CS Historical Paper No. 150
CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY
THE BERLIN TUNNEL OPERATION 1952 - 1956
EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 12958 6.2(c) (C)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: JUL 2007
Other copy held by: DDP
Copy No. 2 of 2
Controlled by: | I_,_rTTT„
Date prepared: . 25 August 1967
Date published : 24 June 1968
Written by:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE i
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS iii
I. INTRODUCTION. . . .......... 1
II. PLANNING 6
III. IMPLEMENTATION 17
IV. TERMINATION ............. 23
V. PRODUCTION. 25
VI . AFTERMATH .............. 27
Appendix A - Analysis of the Reasons for the Discovery of the Tunnel
Appendix B - Recapitulation of the Intelli- gence Derived t
Appendix C - Typical American Press Comment Appendix D - East German Press Comment
PREFACE
(the Berlin Tunnel project) came into being sometime in 1952 (the exact date cannot be established) and ceased as an active operation in the summer of 1956* The writer served as Headquarters case officer on the project from the winter of 1952-1953 until the summer of 1954 and then as the field case officer until February 1955.
1 were intimately associated with the planning and implementation of the project at the policy level and very kindly offered suggestions for the preparation of this manuscript . Their comments have been incorporated and are greatly appreciated. Several other individuals, including
who were in a position to offer valuable advice were absent from Headquarters during the period the paper was being prepared and thus unavailable to assist.
When this project was first discussed with the then Director of CIA, Mr. Allen Welsh Dulles, he ordered that, in the interests of security, as little as possible concerning the project would be reduced to writing. It is probable that few orders have been so conscientiously obeyed, and yet there
i
are a great many cubic feet of files connected with this pro- ject. These files mainly concern technical and administrative matters. Only those details which, in the opinion of the writer, are necessary to a broad understanding of the manner in which the project's objectives were accomplished have been included in this paper. Those interested in additional data may wish to consult the files.
In addition to setting forth significant developments, the Writer has attempted to provide insight into the reasons for certain courses of action. At times this required a speculative approach. The judgments derived from such specu- lation were shared by all those actively concerned in the management of the project, and it is the writer's hope that they are accurately expressed in the following paper . Any error in this respect, however, is the sole responsibility of the writer.
August , 13(57
ii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure
*
1 - Map of Berlin
2 - Detail Map of Rudow Section, Berlin
3 - Aerial View of Rudow Section, Berlin
4 - Dirt in the Basement
5 - Vopos Studying the Installation
6 - East German View of the Compound
7 - Blinds on the Shield
8 - Excavating Using the Blinds
9 - View of the Completed Tunnel
10 - Construction of the Vertical Shaft
11 - Completed Vertical Shaft
12 - View of Cables and Taps
13 - Shaft and Tunnel Entrance in Warehouse Basement
14 - Converted Fork Lift and Dirt Box
15 - Target Cables Exposed
16 - Schematic View of Tunnel
17 - Initial Stage of Construction of Pre -Amp ^ Chamber
18 - Pre-Amp Chamber
19 - Tapping Bridle
20 - Lead -Aw ay Lines
21 - Soviet Press Briefing
iii
I.
INTRODUCTION
The exact moment when the idea emerged of digging a tunnel to intercept Soviet and East German communications is somewhat obscure/ A number of factors must be considered, among them the following:
a. As early as 1948 U.S. Intelligence Officers became interested in the benefits to be derived from tapping Soviet and Satellite landlines on a scale not previously considered necessary. The loss of certain sources during this period created gaps in our intelli- gence coverage which were particularly unfortunate during this period of Cold War escalation. It became evident that the tapping of certain selected landlines might pro- duce the information needed to fill a number of the gaps in our overall intelligence picture.
b. In the late 1940’s and early 1950 's the U.S., through the briefings of "returnee” German scientists (those who were taken by the Soviets after World War II to work in Russia) and other sources, became aware of a new
S
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c. In the late 1940’ s the Office of Communications, in the course of its continuing efforts to provide secure
communications for the Agency, became aware of a principle
* :
which, when applied to target communications, offered certain possibilities. Plans to exploit this technique were immediately formulated.
These factors then served as additional incentives (above and beyond our normal collection requirements) to focus atten- tion on Soviet landline targets. In mid-1951 exploratory
discussions were held in Washington to plan the mounting of an attack on Soviet landlines in East Germany with special empha- sis to be placed on the Berlin area.
E T
E T
during the latter part of 1951, and by March 1952 all of the pertinent technical material had been assembled and sufficient- ly analyzed to permit the pinpointing of the most important Soviet circuits. /
j Subsequent events proved
this information to be completely correct.
Various methods of tapping these circuits were explored and one sampling operation was run in the East Zone, unfortu- nately with negative results. By January 1953, however, the
effectiveness of
had become such that a 15-minute sample
was obtained of the prime target circuit
j The longest continuous sample obtained was 29 minutes and most samples were of two to three minutes' duration. Special mention should be made of the fact that it was necessary to maintain a 24-hour watch over a six- month period on "our” end of the cable to record these
E T
samples
Meantime collateral collection effort continued on the communications systems involved and the
At this point (mid-1953) we knew it could be done - the next step was the problem of installing a* permanent tap on the target lines.
Precisely at what point the idea of a tunnel for the purpose of tapping the target cables began to come into focus
i I 1
cannot be pinpointed.
C R E T
\ While it should perhaps be possible to credit one individual with the initial concept, it appears to be a
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s
E T
II. PLANNING
Inspection of all sites from which it might be possible
to twine 1
to the target cables
served to narrow the choices to two spots:
The site actually used I was selected after careful deliberation which included, but was not limited to, the following factors: a. The location of the permanent water table (which is normally relatively high in Berlin) was ascer- tained to be 32 feet below ground surface. It was con- sidered that this fact would obviate the necessity for the use of compressed air, watertight locks, and water- tight construction with a corresponding reduction in the attendant engineering problems.
b/ The length of the tunnel was considered to be not impractical although it far exceeded anything which had been done
c. Land was available on which to construct an installation from which to begin the tunnel.
d. Complete collateral information on the area
was available
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Figure 1 - Map of Berlin
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At this point the following major questions remained unanswered :
a. Was it indeed possible to dig a tunnel of this magnitude (approximately 1500 feet) clandestinely, con- sidering the fact that the border at this point was heavily and constantly patrolled by the East Germans, and hit the targets?
b. If the answer to the above was favorable, what was to be done with the spoil (reckoned at approxi- mately 3,000 tons of sand)?
c . What type of
in such a remote area (this portion of Berlin was at that time a "squattersville" of shacks and hovels constructed from rubble by refugees from the East German Zone)?
In retrospect the first question, "Could the tunnel be dug?", was never really a debatable one— those concerned more or less decided that given sufficient money and personnel the job could be done. (This judgment fortunately proved sound.) The second question, "Where do we put the dirt?", haunted the minds of project personnel for many weeks and a great many ingenious ideas were brought forth and discarded for one rea- son or another until the suggestion was made facetiously that w© "dig a hole and put the dirt in it." This in effect was the solution. At this time no convincing] |
• "
S E
E T
S E
planning for the project continued
throughout 1953 and in December of that year the Director of , Central Intelligence approved the terms of reference which covered I I the implemen-
tation of the project. A series of conferences in late 1953 and early 1954 led to the following decisions : a. The U.S. would:
(1) procure a site, erect the necessary structures, and drive a tunnel to a point beneath the target cables;
(2) be responsible for the recording of all signals produced
and
(3) process in Washington all of the tele- graphic material received from the project.
