDP (10)

Routine

25 June 51

IN 49934

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. HANDLE AS SECRET CORRESPONDENCE PER PARA. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

PULL 2325
INFO: KARLF, FRANF (C) CITE: PULLF

UTILITY SEEING C 12 OR 13 JULY. IN VIEW OF THIS MEETING AND PROBABILITY FURTHER POLITICAL CONTINGENCIES REQUIRING HIS PRESENCE IN GERMANY, UTILITY SUGGESTED HIS UDRACO TRIP BE POSTPONED UNTIL EARLY SEPTEMBER. THIS CONVENIENT TO US SINCE IT WOULD COINCIDE WITH STATESIDE LEAVE AND ELIMINATE EXTRA TRIP. WE THEREFORE CONCURRED WITH UTILITY'S SUGGESTION.
Chief, Foreign Division

19 July 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

(U) DRACO/UTILITY's Visit

1. In view of the fact that J-CLOAK discussions will probably not be underway until early September and for other reasons, we propose to set UTILITY's departure date back to coincide with Group III on or about 22 September.

2. Thus far I have not attempted to work out an agenda for UTILITY and would, in fact, be perfectly willing to leave that up to you. Complicating it will be his often repeated desire to see Boker, Waldman, Hilger et al. Aside from that he would like to travel the length of the country to San Francisco and back.

3. I have had no reaction to our KLA-6789 outlining UTILITY's views on the trip. However, it seems to me that we might gain something by letting UTILITY see some of his old friends and sitting in on the conversations.

4. Another matter is whether to include UTILITY with Group III for his westward junket. With HOEBEL this would bring the group to six without considering the escort. Also there may be possible advantages in my spending several weeks with UTILITY.

5. I should be in Washington prior to 1 September. If it is convenient to do so, I suggest we discuss the handling of UTILITY upon my arrival. In any case, we are tentatively planning on putting him on the plane at Rhein/Main on 22 September.

6. UTILITY feels that his cover story should be that of his working business cover, i.e., international patents.

Distribution:

2 - FDM
1 - COS
2 - POB
James Critchfield's Comments on Gehlen's Visit to the U.S.A.

1. At this point the chances that ZIPPBR will emerge as a strong, centralized German Intelligence Service are better than they have been at any time since C.I.A. took over the management of the project. I think it is reasonably safe to estimate that Reinhard Gehlen will survive as a dominant figure in German affairs for some time to come. Thus, I think it would be politically inexpedient of us to equivocate in the treatment we give Gehlen in the United States simply because of our reservations about him.

2. Gehlen will be somewhat difficult to control on this trip. He has stated on numerous occasions that he hopes he will have the opportunity to shake hands with General Walter B. Smith. If he does not meet General Smith, he will consider it a brush-off. On his last trip to Spain Gehlen was received by General Vigen, Chief of Staff of the Spanish Army, and on several occasions he has met the heads of the French, Swiss, Danish, and Norwegian Intelligence Services.

3. Gehlen has also stated that he hopes he will have some free time in New York where he would like to see John Boker, Eric Warburg, and Eric Waldman.

Note: Boker and Warburg are New York businessmen with numerous contacts in Germany. Boker escorted Gehlen and members of his staff to the United States in 1945 and has remained in contact with Gehlen during the past few years. In October 1950 Warburg arranged in Germany a dinner for Gehlen with Mr. McCloy. His device in making the arrangements through an officer of K100 turned out to be embarrassing for ourselves and Mr. McCloy. Waldman is a former Army officer who was very closely associated with the ZIPPBR operation while it was under Army control.

4. Gehlen will, of course, measure the success of his trip in terms of how many important people he meets and how many professional conversations he can participate in. He would unquestionably like to see something of our Armed Forces, including the Pentagon.

5. I think Gehlen's trip should be limited to fourteen days, with no more than four or five days in the Washington-New York area.
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

Page No.

To: PULLACH, KARLSRUHE, FRANKFURT
From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS
CONFIRMATION: FDM (1)
INFORMATION: AD/SO (2), OPS (3), PLANS (4), DDP (5), S/C (6-7-8)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-190-S

WASH 00815
TO: PULLA INFO: KARLA, FRANP CITE: WASHF
RE PULL 2325 (IN 49934), 49934 6789

1. WE REQUESTED PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE WASH THAT ROBERT A.
ASCHAM DURING VISIT GERMANY DISCUSS WITH e, f, and e.
ADVISABILITY UTILITY COMING UNITED STATES AT THIS TIME.

2. POUCH UTILITY PRO SOONEST SO THAT WE CAN OBTAIN ALL
NECESSARY CLEARANCES IN EVENT ASCHAM AGREES YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE: 2001 2005

RICHARD HELMS
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET
COPY NO. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE
GEILLEN, Reward dossier

KOLA 7440 23 July 51 Utility and the British (filed British file)

suggests that someone have a clear statement of our policy on Zipper-British liaison ready to give Utility when he comes to U.S. A.
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

From: FRANKFURT  ROUTINE
To: Special Operations  4 AUG 51
Action: DCI (1)  IN 19093

INFORMATION: D/DP (2), AD/50 (3), S/C (4-5-6), FDI (7-8), OPS (9), PLANS (10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-300-5

TO: WASHDPA  CITE: FRANP (ASCHAM)

1. AT MEETING YESTERDAY WITH UTILITY, I REVIEWED ZIPPER SITUATION AND HIS PROJECTED VISIT TO U.S. END OF SEPTEMBER.

2. IN PARTICULAR WE IMPRESSED UPON UTILITY VITAL IMPORTANCE THAT ZIPPER ORGANIZATION SHOULD KEEP ITS HANDS OUT OF LOCAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND MAINTAIN ITS POSITION AS AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OPERATING SOLELY OUTSIDE OF COUNTRY.

3. WE MENTIONED TO UTILITY RUMORS WE HAD HEARD THAT ZIPPER WAS VIEWED AS NUCLEUS FOR FUTURE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF AND ALSO AS A KIND OF LOCAL SECRET SERVICE THAT WAS ENDORSEING TO PENETRATE DOMESTIC OBJECTIVES AND WE STRESSED THE DANGER THAT SUCH RUMORS MIGHT LEAD TO POLITICAL OR OTHER PUBLICITY.

4. UTILITY RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WAS SOME INTRUING AGAINST ZIPPER AND THAT HE HAD CAUGHT CERTAIN PENETRATION ATTEMPTS RED-HANDED. HE ALLEGED THAT AT LEAST ONE OF THESE ATTEMPTS WAS DUE TO BRITISH INITIATIVE. HE FELT THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO TAKE BRITISH HEAT OFF THE ZIPPER ORGANIZATION BY GETTING THEM INTERESTED IN MAINTENANCE OF ZIPPER AND CLARIFYING TO THEM ITS NON-POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. THIS IS IN LINE WITH THE RECOMMENDATION IN PARA 5 OF 4031 (IN 19093) FRAND ALTHOUGH UTILITY DID NOT GO SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST AN EXCHANGE OF ZIPPER MATERIAL WITH BRITISH.

5. MCCLOY FULLY INFORMED.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2001 2005

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 19-49327-7
6 August 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Chief, Foreign Division 4

ATTN: [Redacted]

Operational

U-DRAGO/UTILITY’s Visit

REFERENCE: KOLA 7582

1. No action of any kind has been taken here in preparation for a trip by UTILITY. The political significance of such a visit is all too clear and there can be no doubt that it will boost his prestige tremendously. Regardless of how we interpret his trip we can be certain that Utility himself will make capital of it in Germany. For these reasons we are awaiting the decision of Robert A. Aschen (Wash.00818).

2. Pending receipt of Aschen’s views no action will be taken other than to request security clearance for the trip as soon as UTILITY’s PBQ is received. This should be done strictly because of the time element.

