A FORGOTTEN KINGDOM
The Spanish Frontier in Colorado and New Mexico
1540-1821

By
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Bureau of Land Management
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Denver, Colorado
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John L. Kessell. *Kiva, Cross, and Crown*

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This work is dedicated to the memories of
John Francis Bannon, S.J.
and
France V. Scholes
FOREWORD

This volume represents a bridge between Colorado’s pre-historic past and the time of Anglo-American settlement in our state. Few people realize that hundreds of years before the discovery of gold in Colorado during 1859, a highly developed civilization had explored and settled the area now known as New Mexico and Colorado. Spanish conquistadores roamed the plains in the mid-1500s. They came here permanently in 1598 and founded the second oldest city in North America. This long cultural heritage was overshadowed when Colorado [and New Mexico] became part of the United States during the mid-1800s.

I am pleased to present a new volume in our Cultural Resources Series that is somewhat unique. It is neither prehistory nor pure western history. It reveals an aspect of our past that is sometimes overlooked and forgotten. I hope that both the professional community and general public will enjoy this work.

Tom Walker
Acting State Director
Colorado
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many contributed to the publication of this volume. John F. Bannon S.J. and France V. Scholes, both now deceased, supported this research from the earliest stages. Professor Joe B. Frantz, directed my dissertation from which this document is derived. These three men were vital in assuring that my work was properly researched and they all provided important criticism. I thank them for their time and efforts.

Also significant in this project was the help of Dr. Myra Ellen Jenkins, former director of the State Archives of New Mexico. She and her staff made the use of New Mexico's records much easier and assisted in researching this project. Dr. Eleanor B. Adams, of the University of New Mexico, was also an important contributor. She provided advice and she guided this author to little known resources.

Gary McVicker, Colorado State Office, Bureau of Land Management, suggested that this manuscript could be used to fill a gap between our pre-history and “Anglo” history. This idea was excellent because it provides ethnic balance in the Bureau of Land Management's series of cultural resource overviews. Dave Strunk, also of the Colorado State Office, helped greatly by allowing me time to rewrite and prepare this volume.

Any errors of fact or omission are strictly mine. I hope this historical narrative will be of value to both the general public and to professional readers.

Frederic J. Athearn
Denver, Colorado
October, 1989
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The Northern Frontier
Chapter I
New Mexico, 1536-1680

New Mexico was, from the first, a land of disappointment. Spaniards came to this hostile and barren terrain in the hope that the phenomenon of the Aztecs could be repeated. The stories and legends coming from the area to the north fired the imaginations of the crown. However, Spain was not to find another Mexico in the northern reaches. Rather she would discover death, starvation, rebellion, and finally entrapment in a place she soon had no desire to be.

Legends regarding riches were in large part responsible for Spanish interest. Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca returned in the 1530s to Mexico City, so recently looted by Spain, with rumors of riches northward. He had not seen these places but he had heard from “reliable natives” that there were cities of great wealth to the north and west. He also reported that “cows” with shaggy hair were on the plains. These were, of course, buffalo.

There was truth in Cabeza’s stories. The explorer claimed that he had vaguely heard of Seven Cities of Gold where citizens dined on solid gold platters, the streets were paved in gold and the lowliest resident was covered with riches. There were equally persistent rumors of a civilization far to the south. This was, of course, the Inca civilization, which fellow Spaniards were in the process of looting by the middle 1530s. 

If Cabeza de Vaca stirred the interest of officials at Mexico City, the exploits of Fray Marcos de Niza were even more thrilling. While Cabeza de Vaca was interesting to Viceroy Mendoza, more information was needed. In 1537 the Bishop of Mexico, Juan de Zumarraga, brought to the viceroy’s attention a priest named Marcos de Niza. Fray Marcos was an experienced traveller in “America” and, based on his knowledge, he was permitted to go. In 1538 he was given orders by the viceroy to move north and find out what was there. For this trip the Moorish slave, Estevan, was borrowed from Dorantes, a companion of Cabeza de Vaca’s. It was not until 1539 that Marcos and his little group moved from Culiacan. Near the River Mayo, Estevan decided he wanted to go on faster than the rest of the group. Fray Marcos never heard from El Moro again. Indian tales later indicated that Estevan, a black, so fascinated Indian women that he was killed by jealous native men. Fray Marcos pushed on. He marched up the Sonora Valley into southern Arizona and then into the area of what was called “Cibola.”

Marcos had, by now, heard of Estevan’s demise. Undaunted, he pushed on to “Cibola.” He described the place only from a distance. However, he stated that it was larger than Mexico City and that it was “shimmering”. He said the houses were of stone, with terraces and flat roofs. He also noted that he was told that Cibola was the smallest of the seven cities. Marcos returned to Mexico City and filed his report. It was Marcos’ stories that caused Viceroy Mendoza to agree to a full scale expedition.