(1) drive a vertical shaft from the tunnel’ end to the targets;
10
Figure 5 - Vopos Studying the Installation
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Figure 5 = Vopos Studying the Installation
(2) effect the cable taps and deliver a usable signal to the head of the tunnel for recording; and
(3) provide for a
to process the voice recordings
from the site.
Activity thus proceeded on three fronts - in Berlin steps were taken to lease the necessary land and right-of-way ease- ments for the site and a contract was let with a German con- tractor. The compound, which was roughly the size of an aver- age city block, was fenced with chain- type high security fencing and contained the main operations building (the one story with basement type warehouse previously described) , combined kitchen-dining facilities and barracks, and another building which housed three diesel driven generators to provide power for all facilities. Sanitary
11
Figure 6 - East German View of the Compound
igure 6 - East Ggrman View of the Compound
provisions consisted of a cesspool. (The logical placement of the cesspool was such that it was situated only a few feet from the tunnel site. It later developed when the tunnel was dug that this was quite unfortunate because working conditions in the sector adjacent to the cesspool were, to say the least, highly unpleasant . ) Planning called for the completion of this work r on 27 August 1954.
For assistance in actually digging the tunnel it was decided to request help from the and to this end the
were briefed on the project. The initial contact with was made personally by Mr. Allen Dulles to
Fortunately
a
trained engineer, had just been appointed From the first moment he learned of the operation, General Trudeau was an enthusiastic supporter of the concept
(the only available
member of the
with any experience in
tunneling) to head the project. This proved to be an excellent
turned in an outstanding job. By
choice for
mid-summer of 1954 he had firmed up the engineering plans, selected a crew of engineering personnel, and actually con- structed a mock-up tunnel some 150 yards long working under operational conditions at a high security base ini
■ 12
•
Some mention should be made of the actual method of construct- ing the tunnel. Studies of the soil structure in the Berlin area showed a high percentage of sand. For this reason it was decided that the tunnel should be lined with steel. The same sand content contributed greatly to the danger of cave-ins at the face of the tunnel, and to eliminate this risk a shield was devised with horizontal "blinds"
so arranged across its face that should even dry sand be encountered the danger of cave-ins was virtually eliminated.
The tunnel liner was formed of sections of heavy steel plate so constructed that, when bolted together, five sections formed a steel ring approximately six feet in diameter and 15 inches long. Provision was made for, bolting these rings together to form a continuous tube of solid steel. The men worked under cover of the shield described above (which was slightly larger in diameter than the steel liner) and when sufficient material had been excavated, the shield was forced forward with hydrau- lic jacks and a new section of liner was bolted in place.
Since this method left a void of approximately one and one- half inches around the liner (remembering that the diameter of the shield was greater than that of the liner) , screw-type removable plugs were built into every third section of tunnel liner. This permitted removal of the plugs and the forcing of grouting material under high pressure to fill the void
E T
Blinds on the Shield
Figure 8 - Excavating Using the Blinds
after the liner was in place. It was calculated (and subse- quently proven to be true) that this method of construction would not permit settling of the soil and detection of the tunnel from the surface. (See fig. 9.)
plans indicated that the cables were buried some 27 inches deep along the side of a heavily traveled highway. The top of the vertical shaft (see fig. 11) then needed to be approximately 12 to 14 inches below the surface of the high- way in order to give the tapping crew room to work below the ceiling of the shaft, and the whole structure had to be capable of supporting the weight of heavy trucks since the tunnel and tap chamber lay directly beneath the highway. (See fig. 12 0 Considerable care was devoted to insulating the
14
L. A
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Figure 9 - View of the Completed Tunnel
the Vertical Shaft
Figure 10 - Construction of the Vertical Shaft
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tap chamber to prevent its acting like a huge drum.
Considerable thought was given to the quantity and content of the material available from the target and the manner in which it was to be processed. It was in this field, perhaps, that we experienced some of our greatest problems. It had been decided very early in the project's planning stages to maintain the strictest possible security
measures. As a minimum precaution security checks were made on each individual who in any way became knowledgeable of the project's mission, and the same standards in force for clear-
Iwere utilized. A list of
ances for
briefed personnel was maintained, special secrecy agreements were executed, and special briefings were given to all knowl- edgeable personnel. It was in the assemblage of a processing team that we experienced our greatest problem in maintaining security standards. Since the material to be processed was largely Russian voice, it was thought that we would need linguists with near native fluency in Russian. It is axiomatic that native fluency is usually available only in natives, and
3/
— In spite of the insulation, it was a weird sensation to be in the chamber when an iron-shod horse trotted across it . We also suffered some anxious moments one foggy morning when the microphone in the tap chamber gave forth with a continuous series of dull thuds. After the sun burned away the fog, visual observation showed that the East German police had set up a temporary automobile checkpoint directly over the chamber . The "thuds" the microphone picked up were caused by the police officer in charge stomping his feet on the road surface to keep warm.
15
C R E T
III. IMPLEMENTATION
By 17 August 1954 things were beginning to take shape and the situation was as follows:
a. The German contractors had completed the compound and we were in possession.
b. All of the basic supplies, equipment, and , personnel were in Berlin ready to start construction
on the tunnel. This in itself involved transporting 125 tons of steel tunnel liner from the ZI to Berlin. The initial shipment across the East Zone to Berlin consisted of one and one-half freight trains, the loss of any pack- age of which could have blown the project. For security purposes all sensitive items, such as the tunnel liner, were double crated and banded and subjected to severe drop tests before they left the ZI. Similar items were differently packaged for deception purposes.
c . Space at Headquarters was secured and the
had assembled a crew and was well under way in fabricating the unique equipment necessary to process the anticipated telegraphic traffic.
d. Initial personnel had been selected and were being processed
17
T
It should be noted that personnel and equip- ment were programmed initially to exploit approximately percent of the anticipated take. In retrospect, per- haps this could be considered overly cautious. In justification of this decision it should be said that no one had ever tunneled 1,476 feet under clandestine condi- tions with the expectation of hitting a target two inches . in diameter and 27 inches below a main German/Soviet
highway. There were those who manifested certain reser- vations on the feasibility of so doing, and it is greatly to the credit of those senior officials, both civilian and military, that, in spite of these reservations, the project was permitted to proceed.
In late August a vertical shaft some 16 feet in diameter was started in the warehouse basement floor (see fig. 13) and ground water was encountered at 16 feet instead of at the pre- dicted 32 feet. Such examination as could be safely undertaken under the steady observation of East German border guards and Soviet officials indicated that a clay lens existed in this particular spot, creating a ’’perched water table” the magnitude of which was unknown. Available information indicated that the clay lens possibly sloped down in the direction of the target and it was decided to proceed with the tunnel even though the top cover was to be less than half what had been anticipated.
18
Shaft and Tunnel Entrance in Warehouse Basement
Figure 13 - Shaft and Tunnel Entrance in Warehouse Basement
Careful visual observation was maintained and tunneling operations stopped each time the German guards walked over the tunnel on their regular patrols. Pumps were installed to take care of the excess water. Observation logs were maintained, and since the highway under observation was the main road from East Berlin to the Schoenfeld Airport, consid- erable Order of Battle information was obtained. It was also possible to estimate quite accurately the relative importance of individuals visiting East Berlin by observing the security precautions taken by the East Germans and the Soviets.
