C06828875 Declassified Under Authority of the Interagency | security Classification Appeals Panel, E.O. 13526, sec. 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2014-032, doc. 3 Declassification Date: Jan. 3, 2022

6 ‘ 7 | | cs Historical Raper : | : No. 160 CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY ; THE BERLIN TUNNEL OPERATION 1952 = 1956

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Other copy heid by: DDP Controlled by: FI1/Divieion D

. Date prepared: . 24 use 1968 No. 2. of 2 Date published: | at 968 - ee a Written oe f 4 = * M . ee ’ i

PREFACE, 2.0 ew ee LIST. OF ILLUSTRATIONS. i. INTRODUCTION.:.-.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1% * PLANNING »- @ a » e

ZEY1. IMPLEMENTATION. .

IV, ‘TERMINATION . . . V. PRODUCTION. . . .

Appendix. A’ ; Appendix B.

Appendix C Appendix D

- Analysis of the Reasons for Discovery of the Tunnel

$i. AFTERMATH ra ‘d -

Recapitulation of the Intelli- - gence Derived

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Typical American Press Comment

Kast German. Press. Conment

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PREFACE

PBJOINTLY (the Berlin Tunnel project) came into being Sometime in 1952 (the exact date cannot be established) and ceased as an active operation in the simmer of 1956, The writer served as Headquarters case. officer on the project from the winter of 1952-1953 until the summer of 1954 and then as the field case officex until February 1955. vee la senior Office. of Communications

officer in the project; Mr. William K. Harvey, Chief, Berlin Operating Base, 1962-1958; and. .

F1I/Division D, 1952-1958, were intimately associated with the planning and implementation of the project at the policy level and very kindly offered Buggestions for the preparation of this manuscript. Their comments have been incorporated and are greatly appreciated. Several other individuals, including he iwho Were in a position to offer valuable

advice: were

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absent from Headquarters during the period the paper was being prepared and thua unavailable to assist.

When this: project was first discussed with the. then Director of CIA, Mr. Allen Welsh Dulles, he ordered that, in the interests of security, as little as possible concerning the project would ‘be reduced to writing. It is probable that Sew orders have been so conscientiously obeyed, and yet. there

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are a great many cubic feet of files. connected with this pro-

‘ject. These files mainly concern technical and administrative

matters. Only those details which, in the opinion of the weiter, are hecessary to a broad understanding of the manner in which the project 's objectives were accomplished have been dineluded in this paper. Those interested in additional data may Wish to consult the files,

In’ addition to setting forth significant developments, the writer has attempted to provide insight into the reasons for certain courses of action. At times. this required a

speculative approach, The judgments derived from such specue-

‘lation were shared by all those actively concerned in the

management of the project, and it is the writer's hope that ‘they are accurately expressed in the following paper. Any error in this respect, however, is the. sole responsibility. of

‘the writer.

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Map of Berlin Detail Map of Rudow Section, Berlin

Aerial View of Rudow Section, Berlin ‘Dirt in the Basenent |

-Yopos: Studying the Installation -Bast German View of the Compound

Blinds on the Shield Excavating Using the Blinds .

View of the Completed Tunnel Construction of the Vertical Shaft Completed Vertical Shaft

view of Cables and Taps

Shaft and Tunnel Entrance in Waréhouse Basement.

Converted Fork Lift. and Dirt Box Target. Cables Exposed Schematic View of Tunnel

Initial Stage of Construction of Pre-Amp Chamber

Pre-Amp. Chamber Tapping Bridle Lead-Away Lines

Soviet. Press Briefing

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I, INTRODUCTION

The exact moment when the idea emerged of digging a tunnel to intercept Soviet and East German communications is ie oe gomewhat obscure,’ A number of factors must be cons idered, — .or among them the following: : a. As early. as 1948 U.S. Intelligence Officers became interested in the benefits to be derived fron . tapping Soviet and Satellite landlines on a scale not previously considered necessary. ‘The loss of certain « oo ‘gourees during this period created gaps. in our intelli-

gence coverage which were particularly unfortunate during.

this period of Cold War escalation. It became evident |

that. the tapping of certain selected landlities: might pro-

a : = duce the information needed to fill. a number of the gaps:

ad in our overall intelligence picture. |

‘bd. in the late 1940's and early 1950's the U.S.,

through the briefings of "returnee”™ German. scientists:

(those who were teken by the Soviets after World War II

. ii to work in Russia) and other sources, became aware of a ‘new Soviet voice secrecy device which the Soviets. referred ‘to harmed ag “VHE cuz. = It soon became evident that

1, ee ‘In normal. ugage "VHE CHE" means "high frequency”. ‘The

Soviets, however, in context, used this term for a special

speech scrambling device developed to provide security to their high level comminications,

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€0.6828875 Pe ae 4 be ° ® 2 ee he : | ae 3 1" 50X1 i the Soviets planned. 3 50X1 f oY i i * . i a. "es _ In the late 1940's the Office of Communications,. . ae in the course of its continuing ‘efforts to provide secure r° communications for the Agency , became aware of a principle which, when applied to target communications, offered : certain possibilities. Plans to exploit: this technique ) : : were imnediately formulated. ‘ These factors then served as additional incentives (above

and beyond our normal collection requirements) to ‘foous atten- tion on Soviet landline targets.. In mid~1951 exploratory digcusgions were held in Washington to plan the mounting of an attack on Soviet landlines in Fast Germany with special empha- sis to be placed on the Berlin area, As a result of this

1 conference ; SOX

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S0X1 an agent network was set up which was successful in penetrating the East Berlin office of the East

German Post and Telecommunications network.

Vital information on the S0X1 50X1 S0X1 first became available 50X1

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duxing the latter part. of 1951; and by March 1952 all of ‘the pertinent technical material had been assembled and sufficient- - ly analyzed to permit the pinpointing of the most important

Soviet circuits. ale

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SOX1 | Subsequent events proved ,

this information to be completely correct,

Various methods of tapping these circuits were explored ‘and one sampling operation was run in the Rast Zone, unfortu- nately with negative results. By January 1953, however, the

effectiveness of the penetration network 50%! 50X1

had become such that a 15-minute sample was obtained of the prise target circuit. ‘This was accomplished by. Oot SOx4.

cable pair to the. West Berlin Post Office where it was recorded.

| ie 50X11 This operation continued for some six months

oi for a total of almost. two hours. The longest continuous sample obtained wag 29 minutes and ‘most samples were of two to three ninutes’ duration. Special mention should be made of the fact that ee it was necessary to maintain a 24-hour watch over a six-

month period on "our" end of the cable to record these

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samples 30X1 Meantime collateral collection effort ‘continued on the comminications systems involved and the Office of Conmunica- tions developed techniques for recovering. the text. from the magnetic tape recordings of the: target signal. Somewhat ironically, the firet actual material recovered proved to be @ recording of a ‘student teletypist practicing on the "home keys". ' White ‘perhaps ‘disappointing from the ‘standpoint ‘of intelligence content, this material served to prove the tech-

‘ §0X1 nical possibility

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At: this point (mid-1953) we knew it could be done - the next step was the problem of installing: a permanent: tap on the target lines.

Precisely at what point the idea of a tunnel for the

purpose of tapping the target cables began to come into focus

cannot be pinpointed. In‘1951, the British advised CIA that

they had for some years been tapping Soviet cables through a

system of tunnels in the Vienna area and offered to share the

take with the U.S. . The suggestion. was made by the British at

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the time that: similar opportunities might be present in the

Berlin area. While it should perhaps bé possible to credit

one individual with the initial concept, it appears to be a

bit difficult to do so. At any rate’, the British. and CIA. continued. to pool collateral ditormatioa, and by Way 1963 —| the idea of a tunnel to

tap the target cables began to take definite shape.. |

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i 9 oR pm ! PLANNING. Inspection of all sites from which it might be possible | ~ to ae from the U,K, or the U.S,. Zones to the target cables : 7 served to narrow the choices to two spots: one in the British 3 7 and one in the U.S. Zone. The site actually ‘used (see figs. : 1, 2, and 3) was selected after careful deliberation which . }; included, but was not limited to, the following factors: ¥ ; ; a. The location of the permanent water table : (which tg: normally relatively high in Berlin} was ascer~ tained to be 32 feet below ground surface. It was con- : i sidered that this, fact would obviate the necessity for | the use of compressed air, watertight locks, and water- | | tight construction with a corresponding reduction in the : attendant engineering problems. ! | bs The length of the tunnel was considered to be : : not. impractical. although it far exceeded anything which ! h had been done: by the. British in Vienna : ; Gs Land yas available on which to construct an 7 installation from which to begin the tunnel.

F ‘d. Complete collateral information on the area i was available, including the target cable plans, aerial | 1 photographs, and the plans for all utilities serving the : < area, —— . |

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Figure 1 ~- Map of Berlin

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At this point the: following major questions. remained

unanswered;

A. Was it indeed. possible to dig a tunnel. of ‘this magnitude (approximately 1500 feet) clandestinely, con- sidering the fact that the border at this point. was

heavily ‘and constantly patrolled by the East orm Ns

and hit the targets?

b. If the answer to the above: was ‘favorable,

what ‘was to be done with the spoil (reckoned at approxi-

. mately 3,000 tons of sand)?

c.. What. type of cover installation could be built’

im such a remote area (this portion of Berlin was at that

tine a “squattersville" of shacks and hovels constructed from rubble by refugees from the East German Zone)?

in retrospect the first question, "Could the tunnei be

dug?", was. never really a debatable one--~those concerned more

or less decided that given sufficient money and personnel the. |

en he done. ae eae earn pene ree

minds of project personnel for many weeks and a great. many —

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ingenious ideas were brought forth.and discarded for one rea~

son or another until the suggestion was made facetiously that

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we "aig a hole and-“put the dirt in ate i This in effect was

sks adiudisas? At - thia tine no convincing, cover story had

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suggested itself and the current consensus favored naking the. cover. compound an element of the Quartermaster Corps with s rather vague mission of housing items that should be dispersed for one reason or another in & semote area of Beriin. Space requixenents for the recording and associated equipment were such that a building. of warehouse proportions was needed; 50. it. was: decided to build a two-story warehouse. Local. engineers were told that it had been decided to experiment ‘with a new type of warehouse, one which ‘would be half above the ground and half below with a ramp suitable for running fork lift trucks fxom the basement to the first floor. Berlin had been, selected as the site for this warehouse because (a) construc< tion would be cheap due to Jow labor rates and (b) the work would benefit the Berlin economy. So the basement Was dug linder the eyes of the local border guards and we had ‘our hole to put the dirt. in" = (See fig. 4.)

While the "warehouse cover" was adjudged sufficient to solve the temporary problems of construction, it was not deened solid enough to carry the project for an extended period. At

this particular tine the intelligence community was becoming |

increasingiy interested in the potential of nc osama

2/ as an interesting sidelight, ‘we heard | later that the Quartermaster Corps becane seriously interested in this: type construction because the ratio of cost to storage space

‘available was amazingly low. We do not know if any follow~

up ever occurred. | > . 3 oo.

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For example: m@. Excuse. was provided for maintaining extra- ordinary physical security and tight. compartmentation.

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category at this period in its evolution.)

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c. Legitimate targets 50X1 existed in the area.

d. ‘The. existence #4 at the site provided the opposition with an explanation for the site's existence. In spite of the fact that any form of axe presents a priority target, it was. argued that presenting the opposition with 2 reason for the site's existence would make it a less prominent target than leaving it a "mysterious something." The .

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site did in fact. 2%! In addition, the sight of ‘the Soviets: and East Germans. standing on top of. the tunnel with binoculars focused os

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on the roof of the installation provided considerable amusement to personne} at the Bite. (See fig. 5.)