Marcos got to Arizona. This can be told from his geographic descriptions, but what he saw is another matter. Most likely, Fray Marcos did see the pueblos of Zuni from a distance. They were in no way cities of gold but, in the shimmering summer heat they may have appeared so.

The Spanish government was interested in the potential of what was then generally called ‘the north’ [el norte]. After the successes of Mexico and Peru, Spain felt that northern New Spain was ready to be added to the empire. On the basis of both Marcos de Niza’s and Cabeza de Vaca’s reports, Mendoza organized a major expedition into the northern lands. For one of the only times the crown, upon Mendoza’s strong urging, gave limited aid to an expedition.

The Coronado excursion of 1540-1542 was the first officially authorized attempt to conquer the north. This enterprise consisted of Francisco Vasquez de Coronado, Governor of Nueva Galicia, 230 Spanish soldiers and 800 Indians who flanked them. Three women also went along. Coordinated with this overland expedition, Hernando de Alarcon proceeded by sea, up the coast of Mexico, to the mouth of the Colorado River where his fleet was supposed to rendezvous with Coronado. This meeting never took place.
Coronado marched north and ultimately into the Rio Grande valley where he found pueblos of relatively high civilization. He found Indians who could weave, were potters and farmers, and who had a well-organized government and religious system. However, there was no silver or gold, nor were there seven golden cities. Coronado and his men suffered through a very rough winter of 1540–1541 and, in doing so, demanded so much of the pueblos that they rebelled.

Winter was unbearable as the natives harassed the Spanish, while the elements did their best to finish off the expedition. The spring of 1541 found Coronado on his way across the plains of Colorado seeking Quivira. Led by a native called El Turco [the Turk], the Spanish tramped across southeastern Colorado into Kansas where there were no cities, only groups of buffalo hide houses. The Turk, having confessed that he had lied, was strangled by angry expedition members.

By the fall of 1541 the expedition was back in the Rio Grande area where they survived yet another winter. An accident caused Coronado to become seriously ill, and forced the group back to New Spain, where no doubt they were glad to be. Thus ended the first major effort to conquer New Mexico. The Spanish found that there was nothing of value in the land and the fact that they had covered an area from Arizona to Kansas confirmed this. But the desire for settlement was not ended.

The Coronado expedition answered one thing. There was no gold nor were there any major cities or civilizations in the north. Spain lost interest in a barren land of mud houses. Other expeditions were attempted in North America. Prior to the New Mexican expedition, Ponce de Leon attempted to settle Florida while Hernando de Soto explored the lower Mississippi. On the Pacific coast, explorers like Cabrillo, Ferrelo and others ranged up to and beyond the Monterey Bay area and then had quit. By 1543, Spain had seen enough of northern New Spain to leave it alone. 3

In 1581 the Rodriguez-Chamuscado expedition worked its way into New Mexico and found nothing. A year later, 1582, another expedition set out for New Mexico. Antonio de Espejo and Bernaldino Beltran organized a party to explore the north and to try and make contact with missionaries who had remained from the expedition of 1581. The Espejo-Beltran expedition went north into Rio Grande valley and then onto Zuñi and into the Hopi lands. They returned to Zuñi from which point Espejo went to Pecos and then on to New Spain. Reports were filed and information that the expedition had gained stirred some interest at Mexico City.

Earlier stories were still prevalent and the tales of mines from the Espejo-Beltran expedition aroused the imagination of younger men, those who had forgotten about Coronado's eye-opening excursion into the region.

By the late 1500s, the Spanish government was under considerable pressure from the Church. Since there were large numbers of sedentary Indians in the Rio Grande valley, many church officials wondered why they were not being Christianized. The Franciscan order caused the government to give New Mexico a second look.

There were also rumors of mines and wealth in New Mexico. Espejo and Beltran, came back with information which still had great credence in official circles. The missions and possible mines were the strongest reasons, but Sir Francis Drake's California exploits were also in officials' minds.

In April of 1583 a cedula real ordered the viceroy to take steps to settle the lands in the north. A long line of applicants quickly formed but none of these men seemed to have either the wealth or the personality suited to such a massive undertaking. Years of official indecision prompted several expeditions to go out on their own.

In 1589 Gaspar Castaño de Sosa took about 170 men, women, and children north, but the group was arrested in New Mexico and returned to Mexico. In 1593 Francisco Leyva de Bonilla and Antonio Gutierrez de Humana led a group into the plains of Kansas where they perished at the hands of each other and the natives. It was not until 1595 that someone was chosen to lead the proposed expedition north. Juan de Oñate, the son of a wealthy silver miner from Zacatecas was appointed. The expedition was to be financed by Oñate himself, and he agreed to recruit at least 200 men, to be fully equipped and to be paid by him. He also said that he would take 1,000 head of cattle, 2,000 sheep, 1,000 goats, 100 head of black cattle, 150 colts, 150 mares and quantities of flour, corn, jerked beef and sowing wheat along with other supplies. This too would be paid for by Oñate. The crown would support five Franciscan
friars, a lay brother, and would furnish several pieces of artillery and would provide a six-year loan of 6,000 pesos. Also, the crown would grant Oñate the title of Governor, Captain-General and, once in the area, adelantado, which gave him power to grant encomienda rights. In this way he rewarded faithful servants. 4