3. The preparation of an agenda for UTILITY and any travel arrangements should definitely await your arrival in Washington. If Utility does come, we feel that you should act as escort during his entire stay. Including him with Group III for a westward trip does not appear to be desirable. Encountered many difficulties in handling four persons, so a group of six would be too burdensome for the escort.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 382 E

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DATE 2005
9. At the end of the talk, we asked GLOBKE confidentially whether the personality of UTILITY is acceptable to UTHRUS. His answer was "yes" - and he made it in a direct and emphatic way. He went on to say that both he and UTHRUS realize that UTILITY is no CARABIS but that UTHRUS has been most impressed with UTILITY's calm and objective analysis of items of intelligence. He particularly mentioned the time a month or so ago when Minister President ZINN, of Hesse, arrived at UTHRUS's office with a hot report, and UTILITY, being there, dissected the report item by item, differentiating between those bits of information already known, analyzed and not believed to be alarming; those not known but probably dubious; and the hasty conclusions that had been arrived at in the report. UTILITY's professionalism on this case seems to have made a deep impression.
TO: Chief, Foreign Division  
FROM: Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

DATE: 18 August 1951

SUBJECT: GENERAL— ZIPPER - Operational
SPECIAL— UJ-DRACO

1. Attached herewith for your retention are two completed PRQ forms for Reinhard GEHLEN. The original was done by GEHLEN himself, while FOB staff completed the other one.

2. Also forwarded are statements concerning past membership in the NSDAP and related organizations, signed by Kurt KOHLER (whom you have probably identified by now under the name listed in para 5 of MIKW-9866), and HENGL. Through a misunderstanding, HENGL signed his cover name rather than his true name.

DIST: 
1 - COD (w/attach)  
2 - File
1. Reinhard GEILEN.
2. Not applicable.
3. not applicable.
4. Dr. Schneider, operational alias.
5. a. 3 April 1908; b. Erfurt, Thuringia.
6. German.
7. Same as 6.
8. Waldstrasse #68, Berg bei Starnberg, Germany.
9. Same as 6.
10. Historical research analyst.
11. Name given.
13. Waldmann, 1204 Lehman St., Silver Spring, Md.
14. Walter Gehlen, born 1871; Germany; deceased.
15. Katherine née von Wasmann, born 1881, Germany; deceased.
16. Bertha von Seydlitz-Kurtes, born 17 April 1904; Leobschütz, Germany. Married November 10, 1931, Clogau, Germany; presently resides Berg, Germany.
18. None given.
19. Temporary Travel Document; Konskarte.
20. Protestant.
21. None.
22. 1933 - recreation trip to Rome
1937 - recreation trip to Finland and Sweden
During World War II with the German Army in Poland, France,
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Russia.
1945 - brought by the War Department to the USA; returned 1946.
Since 1946 - several private trips to Switzerland, Italy, Austria,
Spain, and France.

25. Gymnasium, Breslau, Germany.

24. Subject speaks, reads and understands English quite well; reads and
understands a fair amount of French but does not speak French well.

25. Subject entered military service as an artilleryman in 1920; was
commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant December 1925; became a General Staff
Officer as a Captain in 1935; adjutant to General Halder, Chief of
Staff, German Army 1940; Chief of Frenz's War Office 1942; dismissed
by special order of Hitler 8 April 1945; highest rank attained:
Brigadier General 1944; POW of the U.S. Army May 1945 to June 1946.

26. None.

27. None given.

25. 1930 IV a month salary.

28. See para. 25.

29. None.

30. None.

31. None.

32. None given.

51. Routine denaturalizations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>49</th>
<th>normal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>72 kg</td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dark</td>
<td>hair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hair</td>
<td>color</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>none</td>
<td>slight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Personal Record Questionnaire - Part I - Biographic

1. Full Name: Richard GEHLEN

2. Name in native script

3. Name at birth (if different from 1)

4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason & place of use):
   a. UTILITY, cryptonym used only by POB in correspondence with WASH and KARL;
   b. Dr. Richard SCHNEIDER, covername used within compound;
   c. Richard Garner *
   d. Robert GONTARD *
   * German identity papers used in connection with cover names mentioned above give birth dates as follows:
   b. SCHNEIDER 4 March 1905
   c. GARNER 3 April 1902
   d. GONTARD 4 March 1905
   e. Hans HOLBEIN, name used only occasionally, for instance in travelling to Austria (AGO-card D-147 996 in this name);
   f. Dr. GROSS) Names used whenever special precautionary measures g. Dr. ERNST) are warranted and wherever mistaken identity with another person of the same name is desirable.

5. Date of birth: 3 April 1902

6. Nationality at birth: German (no other subsequent nationality)

7. Present citizenship: German

8. Present residence: Berg a/Sternberger See, Bavaria

9. Permanent address:

10. Present occupation: (Full title, salary, etc.) DM 1000 a month (brutto and netto)

11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the U.S.

12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in U.S. Explain relationship.

13. Father - Full name, occupation, present residence, year and place at birth and subsequent nationalities

   Walther Gehlen, Director of a Publishing firm in Leipzig, German
   national, deceased in 1943; date of birth 24 July 1871; former Army officer, retired after World War I with the rank of Lt.-Col; reactivated in World War II; held unimportant administrative position.

14. Mother same information as under 13.

   Katharina Gehlen, nee von Waemewyck, born 12 June 1881, nationality
15. Name (or assumed) - Full name, maiden name, date and, if of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities present residence, war, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages)

Hertha Gehlen, nee von Seydlitz-Kurzach, born 17 April 1904, nationality German, place of birth Loebschuetz/Silesia; married in 1931

16. Children - Full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Katharina Gehlen, daughter, born 1934 19.1.34 - Berlin
Christoph Gehlen, son, 1937 11.3.37 - Berlin
Marie-Therese Gehlen, daughter, born 1941 15.5.41 - Italy
Dorothee Gehlen, 1943 28.2.43 - Italy

German nationals, residing in Berg a/Starnberger See, Bavaria

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.
Giovanni (Johannes Hans) Gehlen, alias BAUM, Johannes), born 15 March 1901 in Rome, Italy; first passport held US passport, validity 6 months; now German citizen;
Walter Gehlen, born approx. 1905, German citizen, died 20 Feb 1945;
Barbara Gehlen, born 1912 in Germany, German citizen, married to a distant relative Walter von GEHLEN, lawyer and former civilian official of German Navy - living in Rie de Janeiro

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.
Brother-in-law Walter von GEHLEN, employed in autumn 1946 by British authorities in Kiel (present status unknown)
Brother Giovanni (Johannes Hans) GEHLEN, Head of ODEUM group in Rome

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.
Auslands Passport No. 000 6529 in the name of GEHLEN, Reinhard
Auslands Passport No. 186 070 in the name of GONTARD, Robert
AGO-Card No. D-147 996 in name of HOLBEIN, Hans,
TID under name GEHLEN, Reinhard, valid for Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain and France
German identity papers (not specified) in the name of SCHNEIDER,
Dr. Richard, GARNER, Richard, and GONTARD, Robert, passport

20. Religion - Degree practiced, membership religious orders. No.186070

21. Present and past political affiliations.
NONE

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited.
Sent to USA by War Department at end of 1945; returned 5 June 1946.
Before WW II - 1933 trip to Italy (Rome, on leave); 1937 to Finland & Sweden (leave)
During WW II - troop duty in Poland, France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Russia
After WW II - several trips to Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain; 1 to France (duty trips)
23. Education - School, location, course, degree, dates  
   1908 - 1920 Gymnäum Breslau (Reifezeugnis) 

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Speak</th>
<th>Read</th>
<th>Understand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>fair</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
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<td>fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Speak</td>
<td>Read</td>
<td>Understand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if over prisoner of war.  
   Entered military service (artillery) in 1924; commissioned 2nd Lt. Dec 1923; promoted to 1st Lt. 1928; General Staff Academy 1933-1935; Promoted to Captain 1934; 1935-1938 General Staff assignment; 1938-1939 Battery Commander; March 1939 promoted to Major; Sept-Nov 1939 Chief of Staff 213th Inf. Div.; Nov 1939-Spring 1940 Chief of Fortifications Section, General Staff; Spring 1940 - Fall 1940 Adjutant to Gen Halder, Chief of General Staff; Nov. 1940 - April 1942 Chief Gruppenleiter I (Section Chief within Department for Plans & Operations); Spring 1942 - Spring 1945 Chief of Department Fremde Heere Ost; dismissed by special order of Hitler 9 April 1945; American POW, arrived at Army Group IC on 27 May 1945