Joint U.S.-U.K. planning for ..the project continued, throughout. 1953 and in December of that year the. Director of , Central Inteliigence approved the ‘terms of reference which — formal négotiatiois: with the British for the implenen~ tation of the project’. A seriag of cénfexrences in late 1953 and early 1954 ied to. the f6llowing decisions:

a. The U.S, would; ;

(1) procure a site, erect the necessary structures, and drive a tunnel. to a point beneath. the target. cables:

(2) be responsible for the recording of all Signals produced rai 50X1 rr

(3) procese in Washington all of the tele- erephle materiel. received cxon the project.

b. The British would: (1). dstve a. vertical shaft from ‘the venvett e

end to the targets;

10

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Figure 5 = Vopos Studying the installation

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(2) effect the cable taps and deliver a usable signal to the head of the tunnel for recording; and (3) .provide. for a jointly manned U.S.<U.K. . : center in London to process the voice recordings from the site: | It. was. jointly agreed that each side would keep the other. advised in det&il on. all aspects of the project. It should perhaps ‘be saidg here that. the. bilateral aspects of this operation (with one notable exception which will be discussed later (see BLAKE; page 23)). caused few, if any, problems. The -

skills developed by the’ British during the Vienna operations.

e stood us in good. stead and the distribution of effort and ex~ = pense proved in the end to be reasonably equitable. Activity thus proceeded on three fronts - in Berlin steps ‘Were taken to lease the -necessary land ahd right-of-way ease- ments for the site and pccaaevart was let With a German con-~ tractor. The compound, which ‘was roughly the size of an. ayer~ age city block, was fenced with chain-type high security fencing and contained the main operations building (the one ; story with basement type warehouse. previously described), conbined kitchen~dining facilities. and barracks, and another building which housed three diesel driven generators to

provide power for all facilities. (See fig. 6.) Sanitary

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Figure 6.-. fast German View of the Compound

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provisions consisted of a cesspool. (The logical placement of the cesspool was such ‘that it was situated only a few feet from the tunnel site. It jater developed when the turnel ‘was dug that. this was quite unfortunate becaise working conditions in the sector adjacent. to the cesspool were; to say the least,. highly unpleasart.) Planning called for the completion of this work: on 27. August. 1954. ‘For assistance in actually digging the tunnel it was. | decided to request help from the Arny Corps. of Engineers, and to this end the Chief of Staff and the G-2, U.S. Army, were briefed on the project.’ ‘the initial contact with the -

on

Army was made personally by Mr. Allen Dulles to General

Matthew 3B. Ridgway. Fortunately General Arthux Trudeau, a trained engineer, had just peen appointed A.C. of S., G=2. From the first moment he. learned of the operation, General Trudeau was an enthusiastic supporter of the concept. The Army selected Lt. ColonelLeslie M. Gross (the only available member of the Engineering Corps with any experience. in tunneling) to head. the presect. This proved to be an excellent. choice for Lt. Colonel Gross turned in. an outstanding job. By nid-summer of 1954 he had firmed up the engineering plans, gelected a crew of engineering personnel, and actually con- structed a mock-up tunnel some 150. yards long working under

operational conditions at a high security base in New Mexico.

- 12.

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Some mention ‘should be made of the actual method of construct-

ing the tunnel. Studies of the soil structure in the Berlin

area showed a high percentage of gand. ¥or this reason it was

decided that. the tunnel should be.lined with steel. The same sand content: contributed greatly to the danger of cave~ins at the face of the tunnel, and to eliminate this risk a shield was devised (see figs. 7 and 8) with horizontal "blinds" so arranged across its face that should: even dry sand ‘be | encountered the danger of cave-ins was -virtually eliminated.

The tunnel liner was formed of sections of heavy steel plate

so constructed that, when bolted together, five sections formed

a steel ring approximately six feet in diameter and 15 inches >

long. Provision was made for. bolting these vings together to form a continuous tube of solid steel. Thé men worked under cover of the shield described above (which was slightly larger in diameter than the steel liner) and when sufficient material had been excavated, the shield was. forced forward with hydrau- lic jacks and a new section of liner was bolted in piace. Since. this method left a void of approximately one and one- half inches around the liner (remembering that the diameter

of the shield was greater than that of the liner), screw-type removable plugs were built into every third section of. tunnel liner. This permitted renoval of the plugs ‘and the forcing

of grouting material under high pressure ta fill the void

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after the liner was.in place: It was caleulated (and subse-

quently proven to be true) that this method of construction.

would not permit settling of the soil and detection of the

tuniel from the surface. (See fig. 9.)

Meantime in the U.X. British engineers constructed a nock— up of the tunnel's terminal end and fabricated an ingenious device which worked in principle like. the tunael “shield

described above, with the difference, of course, that the

blinds (which closely resembied. a conventional venetian blind)

were horizontal but. so hinged as to ‘permit vertical exeavation. This permitted excavating cautiously across the upper face. of the vertical shaft in small areas and then jacking the. entire structure up at the optimum rate. (See fig. 10.) Available plans indicated that the cables were buried some 27 inches deep along the side of a heavily traveled highway. The top

of the vertical shaft (see. fig. 11) then needed to he approximately 12 to 14 inches below the surface of the high- way. in. order to give the tappifig crew reom to work below the eelling of the shaft, and the whole gtrapture- ad -<6 be capable of supporting the weight. of. heavy trucks since the tunnel and tap chamber lay diréctly beneath the highway. (See

fig. 12:) Considerable care was devoted to insulating the

14

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Figure 9 - View of the Completed Tunnel

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Figure 10 - Construction of the Vertical Shaft

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View of Cables. and Taps i .

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3/ tap chamber to prevent its acting like a huge drum.

Considerable thought was given to. the. quantity and

content: of the material available from, the target and the

manner in which it. was to be processed. It was in this

field, perhaps; that we experienced some of our greatest

problems. It. had been decided very early in the project's

planning stages to maintain the strictest. possible security Measures. As a minimum precaution security checks were made

on each. individual who in any way became knowledgeable of the

project's mission, and the same standards in force for. clear-

ances for Special Intelligence were utilized, A. list. of briefed personnel was maintaitied, special secrecy agreements. were exectited, and special briefings were given.to a11 knowl- edgeable personnel. It was in the assemblage of a processing team that we experienced our greatest problen in maintaining security standards. Since the material to be’ processed was. largely Russian voice, it. was thought that we would need

linguists with near native fluency in Russian. It is axiomatic

that native fluency is usually available only in Ratives, and

3/1 Spite of the insulation, it was a weird. sensation ‘to be in the chamber when. an iron-shod horse trotted across. it. We also suffered some anxious moments one foggy morning when the microphone in the tap chamber gave forth with a continuous series of dull thuds. After the sun burned away the. fog, visual observation. showed that the East German police had set up a temporary automobile checkpoint directly over the chamber, The "thuds" the microphone picked up were caused by the police officer in charge ‘stomping his feet ‘on the road surface to keep warm.

15 _S-E-G-R-E-T—

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hatives were hot clearable for the project, Although we were never successful in obtaining as many linguists’ as we needed, ‘we were successful, through careful screening and intensive language training, in asgembling a minimum crew for the job. This necessitated screening each personnel file in the Agency

of those individuals who claimed any knowledge: of German or.

Russian, arranging interviews and language tests, and negoti-

ating ‘transfers to the project. The Agency's language capa- bilities then were considerably less than now and some of the

negotiations proved, to say the least, difficult,

16

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II. IMPLEMENTATION |

By 17 August 1954 shinee were beginning to take shape and the ‘situation. was as ‘follows:

a. The German contractors had completed the compound and ue eage in possession. ; |

b. All of the basic supplies, equipment, and — personnel were in Berlin ready to start construction on the tunnel. This in itself involved transporting 125. tons of steel tunnel Liner from the ZI. to Berlin. The

initial shipment across the East Zone to Berlin consisted

‘of one and one-half freight trains, the loss of any pack-

age of which could have biown the project. For security purposes all sensitive” items, such as the tunnel Liner, were double crated and handed and subjected to severe drop tests before they left the ZI. - Similar items were differently packaged for deception. purposes. |

c., Space at. Headquarters was secured and the Office of Communications had assembled a crew and was well under way in fabricating the. unique equipment - necessary to process the anticipated telegraphic traffic.

d. Initial personnel had been selected and were being processed for both the Main Processing Unit. (MPD} in London and the Technical. Processing Unit (TPU) -in.

17

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Washington. “tt should be noted that personnel and equip- ment gauve programmed initially to exploit approximately ) ten percent of the anticipated take. in Keevoapect > pers haps this could be considered overly cautious. In : justification of this decision it should be said that ‘no one had ever tunneled 1,476 feet under clandestine condi- ' tions with the expectation of hitting a target. two inches in diameter and 27 inches below’ a main German/Soviet ini ghway . There were those who manifested certain reser— vations on the feasibility of so doing, and it is greatly to the: credit. of those senior officials, both civilian and military, that, in spite of these reservations, the project was permitted to proceed, In late August a vertical shaft some 16 feet in diameter was started in the warehouse basement floor (see fig, 13) and ground water was encountered at 16 feet instead of at the pre-

dicted 32 feet. Such examination as could be safely undertaken

under the steady observation of: East German border guards and

Soviet officials indicated that a clay lens existed in this

particular spot, creating a "perched water table” the magnitude

of which was unknown. Available ififormation indicated that the

Clay lens possibly sloped down in the direction of the target

-_

and it was decided to proceed with the tunnel even though the top cover was to be less than half what had been anticipated. 18 |

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Careful visual observation was maintained and tunneling operations. stopped each time the German guards walked over the tunnel on their regular patrols. Pumps were instalied to take care of the excess water. Observation logs were maintained, and since the highway under observation was the main road from East Berlin to the Schoenfeld Airport, consid- erable Order of Battle information was obtained. It was also possible to estimate quite accurately the relative importance: of individuals visiting Rast Berlin by observing the security precautions taken by the East Germans and the Soviets.

Both sides of the tunnel were lined with sand in bags

as the tunnel proceeded and the. excess spoil was hauled back

to the basement of the warehouse. ' To facilitate movement, a wooden track was Laid on the floor of the tunnel and a. con- verted electric fork lift was used to pull a string of rubber- tired trailers back ard forth ina the tunnel]. (See fig. 14.) Cool air was supplied to the face. of the tunnel through duct- work. from an air conditioning unit located in the warehouse. The tunnel was completed on 28 February 1955.. Construction of the tap chamber commenced 10 March 1955 and was completed, with the three target cables exposed, on 28 March 1955. (See fig. 15.)

To appreciate this accomplishment it is necessary to remember that the tunnel was 1,476 feet Long (roughly the.

19

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length of the Lincoln Menorial reflecting pool). and that. the i first half sloped down and. the second half sloped up. (See

fig. 16.) The lack. of aD. adequate bage line made the survéy-

ing problem especially. difficult. The engineers decided. at

one point that an object of known size in the East Zore would

be useful as a reference point, ‘so a baseball game was organ- | ized with the objective of knocking a baseball as far into os | East. Zone as possible. This scheme was frustrated by the friendliness of the East Merman guards who kept: returning the baseball. j Wonetheieany the eneneers “expressed ‘confidence that they a ‘their position. wien the’ tunnel was completed _

to a point which could be contained in a six-inch cube. They

were correct. . EY

°: Excess humidity is probably one of the greatest enemies of electronic equipment. To guard against thie: peébien the section of the tunnel dimediately adjacent to the tap chamber was insulated and sealed with marine—type plywood to form; in effect, a closed room. (See figs. 17 and 18.) ‘Vapor barriers : were erected and, in addition, a heavy. "anti-persennel"”. door ef steel and concrete was constructed to seal off. the tunnel some..15 yards. from its terminal. end. From the béginning it was realized that the duration of this operation was finite. Considerable. thought was given to the posture: the U.S. Govern- ment would adopt pron the tunnel 's discovery and to those

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Figure 16 - Schematic. View of Tunnel.