In one of few such cases of exploration in the New World, Oñate was to be directly responsible to the Council of the Indies rather than the viceroy. Despite his appointment in 1595 it was not until 1598 that the expedition got under way. At the time, Oñate technically had not fulfilled his end of the bargain. He had only 129 soldiers, but, he also had 7,000 head of stock. The Church seeing a great opportunity sent forth eleven Franciscans; eight priests, and three lay brothers. In July of 1598 Oñate's group reached the ford of the Rio Grande at El Paso del Norte where they stopped. The little party rested a few days and then pushed on across the dreaded Jornada del Muerto to the village of Caypa, which Oñate renamed San Juan de los Caballeros. Later San Gabriel became his headquarters. It was not until 1610 that a Spanish capital was finally founded. 5

Oñate was generally successful in his entrada into New Mexico. He suffered setbacks including Indian revolts, mutiny among the soldiers and a lack of food, but in the end a colony was established. The colonists who came with him were not prepared for the hardships they suffered and, because of the constant agitation in the settlements, Oñate was soon in trouble.

His accusers spread rumors of incompetence. Oñate did what he could to counter the charges. However, New Mexico was in turmoil. As soon as the news reached New Spain that there was trouble in the settlement, potential settlers changed their minds. Oñate, suffered constant political pressure in New Mexico. He attempted to clear his name by organizing an expedition to “find the south sea.” Oñate hoped that by finding a route to the Pacific he could regain his fortune and prestige.

In 1604 he set out with thirty men and marched to the mouth of the Colorado River and the Gulf of California where nothing but primitive natives were found. Oñate returned as desperate as he had left.

By 1606 the fate of New Mexico hung in the balance. The Council of the Indies tried to save the province. Oñate was recalled and a new governor was appointed. Hopefully the new man would be more interested in christianization programs. Only the friars were allowed to make further explorations and the number of soldiers would be reduced in order to cut expenses. In 1607 Oñate resigned his post, having lost more than 400,000 pesos in his venture. 6

For the first time Spain actually tried to settle New Mexico. In the quest, the Spanish government was able to spend a minimum while letting Oñate lose a fortune. It is true that Spain did support the colony, but that was quite limited. The settlement of the province was hardly an unqualified success since many of the colonists who came expected far more than either the government or the land could give. New Mexico was a bad investment on the part of the Spanish, even if it was at little risk and Mexico City soon knew it. The new settlers had to be protected from ever-increasingly hostile natives, while the Church insisted that recent Indian converts could not be abandoned. The Church was a major factor in keeping Spain in the new colony, but so too were the pitiful few settlers. Soldiers who had come to New Mexico were trapped too. They were given land as colonists and for the first time, some of these people became encomenderos, a prestigious step up in Spanish social hierarchy. To own land, especially an encomienda, was to reach the pinnacle of Spanish society. No longer were they commoners, but now they could claim to be hijos de algo, hidalgos; “sons of someone.” New Mexico’s land became the lure that kept settlers there.

To replace Oñate, the viceroy appointed Pedro de Peralta governor. Peralta was told that San Gabriel, the capital, was too far removed from the centers of population so in 1610 he founded Villa Nueva de Santa Fe. This was the first Spanish settlement in New Mexico and it became the focus of most activity during the seventeenth century. In founding Santa Fe, Spain signified that she intended to stay in New Mexico for good.

Prior to this time, the settlers and soldiers lived off the natives; eating their food, using their clothing, and dwelling in, or beside, their villages. Santa Fe was established as the first purely Spanish settlement. A governmental center was set up and a province was born.

New Mexico was slow to develop. There was little real progress in the peopling of the province during this period. By the 1630s, Santa Fe had a population of 250 Europeans. By the end of the century overall numbers
of Spaniards increased to several thousand. While the Spanish engaged in cattle and sheep raising, along with subsistence agriculture, the Church was far busier. The Franciscans had placed in the field twelve missionaries who served 50,000 Indians. 7

The Spanish in New Mexico were unable to make the colony prosper as expected. Any trade that New Mexico enjoyed was with Parral [Mexico] and was mainly in sheep, wool, and salt. Such weak trade was further complicated by the system of caravans that ran between Santa Fe and Chihuahua City. The Franciscans operated this trade up to mid-century and were the ones who decided what would be shipped to and from New Mexico. This was a major point of friction between Church officials and the government. 8

Church-State struggle was continual up to the Revolt of 1680. The tensions that built gave the natives an excellent opportunity to arise. The pueblos, seeing internal Spanish battles, along with continual poverty which caused incessant demands on the natives, suggested to the Pueblo people that there was a good chance of getting rid of their unwanted guests. Divisions among the Spanish were deep enough that the natives could plan a revolt with relative safety. The Spanish, on the other hand, numbering some 2,800 in 1680, felt themselves rather secure.