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)  
   None

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)  
   None

   Paycheck (Basic and Brutto) DM 1000 a month; (payroll number 30023)  
   Housing Loan No. 8 1 April 1951 - DM 5,000

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.  
   Army career, see above  
   Present cover occupation: Connected with Bavarian Light Metal Work.
30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (Individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

32. List five (5) character references.

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.
   No Court record
   Complete clearance in routine denazification procedure

34. Description (Use American standards of measurements, if possible.)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apparent Age</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height</td>
<td>1.71 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eyes</td>
<td>blue</td>
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<tr>
<td>Face-shape</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexion</td>
<td>normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Posture normal
   Weight 72 kg
   Teeth normal
   Hair dark blond
   Scars none
   Build normal
   Other identifying features none

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

For cover purposes, subject's permanent residence had been given for the period 12 July 1946 to 30 November 1949 as WASHINGTON; he had full documentation for this purpose. The notional trip from the USA to Germany took place in late November 1949.
**PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE**

**PART I BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Full name</th>
<th>Reinhard Gehlen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>Gehlen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Name in native script</th>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Name at birth (if different from 1)</th>
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<tbody>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (state briefly time, reason and place of use)</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Date of birth</th>
<th>3.4.1902</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of birth</td>
<td>Erfurt</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate</th>
<th>German</th>
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</thead>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6)</th>
<th>German</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. Present Residence (owner, tenant, sub-tenant)</th>
<th>Berg bei Starnberg</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. Permanent address (if different from 8)</th>
<th>Berg b. Starnberg, Waldstr. Nr. 66</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. Present occupation (full title, salary, etc.)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. Naturalization of subject or of closerelatives in the United States, (give date and name in which certificate was granted)</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. Explain relationship. friends: John R. Boker, Jr., 101 Duane Street, New York 7, N.Y. Eric Waldman, 1204 Lebanon Street, apt. 6, Silver Spring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 13. Father - full name, occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities | Walther Gehlen, born 1871, German |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                     |                                    |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>born 1881, German</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3822 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005*
15. Wife (or husband) - Full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages)

Herta von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, born 17.4.1904 Leobschütz married 11.10.1931 Glogau, German, resident at Berg

16. Children - Full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Katharina, fem, 19.1.1934, Berlin, German
Christoph, male, 11.2.1937, "
Marie Therese fem. 4.9.1940 Liegnitz, "
Dorothee, fem. 28.2.1943 "

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

Johannes Gehlen, 15.3.1901, Rom, German, living in Rom
Barbara von Gehlen, 5.7.1912, Breslau, German in Rio de Janeiro

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

20. Religion - Degree practiced, membership religious orders.

Protestant

21. Present and past political affiliations.

None

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited.
23. Education - School, Location, course, degree, dates

Abitur, humanistisches Gymnasium

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Speak</th>
<th>Read</th>
<th>Understand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if over prisoner of war.

Last rank brigadier general;
details and dates about my military carrier are in the US files.
PoW from 23.5.1945 to July 1946
Since then cooperation with USIS

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)

none

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

none


Bayerische Vereinsbank, Munich

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, address, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

see 25.
30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

32. List five (5) character references.

33. Court record – court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, demobilisation, etc.

34. Description (Use American standards of measurements, if possible.)

Age: 48
Apparent Age
Height
Eyes: blue
Face-shape
Complexion
Sex
General appearance
Prominent features
Posture
Weight
Teeth
Hair
Scars
Build
Other identifying features

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.
For cover purposes, subject's permanent residence had been given for the period 12 July 1946 to 30 November 1949 as WASHINGTON; he had full documentation for this purpose. The notional trip from the USA to Germany took place in late November 1949.
PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRES

1. FULL NAME: Reinhard GEHLEN
   First Middle Last

2. Name in native script

3. Name at birth (if different from 1)

4.Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason and place of use):
   1. UTHMITT—Cryptonym used only by FOB in correspondence with WASH and KARL
   2. Dr. Richard SCHENK, covername used within compound
   3. Richard GARNER
   4. Robert CONRAD
   Identity papers (German) used in connection with above covernames give birth dates as follows:
   1. SCHENK 14 March 1905
   2. GARNER 3 April 1902
   3. CONRAD 4 March 1905

5. Hans Holden, name used only occasionally, for instance in travelling to Austria.
   (AGO card D-147-996—in this name).

6. Dr. GEISS—Names used whenever special precautionary measures are warranted.

7. Dr. BERNST—And where mistaken identity with another person of the same name is desirable.

5. a. Date of birth: 3 April 1902
   b. Birthplace: Erfurt, Thuringia, Germany

6. Nationality at birth: German
   (no other subsequent nationality)

7. Present citizenship: German

8. Present residence: Berg a/ Starnberger See, Bavaria

9. Permanent address:

10. Present occupation (full title, salary, etc.):
    Chief of GDEM

11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the U.S.

12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in U.S. Explain relationship
13. Father - Full name, occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities.

Walther Gehlen, Director of a Publishing firm in Leipzig, German citizen, deceased in 1943, Date of birth 24 July 1871.
(former Army officer, retired after World War I with the rank of Lt.-Col; reactivated in World War II; held unimportant administrative position)

14. Mother - Same information as 13:

Katharina Gehlen, née von Vaernwyck, born 12 June 1881, Nationality German, deceased in 1921.

15. Wife (or husband) - Full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.)

Katharina Gehlen, née von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, born 17 April 1904, nationality German, place of birth Leobschütz/Silesia.
Married in 1931.

16. Children - Full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Katharina Gehlen, daughter, born 1934.
Christoph Gehlen, son " 1937.
Marie-Theres Gehlen, daughter, born 1941.
Dorothee Gehlen, " 1943.
German nationals, residing in Berg am Starnberger See, Bavaria.

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

Giovanni (Johannes Hans) Gehlen, alias BMN, Johannes, born 15 March 1901 in Rome, Italy, first passport held U.S. passport, validity 6 months, now German citizen.
Walter, born approx. 1905, deceased on 20 Feb 1945, German citizen.
Barbara, born 1912 in Germany, German citizen, married to a distant relative.
Walter von Gehrken, Lawyer and former civilian official of German Navy.
18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

Brother-in-law Walter von GEHLEN employed in autumn 1946 by British Authorities in Kiel (present status unknown)

Brother Giovanni (Johannes Hans) GEHLEN, Chief of ODEUL group in Rome

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

Austrian-Passport No. 106092 in the name of Robert OENDARD

Austrian-Passport No. 000629 in the name of GEHLEN, Reinhard

Austrian-Passport No. 000629 in the name of SCHNEIDER, Hans

German-identity papers (not specified) in the name of SCHNEIDER, Dr. Richard, GARZER, Richard, and OENDARD, Robert

20. Religion - degree practiced, membership religious order.

21. Present and past political affiliations

None

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited.

End 1945 or beginning 1946 sent by War Department to USA, returned 5 June 1946

23. Education - School, location, course, degree, dates

1908 - 1920 Gymnasium Breslau (Reifezeugnis)

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language English Speak fair Read fair Understand fair

Language Speak Read Understand

Language Speak Read Understand

valid

Temporary Travel Document under Reinhard GEHLEN for Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain and France

-3-
25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why.
Give details if ever prisoner of war.
1920 - Entered military service (artillery); Dec 1923 - 2nd Lt.; 1st Lt. 1928;
1933 - 1935 General Staff Academy; 1934 promotion to Captain; 1935 - 1938
General Staff assignment 1938 - 1939 Battery Commander; March 1939 promotion to
Major; Sept. - Nov. 1939 Chief of Staff 213th Inf. Div.; Nov. 1939 - Spring 1940,
Chief of Fortifications Section, General Staff; Spring 1940 - Fall 1940 Adjutant to
Chief of Gen. Staff, Gen. Halder; Nov. 1940 - April 1942 Chief Gruppenleiter I
(Section Chief within the Department for Plans and Operations); Spring 1942 -
Spring 1945 Chief ABT Premhseere Ost.
American POW, arriving at Army Grupp IC on 27 May 1945.
9 April 1945 dismissed by special order of Hitler.