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Figure 17 - Initial Stage of. Construction of Pre-Amp Chamber

‘Figure 17 - Initial Stage of. Construction of Pre-Amp Chamber

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measures which would be taken at the ‘site. The following position was finally approved: a. The posture of the U.S. would be one of flat

4 cod

denial of any knowledge of the tunnel,

b. The tunnel was mined at the point it crossed the East-West: Zone border with demolition charges capable of: craving in the tunnel tiner should the Soviets attempt , forcible entry into the cover installation.

c. The “anti-Personnel” door descrihed above was installed. =

d. It. was agreed that the installation would be defended against forcible entry with all means at hand. The three. cables were tapped on 11 May 1955, 21 May. 1955,

and 2 August 1955. All equipment for isolating and preampli-

fying the signals and passing them down the tunnel for record-. ing was in place before each tap was made so that monitoring of each paix could begin as soon as it was tapped. {See figs.

19 and 20.) Careful check was kept of the temperature and

4/tnis door bore the followitg inscription featly lettered. in German and Cyrillic: "Entry is forbidden by order of. the Commanding General." -It was: reasoned that this sign might give pause. to Soviet. and/or German officials and gain time. As.a matter of fact, there were those Communist individuals. who considered the ‘posting of this Sigh aS one of the most auda- cious aspects of the entire undertaking.

21.

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humidity in the tap chanber to prevent the possibility of the introduction of moisture into. the target cables thus causing faults, ‘The moisture in the air caused. by the breathing and perspiration of. the technicians doing the tapping cperation forced the suspension of the operation several times to permit the air conditioning equipment to dehumidify the chamber, All the components in the electrical isolation net— works were individually selected and subjected to rigorous tests to insure maximum reliability, and the lead-away cables were constructed of the best available materials, sheathed. in

a

lead, and handled in accordance with the highest telephone

company. standards. The strictest possible visnal watch was maintained with the tap crew. In short, in this, as in all

aspects of the operation, every effort was made to guarantee

success: even though in many instances it meant delay in

achieving the objective.

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IV. TERMINATION.

The tunnel was discovered (see fig. 21) 22 April 1956, after 11 nonths and 1 days of operation. A menorandun pre- pared on 15 August: 1956 (reproduced in its entirety as Appendix A) examines in detail all evidence available as of that date on the réasons for the discovery. The. conclusion reached was that the ‘loss of this source was purely the result: of. unfortunate circumstances. beyond our control - a combina- tion of the fact that one of the cables was in very poor physical condition (this was known from the beginning) and a long period of unusually heavy rainfall. “It appeared that water entered the cable in sufficient quantity to make it inopera- tive, thus: necessitating digging up sections of the cable and causing discovery of the tap.

Subsequent developments offer an alternative reason

for the demise of the operation. In April 1956, MI-6 discov-

ered that Gedrge BLAKE, case officer. in their service, had been recruited by the ‘Soviets while a prisoner in North Korea in 1952 and had continued under Soviet. control. BLAKE was privy to all aspects of the tunnel from the earliest planning stages. BLAKE stated that he had informed. his Soviet contact of the planned tunnel at the time the final decision was.

made on its location in the latter part. of 1953. The

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question then arises. as to why the Soviets permitted the tunnel to be dug and to operate for nearly. one year. Many theories have been advanced, but it is most probable that we will never know the exact ‘rationale behind the. Soviet

moves.

24

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SECRET — - PRODUCTION ‘

The following statistics may be of interest in evaluating

the project:

a. Three cables were. tapped. They contained 273 metallic pairs. capable of transmitting a total of approx- imately. 1200 communications chanhels. The maximum number of channels in use. at any one time approximated 500. On the average 28 telegraphic circuits and 121 voice circuits were recorded continuously. Approximately 50,000 reeis of magnetic tape were used — some 25 tons.

b.. The London! processing: center employed a peak number of 317 persons. Twenty thousand. Soviet two-hour voice yveels containing 368,000 conversations were fully. transcribed. In addition; 13,500 German two-hour voice

reels were received and 5,500 reels containing 75,000

conversations were processed. Seventeen thousand of

these conversations. were fully transcribed.

ec. The Washington center employed 350 people at its peak. Eighteen thousand six-hour Soviet teletype yeelts and. 11,000 six-hour German teletype reels were conpletely transeribed. It should be borne in mind that many of these reels contained as many as 18 separate circuits, some of which utilized time-division multiplex to create additional circuits.. The potential of any given six-hour teletype reel was approximately

216 hours of teletype messages. Both plain text and

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encrypted traffic was received. The daily output was about 4,000 feet of teletype messages, Printed in book

‘form, these messages. would have filled a space ten feet wide, 15 feet long, and eight feet high.

d. A smail processing unit (two to four persons) was maintained at the Berlin site to permit on-the-spot monitoring of engineering circuits for the protection of the project and scanning of the more productive circuits for the "hot" intelligence. Daily reports of sufficient value to warrant electrical transmission to Washington

and London were produced.

e. Processing of the backlogged material con- tinued tatil 30 September 1958 and resulted. in a total of 1,750 reports plus 90,000 translated messages or conversations.

| _ £, The total cost of the project was $6,700,000.

The information from this material was disseminated in a. closely controlled system called “REGAL."" Appendix B. consists of a summary of the value. of the material received together with typical customer comments. Despite our knowl- edge of the fact that. certain elements of the Soviet. Govern= ment were aware of our plans to tap these cables, we have no ° evidence that the Soviets. attempted to feed us dgception | material through this source. 26 —§-i-OR-E-t—

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Vi. AFTERMATH

As previously noted, considerable thougiit was given during the entire life of. the project -on the result its discovery would bring. in retrospect it is probably. correct to say that, among those most. actively concerned with the project's management, ‘a consensus ‘developed that the Soviets would probably suppress knowledge of the tunnel’ S existence rather: than ‘admit to the world that Free ‘world “intelligence organs had the capability ‘of successfully ‘mount ing an ORErS =

°. tion of this magnitude. In. othér words, it. was. felt that for

the Soviets to admit. that the U.S. had been reading theiy high

level communications. circuits would cause the Soviets to lose. face. Perhaps fortunately, -fate intervened, and as 2 possible. consequence the Soviet course of action was exactly. contrary to expectation. | The Commandant. of the Soviet Berlin Garrison, who would | normally have controlled the handling of the situation when the tunnel was discovered,’ was absent from Berlin. and the | Acting Commandant, Colonel Ivan A. Kotsyuba, was in charge. 3 There is some reason to. believe that: he (for whatever reason) was forced to make a personal decision on a course of action without benexit ial advice fron Moscow. At any rate his :

reaction cae unexpected in that he invited the entire Berlin

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and unconcealed delight to this indication that the U.S., almost universally regarded a5 a stumbling neophyte in espionage matters, was. capable of a coup against the Soviet Union, which had long been the acknowledged master in such. matters.

gz. Coupled with regret that the Cold War necessi- tated such measures, thoughtful editorial. comment applauded this indication that the U.S. was capable of fulfilling its role of Free World leadership in the struggle. Appendix € contains a. sampling of typical U.S. press

accounts and editorial comment on the tunnel. Predictably

the Communist press treated the turinel as an cutrage and an

98 —§-B-C Rh ET

2 ‘ ; -§-E—C-k-E-T— press corps to a briefing and tour of the tunnel and its facilities. As a result the tunnel was undoubtedly the most ! highly publicized peacetime: espionage enterprise in modern

times prior to the "U-2 incident." Worldwide reaction was out- standingly favorable. in terms of enhancement of U.S. prestige. | Non-Soviet Bloc sentiment can be generally summarized as foilows: | a. There was universal admiration (and this. : included informed Soviets) on the technical excellence | : of the installation ang the imaginative nature of the | ‘undertaking. | | b. The non-Communist world reacted with surprise |

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intolerable indecency. Appendix D consista of a study of East German press reaction to the incident. For their contributions to Project ee

were made. to the following individuals: —

CR Siaute Distinguished Intelligence Medal Intelligence Medal of Merit. intelligence Medal of Merit Intelligence Medal of Merit :

Mr. William K, Harvey Distinguished Intelligence Medal |

_ CIA Statute

Intelligence Medal of Merit Intelligence Medal of Merit Distinguished Intelligence Medal i

Intelligence Medal of Merit

After the project went. into the production phase it was

necessary to brief a great many people to properly utilize the product. In all almost 1500 U.S. personnel were cleared for the project, in addition to a very large number of British

atthe Vidindindey the writer has been unable to locate an exact record of those persons who received other recognition from the Agency for their participation in this project and any omissions are regretted. It should also be noted that approximately 1000 people participated wittingly or unwittingly in this undertaking. In fact thereare very few, if any, of the elements of CIA that. vere not called upon for assistance, either directly or indirectly (such as providing manpower), during the life of the project.

29

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Subjects. With the exception of BLAKE (as noted above), we have no indication that there was a single security leak during the life of the project. It is also interesting to note that compartmentation was good enough, even at the

Berlin site, that a number of individuals actively engaged

in working with the REGAL material were unaware of the exact

source until they read about it in the press.

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APPENDIX A

NOTE: This assessnent was. prepared by the PBJOINTLY staff immediately after the discovery: of the tunnel and is based on: pertinent information available. At the time the report was prepared BLAKE's. activities had not been surfaced. |

15 August 1956

_ DISCOVERY BY THE SOVIETS OF PBJOINTLY

Analysis of all available évidence - traffic passing on

“the target. cables, conversations recorded from a microphone

instalied in. the tap chamber ; and vital obgervaticnes From the site - indicates that. the Soviet discovery of DRIOINTLY was purely fortuitous and was not the reault of a penetration of the U.S. or U.K, agencies. concerned, a security violation, ‘or

testing of the lines by the Soviets or East Germans. A descrip-

‘tion of the events. Ieading to these conclusions is contained

in this paper.

Following heavy rains in the Berlin area a number of tele-. phone and telegraph: cables were £Looded and began to fault between Karlshorst and Mahlow on the night of 16 April 1956.. The first major fault was discovered on cable FK 151 at Wassmannsdorf on 17 April. The fault was repaired by cutting the defective stretch of cable and replacing a’ 3000 meter length with a temporary replacement cable. Between 17 and 22

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‘April, when the tap was discovered, cables 150, 151, 153, and

157 were inoperative at various times. During this ‘pertod Soviet signal troops and East German Dost and. Telegraph tech- nicians' woxked frantically to re-establish. and maintain con- ftunications.- Télephone lines serving Marshal Grechko, the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces. Germany (GSFG) , and General Kosyakin, Malyi, Tsarenko, and Dudakov failed, tempo- rarily depriving these officers. of communications. Faults on, cable FK.150 put the Main Soviet Signal Center in Germany out of communications with Moscow, and the Soviet Air Warning Control. Center in East Germany similarly lost its communications. German technicians began a testing program based at. Karlgshorst. and ‘Mahlow and working north from Mahlow, A. major fault on FK 150 was. discovered and repaired at Wassmannédort on 18-19 April, and on 19 April a second major fault on the same cable was discovered at Schoenfeld only two kilometers south of the tap site. Jt appears that. the faulty section.of cable was replaced with a. new stretch during the -earlby hours of 20 April, but communications remained unsatisfactory, par=

ticularly on FK 150° , ang the testing and repair program

" FK 150 caused project personnel considerable concern

from the. day that the cables were reached. It was: ‘physically

in very poor shape, with brittle and cracking insulation. The actual tap of FK 150 was. delayed: almost three months in. deference to ata poor physical condition.

2

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continued, This general situation was noted -by personnel at. the site who checked the tap on the morning of 19: April and found it to be in good condition with no faults present. Berlin. notified Headquarters of this fact on the evening of 20 April, noting, “available precautions taken including. primary one of crossing: fingers."

Throughout 20 April Soviet-operators at Karlshorst, the. Mahlow cable. chamber, and Zossen/Wuensdorf checked FK 150 pairs carrying circuits serving high ranking officials and made Switches where necessary or-possible. Nothing was said con- cerning the testing being.conducted to discover the faults or work bieing done by a Soviet. labor force Lent to the Gexmans to assist in digging up bad stretches of cable. On 21 April a Karlshorst technician told a. colleague. in Zossen /Wuensdorf the FK 150 had not yet been repaired and that another two days’ work would probably be necessary to clear up the trouble. Testing and rerouting of circuits were stepped ‘up during the evening of 21 April, and the Soviets showed considerable con-

cern over the failure of the Moscow-GSFG Air Warning’ telegraph

channel which had been transferred to FK 150 on 17 April. Lt.