It is commonly known that one of the key causes for the Revolt of 1680 was the repression of native religion. The friars saw these manifestations as signs of paganism, while the government rarely worried about heathenism. The Franciscans were frequently enraged by the lack of cooperation of officials which only caused more friction. Meanwhile, Pueblo medicine men, who lost their dominant position, worked secretly to regain influence. This continual clash of two vastly different cultures was bound to produce war. 9

The New Mexican government had rumors of a possible uprising as early as 1675. A raid of the northern pueblos captured forty-seven hechiceros (medicine men) who were accused of plotting to get rid of the Spanish. However, Pope, from San Juan pueblo, escaped. He became the primary leader of rebellion. After the San Juan raid, where he agitated, Pope removed himself to Taos, a center of consistent resistance, where he plotted the expulsion of the Spanish.

Finally, in 1680 the fury burst upon New Mexico. On August 9, 1680 a chief from La Cienega sent word to maestre de campo Francisco Gomez Robledo that there would be a revolt throughout the province. Gomez ordered the arrest of two chieftains, Catua and Omtua, suspecting that they were deeply involved. Word of the arrests spread throughout the pueblos and on August 10th, Pope raised the banner of rebellion.

Indians struck from all directions. At Taos two friars were slaughtered in their church and articles of the Catholic faith were burned. The revolt moved south spreading death and destruction everywhere. Four hundred Spaniards lost their lives in the initial uprising. Survivors fled to Santa Fe hoping to find shelter in the capital. Indians surrounded the city and by August 15th all that remained of the glorious conquest of 1598 was the besieged town of Santa Fe.

Governor Antonio Otermin faced two courses of action. He could surrender or he could fight the thousands of Indians around him. The Indians cut off Santa Fe, first by breaking the water supply and then by preventing all food shipments into the town. As the Spaniards huddled in Santa Fe they suffered horribly under the brilliant August sun.

On August 20th the Spanish ventured forth in an attempt to escape. Luck was with them. The Indians were caught off guard, and the beleaguered people of Santa Fe were able to make good their escape. Thus began the long march south to the tiny village of El Paso del Norte. New Mexico was abandoned to the Indians. 10

The natives gloried in their success. Their hatred of the Spanish caused every vestige of the foreign culture to be stamped out. Houses of settlers were looted and burned, horses and cattle were confiscated. Mission churches were sacked and then burned to the ground. At Isleta the charred remains of the chapel were turned into a corral. The official archives at Santa Fe were burned. Indians who had taken Christian Indian wives were expelled, and the names of God and the Holy Virgin were not mentioned.

The pueblos returned to their own culture. New estufas (underground meeting chambers) were built and "pagan" ceremonies openly resumed. However, the natives, not noted for their cooperation, soon quarreled over the spoils of war. The pueblos of Zia, Santa Ana, San Felipe, Cochiti, and Santo Domingo, along with Jemez, Taos and Pecos were reported to be at war with the Tewas and Picuries, according to Governor Domingo de Cruzate in 1689.
The Pueblos were at each others' throats within a matter of months. Realizing the situation, the Spanish thought it might be possible to recover their lost province. Early after the revolt, Governor Antonio Otermin organized an expedition to retake New Mexico. Once he had settled the refugees at El Paso and after he reported the loss to Mexico City, he prepared to recover the land.

In El Paso many settlers were opposed to any plans for reconquest. They suggested that the place should be abandoned and all those driven from their homes be permitted to return to New Spain. Otermin eventually prevailed in his plan for revenge. He was able to raise only 146 of his own men and 112 Indian allies for the counterattack.

As he moved north up the Rio Grande valley he found abandoned pueblos until he reached Isleta. There he discovered 1,500 Indians who received the Spaniards, asked their pardon, and gave them food. Here Otermin split his forces. He left for Sandia, while Juan Dominguez de Mendoza went farther north. Dominguez, reached the Taos area where he found the Indians unwilling to submit, as he reported to the junta de guerra. Otermin, realizing that he could not take the pueblos by force, returned to El Paso in 1681 to await reinforcements. 

Otermin was replaced in 1683 by General Domingo Jironza Petriz de Cruzate, who strengthened the presidio at El Paso del Norte. Cruzate got little help from Mexico City, for rumors of French intrusions into Texas (the ill-fated La Salle Expedition of 1685) caused the viceroy to turn his attentions thither and not toward New Mexico.

Cruzate was temporarily replaced by Pedro Reneros de Posada in 1686, but returned to El Paso as governor of New Mexico in 1688. From that city he led an expedition against Zia where he engaged the natives of that pueblo and killed an unspecified number of them. However, he had insufficient manpower and, without reinforcements, he had to fall back to El Paso once again.