Both sides of the tunnel were lined with sand in bags as the tunnel proceeded and the excess spoil was hauled back to the basement of the warehouse. To facilitate movement, a wooden track was laid on the floor of the tunnel and a con- verted electric fork lift was used to pull a string of rubber- tired trailers back and forth in the tunnel. (See fig. 14.) Cool air was supplied to the face of the tunnel through duct- work from an air conditioning unit located in the warehouse. The tunnel was completed on 28 February 1955. Construction of the tap chamber commenced 10 March 1955 and was completed, with the three target cables exposed, on 28 March 1955. (See fig. 15.)
To appreciate this accomplishment it is necessary to remember that the tunnel was 1,476 feet long (roughly the
19
Figure 14 - Converted Fork Lift and Dirt Box
Target Cables Exposed
length of the Lincoln Memorial reflecting pool) and that the first half sloped down and the second half sloped up. (See fig. 16.) The lack of an adequate base line made the survey- ing problem especially difficult. The engineers decided at one point that an object of known size in the East Zone would be useful as a reference point, so a baseball game was organ- ized with the objective of knocking a baseball as far into the East Zone as possible. This scheme was frustrated by the friendliness of the East German guards who kept returning the baseball. Nonetheless, the engineers expressed confidence that they knew their position when the tunnel was completed to a point which could be contained in a six- inch cube. They were correct . A
Excess humidity is probably one of the greatest enemies of electronic equipment. To guard against this problem the section of the tunnel immediately adjacent to the tap chamber was insulated and sealed with marine-type plywood to form, in effect, a closed room. (See figs. 17 and 18.) Vapor barriers were erected and, in addition, a heavy "ant i-personnel" door of steel and concrete was constructed to seal off the tunnel some 15 yards, from its terminal end. From the beginning it was realized that the duration of this operation was finite. Considerable thought was given to the posture the U„S„ Govern- ment would adopt upon the tunnel's discovery and to those
20
Schematic View of Tunnel
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Figure 17 - Initial Stage of Construction of Pre-Amp Chamber
Figure 17 - Initial Stage of Construction of Pre-Amp Chamber
C R E T
measures which would be taken at the site. The following position was finally approved:
a. The posture of the U.S. would be one of flat denial of any knowledge of the tunnel.
b. The tunnel was mined at the point it crossed the East-West Zone border with demolition charges capable of caving in the tunnel liner should the Soviets attempt forcible entry into the cover installation.
c. The "anti-Personnel” door described above was
4/
installed .
d . It was agreed that the installation would be defended against forcible entry with all means at hand.
All equipment for isolating and preampli-
fying the signals and passing them down the tunnel for record- ing was in place before each tap was made so that monitoring of each pair could begin as soon as it was tapped. (See figs. 19 and 20.) Careful check was kept of the temperature and
.4/This door bore the following inscription neatly lettered in German and Cyrillic: "Entry is forbidden by order of the
Commanding General.” It was reasoned that this sign might give pause to Soviet and/or German officials and gain time. As a matter of fact, there were those Communist individuals who considered the posting of this sign as one of the most auda- cious aspects of the entire undertaking.
Pre-Amp Chamber
Tapping Bridle
Figure 19 - Tapping Bridle
humidity in the tap chamber to prevent the possibility of the introduction of moisture into the target cables thus causing faults. The moisture in the air caused by the breathing and perspiration of the technicians doing the tapping operation forced the suspension of the operation several times to permit the air conditioning equipment to dehumidify the chamber. All the components in the electrical isolation net- works were individually selected and subjected to rigorous tests to insure maximum reliability, and the lead-away cables were constructed of the best available materials, sheathed in
i ■ t
lead, and handled in accordance with the highest telephone company standards. The strictest possible visual watch was maintained with the tap crew. In short, in this, as in all aspects of the operation, every effort was made to guarantee success even though in many instances it meant delay in achieving the objective.
22
E T
IV. TERMINATION
The tunnel was discovered (see fig. 21) 21 April 1956, after 11 months and 11 days of operation. A memorandum pre- pared on 15 August 1956 (reproduced in its entirety as Appendix A) examines in detail all evidence available as of that date on the reasons for the discovery. The conclusion reached was that the loss of this source was purely the result of unfortunate circumstances beyond our control - a combina- tion of the fact that one of the cables was in very poor physical condition (this was known from the beginning) and a long period of unusually heavy rainfall. It appeared that water entered the cable in sufficient quantity to make it inopera- tive, thus necessitating digging up sections of the cable and causing discovery of the tap.
23
d. A small processing unit •was maintained at the Berlin, site to permit on-the-spot monitoring of engineering circuits for the protection of the project and scanning of the more productive circuits for the ’’hot" intelligence. Daily reports of sufficient value to warrant electrical transmission to Washington
The information from this material was disseminated in a closely controlled system Appendix B
consists of a summary of the value of the material received together with typical customer comments.
VI.
AFTERMATH
As previously noted , considerable thought was given during the entire life of the project on the result its discovery would bring. In retrospect it is probably correct to say that, among those most actively concerned with the project's management, a consensus developed that the Soviets would probably suppress knowledge of the tunnel’s existence rather than admit to the world that Free World intelligence organs had the capability of successfully mounting an opera- tion of this magnitude. In other words, it was felt that for the Soviets to admit that the U.S. had been reading their high level communications circuits would cause the Soviets to lose face. Perhaps fortunately, fate intervened, and as a possible consequence the Soviet course of action was exactly contrary to expectation.
The Commandant of the Soviet Berlin Garrison, who would normally have controlled the handling of the situation when the tunnel was discovered, was absent from Berlin and the Acting Commandant, Colonel Ivan A. Kotsyuba, was in charge. There is some reason to believe that he (for whatever reason) was forced to make a personal decision on a course of action without benefit of advice from Moscow. At any rate his reaction was unexpected in that he invited the entire Berlin
27
press corps to a briefing and tour of the tunnel and its facilities. As a result the tunnel was undoubtedly the most highly publicized peacetime espionage enterprise in modern times prior to the ”U-2 incident.” Worldwide reaction was out- standingly favorable in terms of enhancement of U.S. prestige. Non-Soviet Bloc sentiment can be generally summarized as follows
a. There was universal admiration (and this included informed Soviets) on the technical excellence of the installation and the imaginative nature of the undertaking.
b. The non-Communist world reacted with surprise and unconcealed delight to this indication that the
U.S „ , almost universally regarded as a stumbling neophyte in espionage matters, was capable of a coup against the Soviet Union, which had long been the acknowledged master in such matters.
c. Coupled with regret that the Cold War necessi- tated such measures, thoughtful editorial comment applauded this indication that the U.S. was capable of fulfilling its role of Free World leadership in the struggle .
Appendix C contains a sampling of typical U.S. press accounts and editorial comment on the tunnel. Predictably the Communist press treated the tunnel as an outrage and an
28
intolerable indecency. Appendix D consists of a study of
r 1
East German press reaction to the incident.