Colonel Vyunik, Chief of the GSFG Signal Center at Wuensdorf,

telephoned Major Alpatov, Chief of the Karlshorst Signal Center,

at his apartment to inform him of the failure of the Air Warning circuit, They agreéd that commutiications had to be 3 82-22 EB E-

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established before morning and Alpatov left for his duty Station,

There is no significant information available on ‘the actual progress of the testing and repair program proper from . 0300 hours on. 20 April to 0050 hours: on 22 April. On. the basis. of available information, however, it seems probable: that ta) the testing program continued north until a fault. was located near the site and a decision was made to replace an entire section of cable which émbraced the tap site; or (b) the re- peated faulting coupled with the age .and physical condition. of. FK 150 led the opposition to the conclusion that the only

effective remedy was to. replace the cable, section by section,

and that this program was inaugurated somewhere south of our -gite and continued northward until the tap was discovered.

At approximately 0050: hours on 22 April, 40 or 50 men were seen on the east side of Schoenefelder Allee, deployed along the entire area observable from our installation,, digging at three to five foot intervals over the location. of the cable and, incidentally, the tap chamber. At approximately 0200 hours the top of the tap chamber w2s discovered, and at 0210. Russian speech was heard from the microphone in the tap chamber, The first fragments of speech indicated that the dis- covery of the tap chamber aroused no suspicion among: those

present. A small hole was broken in the tap chamber roof

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. permitting limited visual observation of the chamber, and a Soviet adoeaiu? wae brought to the spot. After some discus— ‘sion. all agreed that. the discovery was 4 manhole covering a repeater point, and the working crew ‘began enlarging the hole to gain access to the ®repeater point."

' While. the working party was uncovering the tap chamber, Major Alpatov and Lt. Colonel Vyunik discussed the communi~ cations situation in a rambling telephone conversation at approximately 0230 hours. They indicated relief at. the res- toration of Air Warning Communications with Moscow, and Vyunik.

went on to express suspicion about the continued trouble on

FK 150. In. context it appears that this suspicion was directed at the failure of the Germans to clear up. the. diffi-. culties on FK 150: once and for all. In ‘any event, Alpatov clearly did not share his colieague's doubts. The general tone of this conversation was relaxed and casual, completely. in keeping with the character of the two men, both of whom we know well. ‘The conversation appears to be a clear indi- cation that, ‘as of 0230 hours on 22 April, neither of. these

responsible officers was aware of the existence of the. tap.

2/ presumably Captain Bartash, an enginecr who later received an unspecified award from Marshal Grechko for the discovery of the tap.

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Weanwhile back at the sité the work of enlarging a hole to give full access to the tap chamber continued. At approxi- mately 0250 hoirs an unidentified Soviet Colonel arrived on the scene, presumably in response to a request ‘for eee by the working party. The ‘Colonel did not appear to be 2

Signal officer erage ‘he took no active part in the investiga-

tion and remained on the ‘scene only for a short tinie. - Having

‘enlarged the hole in the tap chamber roof, the workers saw for the first time the cables and the era door on. the floor of the chamber. They “assumed the trap door to be "some sort of box’ and had to suspicion of: the true. nature of the ‘installa- tion. At approximately. 0300 noure- barriers were erected to keep inquisitive Onlookeys ‘away from the excavation and it was suggested that someone be sent to the Signal Directorate, presumably to obtain relevant cable data. At the same. time the first German voice was ‘heard, in conversation with @ German-speaking Russian, The German stated that two trucks must nae ond the spot without eee it. The Russian that they must wait “until morning” for the decision as to what: further work would be undértaken.

While these developments were taking place, Vyunik held a.telecon ‘with the Aix Warning Center in Moscow in. which he

yeferred to the move of the GSFG Air Warning Center ‘and.

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discussed, in detail, communication arrangements nécessi- tated by this move, This revealing. teleconference tends to Support other evidence indicating that. as of 0300 hours the true nature of the installation nad still not been established. The work of excavation continued, and fragments of con- yversation connected: with it were picked up by the tap chamber microphone. A German-speaking Russian commented that. "some-

body. has come from there and there are fewer workers there,”

suggesting that similar work was in progress at another point.

The Russian gave instructions: that’ nothing in the installation

-was to be touched. <A German remarked that the chamber might

be connected with sewage work and proposed that plans of the sewage system be obtained from the responsible authorities. The Russian answered that they already had this information and that the. plans: showed "that chamber" to be 120 meters away from this point. At about 0320 hours, when still more of the tap chamber was revealed and a better view of the ‘in-. terior obtained, those present began to speculate vaguely about its exact nature and the time of its construction. One

of the Soviets, probably an officer, suggested that it might

‘have. been built during the war, possibly for "Vhe Che" (Russian

abbreviation. for "high. frequency transmission," but used. Loose- ly to denote anything connected with. secure communications. ) Shortly after 0330 hours, the. Soviets left the. site by motor ; , —$-B-¢-2-E-

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vehicle, presumably to report their findings. For approxi-. mately one and one-half hours: - from 0330 ‘to 0500. ~ 10 sounds or voices were recorded «

At approximately /0419. hours. _Vyunik telephoned Alpatov’ Ss apartment in..Karlshorst and asked Alpatov if he had spoken : with General Dudakov, Chief Signal Officer, GSFG. Alpatov said that he had, that he was. getting dressed, and that he would go: to his signal center as soon as possible. Vyunik told Alpatov to telephone him at the GSFG frame roon at Zossen/Wuensdort , adding, "When we speak we must do so care- fully. We know what the matter is, so we will speak care-

fully." This indicated clearly that. by 0415 hours. the GSFG

Signal Directorate and General Dudakov, the. Chief Signal

Officer, had been inforsied. of the discovery of the PBJOINTLY

chamber, viewed it with extreme suspicion, and planned to re-

route circuits passing, over the target cables. This. coincides ; i

neatly with ttie departure fron: the tap site of: the Soviets at

0330. At 0630 Yyunik telephoned Alpatov at the Karlshorst

Signal Center and informed him that Lt. Colonel. Zolochko,

Deputy Chief of the Lines’ Department, GSFG, had left Wuensdorf

at 0625 to go “there.” Vyunik, in a resigned tone, then added

‘that all that remained for him and Alpatov to do. was to ‘sit

and wait. | | In due course Lt. Colonel Zolochko arrived at the site,

accompanied by an unnamed Colonel and Captain Bartash, the

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——s Commander of the working party, By this time the Soviets apparentiy had brought circuit. diagrams to the site and were

aware of the pair allocations on the affected cables.. There

was considerable discussion of the discovery, and oné of the

erew actually. entered the chatiber and made a superficial and inconclusive examination, Shortly. afterwards the statement,

"the cable is tapped," was made for the first time on the

At about this. time (0635 hours) Lt. Colonel Vyunik tele- phoned Major Alpatoy and asked whether he had received the. "task" and whether. its meaning was clear. Alpatov replied that he had received and understood the assignmerit. Speaking in. unusually vague terms, Vyunik instricted Alpatov to take

over two. low-frequency channels, presumably provided by the

KGB signals organization. (These channels. would provide tele-

phone, communications between Berlin and Wuensdorf via overhead

line and would by-pass the tapped cables.) Vyunik added that they could continue necessary technical discussions on the new facilities.

Although teletype traffic continued until the tap. wires

were cut - at 1535 hours on Sunday afternoon ~— the last tele-.

phone call of any interest was placed sometime between 08006 and 0900 hours on. 22 April, when an agitated General speaking from Marshal Grechko’s apartment attempted to contact Coionel 9 , tases 5

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Kotsytuba, who was then acting for General Dibroya, Berlin” Commandant, Unable to locate Kotsyuba, the General talked to Coionel Pomozanovskii, Chief of Start of the Berlin Garrison, atressing the urgency of his call. Pomozanovakii promised to: find Kotsyuba at once. and get hin. to return the call. The return call was not intercepted, but there appears to. be no. doubt. that Marshal. Gréchko had by this time been informed of the. discovery and wished to discuss. it. with Colonel Kotsyuba., | A Tew telephorie calls were attempted after. this, but the oper- ators refused to place the calls, and in one case a Karlshorst operator said, "I won't put you through to anyone. Don't ring, that's. all. I won't answer you any more. It's in the order," Between 0700 and 0800 hours a number of additional Soviet officers arrived at the excavation, including ‘Colonel Gusev of the KGB. Signals Regiment. A Rissiah-speaking German was

heard to remark that a "commission" was expected, and a Soviet

officer said that they would await the arrival of. this commis-~

Sion before making a decision as to what the next step would

be. In answer to a question as. to whether anything should be

disconnected, the same officer stated that nothing Should be

done beyond making motion pictures of the chamber. He added,

however, that the hole providing access to thé chamber should be enlarged and a detailed inspection should be carried out.

The. .general discussion. continued, and the possibility of some

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form of explosive booby trap in the chamber was. ‘discussed at | some length. There. was widespread belief that the trap door, which in fact. provided access to the. tunnel. proper, was &@ "box" or "battery box” possibly involving a booby trap. ‘Oné of the Soviet. officers, probably Zolochko, suggested that, after every- thing liad been careers noted and recorded, a grappling iron

could be attached to the thox" in order toa tear it away. MIE

A . ed .

there is no explésion;" he said, "then we can calmly go ahead and deal With it.” |

Several. individuals, presumably. German cable splicers, agreed that the cabies were fully ‘tapped and discussed the method employed. They agreed Pints it must have been done in:

such a way as to. render the tap undetectable by measurements, although one of them failed. to understand why the actual cut— ting of the cables was not detected. He added that at that: time “everyone must. have been quite drunk.” ‘The Germans. con- | tinued to speculate on the nature of the "box" and about the means of: access to the tap chamber. One of them said, "They themselves must have some means of entering this. place, but. naturally it's highly improbable that they have cénstructed a passage for getting from here to there!"

Some of those: present apparently believed that the tap was. an old one and had been abandoned due to recent faults

on the cable. During this discussion the microphone was

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C06828875

twice noted, but was not recognized for what it was. In the first: instance the speaker said; "That, is not a microphone," and in the second it was described as “a black bail."

The. general discussion continued, with speculation as to the nature of the thattery. box". and with several comments that it should be possible to identify the tappers "from the make of the materials" and the techniques employed. While the Ger- mans began work enlarging the hole around the tap chamber, the Soviets discussed in some detail the order in which technical experts and administrative representatives would carry out their inspection. The Soviets identified the lead-off cable as "not ours," indicating that after the inspection they planned to disconnect the lead-off cable and to "check how far it goes from here - probably by means of electrical measurements, It is evident that at this tine (approximately 1130 hours) the Soviets and Germans were still unaware. of the existence of the tunnel, the means of access to the tap chamber, or those re- ‘sponsible for the tap.

At: approximately’ 1145 hours one of the German crew. was: heard ‘to exclaim, "The box is an entry to a shaft!"

From the tenor of the ensuing conversation it would seen that a small hole kad. been made near the still-intact trap. door. The Germans debated the removal of the trap door, but

continued to work at and around it despite the alternate

12-

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Suggestion that "we should open up the road opposite until

we reach the cable or the shaft." By approximately 1230

they had removed the hinges and entered the lower part of

the tap chamber. The padlock which secured the trap door from

below was examined and was identified as “of English origin.”

‘Failing to open the door separating. the tap chamber from the

equipment chamber, the Germans, after approximately twenty min-

utes; broke. a hole through the wall and gained visual. access

to the equipment chamber, which they described as "a long. passage."' By 3300 they evidently had enlarged the access Hole aiid described “a completed installation - a telephone exchange., :.... An installation for listening in /Abhoeranlage/,"' Additional motion pictures’ were made and frequent excla- mations of wonder and admiration were heard. At 1420 a Soviet Colonel, probably Zolochko; a person addressed as Nikolai {vanovich, probably Major Alpatov; and a Captain, presumably

Bartash, entered the chamber and discussed the method used

by the tappers in gaining access to the cables, Zolochko

evidently still believed that this was done "from above."