Cruzate's career was ended on June 18, 1688 when Diego de Vargas Zapata y Lujan Ponce de Leon was appointed governor of New Mexico. He held this position for two years before he was allowed to plan for a reconquest. In 1690 he gained the right to organize an expedition into New Mexico for the sole purpose of reconquering the province.
NOTES

1 See: Fanny Bandelier, The Journey of Cabeza de Vaca from Florida to the Pacific. 1528-1536 (New York, 1922) and Frederick W. Hodge, The Narrative of Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca, in Hodge and T. H. Lewis, Spanish Explorers in the Southern United States, 1528-1543. (New York, 1907).

2 Carl 0. Sauer, Road to Cibola (Berkeley, 1932), and Lansing Bloom, “Who Discovered New Mexico?,” New Mexico Historical Review, XV (April, 1940), 101-132. Also see: George J. Undreiner, “Fray Marcos de Niza and His Journey to Cibola,” The Americas III (April, 1947), 416-486. For a personal account see: “Fray Marcos de Niza’s Relation,” New Mexico Historical Review, I (April, 1926), 193-223.

3 For brief descriptions of these various expeditions see: John F. Bannon, The Spanish Borderlands Frontier, 1513-1821 (New York, 1970). The Coronado expedition is described in: George Winship, The Journey Of Coronado, 1542-1544 (New York, 1904); George Hammond and Agapito Rey, Narratives of the Coronado Expedition (Albuquerque, 1940); Herbert E. Bolton, Coronado, Knight of Pueblos and Plains (New York, 1949); A. Grove Day, Coronado’s Quest (Berkeley, 1940); Frederic J. Atearn, Land of Contrast: A History of Southeast Colorado, (Denver, 1985) and James and Dolores Gunnerson, Ethnohistory of the High Plains, (Denver, 1988).

4 See: George P. Hammond, Don Juan de Oñate, Colonizer of New Mexico, 1595-1628 (Albuquerque, 1953). 2 vols.


6 For descriptions of the Oñate expedition, see: George P. Hammond, Don Juan de Oñate and the Founding of New Mexico (Santa Fe, 1927) and Don Juan de Oñate, Colonizer of New Mexico.

7 See: Gaspar Perez de Villagrás, History of New Mexico, trans. and ed. by Gilberto Espinosa (Los Angeles, 1933).

8 See: France V. Scholes, “The Supply System of the Early New Mexico Missions,” New Mexico Historical Review, V (January, April and October, 1930),


Chapter II

The Reconquest of New Mexico, 1693-1704

From 1680 until an actual reconquest was organized, the Spanish government attempted several expeditions into New Mexico. It was a matter of a collection of unchristianized natives removing a highly cultured and ancient civilization from the province.

However despite a desire to return on the part of the government many settlers who huddled in El Paso del Norte were not interested in going back. From 1680 until Diego de Vargas actually retook New Mexico there was constant friction between the government and its settlers. Ambitious governors looked to go back to Santa Fe while the settlers looked south for safety. More than once a governor tried to recruit refugees for an expedition north. There were few volunteers. Instead, the government depended on Indian allies and professional soldiers. The government was unable to force settlers to move, and even with promises of safety, these people, having survived one rebellion, were not about to try again.

Officials, both at Mexico City and at El Paso, worked on plans to retake New Mexico. It was clear that while the settlers might not be willing to return, the government would do so at nearly any cost. Therefore, the Franciscans put a great deal of pressure on the Spanish crown to help in the reconquest of New Mexico so that many thousands of natives could be saved for Christianity. While it seemed as if Christianity was universally rejected in New Mexico, there were still a few Indians, like several hundred at Isleta, who believed in the Catholic faith. These souls were enough to encourage the missionaries that New Mexico was not lost.

The Spanish government also had its reasons for returning. Reports coming from the north indicated that the Indians had split into factions. As early as 1683, exploratory expeditions went as far north as Isleta and found the natives contrite. However, it was the northern sector of the province that was the most troublesome. The western, eastern, and northern pueblos were still warlike.

Nonetheless, the fact that the southern pueblos were pacific caused the government at El Paso del Norte to report that reconquest might be possible given enough support. The viceroy was unwilling to spend much in taking the province by force. Due to constant reports from El Paso indicating there would be no problem in reconquest, he permitted various governors to organize their own expeditions. This is one of the major reasons it took over ten years to recover New Mexico.

If the Spanish ever needed a hero, the reconquest was the reason. It was no accident that one of the most qualified men available was chosen to lead an expedition north to remove the natives and to restore Spanish government in New Mexico. After years of quarreling over who would go, Mexico City finally chose Diego de Vargas Zapata y Lujan Ponce de Leon as governor in 1688. A man of noble lineage, with nearly twenty years experience in New Spain including numerous government posts in northern Mexico, Vargas was perfect.

It was not until 1690 that Vargas was confirmed and the governor began to plan his reconquest of New Mexico. Don Diego made it clear that he was prepared to spend much of his sizeable personal fortune in this venture, but he could not raise volunteers. It took two years and recruiting far south in New Spain before the Vargas expedition was ready to leave El Paso.