For their contributions to Project awards
R7
were made to the following individuals:
Distinguished Intelligence Medal Intelligence Medal of Merit Intelligence Medal of Merit Intelligence Medal of Merit Distinguished Intelligence Medal Intelligence Medal of Merit Intelligence Medal of Merit Distinguished Intelligence Medal Intelligence Medal of Merit
After the project went into the production phase it was necessary to brief a great many people to properly utilize the product. In all almost personnel were cleared
for the project
^Unfortunately the writer has been unable to locate an exact redord of those persons who received other recognition from the Agency for their participation in this project and any omissions are regretted. It should also be noted that approximately | |people participated wittingly or unwittingly
in this undertaking. In fact there are very few, if any, of the elements of CIA that were not called upon for assistance, either directly or indirectly (such as providing manpower) , during the life of the project.
’Em i H i il
APPENDIX A
NOTE: This assessment was prepared by the staff immediately after the discovery of the tunnel and is based on pertinent information available.
15 August 1956
DISCOVERY BY THE SOVIETS OF
Analysis of all available evidence - traffic passing on the target cables, conversations recorded from a microphone installed in the tap chamber, and vital observations from the site - indicates that the Soviet discovery of[ purely fortuitous
was
A descrip- tion of the events leading to these conclusions is contained in this paper.
Following heavy rains in the Berlin area a number of tele- phone and telegraph cables were flooded and began to fault between Karlshorst and Mahlow on the night of 16 April 1956.
The first major fault was discovered on cable
on 17 April. The fault was repaired by cutting the defective stretch of cable and replacing a 3000 meter length with a temporary replacement cable. Between 17 and 22
RET
tab b
r
APPENDIX B >
RECAPITULATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE DERIVED
Set forth below are a recapitulation of intelligence
derived from the
material and some typical consumer
comments .
S^CLR E T
APPENDIX C
TYPICAL AMERICAN PRESS COMMENT
WASHINGTON POST 1 May 1956
The Tunnel of Love
Tho United States Government has not yet made any official reply to the Soviet and East German allegations and protests concerning the 300-yard tunnel that American intelligence operatives aro said to have built underneath the border1 between West and East Berlin for espionage purposes. Meanwhile, assuming the story to be correct— we cannot help thinking the Communists have made a grievous mistake to raise so much fuss about their discovery. They are even said to have conducted special propaganda lours through the tunnel and to have exhibited the wiretapping and other record- ing apparatus that the Americans are supposed to have installed inside it.
The probable result of all this has been to give the anti-Communist resistance in East Germany a good deal of amusement and encouragement. Cer- tainly it must have served to strengthen the im- pression of American resourcefulness and thereby to restore some mcasuro of our prestige — which apparently had been deteriorating since tho equivo- cal attitude taken by the American authorities in the East German uprisings of June, 1954 — among the caplivo population. The reaction of their kinsmen in West Germany is probably a pretty good index to. their own.
In West Germany the story has been accepted at face value with astonishment and delight as an evidence that tho tradition of Yankee resource- fulness and ingenuity is not a myth after all. Espionage is one game in which the Communists were deemed, even by their enemies, to be par- ticularly expert and our own side to be dismally inept. Very few Germans, as the Frankfurter Neue Presse exultantly observed, even suspected that the Americans “were capable of so much cleverness”; and it would be even more devastating to Communist prestige if it were disclosed that the espionage tunnel had been in operation for some time beforo the Communists became aware of it.
Indeed, if the tunnel episode turns out to have been the product of Yankee ingenuity, there is an interesting parallel in American history. During the siege of Petersburg in 1964, an 'enterprising Union officer from the Pennsylvania coal fields conceived the idea of mining the Confederate positions from a tunnel under them. The tunnel was dug and the mines were finally set off; and though the operation was a fiasco in part because' of the failure of Union commanders to execute orders, the boldness of the stroke, has compelled admiration ever since.
TIME MAGAZINE
7 May 1956
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V. .
BERLIN
Wonderful Tunnel
Merlin, city of rubble, refugees, and occasional patches of glitter, is an Alfred Hitchcock dream of subterfuge and suspi- cion, In back streets, darkly mysterious houses lurk behind high wire fences sug- gestive of darker and more mysterious doings within. Newsmen recently counted >7 separate agencies of Western intelli- gence known to be at work in Berlin.
Their operatives — some fashionably ! 'clothed in the grey Ilannel of New York’s 1 Madison Avenue, some with armpit hob ; sters bulging under blue serge — report to 'different headquarters, and rarely know what their colleagues are up to.
In all Merlin there is no spot better Mjitcd to the Hitchcock scheme of things than a rustic, semi -deserted corner known on the L*.S. side as Kudow and in the Russian /one, just over the way, as Alt- filicnickc. Self-important ducks and chickens strut like commissars in Alt- (ilicnickc's cobbled street Merlin’s only working windmill turns lazily in the breeze near by, and dose to the boundary separating Hast and West stands a U.S. radar station, bending its reticular tar to the operations at Hast Berlin’s busy Srhdncfcld Airport, Two rings of barbed j wire guard the lonely radar post, and
behind them a detachment of uniformed Signal Corps men live a life as secret, and isolated as monks. / : h;*. j
Tho Big Cellar, For many a month, the supcr-sccrecy surrounding the con- struction and operation of Rudo\v*s radar station had fed the gossip of bored Amer- icans in the occupied city. There were those who remembered a civilian engineer hired to supervise the job; he had quit in disgust because the blueprints seemed so crazy. "Why build a cellar big enough to drive through with a dump truck?” he asked, and was told to mind his own busi- ness. Others recalled seeing friends whom they knew to be engineers suddenly ap- pearing at the station wearing the insignia of the U.S. Army Signal Corps. Why? An amused shrug was the only answer ques- tioners ever got — but last week the Rus- sians thought they had found a better one. * One night at 7 o’clock, an angry, chunky Soviet colonel named Ivan Kolsi- uba called a press conference in East Ber-
\ lin. Purpose: to protest the building by "American organizations" of a secret tunnel under Kast Herman territory, "with the criminal intent of spying.” Offered a chance to sec for themselves, the Western ’ newsmen were taken to a site some 500 ; yards from the radar station at Rudow, -
A Lot of Money; Truckloads of Red army troops and squad cars crowded with Yolks polizvi stood by. Mobile generators were humming to provide lights lor the occasion, and at the entrance in a hole dug in I lie ground, a colonel nt the Rus- sian signal corps was on hand to explain it j all. Ten feet below, its entrance a hole cut J in the roof by the Russians, lay the tunnel itself: a cast-iron tube about six feet j in diameter and 500-600 yards long, j crammed with electronic equipment, cu- ! hies, tape recorders, ventilating apparatus
■ and pumps of both British and American make. At the East Orf*pan end. cables led out of the main body of the tunnel to a
; separate chamber where they were linked ; to two East German cables and a third ! used by the Russians. What was at the American end? The newsmen were not permitted to know. As they crawled west- I ward, a sandbag barrier barred the way. I its purpose emphasized by a sign reading in English and German: "You are now entering the American sector.”
“This tunnel," said the Russian expert, with a note of admiration, “was built to last years. The parly responsible must | have had a lot of money.”
Who was responsible? Nobody, neither the Pentagon, the State Department, nor
■ the Central intelligence Agency, was sav- ! ing. But as Berlin’s’ papers erupted glee- j fully with the news, one Berlin editor told { a ranking U.S. official : “1 don’t know j whether your people dug that wonderful ! tunnel or not, but whoever it was, let me .5 say I think it was loo bad it was found, v It’s the best publicity the U.S. has had in
Berlin for a Jong time,’' .