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)
No membership in political party or affiliated associations, neither at present nor
in the past.

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)


29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include
employment by any government.
Army career, see above
Cater occupation: Connected with Bavarian Light Metal Works
30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

32. List five character references.
33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Apparent age</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teeth</td>
<td>blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face - shape</td>
<td>Scars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexion</td>
<td>Build</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>m.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General appearance

Prominent features

Other identifying features

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

For cover purposes, subject had his permanent residence in WASHINGTON from 12 July 1946 to 30 November 1949 with full documentation. The notional trip from the USA to Germany took place in late November 1949.
1. Full Name: Reinhard GEHLEN
First
Middle
Last

2. Name in native script

3. Name at birth (if different from 1)

4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (state briefly time, reason & place of use):
   a.
   b. Dr. Richard SCHNEIDER, covername used within compound; *
   c. Richard Garner *
   d. Robert GONTARD *
   * German identity papers used in connection with cover names mentioned above give birth dates as follows:
   b. SCHNEIDER 4 March 1905
   c. GARNER 3 April 1902
   d. GONTARD 4 March 1905
   e. Hans HOLBEIN, name used only occasionally, for instance in travelling to Austria (AGO-card D-147 998 in this name)
   f. Dr. GROSS ) Names used whenever special precautionary measures g. Dr. ERNST ) are warranted and wherever mistaken identity with another person of the same name is desirable.

5. Date of birth: 3 April 1902 Birthplace: Erfurt, Thuringia

6. Nationality at birth: German (no other subsequent nationality)

7. Present citizenship: German

8. Present residence: Berg a/Starnberger See, Bavaria

9. Permanent address:

10. Present occupation: (Full title, salary, etc.) DM 1000 a month (brutto and netto)
    Chief of ODEUM

11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the U.S.

12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in U.S. Explain relationship:

13. Father - Full name, occupation, present residence, year and place at birth and subsequent nationalities
    Walther Gehlen, Director of a publishing firm in Leipzig, German national, deceased in 1945; date of birth 24 July 1871; former army officer, retired after World War I with the rank of Lt.-Col; reactivated in World War II; held unimportant administrative position.

14. Mother same information as under 12
    KATHELEWA Gehlen, née von Haern, born 12 June 1881, nationality
21. Present and past political affiliations.

NONE

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited.

Sent to USA by War Department at end of 1945; returned 5 June 1946
23. Education - School, location, course, degree, etc.
1906 - 1920 Gymnasium Breslau (Reifezeugnis)

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)
Language English Speak Fair Read Understand Fair

Language
Speak
Read
Understand

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisoner of war.
Entered military service (artillery) in 1929; commissioned 2nd Lt. Dec 1933; promoted to Lt. Lt 1928; General Staff Academy 1933-1935; Promoted to Captain 1934; 1935-1938 General Staff assignment;
1938-1939-Battery Commander; March 1939 promoted to Major; Sept/Nov 1939-Chief of Staff 213th Inf. Div.; Nov 1939-Spring 1940 Chief of Fortifications Section, General Staff; Spring 1940 - Fall 1940 Adjutant to Chief of Staff; Nov 1940 - April 1942 Chief of General Staff; Nov 1940 - April 1942 Chief Gruppenleiter 1 (Section Chief within Department for Plans & Operations.
Spring 1942 - Spring 1945 Chief of Department Fremde Heere Ost; dismissed by special order of Hitler 9 April 1945; American POW, arrived at Army Group IG on 27 May 1945.

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)
None

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

Salary (Basic and Brutto) DM 1000 a month; (payroll number 3002)

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

Army career, see above
Present cover occupation: Connected with Bavarian Light Metal Works
Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

No

List persons living at same address, close associates, (Individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

Complete clearance in routine denazification procedure

List five (5) character references.

No court record

Description (Use American standards of measurements, if possible.)

Age 49
Apparent Age 49
Height 1.74 m
Eyes blue
Face-shape normal
Complexion normal
Sex male

Posture normal
Weight 72 kg
Teeth normal
Hair dark-blond
Scars none
Build normal
Other identifying features none

Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.
a) before World War II.

1933 trip to Italy (Rom) (leave)
1937 " to Finland and Sweden (leave)

b) during World War II.

during troop duty in Poland, France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Russia.

c) after World War II.

several trips to Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain,
one trip to France
(duty-trips)
Staff of German chief. Consists of Chief of Staff, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, Communications Section, Camp-Administration. Approximately 57 individuals. Dec. 48 Subordinate sections: 41, 56, 100, 9999, 34, 41, 45, 7.

The following individuals requested travel documents as special connections of 13 July 50: Hans H. HEINER von BITTENFELD; Hugo Prince v. THURN & Taxis; Robert GONTHARD (30) and Annelore KREIBER (secretary of 30).

20 May 54 was later directed through 34 (now 30).


10 Jan. 51 ZIPPER Staff R organization Overall staff work previously done by staff 30 will now be under 30c. 30c will take over the responsibility of 31. 30b will be in charge of all functions concerned within the staff of 30 and take over the staff of 31. The personal office of 30 will have the designation 30c. 35 remains subordinated to 30. Within the staff of 30, 30c is in charge of matters concerning 35.

18 Aug 51 submitted PRO on Gehlen

von GEHLEN, Reinhard

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3820 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2001 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
To WASHF INFO Karlf Cite FULLF

28 August 1957

RE MCKW 100:10

1. ASSUME YOU HAVE RECEIVED UTILITY POUCH WITH MOLA 78:67.

2. SINCE REF DOES NOT ENTIRELY PULL OUT UTILITY TRAVEL WITH GROUP THREE, SUGGEST YOU DISCUSS WITH L.J AND GIVE US DECISION BY CAPL AS AIRLINE BOOKING DIFFICULT OBTAIN ON LESS THAN TWO WEEKS NOTICE.

3. WE HAVE ALREADY BOOKED GROUP THREE PLUS HOEBEL BUT MIGHT BE ABLE GET UTILITY ON SAME PLANE IF YOU INFORM SOONEST.
7 September 1951

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief, I & S
   Attn: C

FROM: Chief, FDM

SUBJECT: U-DEAD (Reinhard Gehlen)

Ref: FDM Memorandum subject U-DEAD, dated 29 May 1951

1. Transmitted herewith is biographical information on Reinhard GEHLLEN. Mr. GEHLLEN, the chief of ZIPPER, is expected to arrive in the United States on 23 September.

2. IR and division files contain no disqualifying derogatory information.

3. Local field traces developed no disqualifying derogatory information.

4. OSO operational files and documents contain no information of investigative value or security interest in addition to that set forth herein.

[Signature]

Bronson Tweedy

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
TO: ACNORT

ACTION: FDM (1-2-3)

INFORMATION: IR (L-5), AD/SA (6), OPS (7), PLANS (8), S/C (9-10-11), STG (12), DDP (13)

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

From: PULLACH

To: SPECIAL OPERATIONS

ACTION: FDM (1-2-3)

INFORMATION: IR (L-5), AD/SA (6), OPS (7), PLANS (8), S/C (9-10-11), STG (12), DDP (13)

[Redacted]

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET. Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 604 AR-380-5

PULL 2664

TO: WASH

INFO: KARLF

CITE: PULLF

RE: WASH 07223 (OUT 75765), PULL 2648 (IN 27908)

UTILITY TRAVELING AS REPRESENTATIVE GERMAN BUSINESS GROUP WHICH INTERESTED DEVELOPTING GERMAN AND FOREIGN PATENTS IN USA AND FURTHERING EXCHANGE TECHNICAL INFO US-GERMAN FIRMS. FOR THIS PURPOSE WILL CONSULT VARIOUS US FIRMS. GROUP HEADED BY DR. JNR. REUSZ-ZIPPER SPECIAL CONNECTION LIVING MUNICH WEINSTRE 8 WHO INFORMED UTILITY COVER

[Redacted]

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE
TO: Assistant Director for Special Operations
THRU: Staff C, SPB
ATTN: Chief, FDM (For
FROM: Chief, Special Security Division
SUBJECT: MJ-DRAGO
#54150 - R.G.