On July 13, 1692 Vargas was notified that the Junta General de Hacienda had approved his plans and in August of that year, having rallied a sufficient force, he set out toward New Mexico. On August 16th, Vargas, along with forty soldiers, ten residents of El Paso, fifty Indian allies, three Franciscans and two ox carts of food crossed the Rio Grande headed north. He camped along that river waiting for fifty men from Parral who were to reinforce him. The Parral soldiers had not arrived by August 19th, so impatient, he left for Isleta, about four leagues from El Paso, placing Lieutenant Governor Luis Granillo in charge at El Paso. Juan Paez Hurtado, whom Vargas had chosen as his personal secretary,
was given the task of taking the Parral volunteers directly to Santo Domingo, thirty miles north of present-day Albuquerque.

By August 21st Vargas was ready to leave Ysleta with his little group. They joined forces with Roque Madrid at Robledo, twenty leagues north of Ysleta, where they decided to divide the company due to a projected water shortage between Robledo and Fray Cristobal, some thirty-six leagues distant. The army arrived at Fray Cristobal six days later, having crossed the Jornada del Muerto without incident. They then marched on to the estancia ruins of Juan de Valencia. From there they moved on to Mejia arriving on September 9th. The little force set out for Santa Fe on the next day. They reached Santo Domingo only to find it abandoned by the inhabitants who heard the Spanish were coming. At this point, Vargas linked up with Juan Paez Hurtado, who had come up river with the Parral volunteers faster than Vargas. From this pueblo, Vargas proceeded cautiously toward Santa Fe where he was expected.

Upon arriving at the former Spanish capital, Vargas attempted peace negotiations with the defenders of the city. Receiving no answer to his peace bid, he was forced to resort to force. By September 12th a battle was the only clear solution. Vargas dispersed his men and placed his artillery where it could breach the walls. Domingo, a native leader, who came out to parley with Vargas, was told if he did not submit, the water supply would be cut off. This was no idle threat, for the Indians did the same to the Spanish in 1680. The natives quickly sued for peace.

The next day Vargas made his entry. Accompanied by Juan Paez Hurtado, Roque Madrid, the three Franciscans, and ten El Paso residents, he formally occupied the city with raised swords and he elevated the royal standard three times.

From Santa Fe, Vargas went forth to conquer other rebel pueblos. Marching north he took Tesuque, Galisteo, Pecos, Cuyamungue, Nambe, Pojoaque, Jacona, San Ildefonso, Santa Clara, San Juan, San Lazaro, and San Cristobal. At each pueblo he reaffirmed Spain's claims to New Mexico. Vargas' biggest problem was Taos, where the revolt began. Using Indian allies he managed to reduce this pueblo by early October, 1692. He returned to Santa Fe believing that the northern pueblos were pacified. He then went west and took Acoma and Zuñi, two of the hardest pueblos to capture. It took several weeks of struggle before Acoma was retaken, while Zuñi was captured without bloodshed. With the whole of New Mexico now ostensibly under Spanish control, Vargas prepared to return to El Paso del Norte which he re-entered in late December, 1692.

In a period of five months Vargas, seemingly, had recovered the whole of New Mexico. He reduced the Indians, and prepared them for their return to Christian practices. He had formally reclaimed New Mexico for the Spanish empire, without costing the King a single peso. Seventy-four Spanish captives held by the natives were released and 2,214 Indians were baptised by the Franciscans who travelled with the expedition. The stage was now set for phase two of Vargas' plan: the recolonization of New Mexico.

After the Revolt of 1680, Spain had a chance to wash her hands of the whole New Mexican venture, yet she refused to do so, for reasons of conscience. Spain's commitment, ending in 1680, was resumed in 1692. El Paso del Norte was the primary settlement for the refugees of 1680. A census, conducted from December 22, 1692 through January 2, 1693 showed that the town had 382 inhabitants contained in fifty households. At San Lorenzo, two leagues from El Paso, another 266 persons resided while at Ysleta, four leagues south of the city, 118 residents lived. At Senecu, three leagues from El Paso another 130 residents were counted. Altogether the El Paso area had about 1,000 persons in early 1693.

Upon arriving in El Paso del Norte, Vargas found living conditions for the citizens less than comfortable. Most lived on a miserable economic level; many more were without basic needs. They lacked sufficient clothing and adequate transportation. In addition, articles of furniture and cooking utensils were sorely needed.

To resettle New Mexico, Vargas saw that it would take the full cooperation of the refugees at El Paso as well as more money than was granted by Mexico City for the project. The crown had provided a measely 12,000 pesos to move the colonists north. Vargas stated that livestock, grain, seeds, wagons, mules, horses, plus household goods were needed to make the expedition a success. He requested forty more missionaries to insure that the pueblos would be adequately served.
The governor, a thorough man, spent most of 1693 traveling throughout Nueva Vizcaya and Nueva Galicia recruiting men and buying horses. By the summer he proudly reported that he could count on forty-two soldiers plus 200 horses, along with supplies. A request for 300 arquebuses from the government was also granted.  