. \
C-3
• BOSTON HOST
m 41953
Circ.: m. Si
267,872 J 96,496
Hops it Is True
Soviet charges that American intelligence agents.' •dug a tunnel in Ecrlin, tapped a telephone cable, and] (recorded conversationsover the Red communication net-1 : work, which the Reds made with considerable fanfare. ! and during a conducted tour of the spy tunnel for cor- ( j respondents, gives us some faint hope. . ]
! Frankly, we didn't’ know that American intelligence! (.agents were that smart.; In fact, we were beginning td! (think that what t he^ Cent ml Intel Ij genre Agency, needed' j was ■ a‘ ie\v ]id«onT on the. fundamentals ' of' espionage] i from"some_defcctcd Russian agent!- Butf no\y_w_e_ take it* ! ah bacKTlf the Soviet charges are True] Americaninteb; |ftjfence agent&^iavo'Act-ually..
| i.^™^ttoh.,c6ii.cerningn SpvicJL.,n$itar£ operations' and; .installation^in^East-Gerroany,, " •
; '"'We' Hope that American intelligence agents have (infiltrated j the Soviet department of foreign affairs j ' planted western ‘sympathizers in the heart of the Soviet!
■ bureaucracy and started a stream of microfilmed copies’ (of important Soviet' documents . jQ\vards^_the.-.CIAairi:
I Washington ,«■ t J:
i*"1 "TWehope, all this because that is precisely what^the (Soviet spy network did and is probably doing right now tin the United States. This is not just tit for tat — but a li stark necessity in 'the world of cynical power politics. ]
■o
STAMFORD/fCor.n.) ADVOCATi
Front
PflflO
Date:
|
Q.f |
23,166 |
|
ft |
Orhor 12 & |
Money Well Spent rZ
There is only one agency in Wi- ington which does not account-for the} money It spends. The Qc_n_tral Intelll-^ gence Agency, headed oy Allen W.j Dulles, has never reported to Con-f gross. A special committee, appointed by the President, did make 'a survey- or the agency’s activities and was ap- parently satisfied that It was efficient. So score u are the activities of this group that even the amount of money it spends is unknown. Ac- countants have estimated that there is roughly $2 •billion in budgets of other departments which , is diverted to the CIA.
Naturally enough. Congress worries from time to time that this money may not be well spent. Last week some news came out of Berlin which should calm such, fears.
The Russians discovered that their three main . telephone cables- from East Berlin, to points east were tapped. .A tunnel from the western zone, con- nected with the tapped lines arid wires, led to sandbags at the zone boundary. The Russians were greatly disturbed. They claim that all mes- sages for several years have £cen in- tercepted. They blame this violation | of privacy on American Intelligence.
Our officials have expressed horror, at the charge. They haven’t,' they say, jj |the slightest idea ‘of where the lines plead or by whom they were laid. The, Russians are just old meanies to claim we wire-tapped. • '' _ ■ Jp
( West Berliners are laughing. Good for American Intelligence, they say. They hope, and so do we, that the Russians have only discovered one of |j several taps. At least, the expose.: shows that some of . the . money spent ] by, ClA may have, been very well spent u
.indeed...? \ .!.:y
,1
RATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY
CIA MAX HAVE ORDERED WIRETAP TUNNEL — DREIER.
Alox Dreier at 6:00 P.M. over WMAQ (Chicago) and the NBC
Radio Network: .
"And now under the heading, special report, part one.
~aiGre-at^itain^t^h-itff^ogmm'sprwh-o-i;urned"6Ut to be- not -po successful. in— his~sccTctivoness— has.^.no.bhmg^.on- us , We have a tunnel we dug under the communist sector of Berlin and which the reds exposed to .the light of day, as you probably know, a short while a^o. Well, our NBC correspondent, good friend and colleague, Prank Burkholzer, has investigated the story of the wiretap tunnel and he says there* s just one conclusion — it's ours. We dug it, wo equipped it with electronic equipment to listen in on communist East German conversations for a whole year before they found, us out#
"Presumably we should be embarrassed but nobody in Berlin is.
In fact, there is a hint of American and West German pride in know- ing that we pulled off an espionage trick on the Reds for a change.
Of course, the East Germans are making a good thing of it by con- • ducting tours through the tunnel to impress their people with the dastardliness of the American spies, but that may backfire on them because the East Germans are not beyond getting a quiet chuckle at ; this outwitting of their communist rulers.
"Burkholzer tells us that the United States is stamped all over the listening post tunnel. Now, the tunnel is on the outskirts of town with our end being located under a so-called experimental radar station beside a garbage dump. It runs straight under a plowed field that has white border marking posts above it. The Russians have made three openings for the tourists. One is near the wiretap, another at a point about l£0 yards out in the field. When anyone asks an American why there isn't any radar at the experimental radar station, the usual answer, according to Burkholzer, is, we said it was experimental, didn't we? Want to make something of it?"
"Naturally the army and the government in Washington aren't going to admit anything unless they have to. No one tells who ordered the eavesdropping tunnel built or who paid for it or who did the listening and the digging. Perhaps it was the work of a local Berlin outfit, just a curious bunch of boys. Or perhaps it was done secretly on orders direct from the Pentagon or the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY . Anyway, it was done well because it wasn't discovered for a year and now the Russians may be wondering how much we learned from recording all the phone talks, possibly includln, everything that went through the switchboard of the nearby Soviet airfield. So thinks for the information, Frank Burkholzer, and now we have a question for you. Why don’t we open a tourist entrance at our end of the tunnel and cash in on the publicity? Step up, one and all. Only a quarter. See modern espionage in electronic form and all underground, and who knows? Porhppa you will meet an occasional communist tourist."
r* £
NSW YOKE. I32RALD TRIBUNE
way arm'
(TD
7.
Berlin Reds Flock t® See i ;IJ. S. Wire ■ Tap TmmeF
• A
By Gaston Coblcnlz ] Sandbag Barricade
1 By Wireless to thc UcraldTr Unite] 41 We have no fault whatsoever .s® 1953, N.YJIcrald Tribune Inc. \l° *h)d with the technique/ one
(attendant said.
jjhKuiN, May so.— unc oir the Greatest sights of the cold)' L
.war is the “American spy tun- f varju nofnt
i»rt-n°w on exhibition in J&st i, 2LJL
Berlin,
Tiie
500-yard tunnel repre- sents a venture of extraordinary audacity— the stuff of which thriller Aims are made. It it was duff by American Intelli- gence forces— and that is the general assumption — it is a striking example of their jcapacity for daring undertakings.
Seldom has an intelligence organization executed* a mere skillful t'and difficult operation •than that accomplished by the tunnel’s diggers: the tapping of 250 Communist long-distance
where the tunnel crosses under the sector border. Then a sand- bag barricade is encountered,.' and a voice calls out “halt” in.' German. *
It is clear that If the visitor; could continue westward past the barricade he would emerge, soon at a low but prominent, American building with radar, ^equipment on the voot. The]
building is surrounded by barbed] wire and guarded constantly byt[ American soldiers. Signs in Ger ' man want: “Entry most strictly! forbidden.” •
... v , A study of the area suggests
'telephone lines running under- ;no possiblHty other than tha<
. .giound in Beilin.. The hnes ap-.tbe radar building encloses the (parently included some running ;Wcstcrn cnd o{ the tunneL 1
to Soviet satellite state in East-
,crn Europe, as well as Soviet Clay Hauled Away j^rmy circuits in Germany. ■ The men who dug the tunnel
" Jr- ' Snack Bir Thrives •“'Obviously labored under two
*\rT &nacK uar Tlln'cs .'major handicaps. They had to [ The tunnel, discovered by the work very silently to avoid de- .Communists a month ago and.tcction, and they had to haul mow the main sightseeing at- 'away secretly the thousands of .traction in Berlin, can be visited -tons of clay they dug out, since]
Complex Equipment Beyond the door is a compart- ment seven feet long housing equipment to maintain certain, levels of temperature and hu-| midity. The Communists say] this was necessary to protect] delicate equipment in the other wise da^k and cold tunnel.