Conversations indicated that the joint Soviet-German: commis-

sion, mentioned earlier, had already visited the site and

established the nature of the installation without going into

technical details.

13

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C06828875

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Measurements. of parts. of the interior were then taken, discussion of the installation became general, and the partici-

pants clearly tndicated that the means of ‘access and full impli-

cations of the operation were finally appreciated, ‘ Converadtions

reflected that all present realized ‘that the planning of the tunnel approach to the cables. ‘must have. necessitated a very detailed study of relevant naps and plans.” The. stress to which the roof of the. chambers would be subjected and. the: necessity of preparing the. lead-off cables beforehand were’ mentioned,

and e Caechneae joard to exclaim, “It must have cost a pretty penny." A Russian-speaking German added ;. admiringly; "How neatly and tidily they Have done it.” It was decided that

work on the tunnel must have been carried out during the day

when the sound of the street traffic would drown any noise,

whereas the actual tapping was done "during the night, between one and ‘two o'clock, when the traffic on the cables is slight." One of the Germans rather indignantly exclaimed, "What 2 filthy trick. And where you would least expect it.” -- to which another replied, "Unless one had seen it for: oneself, nobody would believe it.” Between 1515 and 1530 hours the tap wires were cut, and at about 1545 ‘the attention of the Germans. began to concentrate on the microphone itself. One of them assumed it to. be an.

‘alarm device - probably a microphone," to give warning of

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approaching motor traffic, and added that it ought to be photographed, At 1550 hours work began:-on dismantling ‘the. microphone. Shortiy afterward the microphone went dead and, after 11 months and 11 days, the operational.

phase of PBJOINTLY was completed,

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APPENDIX B..

RECAPITULATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE DERIVED |

Set forth below..are a recapitulation of intelligence derived from the REGAL material and some typical. consumer

comments ,.

GENERAL | The REGAL operation provided the United States and the British with @ unique. source of current intelligence. on the

Soviet Orbit of a kind and quality which had not been avail-

able since 1948. Responsible U.S. and British officials. con-

sidered PBJOINTLY, during its productive phase, to’ be the prime source of early warning concerning Soviet intentions in Europe, if not world-wide. Following are examples of items of intelligence. for which REGAL was either a unique or most

timely and reliable source.

POLITICAL

Throughout the life of source (11 May 1955 - 22 April

1956) we were kept currently informed of Soviet intentions in

Berlin; REGAL provided the inside story of every “incident”

occurring in Berlin during the periog-- a story which was in

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C06828875

each case considerably at variance. with accounts of ‘the same incident as reported. by other sources, REGAL showed that, contrary to estimates by other sources; the Soviets at that tine did not intend to relinquish their ‘prerogatives vis-a-_ vis the other. ‘three occupy ing ‘powers despite continually | increasing pressure from the Fast Germans to assert thear Sov- ereignty in East Berlin as well as in the rest of Kast Germany. REGAL provided -a clear picturé. of the unpreparedness, confusion, and indecision among Soviet and East German officials whenever

| an incident occurred in East Berlin involving citizens of one of the Western powers.

The Soviet decision to implement the establishment of an

Hast German Army was disclosed by REGAL in October 1955, ‘in time to notify our representatives at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Genéva to that effect. | REGAL . provided a detailed account of the Soviet. prograni for implementation of the decisions of the 20th Party: Congress, including measures to suppress unrest among Soviet nuclear scientists resulting from a too-literal interpretation of the new. theory of collective leadership and the detigration of Stalin, | 7 The progress of ‘Marstial Zhukov's attempt to curtail the influence of the political officer in the Soviet Armed Forces (which led to: his subsequent downfall) was traced in REGAL "

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C06828875.

material from the aiitumn of: 1955 to mid-April 1956.

REGAL provided considerable intelligence on the relation- ships between various key military and political figures of the Soviet hierarchy and on relations between the Poles and

od oe . the Soviet military forces stationed in Poland.

MILITARY General | a. Reorganization o£ the Soviet Ministry of Defense. | b. Soviet plans to implement. the Warsaw Pact by

increasing Soviet-Satellite military coordination.

¢. Implementation of the publicity announced intention to vedice the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces, d. Identification of several thousand Soviet ' officer-personnel. Air | &@. Development of an improved nuclear delivery capability in the Soviet Air Army in East Germany. b. Re-equipment. of the Soviet Air Army in East Germany with new bombers and twin-jet interceptors having an airborne radar capability. ¢. Doubling of the Soviet bomber strength in Poland and the appearance there of a new fighter division.

CO6828875.

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d. Identification and location of approximately 100 Soviet Aix Force installations in the USSR, East Germany , and Poland, ineluding a number. of key. wircraft factories. | : ' Ground Forces . ; .

a. Order of battle of Soviet ground forces. within the USSR not previously identified or not, located for several years by any other source.

b. -Soviet training plans for the spring and early. summer of 1956 in East Germany and Poland.

c, Identification of several thousand Soviet field

post numbers (used by G-2 to produce Soviet order of

battle intelligence). Navy

a. Reduction in the status and personnel strength. of the Soviet Naval: Forces..

b. Organization and. administrative procedures of ‘the Headquarters: of the Soviet. Baltic Fleet and Soviet

Nayal Bases on the Baltic Coast.

| | SCIENTIFIC | Identification. of several. hundred personalities associ- .- ated with the Soviet Atomic Energy (AE) Program.

Association of certain locations in one USSR with AE

activities.

eA We £00 SOF FES SITS OTT PVC i eA OAD ATI I PLD CPP TOG gD Paci Lele + nl DIYS OLR ED VOD 8 CPI: PPD PNA ay TRITON T Pas Caan IN I, IOFOTO TTR Ratatat iD fa UP TTI So TIS FATTO t YS, POE 8 ISS HAS beees > Ps Fees went cecmrmnme Onn PUES BUVAL FEED ol Mel ohm oe OEE I SERIES IR Oe t AA AGS OR Re VY OPA TS Oe DF 2 Pes es ce

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Organization and activities of. Wismuth SDAG (mining

‘uranium in the Aue area of East Germany).

OPERATIONAL

Organization, functions, and procedures of the Soviet Intelligence Services in East Germany; identification of ‘several hundred Soviet intelligence pevecnnlitica in. Bast

Germany and. Moscow,

TYPICAL CONSUMER COMMENTS.

March .1956 ACSI /Ariny - "REGAL has provided unique and highly

valuable current information on the ordex of battle, training, Groanteation: equipment, and operations of the Soviet and East German Ground Forces. In addition, the scope and variety of the types of information found in REGAL have confirmed that it is our best source of early warning of Soviet attack.”

ACSI/Air = "The numerous productions received from — the REGAL project have been an extremely. valuable con- ‘tribution to the Intelligence Comminity in our common , probiems...”

7 February 1958: CIA/OSI - "REGAL ‘has provided valuable information

on atomic. energy activities in East Germany, including.

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organizational relationships, personalities, procurement details, and uranium ore shipmerit data, The number. of hitherto unknown atomic energy localities, personalities, and activities disclosed in REGAL traffic is impressive." CIA/ORR - “in refexvenced memorandum we indicated our great interest in Zinanciail material of all kinds which Was availiable. in REGAL material, ‘Thanks: to your coopera—

tion ve are exploiting the material with great success,".

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APPENDIX C_

TYPICAL AMERICAN PRESS COMMENT

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A. - WASHINGTON POST 1 May 1956

The Tune of Love.

Tho United Slates‘Coverument has not yet nada Any official repty to the. Soviet and East German allegations and: protesls concerning the 300-yard

tunel (ist Ameyican Inleligenca -oparatives are , said to have-buill undérneath, the. border between 7

‘West and East. Berlin for espionage purposes. Meanwhile, assuming the story to be correct-—-we cannot help thinking the Commuaisis have made a grievous mistake 10 raise 50 much fuss about their ‘discovery. They are even said to have conducted ‘special propatanta tours through “the tuancl -and 10 have exhibited the wiretapping and other record- ‘Gng apparatus that the Americans-.are supposcd. to have installed inside it:

The probable result.of all this has been to give the anti-Communist resistance in Hast Germany a good deal of amusement. and encouragement. Cer- tainly it must Nave ‘served to- strehgthen the -im- “pression. of American, resourcefulness and therehy ‘ta restora: somo micasure of our prestige—which apparently: had been deteriorating sinee ihe equiva-

cal attitude taken. by the American authorilies in ihe East German uprisings.of June, 1954—among “the captiva. population. The reaction of their kinsmen in ‘West Germany is ea a prelty ‘ : good index to.their own, ‘i In West Germany the slory has been accepted at face value wilh astonishment and delighl.as an éevidenes.that tha tradition of Yankes résource- fulness and ingenuity is not a myth afer all. Espionage Is one game jn which the Communists. ot were Geemed, even by their encinics, to be: par- 2 ticularly expert and ‘our own side to. be dismally ; inept. Very few Germans, as the . Fraikfurter : Neue Presse -oxullantly observed, even’ suspected. ihat tha Aniericans “were capable of so much . cleverness"; and it would be even more devastating 7 to ‘Communist prestige if it wera disclosed (hat. | a ae tha espionage tinnel had been’ in operation for sania time-befora the Communists became aware: of it. ‘Indeed, if the tunne) episode turns out to have. heen the: product of Yankee ingenuily, there. Js an: cae: interesting patallel in American history, During fhe siege of Petersburg jn 1064, an enterprising Union ‘officer from the. Pennsylvania . coal fields conceived the idea, of: mining the Confederate positions from a tunnel..under (hem. The tunnel was dug. and the niines werd finally’ set-off; and j though the operation was a fiasco in part because” ’ of the: failure of Usion commanders: to execule ‘orders, the boldness.of. tha slroke, has. compelled — ‘ever. since, © ts? +, ee ‘ Soa, (SE :

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BERLIN Wonderful Tunnel

Belin, city of rubble, refugees, ‘aatl occasional preteltiss of glitter, is tin Alfred Jiitehenck. dream of subterfuge aart suspi- ‘cioa, In hack. streels, darkly mysterious’ houses hurk behind high wire fences: sug- Restive of darker and ‘mare mysterious lodge within. Newaen recently caurted 37 separate..agécnen’s af. Wear iutcili- gence known to ‘be at work in: Berlin.

fashionably

Their —_ojteratives-—some Manlison Avenue, some with armpit hole stars bulging’ wader hie serge—report to

scliiteriut Readquiiriers. and varely {Know ~ what their collegues are up ta.

Msi stl Perlin dhere’ is no spot better sulted) is alee Hiteheck schema (rings: thay a-riatic, semineyerte:] comer. knee on the U.S. side an Kastow and ‘in the Russian zone, just aver the way, as Alt- GHenicke. -Selfsimportant.. ducks and chickens strat like ‘commiissars in AR CHienirke's ‘cabled stfect . Uerlin’s any warking windmill fords lazily in the heveze near ly, and close fo, the hourly Separating East and West stands a U:S: radar sitting, bending its reviculas ter ta the. upesations at East Betlio’s. hisy ‘Schdneteld Airport. “Pwo rings of buried ‘Wire jaavd Use lonely tadar post, and .