By July of 1693 he had sixty-two volunteer families, from as far away as Mexico City, ready to make the journey into New Mexico. Since not all residents of El Paso were enthusiastic about returning to their previous homes, the volunteer families were a godsend. The families that decided to risk their futures in New Mexico were motivated by land. Vargas had recruited from all over New Spain, so he ordered the volunteers to meet at Mexico City whence they would proceed north to El Paso and then ultimately on to Santa Fe. Most of the recruited families were suited to the frontier conditions they were about to find. Unlike many settlers, they did not move to New Mexico in abject poverty. For example, the families of Simon de Molina Moquero, Antonio de Uassasi Aguiler, Jose Cortes de Castillo, Antonio de Monya, Cristobal Gonzalez de la Rosa listed as chattle the following items: 10½ varas of best quality cloth, one piece of Breton linen, two pieces of Silesian linen, two metal cooking pots, ten pieces of goat's hair cloth, two pairs of mules, seven varas of woolen goods and a number of pairs of gloves, 1½ varas of green cloth, some cradles, one cloak, three sets of heavy woolen goods for snow, one small helmet, one small cauldron, and one flat earthenware pan. Although these settlers were clearly not rich, they seemed well informed as to what to take to their new homes.

Vargas' settlers represented a cross-section of society in New Spain. Along with the "quality" families of the interior, Vargas gathered twenty-seven families of negros and mestizos from Zacatecas. Also included were widows, single men and a few Spaniards of "pure blood" with great social standing. As the expedition set out, it had cost 7,000 pesos to outfit and included 900 head of livestock, 2,000 horses and 1,000 mules. Vargas also carried a letter of credit worth 15,000 pesos although where it could be used in New Mexico is not clear. Perhaps the pueblos would give credit to these tourists.

On October 13, over ten days late, the permanent settlement expedition, divided into three sections, and set out. Luis Granillo was named second in command, Roque Madrid was put in charge of the soldiers, and Fray Salvador was superior to the forty missionaries. Santa Fe was to be reached in fifty days.

The march took the expedition to Robledo by October 18th. As the families marched, Vargas went ahead to scout and plan the best method of moving the group safely. The trip was slow and rough. By the time the group had reached San Diego, about 75 miles north of El Paso, food ran low. The colonists quickly sold arms, jewelry and horses to the Indians in exchange for grain and beans. In contrast to the warmer climates to the south, New Mexico in October and November was cold and the land was covered with snow. The party was not prepared for the cold they encountered. The chill winter months took their toll on the party. Women and children died of cold and starvation. By November 12th the advance party reached the pueblo of Sandia (near the future Albuquerque) where a friendly welcome awaited the Spanish.

However, despite the "pacification" of the natives, trouble was brewing for the settlers of New Mexico. Although Vargas found the Indians at the mesa of San Felipe friendly, he also heard rumors that after he left in 1692 some of the "pacified" pueblos plotted another rebellion. Undeterred, Vargas pressed on toward Santa Fe. Indian runners informed the town of the oncoming Spanish. When in late December the Vargas party arrived at the capital, they were greeted with an unhappy surprise.

The new residents found themselves without living quarters, without food, and, worst of all, among unfriendly natives. Despite the complaints, Vargas planned to refund the missions and to reconstruct the churches. The Spanish tried to trade with local pueblos for badly needed grain, only to find that none was available. As the cold weather continued, more children and infants died.

Vargas now concentrated all of his efforts on obtaining food. One incident provided food from an unexpected source. On December 23rd Captain Diego Arias de Quiros arrived with three deserters, captured at Ancon de Fray Garcia two weeks before. Vargas told the Indians that the men were the vanguard of reinforcements totalling 200 men. Impressed, the natives of Santa Fe turned over twenty sacks of maize on the spot.
Yet this was unsatisfactory. While the settlers were eating better they had no shelter. Vargas turned toward the Indian dwellings in Santa Fe. The leaders met in a council of war which soon turned into a cabildo abierto, [open meeting]. It was decided that the Tanos Indians, who occupied Santa Fe, should return to their pueblo at Galisteo and the town would be turned over to the Spanish. Six Spanish dissenters felt that the natives should be removed by fire and sword. When the Indians heard of the proceedings, their wrath grew. They vowed to resist any attempted resettlement.  

After several days of mounting tension, the Indians attacked Spanish settlers. In the early morning of December 28th, Vargas sounded the alarm and the battle for Santa Fe was on. For two days it raged, as the Spanish attacked the walls of the city while the Indians repelled them. Finally, on December 30th, Santa Fe was taken after hand-to-hand combat. Vargas not only gained badly needed shelter, but he found the houses well provisioned with maize and beans. The natives paid dearly for their resistance; nine Indians died in battle, seventy were summarily executed in a rather brutal manner, and two committed suicide. The Spanish lost twenty-two men and women from the cold, with one killed in battle. Santa Fe was in Spanish hands, which could hardly be said for the rest of the province of New Mexico. 