Finally, there is the complex tapping equipment, all of Ameri- can or British manufacture-. This includes eight racks ofj boosters to carry the tapped con- versation back to the western
by making a twenty-minute big piljs of earth near the sector end of the tunnel and also to drive from the center of Berlin border would have alerted the help prevent detection of the !to the southeast comer of the Communists. taps.
city. \ 1 Apparently the excavated j There are three power-control
A mobile snack bar is doingJearth was hauled awi^y in closed] units near two long racks of A thriving business ’near the .trucks brought into the radar [eastern end of the tunnel, cater*! building. Possibly the same ‘dug to East German factory'! M*ucks bought in the sections of ’delegations brought to see thelc°rru"a^c<* b’on tubing which * work of “American imperialists.” I bne the tunnel. The utmost I After inspecting the tunnel JSCCI^C^ have been used to
[the factory workers record their; stirring up local talk,
'“indignation” in a visitors’ bookJ , 7 ie Communists estinate that
{The book contains th^ signa-|tbis part tbe work took sev" painted a, battleship gray tu res of foreigners on both sides i er?i . P,1 onJJls* j , , ,
of the Iron Curtain, Even a ., the tunnel completed
Sudanese official is listed, x there came the ^ob of installing — The tunnel, six feet in "di- thc monitoring equipment. Ap- n/meter and with its roof twelve I Parcntly this had to be done feet below the surface, was dugibc^°^e Communist lines
from a point 200 yards insidci®°!,ld bo popped, because part of.__ an ultra-sensitive micronhonp
Berlin m-°liCan of. have reported anv
point sian
i
equipment into which the 259 Communist lines lead from three main cables. Here the in- dividual ' monitoring taps are made. ' Along the opposite wall of the tunnel is a row of benches, with fluorescent lighting over- head. Ihe compartment is
Considered Great Experts At the very end of "the eastern compartment there is another steel door. On the eastern (ddc of it is one more important item[
■din. It runs eastward to ajj"* °.f preventing detection of;flCtivity by tho
int 300 yards inside the Rus- the Phone taps. The mass of, fog point w)iei.0 their lines werpi
m sector. The western en>OUlPment __wa,s pa.nStaklnRlrtappecl_ Any acUvj',^hi‘"f w^r,i
latcd locality called Rudow. / ,
Only tho eastern end of thejj'l0uscdT1 R special njnety.-foot-| tunnel is open for visitors. A1''"'"''' 4 ““*“**'
detachment * of Communist]
People’s Police and a communi cations expert arc on hand to]
lone compartment at the castcrnltBnmn/mn^^ dlCL thc nctual end of the tunnel. have ,bccn
This compartment begins with'™-/ /T,™ T u’,° T!c^ thick steel door ct Its western.^ rcmarknbly *ldy‘
explain every detail. They readily express their admiration for thc| jskill of the project’s builders,
(entrance. On the door— one ofj Th„ „ •,
the tunnel’s nicest touches— l4fniwi£° mUn ts ,say thc Sn
piece of .work.
written in Russian and. Ger-i5~U“™T» appa.^nt,y opprati!di man: ’'Entry forbidden by order^'t*®”1 before ,VftSl
of the Commanding General.”
l* '^covered. There Is no cxplana-
.bow it was dctcctecL.
- ... * 1 '
nrM Wf , OluhilM.'
» Let
/^ driven' out 16' the" radar site Kiby Robert Tuckman, Asso- ciated Press 'bureau cpicf.
‘ Barbed wire surrounded the J; station and its permanent j type buildings.
Watched by Yanks American soldiers in' sentry boxes watched us, thru field glasses' as we sauntered to- ward the clearly marked com- munist border, down a dirt
II ^ RpnnrWc- ™unist border, down a dirt u8. o# UUjJUUWo road' bordering an open ficlc|,
Four Eerie Bore
I
| We could stc knots of Vopos ■ around mounds of earth cxca- , vated to reveal two sections of • the tunnel.
T‘7*ce’ -<*vCr0SS the border,' Vopos 4,4 *tock us Co .their* commander,
BY JOHN IL THOMPSON
i Chirac Tribune rr«a Service]
BERLIN, Slay 28
American newsmen today' , , , „ . ,.t.
stood 20 feet underground
; the alleged “American spy . tunnel,0 burrowed 300 yards under Berlin’s little Iron Cur- tain, and peered into the > gloom of the American scctoy • over the shoulders of two 1 German, communist tommy l gunners. *
y Our host. in as eerie a set- ting as’ was ever devised by a V mystery writer, was a jack- ' booted officer of the East
jng a Communist movie of its! discovery. The commander i examined our passports, smiled, 'and led us down a‘ flight of dirt stairs into the tunnel.
Encased in steel and ' con- crete was the alleged -wire tap 4t laboratory/* directly under a* paved road leading from Bcr-.^ lin to the Russian air base at’
the borders of the German democratic republic?0 he asked.
Pens a Thank You '
Our answer, in halting Ger- man, explained that owner- ship of the tunnel has not been established, but that in a time of 44 tension,” the right- ness or wrongness depended upon. the Side of' the fence from which the operation was viewed.
He showed us a book in. which tunnel ■ visitors weraj asked to inscribe their opin-J 'ions, assorting it held signal sures of Chinese, Koreans,? -British!* Americans, and ofcl>* ers, and asked us to. sign-*
Just to keep the record' straight, in case the .East Go- mans attempt to use our statements for propaganda, we wrote, in my handwriting: T t V We wish to thank the volkspolizei very much _ £or being kind enough to showily the tunndl/V y,:
: German communistvpolice, the I1 Schocnfcld. The commander,
j.- Vopos,” or Volkspolizei. ; who dccb"cA J® ' ®ve . his ' 1 Our tour was the third per* J1.31100’. said that 216 telephone
Emitted western reporters since *incs J.n tbrcc cab cs. were ! the night of April 2i when tapped. \
ithe Russian high command.; Fluorescent ]i£htin£_illiu.
here announced "discovery of ^ minated a -switchboard, banks the tunnel and equipment it . 0f current boosters, ampli- '•said was used for wire tap* f fjers and cables. -All instruc*. ! Ping. | '
, Since then the “spy tunnel, j so labeled by the Russians and j East Germans, has been vis*j ited by more than 15,000 East ■German worker delegations,
j'fions on the equipment wei;c in English.^ Some items boreJ the labels of British, or Ameri-j can manufacturcres. •
' Reds Man Guns 4 i Pumps sent hot and cold- water to an air conditioning! unit. Other long .pipes held! j oil or air. The tunnel was! made of bolted sections of cor-!