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Tho Big Colley. For many 2 month, ‘the’ supsrscerecy sucrounding the can-. ‘struction aiid operation: 6f Rudow's radar * ‘station had fed the gossije af bored Amer: icans in the eecupied city. “Fhese were

(- those who remembered a-civilian engineer Slotheil inthe grey inne! of New York's: ured to supervise. the job; he had quit ia

‘disgust -because the blueprints svemed so.

crazy. “Why build a cellar ‘big. enough: ta

(lcive through with a-dump truck?’ he

- asked. and was told to ining ‘his.own busi- ness, Others recalled scempg friends whom they knew to he engineers suddeniy aj- peating at We station wearing the insignia of the U.S. Anny Signal Cur. Why? An aniused shrug. was the only ansiver gues- tioners-ever got—hin lael week ihe Rus-- sians dhought they had found a better one. - One. night at. 7 o'clock, “an angry,

| ghunky Soviet celuticl uimed ‘Ivan Kolsic—

, Uba catled a press conference in East Beve '

I" lin, Purpose: to provest the Building by~

r “American osganizations” af -a: secret sunncl.unader Kast Cierman‘tescitary. “with the ¢rininal intent of spying.” -Olfercd x

4 chance to sco i ees the Wester eo og . ; e, : ‘_ Newsyren were . ; e . a e Signal Corps. men five a life as secret," " :

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A Lot of Money: Truckloads of Red army troops and squad cars crowded with Volkspaliees staml by, Mahile generators:

7 were hing to provinle:- lights far the

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cveasion, ndoad Ute. etitésine (af hale dling te the gemuned.a cole ofthe Bie | shur-signal carps iwas-of lapd da explain it ald. ‘Fen ives below, its cutranve a Teity vat ; in the roof by the Russians, lay the: tunel ‘itself: a cast-iron tube about six feet ijn diamcier atid seo-Geo yards long, \ eranimed ‘with electeonic edsiipmienl, ¢n- bles. tape securders, ventikating apporsivs and pumps of bath Svitish dud Antericas. make. Al Wie Exast-Gerguan ened. cables led gut of the main bndy of the tunel to a: separate chamber where: Lhey were liked to two Kast German cables aud a ubied used hy the Russians, What-was at the Awefican. ends The newsmen were net permitted lo Rudw. As they crawled west- Ward. ss sandlig:beerrien barrel the way, ils purpasy emphasized by a. sign reads ine Maijglish cau German; "Vou are naw entering (he Amerisiuy sector”

“This tunnel,” said the Russiay expert, with a note of admiration, “was wile 16 lust séary. “Phe parly respensilde must. have hud’ low af maaey."

Wii .was responsibies Nalaly, neither the Bentayan.. the Siste Depmirtinent, mee.

.. the Central Lntelligence Agency, Was soy- . ing. But :as Hertin’s’ pnjiers erapled glee | fully with the news, oie Kerlin editor told ;

@ a ¢e to

2 08 oe Sam etter Se 28 04

a sanking U.S. official: “& don't know ‘whether your people dug that wanderful: ; cunnel er not, but whoever it was, let me } gay Lthink it was too bad it was found . It's the best publicity the U.S. has had in. . Berlin for.a long tinie.” *.

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> + eet ,. - - a, x. Us ae baled . Hope lt Is True’ +" Soviet’ me that American intelligence “agents: dug a tunnel in Eerlin, tapped. a telephone cable, and; | recorded conversations-over the Red communication net-' iwork, which the Reds, made with considerable-fanfare. ‘and duting'3 conducted: tour of the spy tunnel for cor-, a gives us some: faint hope. 4 Frankly, we didn't know that American intelligence agents were that.smart. : In- fact, we were beginning” {think that, what it the Central Intelligence Agency necded’

[WEES TE TCS on the asaamentels 8 "ot espionage on

“We : tape “that American | as agents have’ MAL, ‘the Soviet..department of foreign -affairs,' iplanted western"sympathizers in the Heart-of the. Sovietl - bureaucracy. and started a stream of microfilmed copies’

jof important ie ceenearemamard |

‘Washin e ; Soe be: ‘ail this because that is precisely what. the ‘Soviet. spy network ‘did and is probably doing right. now:

tin the United States. ‘This is not just tit for tat—butsa, istaric necessity in ‘the world of cynical power SS ad

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= ‘1 Front: Ed Oikos ; ' : ae : Pege Fe Hs r aii ; t. ; Ne EN a 50 Piss gree Well Spent /z 2 § ce coe | There is-only one agency in Pee aa Seo ington which does not. accountt wien} ee os 5 money it spends. The Central. Intelll- nt BONS ilgenee Agency, headed by Allen W. a 2 . ee a * oo tDuiles, has never reported to Con- . ae ae Hgress, A special committee, appointed ; :. eee iby: the President, did make"a survey . are Jof the agency's activities and Was ap- e a eee | parently satisiied that ib was efficient. . Pot 480. scarey are the netivities of . this}. : he ‘‘geréup that even the amount ‘ of - a eek +money it. spends Is unknown, Ac- . Sane ee dcountants -have estimated that there | ae jis roughly $2.*billion in budgets of . : de eee other departments which, is diverted :* ae eee tothe CIA: — ae } Naturally enough,. Congress. worries} ¢ rk oe. from. time to: time that this money} a Pe 2 may-not be well'spent. Last weék some] . wt Laer sth snews came out of Berlin which should “Hyp ped jealm such, fears: : pet : The Russians discovered that their wb 4 dthree main. telephone: cables from} rs i7-~. | Bast Berlin to polite cast were tapped.| ae, aes ; C) A tunnel from the Western zone, con- ae at nected ‘with the tapped ines and ok wires, led to Sandbags dt the zone ab tg boundary. The Russians ‘were greatly} ~ 2 -% disturbed. ‘They claim that all mes- * ay sages for several] years have. pceen ine gag tercepted, They blame this violation? doo of privacy on American intelligence. . : eae res ous officials. have expressed horror 2 ne = t the charge, They. haven’t,’they say, f ee ee ae = tthe slightest Idea ‘of where the nest: 2 eT ae ar lead or by’ whom: they were.laid.. The r . vce’ Russians. are. just old. meanies to elatm: ) ae we wire-tapped. : wee \ West Berliners are laughing, Good’ : oe Ves for American Intelligence, they say.}: POM dt {They hope, and so do. we, that chet "e : ug ont! Russians have only discovered one off ~ ey ahs scveral’ taps. At least, the exposal ; a shows that some. of.the- money. spent , ie ” ate by CLA’ may rst been very well spent : - .. : ra : a indeed, »/ CNS voit ., ey oe ‘ wa eg Gias 4a ‘ So ve “ @ vie 7

ALAN eer TNETALE ROTA tr nA nat cnt py ee eterna on pepgnry menor nese rene ee Ob Patents earn APR ERINOINAE DS FH 6 5 5 ot 4 Ammen Cem R POMIEMEON Yes crt et TOA toda Nah © ran ee OOOO ONT RNY SALE KATIA LAAS IY tate FV abel! bee atremeAmare POPS OTTO PITT IS OTR ARAR APA PAPA Rati, eee a

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“RATIONAL WAL, EROADOASTANG COAL AV Tee co Es

OTA Mi HAVE ORDERED WERETAP TUNNEL == DRETER 0:

Alex Dreier at 6:00 P.M. over WMAQ (Chicago) and the “Nee Radio. Networks: .

' Avid now under tha heading, special réport,. part ones ~igreat-Hnitein-waith-ibe—frogman-spy- who-burned “Out ‘tbo "be" nob.

~so-suckéessfinl_in-his-secrotiveness—has_nobhing onus. We have a » ‘tunnel we dug under the communist sector of Berlin and which ths.

feds exposed to the light of day, as you probably know, a short while ago.. Well, our NEC corraspondent, good friend and colleague ; Frank Burkholzer, has investigated the story of the wiretap tunnel ~ ard he: say's ‘there's. just one conclusion — it's ours. We dug it, we equipped it. with electronic equipment to listen in on communist East German conversations for a whole year before they found us cute

“Presumably wea should. be. embarrassed but nobody in Berlin ise

In fact, there is a bint of American and West. Garman pride in know~ that we pulled. off an espionage trick on the Reds for a change, Of course, the Bast Germans ere making a good thing. of it by con-: ducting tours through the tunnel. to impress ‘their people with tha éastardlinéss of the American spies, but that may backfire on them because the East Germans are not bayond getting a qitiet ‘sliuckle at - this outwitting of their commnist rulers.

(Burkholzer tella us that the United States is stampad ali over the listening post. tunnel. Now, the tunnel is on the outskirts of town with our end being lecated-under a so-called experimantal

‘radar station beside a garbage dum. it runs straight under 4 plowed ;

field that has white. bérder marking posts above it. The Ruasians. have made three openings for the tourists. One is near the wiretap, another at. a point about 150 yards out in the field. When arrrone aske on American why thera isn!t any’radar at the experimental svg atation, the usual answer, according to Burkholzer, is, we said it .

‘was expefimental, didn't we? Want to tale something of 174

WNaturally the army and the. aprerrnent: in Washington aren't going to admit anything unless they have to. No-one tells who ordered ‘the eavesdropping tunnel built or who paid for it. or who did the listening and the digging, Perhaps..it was the work of a Jecal. Berlin outfit, just a curious bunch. of boys ¢ Or perhaps it was done secretly on orders direct. from the. Pentagon or the CENTRAL INIELLIGENCE AGENCY. Anyway, i+ was done well because it. wasn't discovered: for a year and now-the Russians may be wondering. how

. mach we learned from recording all the phone talke, possibly ineludin,

everything. that want through the switchboard of the nearby Soviet airfield. So thanks for the information, Frank. Burkholzer, and now we have a question for you. Why don't wa open a tourist entrance at our end of ths tunnel and cash in. on the publicity? Step up; ene and ali. Only a quarter. See modern espionage in electronic form and all underground, and: who knows? Pies You will meet an . occasional communist tourist."

m...é.

“C'06828875

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NEW YORK.

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' 41 a FIERALD TRIBUNG t - ; - ‘ Soccer aes Low atm a . ee Pa i: ae ! TD. BI R a ae ae 4 , p ¢ eS res “a i: nN Gi , "aR. . ° : ix |. ay | Berlin Reds Flock to See} _ a a a . 2 ° . ; : mn ce e FS “E+ °° 1S Wire-Tay TimaeP| = * po cao | ff SER. BAT iam 8 : ° i. J.S. Wire- Tap Tunnel | : 4 : e . < i i a . a Pee t By-Gaston Coblentz Sandbag Barricade eS a se «2 - . _ - ° ' ByWircless tothe LeraikTribéie) “We bave no fault whatsoever! Pan ge ” 201956. NY, Herald Tribune ine, jbo find with the techniquc,” one) yy Ped Pcl “BERLIN, May 26—One of aticndant said. e & PE a the arpatest elehts of ine eoids! 2rom) the eastern entrance, a - oy the greatest slats of the coklf! 7.0 ee Sm . . wat is-lhe “American spy tun-{Yisitor tan. eles Midd for oe tS : Oe ee ee 4 spare sac¢ (PETRA 190 yards past the point} * ‘ a ‘ 2. As Ne tow Gn exhibition In 8st vicre wid tunnel eronses under! © > ‘ ea ‘The S0d-yard tunnel repre-|'he Sector border. Thena sands)» eg i? og sents a venture of extraordinary ae Biponktact Degen pee a , : _ 7 yee it i nudacity—tho stuff of which German: oer inane” OP as ? —s [thyiliey films are made. If i 3,"2. - c Sie ay = Dork fens dug ay American Inteli|egtiq continue ‘WeNARG PAS :* oe ae 2 Ronee f{orecs—and: that is thet. < ED GRE: . ; + : ciara Gs Hone is the barricade he would emerge. . oie. - oehgral AssuMplon—ie 4S Nicoon at a Jow bet prominent. : 7 £% _ SBOE example, Of thei American building “with rodor.

ms ae (oe ' capacity for daring vnderlakings. sec uinment ‘on the. roof, Tiiei

2 4 ag “5 : Seliiom ‘has -an intelligence fy ilding is eure ee 2 3 i L i orzanization exccuted a mere beep ied aight bathed PgR. of i ISRO cand difficutt operation | re enn ccldlens, See eee ene carmen ee ee i wwe s tbhan that. accomplished by thetmon warn: “Entry most mein]... complex Equipment: —

: Oe ee. an ? ‘tunnel's diggers: the. tapping Oflronadon . eels Beyand the door is.a:-compart-

ica ee . | 269 Communist. Jongedistanice| 4 sindy of the-area-suggestdmene seven fect long housing or : telephone nes yunning under-ing ooccinitiny optor tas equipment t6 maintain: certain,

ce re ; ee a, 80 ‘possibilty other than that

5 pees. : ground hy Berlin, The lines ap- ‘thie radar ‘oullding enclases the levels of temperature and hue

gee tee ot ; parently included some rinsing ‘western end of the:tunnel, |Midity.. ‘The. Communists’ say!