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 7 September 1951, requesting the appropriate security clearance so that the Subject might enter the United States, receive certain training and return to his field of operations.

2. This is to advise that this office grants the necessary security approval desired so that the Subject can be utilized as set forth in Paragraph 1 and in your memorandum of 7 September 1951.

3. The Subject is not to represent himself as, nor is he to be represented as, an employee of this organization.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES: WEIHRAUCH EXEMPTION 3512 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET
A memorandum for the record dated 8 Oct 1951 subject:

DCI's Meeting with General Gehlen, written by Lyman B Kirkpatrick,
Acting Assistant Director is filed in Policy file.
9 October 1951

TO: Assistant Director for Special Operations
THRU: Staff C, SPE
ATTN: Chief, FDM (For C)
FROM: Chief, Special Security Division
SUBJECT: UJ-DRACO - Operational Support - Project (OSO)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 2 October 1951 requesting hotel accommodations for the Subjects in Washington, D.C., on October 8, 1951, through October 9, 1951.

2. This memorandum will confirm the following:
   a. The only suite available in Washington, D.C., that would fulfill your request was at the Hotel 2400, on Sixteenth Street.
   b. Of your office was telephonically advised by of this office that the reservations were made in the names of the Subjects. Mr. James Critchfield, employed by the Army, resided in Washington, D.C., and Germany. The other two were private individuals from Germany.
   c. The Subjects occupied this suite on October 8, 1951.

3. If we may be of assistance to you in the future, do not hesitate to say so.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

[Signature]
TO : Assistant Director for Special Operations
THRU : Staff C, SH3
ATTN : Chief, FBI (For C)
FROM : Chief, Special Security Division
SUBJECT: UJ-DRACO
#51450 - R.O.

9 OCT 1951

1. Reference is made to your request for assistance in facilitating the entrance of the Subject into the United States on 23 September 1951.

2. This will confirm previous telephonic advice from L of this Division, to L of your office, on 23 September 1951 that the operation was successful and no untoward incident occurred.

3. If we may be of assistance to you in the future, do not hesitate to say so.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Director for Special Operations
THRU: Staff C, SPB
ATTN: Chief, FDM (For )
FROM: Chief, Special Security Division
SUBJECT: 

1. This will confirm telephonic advice from this Division, to your office, of our compliance with your request for assistance in Subject's exit from the United States.

2. The operation incident to Subject's mission in the United States was successful and departure was accomplished on schedule with no untoward incidents.

3. If we can be of assistance at any future date, please so inform us.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:
30 October 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe
Attention: C

Chief, Foreign Division II
Operational
Personal Letter for Dr. Schneider

Attached are two envelopes containing identical copies of a personal letter from Dr. Critchfield to Dr. Schneider. Items of operational interest (paragraphs 3 and 4) contained have been extracted and appear in the report on Richter's visit to the USA now ready for forwarding to you. It is requested that the sealed envelopes be delivered to Dr. Schneider and that the second copy be filed with other correspondences with Dr. Schneider in your safe.

J. Critchfield

Attachments: 2

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3028 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2001-2005

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
Dear Doctor Schneider,

Since your departure a fortnight ago, I have been in Washington concentrating on the problems that require action here before I return to Europe. Foremost of these problems are, of course, the involvements related to the contractual agreement negotiations and the rather pressing attendant financial matters. I am reasonably optimistic that a solution to our immediate financial problems can be reached in the near future.

I have been following the discussions between the Bonn government and the Western Allies with much interest. I fear that there are still many unresolved differences and misunderstandings involved in the discussions related to the contractual agreement; a recent personal letter from Mr. Pleasants did not reflect a particularly optimistic outlook. I am increasingly anxious to be back to make any contribution possible to minimize these differences and misunderstandings. However, it does not appear that I will be sailing until sometime in December.

It appears that the matter which brought Roger to the United States has again been dropped into my hands. It appears that the General whom you met on 8 October learned of the matter and discussed it with the General with whom you had the talk on the 25th of September. They agreed that my organization would assume responsibility for representing the United States Government interest in continuing the negotiation with the Athenium Institute represented by Mr. Roger. This arrangement, it was felt, would not basically modify the nature of the negotiating privately and independently initiated by Mr. Roger; but would offer the most expeditious and secure means of coordinating these negotiations, with our and your more specific interests.

Would you kindly convey this information to Mr. Roger. The plans for the travel of two technicians to Germany has not been altered by this arrangement; however, I have been informed that the trip will be delayed until late November or early December due to other pressing commitments.

The trip through the United States with you and Neims was for me a pleasant and significant experience which, I feel, further strengthened the bond of personal friendship and professional understanding that has characterized our association during the past three years.
I am looking forward with great enthusiasm to my return to Germany. Please give the gentlemen of your staff my warmest regards and assure them that their contributions to assist Mr. Gengelmen's efforts to keep us fully advised of existing problems, both professional and personal, have been most helpful. I look forward to seeing all of you sometime before Christmas.

Sincerely yours,

James H. Critchfield
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

Page No.

From: VIENNA
To: SPECIAL OPERATIONS

ACTION: FDM (1-2-3)

INFORMATION: IR (4-5), AD/SO (6), OPS (7), PLANS (8), STC (9),
S/C (10-11-12), DDP (13)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Paras. 51 (1) 60A AR-389-5

VIEN 6450

TO: WASHF INFO: PULLF BERNF CITE: VIENF

FROM: SALZBURG

1. UTILITY TOLD ON 18 NOV 51 IN PRESENCE MERKER AND HALTER HE HAD MET FEW DAYS BEFORE AND ESTABLISHED CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONS.

2. UTILITY CLAIMS DENOUNCED TO HIM FOR HAVING CONTACTED CAPOTE GROUP WITHOUT CLEARANCE AND FOR FREE WHEELING IN GENERAL.

3. AT MEETING WITH UTILITY:
   A. GAVE LONG WORLD SITUATION REPORT.
   B. OFFERED PROCURE INFO ON FUTURE GERMAN ARMY ORGANIZATION FROM HORN FOR.
   C. STATED COULD NOT PASS INTELL MATERIAL AS LONG AS U.S. SPONSORED.
   D. EMPHASIZED HIS CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH ADENAUER.

SECURITY INFORMATION

Routine

20 NOV 51

IN 41727

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE
E. SAID HORN "HIS MAN" IN GERMAN ARMY PLANTING PICTURE.

F. DENOUNCED CAPOTE AND KIELMANNSEGG AS CARRY OVER FROM SCHWERIN REGIME.

G. ASKED NO QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS OR J'S ACTIVITIES.

H. SAID EAGER TO TAKE UP LIAISON WITH AUSTRIAN F.S.

THEN, OFFICIALLY CONSTITUTED.
Lieber Herr Emichfeld!

Meine Frau und meine herzlichen Grüße

dem Herrn, der von uns_HERE_lesen_Lassen

Künste für das neue Jahr, aussichtsreich. Köche
und seinen neuen Glück, Pfer, Gemü-

heit und seine Lieblingsbringen! Ich möchte
ihnen nochmal danken für den Fort, der

unsere Zusammenarbeit in vergangenen Jahre
getragen hat. Wenn wir jetzt zurückblicken, so
könnt uns das Jahr 1851 doch in jeder Be-

derung einen großen Schritt vorwärts gebracht.

Mit herzlichen Grüßen von uns

[Signature]

[Date: 23.12.51]
OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR FOUCH

SPECIFY AIR OR SEA FOUCH

DISPATCH NO. WMA-1738

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational

SPECIFIC - Activities of Otto SKORZENY

TO: Chief, FON

DATE: 6 December 1951

FROM: Chief

1. On 5 December 1951, Major Robert B. Black, Assistant Air Attaché, informed that Otto SKORZENY is planning another trip to Germany. For the first time in SKORZENY's travels, he is apparently having difficulty in getting a visa to enter Germany. Other details regarding the present activities of SKORZENY are included in the attached memorandum from Major Black.