Chicago Tribune 29 May 55
rugated steel, lined on the, sides with sandbags. <
‘ Walking back- 300 yards, we? reached the east-west border.! There^behind sandbags two! young Vopos crouched with’
ft he Communists said, j Germans* Admire Feat I Siiuatcd in line with an ex- perimental American army, radar station . [the Russians ; say it is a dummy], owner- ship of the tunnel has not ;bccn officially admitted by l the American command; here yor .in Washington.
*** West Berliners are con- , . f.vinccd ■ the AmcVicans built their guns and a powerful the tunnel, 'equipped it with; searchlight, ^ aimed up the tun-. ’ expensive apparatus, and then^0* unc*er the American seer
listened in on Red army . tcl*i .. • J
•ephone conversations . sincel Outside again, _ the com*, 'the summer of 1954. * ' asked us %yhat would
: To them, it was. an astound-! bf- the reaction tbe u™tcd
ing feat, which -‘has greatiyj States if the Canadians or Mex*
: enhanced American prestigeJ ‘can^ , .^ove '-such a “spy iThe boldness of burrowing bordci;s:
'under the' Russian noses, and .We ^id the Americans would
its .'technical accomplishment, bc- ^?^appy-. abouti lt;- * have captured the imagination s. ^ right .pr wrong for i; of. many Germans. / , Amcr}«ins to do. this .under
'T" No one expected a sight of , i the tunnel . today when Wai>:
TAB D
APPENDIX D
NOTE: This analysis was prepared by the
staff as part of the wrap-up of the operation
ROUND-UP OF EAST GERMAN PRESS REACTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE WIRETAP TUNNEL AT THE BERLIN SECTOR BORDER
(Sources as Indicated)
The following is an analysis of the East German press reaction to the discovery of the wiretap tunnel at the sector border between West and East Berlin. During the period under review - 24 to 26 April 1956 - a total of 31 dailies per day and four weeklies were available for scrutiny; however, only the dailies reported and commented on the incident.
Mostly concerned with reporting and commenting on the incident were the East Berlin papers which, in some instances, devoted full pages of their local sections to reports and pic- tures on the tunnel in addition to their front-page or second- page accounts of developments. The* provincial press gave front page treatment to the matter only in few instances, generally refrained from large articles or commentaries, and often carried pictorial material with only brief explanations. The least coverage was noted in the provincial press of other
than SED (Sozialist ische Einheitspartei Deutschlands - Communist Party Germany) affiliation; none of these papers published any commentary, or any cartoon of their own, on the subject up to 26 April, in fact.
Describing the tunnel as inspected by the journalists after the Soviet press conference, the papers pointed out that the installation was well .designed and constructed, that the installation was costly and equivalent to a modern tele- phone exchange, and that the material - of British and Ameri- can origin - used in the installation was of such quality as to guarantee long service .
The East Berlin papers, which were leading in the reports on the issue, treated the matter as a "bitterly serious inci- dent" which represents an "international scandal" and a "breach of the norms of international law." The papers, in their commentaries, addressed the West Berlin Senat, demand- ing an all-Berlin understanding and stressing the necessity for united action, and insinuated that Berlin is being kept divided merely for the purpose of providing the espionage centers in West Berlin with a base for launching provocations against the GDR. Other commentaries by central and provincial papers contained calls for vigilance and for defense prepared- ness. Only one paper printed an editorial on the incident.
In commenting on the incident the press did not draw a line
2
E T
between the different developments, such as the press confer- ence, the Soviet protest, the GDR Government protest, etc., but, as a rule, the commentaries dealt with the incident as a whole. Later, when the first reaction of the West Berlin press was available, the central press swooped down upon the West Berlin press for attempting to belittle the incident and to divert attention from the "seriousness of the matter."
The few caricatures published by the papers were designed
..... I .
to slander the Americans.
Day by, Dfty Reaction
24 April 1956
On 24 April 1956 six East Berlin papers printed the ADN (Allegemeines Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau - General German News Office) release of individual reports on the Soviet press conference, reported on the inspection of the tunnel by the journalists, and carried excerpts from General Zarenko’s letter of protest (1-6). DER MORGEN and BERLINER ZEITUNG (5 and 6) printed only the abbreviated version of the ADN release. Six provincial SED papers (7 - 12) carried announcements of the discovery, brief reports on the press conference, and merely an announcement to the effect that a letter of protest has been sent to the American Chief of Staff. Only NEUER TAG, Frankfurt /Oder , printed the long version of the ADN release (12)
3
Provincial papers of other party affiliations carried no reports .
25 April 1956
On 25 April 22 provincial papers came out with the ADN version of the report on the discovery of the tunnel (13 - 34); the six provincial SED papers which had carried a brief announce- ment the day before followed up their reports by more extensive accounts of the press conference, the letter of protest, and the inspection of the tunnel (13 - 18). Papers of other party affiliations joined in the reporting campaign on this day.
Only MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME, of all provincial papers, published an "eye-witness” report containing a description of the tunnel and quoting individuals who had voiced their "outrage at such a thing" which produces new material for conflicts in foreign' policy (16). SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG, which printed the long version of the ADN release, reproduced the first picture of the tunnel (22) .
Meanwhile the central press, in addition to supplementary reports on the discovery of the tunnel, descriptions of the tunnel, and pictorial material showing sections of the tunnel such as the amplifier station, etc., came out with the first commentaries. A total of five commentaries appeared on this day. The press treated the matter as a "bitterly serious affair" which represents an "international scandal" and a
4
"breach of the norms of international law," pointing out that the United States violated the Buenos Aires Treaty on Telecom- munications on the one hand and the GDR's sovereignty on the other hand (35 - 39). NEUES DEUTSCHLAND spoke of a new, hitherto unsurpassed "gangster act" of the U.S. secret service (35), NATIONAL ZEITUNG termed the incident as a "sensational international scandal" (36), NEUE ZEIT stressed that there is no word "strong enough to brand such wickedness" (38) , and JUNGE WELT declared that "this had to happen just to those who always babble about Communist infiltration but can never prove it" (39) . All commentaries were addressed to the West Berlin Senat, demanding an all-Berlin understanding for the purpose of discontinuing the "stubborn adherence to NATO policy," achieving the withdrawal of the "cold war experts of all shades," dissolving the espionage centers in the "frontier city," and achieving a "normalization in the situation in Berlin." Three papers reported on a meeting held by the National Front at Alt-Glienicke , at which the population adopted a resolution protesting against this "provocation." Franz Fischer, First Secretary of the Kreis Treptow SED Executive Board, was reported to have said at the meeting that the people of West Germany and West Berlin have to pay for this installation through the occupation costs and to have termed the tunnel as "an appendix of the cold war" (38, 40, and 41).
5
TRIBUENE, moreover, referred to a report by the HAMBURGER ANZEIGER to underscore the fact that the installations in the tunnel were not of provisional nature but designed for long service (40). DER MORGEN, describing the tunnel, added that West German correspondents who inspected the tunnel noted With satisfaction the declaration of the Soviet Lieutenant Colonel that "quite obviously, German quarters have no part in this" (41) , while NATIONAL ZEITUNG briefly referred to an announce- ment made at the Alt-Glienicke meeting to the effect that the tunnel was open for public inspection (36) .
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reproduced the first caricature on the issue. The cartoon showed a garden which is divided into two parts by a sign indicating the "Democratic Sector" - full of flowers, and the opposite side - a barren piece of land with a molehill topped by a flag with the dollar sign. A strong arm is pulling out of a hole in the Democratic Sector a mole wearing "U .S „ "-marked earphones, some sort of Army trousers with plugs and pliers showing from the pocket, and a U.S.