eRe ts r to Soviet satelite stite in Existe|° gy at jthis’ was. necessary to protect;

eee ae + jerR Europe, as well as Soviet} _ Clay Mauled Away {delicate equipment in the other~|

ae cea , ,Atmy circuits in Germany, = {_The-men who dug. thé tunneliwise dagk and.cold tunnel. H Bit, Poi gt” Snack BSE Thrives,” “~~ SSviously Jnbored under two) Finally, there 1g the complex,

Oe ar ae a wet : “major handicaps. They had tojtapping equipment, ali of Amer't-|

er ee & wi The. tunnel, discovered by the-work very silently to ‘avoid-de-ican or British manufactureg

foal piste i Communists A month ano. and,tection,. and they had to -haul/This includes. eight racks of]

: a a ee ‘ow the main: sightseeing nat-“away secretly the thousands offocestcrs to carry the tapped cor-}- ee) ac -traction-in Berlin, cin ba visited tons. of clay they. dug out, since! vargation back to the western| - ob Boas . “by making ‘a twenty-minute Dig pilgs.of earth near the sectoriend of the tunnel and alsa ta|

. oe ae ae _ rive trom ‘the center of Berlin border waild have alerted theélhelp prevent. detection of ’ the tee a tothe southeast corner of the:Communists. = == = taps Ps ae: teen ‘city, } Apparently the excavated. There ave three power-contro} ae ee ee A mabile snack bar is .doing-carth was hauled away in closed lonits near two Jong racks off

a io. thriving. business’ “near theltrcks brought inte the: radarirquipment Into: which the 259

ee iad oo veastern enctof the tunnel, cater={building, Possibly the sameicommunist liner lead from O.. hae a ‘= Mhe to East, German factory|'ucKs bought in: tite. sections ofjchres main cables; Here the in- :- oe Rese 34 jatlekations. brought to. sce theiCorrugated ton tubing whichidividual monitoring taps ares. « she”. “Work ofAmerican imperiausts {ine the: tunnel, The wWimosthnade.: Along thé “opposite wall . Be rE, ae Afier inspecting the tunnel Scercey must have been used tolof the tunnel is-n.zow of benches } ‘ 5 a an « tiie factory workers record their:®¥old -stin Ing. up faca) talk, , with fluarescent lighting. overe ea oe i*indienation™ in’ a.visitors’ book. ts Communists estinate thatihead: “Vhe. compartment is} - os cae ae . [The book contains wie signn={!s part of the work took sev-dpainted o battleship gray. * f° Siete a tures of foreigners on both sidesj°PA) Months, acd] Considered Great Experts | Seta ee~ 22 of the Iron Curtain, Even af Svith the tunncl completed? oo. i endt'of the eastern) - a se Sudanese official ig sted, ~. [there came the Job of instaliney ee Shore in anol sae ee -}= The tuniel, six fect in di-{he monitoring equipment. Ap-(Comporment thove is another coos, * tntne id with:i ; Paréently this had to be done4Steel door.-On the eastern side ae y jometer and with: its rool twelve le ene es ee oe GONG ede ts annemore important iG Pe 7 ee feet below the surface, was dug Berens Tapa toes Bas of i fs ane-niore important item! ‘ eg from a point 200 yards. insides Sols be lapped, hecause Hass Of _an ultras ae ae . [the American sceter of est his equipment had. the grimaty: wnicn: would Taee fone oe “ ee Berlin, It, runs eastward’ to sifisk of preventing detection of:acrivity by the ‘Communists ati oo - rn ar . {point 200 yards Inside the Rus-j*8e Phone taps. The mass of tne noine whore ; po ok ms: ne JU Y ; ne point where-their tines y : 2 Sian. sector. The western en-CIipment war -painstakingly¢aoced any Activity there would cae } [tyance lies In“ sparsely-popu-![rassed through the tunhtljave meant thnd the ¢ Rate: oS : 2 = Fd ‘ ; as alton two ve den . {3 a tee Le fl rb the tunnel haat: ° e ‘ . iy { é 1 lated iscallty called, Rudow. y c te ¥ FOOt . Ta & an ‘Been discovered ‘ eh : : a 2-1 Only the easter end of the/!ioused.in a apecial Dinesyeloot-| The men who did the acty i | ae. = erpo is open ae b-sehsiart A Hong A Gena Ab the eastern tapping must Have been ameng: | aes clachment’ of Communist en . eee - the great experts -in the fela | =. & | Teople's Police-and & communi-| This compartment bertns with’rney ‘did a? secon Sy rey a fyo~\ jeations expert are-on hand told thick steel door at its Western pice at work, ee AYE haat _( -}-:lexplate every detall, They readiiyiB’rance. On the door—one of ne Communtsts say tie 22° | i. 4 | jexpress ‘thelr admiration for the the tunnel’s nicest. touches cto tiation, Sosnrentiy Goo nS a eee J. [BNL of the project's builders,- [Witten tm Russian and Gerdyor several monte hot operated) . l Pe, FO - cree oh pean -ereqparey enone <"°% Iman? “En f ih dchde moaths before “8 Wast , 1 Phen Ne aya try forbidden by order coovered. Thera fs no exploa . - t. 7 aes . e? _ vee £18 Commanding General. oR At how 3 Weis detector. a

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oe eer ae ie ‘vgaid "Barbed wire surrounded ihe! asked. “ : hi ‘Gn ; Hi ; Net Stalion. and its -permancat Fes a3 Thank You

(#eik GI SCHAZL. type buildings. ° ° Owe answer, in halting Ger: Baca T — Watetted by Yanks man, explained that owner. ~ MUTE R= Re Aji American soldiets in’ sentry! ship of the tunnel has moby 1 ey3 : it i. Bist if 'hoxes: watehed us, thru field heen, established, But: that int: ee . Pa 4” elasses” as: we siuntered tol. time of “tonsion,” the right:

ward the clearly’marked- con: ness or wrongness. depended

ist border, down a dirt 0 _ upon :the Side of: the fence Let 3 u 3. Hope ners: aad, bordering an open field: | from which the operation Was

. Tour Eerie Bore around see earth cas » vated to reveal two seclionso BY IOUN: H. THOMPSON.” the tunnel ~lwhich tunnel” visitors were BERLIN, May. 20 a Across the. order, Vonos sacked’ to aad ae ioe i Arecican’ per Poet en today’ tok us fo, their: commander, | 2005, ot on nay Kernan : stéod 20 {cot anderground: ini Past men and women Waiting Britieh’ m 7 Phnmerie oe ang ‘ the alleged “ American spy to tour. the tuntrel after watch. crs . i q gue d a to. 4i Bs _tunnel,” burrowed 300 ards 108 a tommunist movie of its: "> ign

Si and peed, in “elo 2 er Peper, BEN a OP filaom of the American secto talements for propaganda, w Sits the: shoulders -of swe slight. of dirt stairs, into the. arbie. A my Handwriting? ~

tuineh Miunners: § eomunit ary Encased in. steel and eon! a ae te %6 posse the Our host in as ceric a set.| crete was the alleged-wire fap. ‘be Pind enougt to’ sho’ fer - “laboratory,” directly under‘a’ Pe mnough ad ting: asrwas ever devised by a| tunadl. ae prnystery> writer,. wis 2 jack paved road leading from Ber-. 1h ne HS "booted afficer of the. East lin: io the Russian air base at oe ; Z ; ro = t : German communist poliee, the!s Schoenfeld, The, commander; ee ::"Yopos,”. or Volkspotize. vho. declined to.-give his. a a Te 3 : Our tour was the third: pers ‘name, said that: 2i6. telephone jJines.in three big cables were i «

is the a tga aks Me ie sh tapped. “the night of April 21 ‘when "\tlhie Russian high command: F lugrescent: lighting... illue ‘here announced “discovery: of minated 4 a “switchboard, banks ‘the tunnel and equipment it’ of current «boosters, ampli. ; ‘pin ‘Was used for wire . tap| , fiers, and. cables, ALL instruc: ing. * . Since then the * spy tunnel, ons on the: equipment. svere: i so labeled by the Russians and | in English. Some’ items: bore! ’ : Bast Germans, has been: yi the labels of British, or Ameri-| {Med by.wiore than 15,000 East}¢an.manufactureres. * = 4 “Germian worker delegations, | ’ Reds‘Man Gus --” { *the Communists said: < . .) Pamps sent hot ‘and. cold: Germans Admire Peat.. “| water to an air conditioning? Situated in ling with-an ex-| Unit. Other long pipes: held! : perimental American army; ‘ oil or. ‘air. ‘The. funnel Wast - radar station . [the Russians ruade of balted sections nf ¢ore! “say-it is a dummy) owner-|TUgeted stccl, lined on the, . ,- :ship. of -the ‘tunnel has ‘not/ Sides with sandbags, . 4 sbeen officially admitted by|. Walking back 300.yards, we. s , {ihe American command, here|Tesched the east-west bérder.! - “or in Washington, There“behind sandbags “two! VYopos crouched with’

inced ‘the Americans, built teir’ guns-and a powerfol: “thie tunnel, equipfied it with: : searchlight, aimed up the tun-:

2 expensive apparatus, and. then: a under. ‘the American" ‘st Boeck

1 ‘listencd in onRed ‘army, ek Outside “again, ‘the "com

eephone conversations . sincel : the: ‘sunimer. of 1954. vos” | mander. asked us tyhat would! - ;

To them, -it was, an astound Ibe, the’ reaction-in the United

” Songs fest, *vnioh * “has -greatly) States.if the Canadians of Mex: senhanced: ‘American prestige: | ican’. drove “such a. “ spy tunnel" “under. our -borders,

‘The boldness of burrowing. : “*“indor’ the Russian noses, and \¥¢: said ‘the Americans ‘would | bes! ‘unhappy.’ aboutibt. ;

“its “technical accomplishment, “* . ‘have captured the imagination “SIs it right .or wrong for ‘Yef:many Germans. ;. An mona, a de ‘this. under

“No one expected A-sight of: — . a eS jthe tunnel teddy when ‘Wate, ou — a

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APPENDIX D

NOTE: This analysis was prepared by the PBJOINTLY ‘staf? as part of the wrap-up of the operation.

ROUND-UP OF EAST GERMAN PRESS REACTION TO THE. DISCOVERY OF THE. WIRETAP TUNNEL AT THE BERLIN SECTOR BORDER

{Sources as Indicated)

The following is an analysis of the East German press

reaction to the discovery of the wiretap. tunnel at the sector

border between West and East Berlin. During the period under.

review - 24 to 26 April 1956 - a total of. 3] dailies per day- and four weeklies were available for scrutiny; however, only the dailies. reported and commented on the incident.

Mostly concerned with reporting and conmenting on the

sncident were the East Berlin papers which, in some instances,

devoted full pages of. their local sections to reports and pic-

page treatment to the matter only in few instances, generally

refrained fron. large articles or commentaries, and often

carried pictorial material with only brie explanations. The

least coverage: was noted in the provincial press of other

tures on the tunnel in addition to their front-page or second-

page acccunts.of developments, The provincial press. gave front-

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than SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei. Deutschlands -

Communist Party Germany) affiliation; none of these papers

‘published any commentary , or any cartoon of their own, on the subject: up to 26 April; in fact. Describing the tunnel as inspected by. the journalists after the Soviet press conférence, the papers pointed out that the installation was well designed and constructed, that the installation was’ costly and equivalent. to a modern tele- phone exchange, and that. the material - of British and Ameri- can origin ~ used in the installation was of such quality as

to: guarantee long service.