2. Black was asked regarding any new developments in the alleged penetration of the various High Commissioners offices in Germany by Soviet agents. To this Black replied that SKORZENY had mentioned that this operation cannot continue to go on indefinitely due to a lack of funds. Although SKORZENY did not apparently ask directly for financial aid, it was nevertheless strongly implied. SKORZENY did not show Major Black any additional information allegedly coming from the penetration, and presumably he has received none recently. SKORZENY expects that on his next trip to Germany he will receive additional information regarding this operation.

3. Black also mentioned the fact that SKORZENY is afraid of an organization run by General GEISEL (fmr). GEISEL is a German officer who, according to SKORZENY, was an active collaborator with both the U.S. OCM and CID. Black is not completely clear as to why SKORZENY fears the organization led by General GEISEL, but he is presumably afraid of some of GEISEL's assistants and not GEISEL himself. According to SKORZENY, he is a gentleman.

4. According to Black, the SKORZENYs seemed happier to him in their last meeting on 5 December than they have ever been. Major Black has concluded that their lightheartedness is probably due to the fact that some money will be forthcoming shortly from one source or another. Black ventured that it might be that SKORZENY expects some financial returns from his contact with the industrialists mentioned in the attached memorandum. In speaking of industrialists, Black also mentioned that SKORZENY expected to meet an important industrialist from Venezuela at the Barajas airport on 4 December, but that the expected industrialist did not arrive.

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

FOR COORDINATION WITH: Army
5. SKORZENY also informed Major Bieck at their last meeting that he had recently conferred with General Agustin HIJOSPARRERES, Minister of the Army, regarding his plan to set up a "core cadre" in Spain.

6. Comment:  ... continues to press Bieck to procure from SKORZENY actual copies of the product of the alleged penetration of the High Commissioners' offices in Germany. Bieck agrees to continue efforts to get this information.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM: Major Hisek

SUBJECT: Further Activities of Otto Skorzeny

1. Last night, Otto Skorzeny and his wife called at my home. The purpose of the visit, as near as I can make out, was to inform me that both he and his wife are planning another journey to Germany. Ilza will depart on Thursday for Stuttgart and Cologne via aircraft. Skorzeny, himself, will, in all probability, have to wait perhaps another week before he, too, can make the journey. It seems that he is now having his problems obtaining a German visa. Apparently the Germans, due to their new setup, retained the right of visas. Skorzeny is undoubtedly on a caution list and full approval must be obtained from Bonn prior to giving him the visa. As near as I can tell, this trip involved meeting big steel industrialists and construction people in Cologne and other cities of Germany. From what Ilza let on, last night, they do have an exceptionally big deal in the offing and with any degree of success, they can make a killing.

2. I have referred to you in the past of one Leon Degrelle, the famous or infamous Belgian Fascist. I believe that one of the offices of our Embassy has been greatly interested in the past as to his whereabouts. I believe he is still wanted by the Belgian Government for his nefarious activities with the Germans during the War. This man is definitely living in or very near Sevilla, the Skorzeny's having seen him only several days ago. Another interesting development is our flighty little friend, the Red Duchess of Valencia, is sadly in love with Degrelle, who is not having any. For your information, Degrelle is coming to Madrid about the 15th of December and at that time I plan to meet him. Skorzeny is still definitely interested in "talking to somebody."
See: Odeum Reports file Jan 1952

for copy of Director's letter to General Gehlen thanking him for Zipper's Estimate of the International Situation as of March 1952.

Director's letter dated 9 May 1952.
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

From: BONN
To: SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Action: FRAN
Information: IR (1-2), AD/SO (3), OPS (4), FDM (5-6-7), STC (8), S/6 (9-10-11), DDP (12)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Paras. 51 (1) 604 AR-380-5

SUBJ: BONN 017

TO: FRANF INFO: WASHF, PULLF CITE: BONNF

1. GLOBKE INFORMED THAT HE PLANS TO DISCUSS WITH UPTHRUST INTELLIGENCE MATTERS ON JAN 26 IN EFFORT TO CLEARLY DEFINE DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS EXISTING GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES INCLUDING ZIPPER. GLOBKE HOPES THEREBY TO MINIMIZE PRESENT FRICTION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS.

2. REACTION OF DR GUMBEL AND DR GRAU WHO HAD MADE BRIEF SURVEY OF ZIPPER PERSONNEL AND FINANCES COMPLETELY FAVORABLE BOTH (REC) TOTH AS TO BACKGROUND LEADERS AND SALARIES BEING PAID WHICH WERE IN ACCORDANCE GERMAN CIVIL SERVICE.

3. GLOBKE PLANS TO HAVE CAREFUL ESTIMATE MADE OF GERMAN FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO ZIPPER. RESULTING BUDGET WILL BE SUBMITTED TO FINANCE MINISTER AND SPECIAL BUNDESTAG FINANCE COMMITTEE. FINANCE MINISTER ALREADY INFORMED CONCERNING ZIPPER.

4. NO GERMAN INTELLIGENCE TECHNICIAN YET APPOINTED FOR QUADRIPARTITE WORKING COMMITTEE TO ADVISE ON CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS. GLOBKE CLAIMED HE UNAWARE SUCH PERSON NEEDED AND MADE TENTATIVE SUGGESTION THAT RADTKE MIGHT BE SUITABLE AND COULD BE SUPPORTED BY ZIPPER STAFF IF REQUIRED.

DECLASSIFIED ANDReleased BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 322B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2003 2005

TOR 2147Z 25 JAN 52

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT
1. Following is translation of a report dated 2 October 1951 passed by

*From a confidential source it is known that in West Germany a large
intelligence organisation is operating under the direction of Utility, former
Brigadier General in the OKW and manager of the office for Fremde Heere Ost,
who previously had been active with the AST. The majority of his colleagues
are former SD-personnel. The organisation depends directly on the American
High Command for support and receives from the Americans its general assign-
ments. The processing of reports and regular evaluations is done by the
organisation itself. The organisation works primarily against eastern
targets.*

2. Original, which contains Utility's true name, is retained with file
copy here. One would think that KERNMAYER is well enough informed not to
accuse Zipper of primary SD-membership, and one would suspect that this bit
is deliberate slanting to prejudice the Austrian police against Utility.
International Phone Calls made by UTILITY Personal phone-Munich 793 409

NGLA-8097, 10 Sept 51
- Rome 39 07 66 (9-1933) called on 25 July 51 for 3 minutes.

NGLA-8486, 8 Oct 51
- Bern 54 225 (VERGER) called on 4 and 24 Sept 51 for total of 6 minutes.

NGLA-9263, 12 Dec 51
- Rome 39 06 66 (9-1933) called on 19 Nov 51 for 3 minutes.
- Bern 54 225 (VERGER) called on 16 and 19 Nov 51 for total of 8 minutes.
- Bern 554993 (identification requested) called for 3 minutes on 24 Oct 51.

NGLA-9974, 14 Jan 52
- Bern 55 993 (identification requested) called on 13 Dec 51 for 3 minutes.
- Rome 39 07 66 (9-1933) called on 7, 10 and 12 Dec 51 for total of 15 minutes.
- Zurich 24 67 80 (identification requested) called for 3 minutes on 10 Dec 51.

NGLA-13331, 12 Feb 52
- Bern 54 225 (VERGER) called on 18 Jan 52 for 3 minutes.
- Bern 51 26 12 (identification requested) called on 9 Jan 52 for 3 minutes.
- Zurich 24 67 80 (identification requested) called on 1 Jan 52 for 3 minutes and on 7 Jan 52 (two calls) for 4 minutes.

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UTILITY International Phone Calls Cont'd.