Army cap bearing the legend "Espionage." The cartoon is captioned, "Do Not Burrow in Other People's Yards" (35).
26 April 1956
On 26 April 27 papers continued reporting on the issue (42 - 68) . In 17 instances the reports were supplemented with pictures as outlined above. A total of 15 papers
6
S
E T
printed the text of, or large excerpts from, the press release on the GDR Government protest (42 - 56) . Six papers reported on the inspection of the tunnel by the population, the press, and representatives of the diplomatic corps (42, 49, 59, 60,
65, and 67) . Four papers referred to a report carried by the West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL according to which Western journalists were prohibited from inspecting the mouth of the tunnel on the Western side (42, 43, 51, and 58), and four papers referred to FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE which had spoken of an "eloquent silence" about the affair on the part of the Americans (42, 51, 55, and 58). A total of four papers reported on the Alt- Glienicke meeting (51, 60, 61, and 67). NEUES DEUTSCHLAND gave excerpts from Fisher's speech, quoting him to the effect that the people of West Berlin, in particular the SPD members, will be invited to inspect the tunnel (51) . Three papers re- produced caricatures (51, 52, and 56), six papers carried 1 commentaries (51, 52, 53, 54, 57, and 58), and one paper came out with an editorial (55). Three East Berlin papers, through their commentaries, swooped down upon the West Berlin press for its attitude toward the incident. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND accused the West Berlin papers of attempting to belittle the incident and of lauding the efficiency of the American "goblins," adding that the West Berlin press is thus making vain attempts to divert attention from the seriousness of the matter (51).
7
r i
s
E T
JIJNGE WELT lashed out at the West Berlin DER TAG, saying that, by its opinion, the West Berlin paper manifests its total loss of any sense of decency. Besides, DER TAG is not in the least disturbed about the violation also of West Berlin's territory (52) . NATIONAL ZEITUNG held that DER TAG now admitted what it has been denying at all times, namely that West Berlin is a
de facto part of NATO, adding that DER TAG now regards as ,
• ' 1 ’ »
"customary" the military espionage of the United States on GDR territory in addition to the "customary frontier-city policy," the "customary" partition, and the "customary" diversionist activities of the KGU and other underworld organizations. The paper stressed that all Berliners fully agree with the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE which said that the people must demand the discontinuation of "such things" (58). NEUE ZEIT, carrying the only editorial, said that the wire- tapping post is a feature of West Berlin's misuse as a NATO base. The paper emphasized that GDR policy will continue to serve all-German understanding and relaxation of international tensions. "But it must be kept in mind that the success of this policy will not only depend on the volume of the appeal for peace but also on our preparedness to defend our homeland as well as on our vigilance regarding the prevention of dan- gers resulting from the fact that one part of Berlin has be- come a frontier city against peace," the paper added. "What
8
C R E T
we need are contact points above the ground and in full light, namely all-German talks, and not underground trenches in the cold war” (55).
The first commentaries carried by provincial papers dealt with the incident as an example of proof for East German press reports on hostile espionage. VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt, pointed out that the tunnel represents "a document” which is quite apt to dispel all doubts of those who have hitherto been inclined to regard East German press reports about the underground activities of Western espionage services as "exaggerated” (57). MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME quoted several workers who voiced their indignation over "such a vileness” which makes German unity more difficult to demonstrate that the ’’Western side" is just as quiet about this "unpleasant affair" as the population is outraged (53). And LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG stressed that anyone reading about the discovery of the tunnel will inevitably weigh the Soviet attempts at maintaining peace against the efforts made by the U.S. espio- nage service, adding that this "breach of international law” also places the West Berlin administration "in a peculiar light." The paper reminded its readers that war preparation, which ’.'formerly marched on Prussian Army boots," is now marching on "American rubber soles, chewing gum, and tapping telephone lines" (54) .
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NEUES DEUTSCHLAND’S caricature showed an American soldier try- ing in vain to "milk” a disconnected, oversized telephone re- ceiver into a bucket marked ’’CIC’’ while another soldier is thoughtfully standing by (51). JUNGE WELT reproduced a car- toon showing a mole wearing a U.S. Army cap on its head and a telephone receiver on its back halting before a sign which warns that ’’spies are now facing danger.” The cartoon is , captioned, ’’The Underworld that Shuns the Light,” and foot- noted, "Damned, we did not put up that sign" (52). FREIES WORT showed rats wearing U.S. Army caps being disturbed by a Russian soldier in the operation of what looks like a communication center. Two rats are shown facing the soldier in surprise, another standing with arms raised, and still another escaping through an opening in the wall. The caricature is entitled, ’’Unpleasant Surprise," and footnoted, "It is an Effrontery of the Russians to Disturb Us in Our (Burrowing) Work” (56).
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SOURCES
1956
1. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 24 Apr
2. NEUE ZEIT 24 Apr
3. TRIBUENE 24 Apr
4. NATIONAL ZEITUNG - 24 Apr
5. DER MORGEN 24 Apr
6. BERLINER ZEITUNG 24 Apr
7 . FREIHEIT 24 Apr
8. SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG 24 Apr
9. VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt 24 Apr
10. MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME 24 Apr
11. LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG 24 Apr
12. NEUER TAG 24 Apr
13. FREIHEIT 25 Apr
14. SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG 25 Apr
15. VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt 25 Apr
16. MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME 25 Apr
17. LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG 25 Apr
18. NEUER TAG 25 Apr
19. LAUSITZER RUNDSCHAU 25 Apr
20. VOLKSSTIMME, Magdeburg 25 Apr
21. DAS VOLK, Erfurt 25 Apr
22. SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG 25 Apr
23. FREIE ERDE 25 Apr
24. OSTSEE ZEITUNG 25 Apr
25. VOLKS WACHT 25 Apr
26. FREIES WORT 25 Apr
27. SAECHSICHES TAGEBLATT 25 Apr
28. DIE UNION 25 Apr
29. NORDDEUTSCHE NEUESTE NACHRICHTEN 25 Apr
30. MAERKISCHE UNION 25 Apr
31. BRANDENBURGISCHE NEUESTE NABBR. 25 Apr
32. BAUERN ECHO 25 Apr
33. DER NEUE WEG 25 Apr
34. LIBERAL DEMOKRATISCHE ZEITUNG 25 Apr
35. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 25 Apr
36. NATIONAL ZEITUNG 25 Apr
37. BERLINER ZEITUNG 25 Apr
38. NEUE ZEIT 25 Apr
39. JUNGE WELT 25 Apr
40. TRIBUENE 25 Apr
41. DER MORGEN 25 Apr
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42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
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BERLINER ZEITUNG SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG DAS VOLK, Erfurt NEUER TAG FREIHEIT DER MORGEN TRIBUENE BAUERN ECHO DER NEUE WEG NEUES DEUTSCHLAND JUNGE WELT
MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME LEIPZIGER VOLK SZE I TUNG NEUE ZEIT FREIES WORT
VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt NATIONAL ZEITUNG VOLKSSTIMME, Magdeburg MAERKISCHE UNION FREIE ERDE
LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG VOLKSWACHT
SAECHSISCHES TAGEBLATT OSTSEE ZEITUNG LAUSITZER RUNDSCHAU DIE UNION
SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG
1956
26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr 26 Apr .V
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