The East Berlin papers, which were leading in the reporta

on the issue, treated thé matter as a "bitterly serious. inci-~ dent” which represents an “international scandal" and a: “breach of the norms of international law." The papers, in their commentaries, addressed. the West Berlin Senat, demand- ing an ali-Berlin understanding and stressing the necessity for uhited action, and insinuated that. Berlin is being kept Givided merely for thé purpose of providing the espionage

centers in West Berlin.with a base for launching provocations

against the GDR. Other commentaries by central and provincial.

papers contained calis for vigilance and for defense: prepared- neas.. Only one paper printed an editorial on. the incident,

In commenting on the incident the press did not draw. a line

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between the different developments, such.as the press confer- ence, the Soviet protest, the GDR Goverment protest, etc.; but, a5 a rule, the commentaries dealt with the incident as @ whole. Later, when the firat reaction of the West Berlin press was available, the central press swooped down upon the .West Berlin press for attempting: to belittle the incident and to divert attention from the “seriousness of the matter." , The few caricatures published by. the papers were designed to slander. the Americans. a Day by. Day. Reaction

24 April 1956 ss ie = , On 24 April 1956 Six East Berlin papers’ printed the ADN

(Allegéemeines Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau - General German

. News Office) release of individual reports on the Soviet press. conference, reported on the inspection of. the tunnel by the journalists, and carried excerpts from General Zarenko's letter of protest (1 = 6). DER MORGEN and BERLINER ZEITUNG (5 and 6). printed only the abbreviated version of the ADN release. Six provincial SED papers (7 - 12) carried announcements of the discovery, brief reports on the press conference, and merely an announcement to the effect that a letter of protest has been sent to the American Chief of Staff. Only NEVER TAG, Frankfurt/OQder, printed the long version of the ADN release (12).

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Provincial. papers of other party affiliations carried no reports.

25_ April 1956

version of the report on the discovery of the tunnel (13 - 34); the: six provincial SED papers which. had carried a brief announce- ment the day before followed-up their reports by more extensive accounts of the press conference, the letter of protest, ea the inspection of. the tunnel. {13 - 18). Papers of other party affiliations joined in the reporting campaign on this day.

Only MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME, ef all provincial papers ; ‘publ ished. an. "eye-witness" report containing a. description of the tunnel and quoting individuals. who had voiced their. “outrage at. such

a thing" which produces. new material for conflicts in foreign’ policy (16)... SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG, which printed the long version of the ADN release, ‘reproduced the first picture of

the tunnel (22).

Meanwhile the central presa, in. addition to supplementary reports. on the discovery of the tunnel, descriptions of the tunnel, and pictorial material showing sections of the tunnel auch as the amplifier station, etc., came out with the first commentaries. A total of five commentaries appeared on: this day. The press treated the matter as a "bitterly serious

‘affair" which represents an "international scandal” and a

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"preach of the norms of international law,” pointing. out that the United States violated the Buenos Aires Treaty on Telecom- munications on the one hand and the GDR's sovereignty on the other hand (35 - 38), NEUES DEUTSCHLAND spoke of 5 new,

. hitherto unsurpassed “gangster geen of the U.S. secret service (35), NATIONAL. ZELTUNG termed the incident: as.a “sensational. international scandal" (36) , NEUE ZEIT stressed that there is tio word "strong enough to brand such wickedness" (38), and JUNGE WELT declared that "this: had to nappen just. to those who aiways babble about Communist infiltration but.can never

- prove it” (39), All commentaries were addressed to the West -

Berlin Senat, demanding an all-Berlin understanding for. the

purpose of discontinuing the “stubborn adherence to NATO policy," achieving the withdrawal of the "cold war. ozhents of all shades," dissolving the espionage centers in the "grontier city," and achieving’a "normalization in the situation in Berlin." Three papers reported On. a meeting held ‘by the National Front at Alt-Glienicke, at which the population adopted a resolution protesting against this "provocation: Franz Fischer, First Secretary of the Kreis Treptow SED Executive Board, was reported, to have said at the meeting that the people of West Germany and West Berlin have to pay for this installation through the occupation costs and to. tiave terned

the tunnel as “an appendix of the.cold war" (38, 40, and 41).

& —S-E CO 8-E-F

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TRIBUENE, tioreover, referred to a report by thé HAMBURGER “ANZEIGER to underscore the fact. that the installations in the tunnel were not of provisiondl ‘nature but designed for long service (40). DER MORGEN:; déeseribing the tunnel, added that: West German correspoiderts who inspected ‘the tunnel ‘noted With satisfaction the declaration of the Soviet ‘Lieuteiant Colonel that “quite obviously ; Géermiin quarters have no part in this” | (41), while NATIONAL ZEITUNG briefly referred to an announce- ment Made at the Alt-Glienicke meeting to the effect that the tunnel was open for public inspection (36).

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reproduced the first caricature on the:

“issue. The cartoon showed a garden which is divided into two parts by a sign indicating the "Democratic Sector" - full of fiowers, and the opposite side - a barren piéce of land with a molehili topped by a4 flag with the dollar sign.’ ‘A strong: arm is. pulling out of a hole in the. Democratic Sector a nole wearing "U.S,"—marked earphones; some sort ' ‘of Army trousers with plugs: and plters. showing from. the pocket, and a U.S, Army cap bearing the. legend. "Eapionage."! The cartoon is captioned, "Do Not Burrow in Other People's Yards" (35).. 26 April 1956

On 26 April. 27 papers cotitinued reporting on the issue (42 - 68). In 17 instances the reports were supplenénted with pictures as outlined above... A total of 15 papers

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printed the text of, or large excerpts from, the press release

‘on the GDR Goverument protest (42 - 56). Six papers reported

on the inspection of the tunnel by the population, the press,

and representatives of the diplomatic corps (42, 49, 59, 60,

‘65, and 67). Four papers referred to a report. carried. by. the

West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL according to which Western journalists

were prohibited from inspecting the mouth of the. tunnel on the

Western side (42, 43, 51, and 58), and four papers referred

to FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE which had spoken of an "eloquent silerice” about the affair on the part of the Americans (42, 51, 55, and 58). A total of four papers. reported on the Alt~ Glienicke meeting (51, 60, 61, and 67). NEUES DEUTSCHLAND gave excerpts from Fisher's speech, quoting him to the. effect that the people of West. Berlin, in particular the SPD members, will be invited to inspect the tunnel (51). Three papers re-

produced caricatures (51, 52, and 56), six papers carried ,

commentaries. (51, 52, 53, 54, 57, and 58), and one paper cane

out with an editorial (55). Three East Berlin papers, through

their commentaries, Swooped down upon the West Berlin press

for its. attitude toward the incident. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND

accused, the West Berlin papers of attempting to belittle the incident and of lauding ‘the ‘efficiency of the American "goblins," adding that the West Berlin press is thus making vain attempts

+o divert attention from the seriousness of the matter (51).

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JUNGE WELT Yashed out at the West Berlin DER TAG, saying that,

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by its opinion, the west Berlin paper manifests its total loss Of any senge of decency. Besides, DER TAG is not in the. teast disturbed about the violation also of West periin's territory (52).. NATIONAL ZEITUNG hela that DER TAG .now admitted what it has been deny ing at all times, namely that West Berlin is a de facto part of ‘NATO, adding that ‘DER TAG now regards as "eustomary’” the military. ¢ espionage (of. the United States on GDR. territory in “addition to. the "customary f*ontier-—city policy," ‘the “customary” partition, ‘and’ the ‘customary’ diversionist activities of the KGU and other underworld i

organizations. The paper ntronaad that’ all Berliners fully

agree with the ¥RANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE which ‘said. that the people must demand the discontinuation of "such things" (38). NEUE ZEIT, carrying the only editorial, said that the wire- tapping post is a feature of West Berlin's misuse as a NATO: base. The paper emphasized that GDR policy. will continue to serve a1l-German understanding and relaxation of international tensions. "But it mist be kept in mind that the success of this policy will not only depend on the volume of the: appeal : for peace but also on our ‘preparedness to defend our homeland as well as on our vigilance regarding ‘the prevention of dan- gers resulting from the fact that one ‘part of. Berlin has be-.

come a frontier city against ‘peace,’ the paper added. What

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we need are contact points above the ground and in full Light, nanely all-German talks, and not underground trenches in the cold war" (55).

The first commentaries carried by provincial papers dealt with the incident as an example of proof for East. German press reports on hostile espionage. VOLKSSTIMME, .Kari-Marx-Stadt, pointed out that the tnnel Yepresents "a document” which is, quite apt to dispel all doubts of those who have hitherto

been inclined to regard East German press reports: about the

j underground activities of Western espionage services. a8

“exaggerated” (57). MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME quoted several workers who voiced their indignation over "such a. vileness! which makes German unity more difficult to demonstrate that. the "Western side" is just as quiet about. this “unpleasant affair" as the population is Gutraged. (53). And LEIPZIGER YOLKSZBITUNG stressed that anyone reading about the. discovery of the tunnel will inevitably weigh the Soviet attempts at.

maintaining peace against the efforts made by the U.S. espio-

nage service, adding that this “breach of international law"

‘also places the West Berlin administration "in a peculiar

light.” The paper reminded its readers that war preparation,

which ‘formerly marched on Prussian. Army boots," is now

marching on "Américan rubber soles, chewing gun, and tapping telephone lines" @4).

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‘NEUES DEUTSCHLAND's caricature showed an American soldier try~-

<, owleey wo enele Seeding! Saree wn

ing in vain to "milk" a disconnected, oversized telephone. re- ceiver into. a bucket marked "crc" while another ‘soldier is : thoughtfully standing by (51). JUNGE WELT reproduced a car-. | toon showing a mole wearing a U.S. Army cap on its head and a telephone receiver on its back halting before a Sign which warns that "spies axe now facing danger." The cartoon is, captioned, ‘The Underworld that Shuns the ean cal tenes. noted, “Damned, we ‘did hot put up that sign" (52). FRELES WORT showed rats. wearing U.S. Army caps being disturbed by

PO Teeny ent eet i

@ Russian soldier in the operation of what looks like 2

communication center. ‘wo rats are shown facing the soldier in strprise, another standing with arms ‘raised, and: still another escaping through an opening in the walk. The

cpr aeeruee is. entitled, "Unpleasant Surprise," and footnoted, “It is an Effrontery of the Russians to Disturb Us ‘in Our ‘Gurrowing) Work" (56).

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see _ SOURCES: L9G: 1. NEVES DEUTSCHLAND 24 Apr 2. NEVE ZEIT 2? 24 Apr 3. TRIBUENE ; 24 Apr . 4, NATIONAL ZEITUNG a? 24 Apr 5. “DER MORGEN 24 Apr 6. BERLINER ZEITUNG . 24. Apr. %. FREIHEIT 24 Apr 8. SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG 24 Apr 9. VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt. 24 Apr . 10. MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME 24.-Apr : 11, LEIPZIGER ‘YVOLKSZEITUNG : 24: Apr 12... -NEUER TAG 24 Apr 13. ‘FREIHEIT zo Apr 14. SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG 25 Apr 15, VOLKSSTIMNE, Karl-Marx-Stadt 25 Apr 16, MSERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME 29 Apr 17... LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG 25 Apr 18. NEVER TAG | 29 Apr ‘49. LAUSITZER RUNDSCHAD: —— 25 Apr 20. VOLKSSTIMME, Magdeburg 25 Apr 21. DAS. VOLK,. Erfurt 25 Apr 22. SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG 25 Apr 23. FREIE ERDE. 25 Apr 24. OSTSEE ZEITUNG 25 Apr 25. VOLKSWACHT 25 Apr 26. FREIES WORT eS 25. Apr 27. SAECHSICHES TAGEBLATT . 25 Apr 28. DIE UNION 25 Apr 29. NORDDEUTSCHE NEUESTE NACHRICHTEN 25 Apr 30. MAERKISCHE. UNION 25 Apr 31. BRANDENBURGISCHE NEUVESTE NABBR , 25. Apr 32. BAUERN ECHO 25. Apr 33. DER NEUE WEG. 25 Apr 34. LIBERAL DEMOKRATI SCHE ZEITUNG 25. Apr 35. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND : 25: Apr 36. ‘NATIONAL ZEITUNG 25 Apr 37. BERLENER ZEITUNG 25 ‘Apr 38, NEUE ZEIT | 25 Apr: 39. JUNGE WELT : 25 Apr 40, . TRIBUENE 25. Apr 41, DER MORGEN ; 25 Apr 13

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