- MCLA-10833, 24 Mar 52
  - Bern 54 225 (MERCIER) called by U. on 22 Feb 52 for 5 minutes.
  - Hochseeland 22 ( ) called by U. on 15 Feb 52 for 3 minutes.
  - Rome 390 766 (8-1933) called by U. on 21 Feb 52 for 6 minutes.
  - Zürich 24 67 80 (Hotel Eden au Lac) called by U. on 2 Feb 52 for 3 minutes.

- MGLA-11099, 4 Apr 52
  - Bern 54 225 (MERCIER) called by U. on 11, 14, 17 March 52 for total time 9 minutes.
  - Rome 39 07 66 (8-1933) called by U. on 26, 27, Feb and 10 Mar 52; called a total of 15 minutes.
  - Zürich 24 67 80 (Hotel Eden au Lac) called by U. on 29 Feb and 22 Mar 52 for total of 6 minutes.

4 April 52
TO: Chief, ME
FROM: Chief of Station, Frankfurt
SUBJECT: GENERAL—Operational
SPECIFIC—General GEHLEN

DATE: 12 February 1952

1. The attached clipping appeared in the Westfälische Zeitung published in Bielefeld, Germany on 6 February 1952.

2. The article originally appeared in the Journal—American in New York and describes the former role of General GEHLEN in the German Army department responsible for intelligence on foreign armies. More interesting, it states that his intelligence network has been reorganized in the last two years, mostly within the American secret service which financed it. This department has at its disposal excellent information concerning the Russian and Chinese armies.

3. Commenting on the final sentence, Gehlen states: "Schoen Ware".

VIA: AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)
CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3928 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2001 2005

DISTRIBUTION:
EE w/1 incl.
1 - COS
2 - POS

General Gehlen
New York
Journal-American

Da gibt es den deutschen General Gehlen, der selten zu sehen ist und
UTILITY is cold, forceful, intent, completely preoccupied with his professional ambitions, untalented and disinterested in things cultural, completely lacking in informality and warmth of personality ... and never takes a drink. Otto JOHN is everything UTILITY is not; possesses all the talents and personal charm that UTILITY lacks; lacks the drive, intensity of purpose, and complete, personal dedication that UTILITY has. In the final analysis, I suspect that JOHN is the more moral of the two, but where UTILITY is the simple, resolute, and uncomplicated man, JOHN is probably a highly complex man, irresolute and no match for UTILITY in the knock-about of German intelligence politics.
Daily Log Item for 11 March 1952

On 13 February a zipper consultant in Bonn reported to the OSO representative in that city that the German Federal Government intended to replace Dr. Theobald Mosheim, spokesman of the German delegation discussing intelligence matters in quadripartite meetings on the Contractual Agreement. Hans Globke, Internal Affairs Chief of the Federal Chancellory, when asked to comment stated that it had been agreed to withdraw Mosheim from the discussions because of his inexperience in secret intelligence matters. Globke was of the opinion that Reinhard Gehlen would be much more qualified to discuss these subjects but since he was not a member of the Federal Government, Globke would be glad to front for him if the allies had no objection. Globke was assured by the OSO representative that the Allies were entirely satisfied with the progress of the discussions held with the German delegation.

The OSO representative was later instructed to inform Globke at a subsequent meeting that there would be strong objections to the presence of Gehlen at the quadripartite talks; but that there would be no objection to Globke's presence without Gehlen whom he could consult in private as he saw fit.

Based on MGFA 6340
Dear General:

Attached hereto I send you a short summary of the results of our evaluation work, based on the Intelligence production of this organization during the last year. In spite of the fact that since the completion of the study the political situation developed further, the study might give you an impression of our work and our January estimate on the situation.

I am always remembering the very nice time I had last year in the United States on your invitation. Please be so kind to give my best regards to Mr. Dulles and all the other gentlemen I had the pleasure to meet.

I also inclose a letter of Mr. OXENIUS, who was very happy to get news from you via me. He will enter this organization as soon as he makes his last graduation.

With best regards, dear General,

Very sincerely yours,

Reinhard Gehlen
1. The problem of continuing the case has been the subject of several intensive discussions among the staff here, leading to the conclusion, in which I wholeheartedly concur, that it should be left with exclusively if possible. is at least sufficiently removed from the scene, which I am not, to keep from developing into a millstone around his neck.

2. I have been much impressed by elaboration of the ways in which has contrived to make a nuisance of himself, including important and indiscreet telephone calls involving any number of minor favors, for which he gives next to nothing in return. There is little evidence in the files of any of the officers who have been involved in the case at one time or another that 's interest in maintaining contact is based on anything other than self-interest and profit.

3. This is not to say that there may be no contact between and me. He knows that I am here and certainly knows something about where I have been. He may get in touch with me at any time by letter or phone. But the initiative must come from him; and if he wants to see me, he will have to come . The same applies to is full of such garden paths and it is hardly likely, and possibly not even desirable, that I avoid them all, but the and will have to do the walking.

4. I am encouraged in this attitude by reluctance to become overly-identified with Germans in the eyes of our liaison contacts. Both and know of my previous whereabouts. There is no indication that they take them amiss. But I would not want to give them occasion to feel that these former associations were being too intensively pursued here. It is, after all, still unfashionable to speak German in so much so, indeed, that I have found it expedient to temper my German with an occasional lapse into Wienerisch.

5. Thus it was that when I breakfasted with on 24 March in Bern I went prepared to decline the anticipated invitation to accompany him on a tour of his Swiss contacts. As it happened, the subject was not mentioned. Possibly was too full of his Paris trip to speak or think of anything.
else. He did not, for instance, even allude to the fact that I had been in the States or behave in any way as though we had not seen each other in almost three months. He just launched right into his Paris adventures, passing on with emphasis and relish Kurskis’s disparagements of the British. I have not reported separately on this conversation, since it developed nothing that UTILITY might not have been expected to report to FALLSCHLICK.

6. For FALLSCHLICK: UTILITY did inform me that MERKER’s successor as Chief of 35 will be KALLENBERG, heretofore Chief of IV-X. I assume you have his clear name. If not, I shall forward it upon request. UTILITY indicated, incidentally, that with MERKER’s gradual withdrawal from this scene, the activities of 35 will be scaled down, eventually to be absorbed in 40.

[Handwritten note: Must watch this closely.]

[Handwritten note: This could be manacled with a strong power never be absorbed by 35 alone.]

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**RECORDS INTEGRATION STAFF**

JUN 2 1952

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**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**
6 May 1952

Chief of Station, Frankfurt

6 May 1952

Chief, Bonn Liaison Office

Operational

Lehre Gustav JANKE

R.F. [NGA-001(15-0L)]

1. About six weeks ago during my last meeting with C of HU-32 I asked him if he could tell me something about JANKE. I explained to him that on several occasions JANKE had requested a KICCO employee (Miss H. Metzenthin) to introduce him to some American intelligence officials to whom he could make some rather interesting disclosures. He admitted that he was familiar with JANKE's case, whom he considered an intelligence peddler involved in all sorts of shady deals. For example, the German Soft Drink Association gave JANKE some of their trade secrets as a basis for his investigation of the trade secrets of American soft drinks. JANKE sold the German secrets to the Coca-Cola representative in Dusseldorf for 10,000 DM, and the German Soft Drink Association is now considering the advisability of using JANKE for brokering confidence.

2. About two weeks after my talk with C, I learned that JANKE had been arrested by the British. Knowing our interest in the case, the British liaison officer today brought me the attached interrogation report. He was careful to explain that the report contained only items that would be of interest to us, but should we want additional details we should get in touch with [ ].

I am handling the case. If you wish to send a representative to talk to C, I shall be glad to arrange an appointment with him.

DIST:
2 - GOL (w/2 attch)
1 - PCD #1
1 - PCD #2
1 - WC
2 - Bonn

Secret - Security Information
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COPY

1. Interrogation was designed to bring out details of JAHNE's dealings with Buero BLANK, and other similar agencies, apart from those concerned with the handling of the stolen documents.

2. JAHNE sent papers on the following military subjects to his old CO, Gen Heinrich EBERBACH:
   
   - Disciplined and Drill for Recruits
   - The Part of the Infantryman in Arm warfare
   - The composition of Arm Fighting Ops with Commandos, Air Strike Kings and Parachutists
   - The Defence of Europe against the East

   Those papers were passed into Buero BLANK by EBERBACH jun at the beg 51, and JAHNE later heard that they had received flattering attention. However, he was not called to personally enlarge on them.

Spring 51

During his manifold activities, Prof CLASSEN had established contact with Prof FOESE, the aircraft designer, who had recently completed plans and models for a hover plane and a speed boat, which allegedly represented revolutionary advances in their several fields. CLASSEN asked JAHNE if he knew any parties likely to be interested in the development of those projects, and JAHNE mentioned it to EBERBACH, at that time already in contact with Buero BLANK.

As a result, a meeting was arranged at CLASSEN's home, at which the following were present:

- Wolf BLY, industrial merchant of WUPPERTAL, representing Prof FOESE,
- General der Flieger Sendemann (of Flieger Corps),
- Unofficial representative of Buero BLANK,
- One unknown, representing Industry,
- CLASSEN and JAHNE.

BLY described the projects and spoke of the necessity of raising money for further development. It was suggested that the Americans be approached, but this suggestion was dropped since no-one present had the necessary access. The meeting ended inconclusively, SENDEMANN privately telling JAHNE that it was too early to consider the realisation of such ambitious plans.

Beg Aug 51

JAHNE however reported to EBERBACH that a trial speedboat was being built at FLIESACK, and a further conference was held in the premises of Buero BLANK, after EBERBACH had officially joined that organisation.
(NOTE: Also after the documents had passed from JAHNIE to EBERBACH.)

Present were:-

Kapitanen ZAHNKE, described as "Seefahrt Nr.1" at Buero BLACK,
WOLF BLAY,
JAHNIE,
EBERSOHN Jun.

It was reported that the trial boat was completed and it was arranged on the spot for Admiral FALK. (Kern der Kleinansicht) to represent Buero BLACK at the first run.

(NOTE: These were actually later shown in the German newsreel.)

After the meeting, BLAY and JAHNIE took coffee together, BLAY questioning JAHNIE as to his occupation. Nothing loathed, JAHNIE described his plans for the INDAGO, whereupon BLAY exclaimed that he could effect JAHNIE's introduction to the "greatest detective in the world". Interested, JAHNIE was told of the existence of a certain "Geheimrat" WINDISCH, Bahnhofstrasse 62, to whom BLAY promised he would write on JAHNIE's behalf.

(NOTE: JAHNIE now says he had no previous knowledge of HEINZ's existence. In the first interrogation summary he is quoted as saying that HEINZ should be excluded from access to the stolen documents, when these were handed to EBERBACH in Jul 51.)

28 Sep 51 JAHNIE visited his mother in MAINZ, Freiherr v. STEINHUR. 9.

29 Sep 51 He called at HEINZ address, whom he noted was camouflaged as the "Michael Verlag". On mentioning BLAY's name, he was immediately received by HEINZ, although the latter said that BLAY had not effected the promised introduction. JAHNIE gave the purpose of his visit as being calculated to arouse interest in his INDAGO plans, which he proceeded to describe. HEINZ asked him if he had been in the Abwehr and, receiving a negative answer, said that he was not concerned with industrial security, but was engaged in espionage in the spheres of high level politics and military affairs in RL and Russian occupied-AUSTRIA. JAHNIE asked HEINZ if he were connected with Gesuch CHILN, of whose activities he had heard from EBERBACH Jun. HEINZ said that he was not, and, during the course of subsequent conversation, gave the following facts about the GUSHIN organisation:-
a) that it employed 52/60 Analysis officers, and was thus better staffed than the Abwehr had been,
b) that it employed 1000 operatives,
c) that it conducted operations all over RU, L.SIA and the Satellite Countries,
d) that [Confidential] was GHLEN's 2 i/o,
e) that it was worn in a village near LUSCHEN,
f) that it was financed by the Americans.

JANKE expressed interest in establishing contact with the organisation, so that HENZ promised to see what he could do; he did not appear keen. When JANKE said that GHLEN, with such an apparatus under his control appeared to be the natural successor to GABARIS, HENZ denied this saying that part was reserved for himself, that he was already espionage chief in Buero BLANK, with OSTER as his 2 i/o. Describing his wartime activities, KRENZ said that he had commanded the BRANDENBURG Begg, and had conducted radio deception operations against Britain from Holland. On parting, he extended a cordial invitation for JANKE to visit him at Buero BLANK, where he spent about three days each week.

On return home, JANKE described his interview with HENZ to SHABACH Jun, and expressed wonder that HENZ should be so indiscriminate to a comparative stranger.

JANKE described his interview with GERSTENBLO, saying that his intention had been to subvert a secretary, but that GERSTENBLO had been pre-warmed of his visit by CLASSEN, so that they parted after an exchange of insults. His account of the LUSCHEN incident is subjective but agrees with CLASSEN'S in all essentials.

17 Nov 51 Charged by Coca-Cola with investigating the source of an article against CC which had appeared in the FRANKFURT newspaper, "Sozialistische Volkswirtschaft", which was assumed to have been inspired by the German soft drink industry, JANKE again called on HENZ to see if the latter would give him list of the local KPD. HENZ could not, but he put JANKE on to the K IRBACH LIV, as a result of which he had an interview with the chief, for HENZ, HLYER was also unable to help but he arranged for JANKE to meet his FRANKFURT vis-a-vis in Cafe KRAUSL, FRANKFURT at 1000 hrs on 30 Nov 51.

19 Nov 51 JANKE discovered that a KPD member, Reinhard SCHMIDT, was working the OPPENHEIM Coca-Cola concession, Peter HARDT & Sons. He briefed SCHMIDT to ascertain the source of the SVZ article, which SCHMIDT agreed to do.
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20 Nov 51 JAHKE kept the RV in Cafe BRENZLER, duly meeting a certain SPACK, who, on hearing JAHKE's business, regretted that he had no source in the local KPD.

Beg Dec 51 JAHNE visited Buero BLANK to pick up BURBACH jun. BURBACH was out at the station while JAHNE was visiting. JAHNE came into the vestibule, greeted JAHNE and, assuming that JAHNE had called to pay the promised visit, took him into his office. Here he showed JAHNE a map pinned to a cupboard, which bore a number of cabalistic signs and which he described as prepared by OSTER under his direction to show the extent of their espionage operations. Referring again to GELIN, against whom he seemed to bear a grudge, he said that GELIN had recently suffered severe operational losses, but that he was still financed by the Americans to the extent of $6,000,000 yearly. JAHNE then took his leave to collect BURBACH.

He described his conversation with OSTER to BURBACH, who asked him to report it in writing. At first unwilling, JAHNE eventually complied, later learning that BURBACH had passed it to OSTER, who had in turn shown it to BLANK.

(NOTE: JAHNE says that this incident led to BURBACH first losing favour with BLANK, since his report was apparently not believed.)

BURBACH jun then left for PARIS.

JAHNE assumed that it was at this time that OSTER first reported to KELLERKLOCK to report OSTER's loose allegations regarding himself and BURBACH. He later learned from BURBACH jun that these were:

a) that JAHNE was informed of all the ALTENBERG military discussions five minutes after they had taken place by BURBACH,

b) that JAHNE was employed by BLANK, from which he had received large sums of money and the promise of a regular command,

c) that he maintained a dwelling with mistress for BURBACH in a large town, where alcoholic and sexual orgies took place.

Jan 52 BURBACH was called back from PARIS, faced with the allegations, ordered to break contact with JAHNE and suspended from duty without pay.

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Gen ESBACH communicated these facts to JANKKE and asked him to attend a council of war in BAD BOLL, enclosing DM 50 travelling expenses. Gen ESBACH, his son and JANKKE duly conferred, as a result of which JANKKE learned of CLAUSIN's (or GERSTIN-HERO's) allegations and the fate of his report on RHINE. At Gen ESBACH's request, he prepared a written refutation of the charges on the spot, later supporting it with a sworn statement prepared by his lawyer.

3. Interrogation was broken off at this point.