The Spanish, now protected in the villa of Santa Fe could go to work pacifying the outlying pueblos. This included sending forth missionaries. Santa Fe faced overwhelming odds against survival. San Ildefonso mesa held the key to continued Spanish existence. Here were grown all-important grains. Because continuous hostilities prevented planting, the Spanish as well as the Indians lacked food. San Ildefonso had to be taken so Vargas established a siege; he soon lifted it when it became clear that the effort was futile. Meanwhile, Roque Madrid was sent to Nambe with twenty soldiers and forty mules to capture grain. The desired food was removed while Madrid gained news of the Indians. It seems that the natives of San Lazaro and San Cristobal had joined the rebels of San Ildefonso and only about ten families remained at Nambe. Clearly the Spanish would have to crush to the rebels and restore food production.

On March 23rd, Vargas wrote to Viceroy the Conde de Galve requesting more colonists. He asked that settlers from Nueva Galicia, Parral, and other areas be sent to protect New Mexico from uprisings. In response to the pleas, Galve issued an order calling for volunteer families to go to Santa Fe and defend the city. Presumably the fear of both Galve and Vargas was that the natives would retake Santa Fe, resulting in another defeat for the Spanish. Numerous discontented settlers felt that Vargas should be removed because he was unable to supply food or to break the rebellion at San Ildefonso.  

Luckily, the viceroy's orders were heeded, and on June 16th, Don Diego commanded the people of Santa Fe to prepare for the arrival of an unspecified number of colonists. He asked that both citizens and soldiers receive the new residents with favor and to offer their thanks to Viceroy Galve for delivering them from the hands of the infidels. 

But beyond the need for food and shelter, Diego de Vargas had more problems. One of his first acts was to reestablish civil government in New Mexico. By tradition, Santa Fe continued as the center of government. Since most of Mexico was either in the hands of the Indians or was in a state of open rebellion, Vargas had military control over the government. Even so, a cabildo, [advisory group of the most important citizens], was set up in Santa Fe. The cabildo consisted of both civilians and military men who helped the governor provide defense for the city. Roque Madrid and Luis Granillos were the two men of importance as military leaders. Granillos was Vargas' maestre de campo (lieutenant governor), while Madrid was his captain, head (of the militia), and caudillo (chief military adviser). Basic military policy in New Mexico was the defense of Santa Fe and to prepare expeditions to reduce the pueblos. 

Santa Fe itself was reasonably well-protected from Indian attack. It had been designed as both a villa and a fortress in 1610. The city was formed on a plaza with the governor's palace along one side and adobe houses about a block long on the remaining three sides. Within the houses were supply depots, quarters for soldiers and governmental offices. The general populace lived in single or multiple adobe houses outside the defensive perimeter. When danger threatened, the occupants could flee to the square where attackers had to scale walls of some magnitude. That the defense of Santa
Fe was adequate is seen in the fact that the Spanish had such a difficult time in recapturing the city.

While the walls of the city were on a square, they opened at four corners proving a major problem for defense. No blockhouses were to be seen. Vargas was able to keep the citizens within easy running distance of the square, but his successor dispersed the populace and reduced the town's defensive effectiveness. 30

Within Santa Fe life seems to have been on a communal basis, less from desire than from necessity. From the descriptions of Vargas' distribution of foods and goods, grains were gathered in a central place for storage. Food supplies were evidently doled out by a single authority, as was clothing, medicine, and other goods. For housing, settlers at first lived in woolen or hide tents, then in ex-Indian estufas and finally in adobe huts. Chances are good that several families inhabited each house, for the simple reason that too few houses existed. A number of buildings were destroyed by the natives. Others were in such poor condition from their previous tenants that they had to be razed. Santa Fe in 1694 resembled more a primitive commune than a Spanish capital, but this was soon to change. 31

On June 22, 1694 a group of 220 newcomers from Mexico City arrived in New Mexico. 32 All were given housing in the city. While this meant reinforcements were available, the food situation had not improved. To meet this new crisis, Vargas planned an expedition against the Jemez and Santo Domingo Indians, still in a state of rebellion. They were raiding the friendly and food-providing Keres. In addition, Vargas wrote to the viceroy requesting other necessities for resettlement at Santa Fe. Among his needs were: 2,000 varas of flannel cloth, 2,000 varas of fine cloth, 1,000 varas of blue woolen cloth, 2,000 blankets, 500 campeches (slickers), 2,000 varas of linen, 2,000 varas of sack cloth, 100 dozen men's shoes, 150 women's shoes, fifty rolls of Breton linen, twelve spools of silk, thirty dozen hats, fifty rolls of goat's hair cloth, twenty packs of soap, 300 pesos worth of medicine and numerous other items. Vargas also purchased grain from Nueva Vizcaya rather than take it from friendly Indians. Luis Granillo was sent south with 3,000 pesos to purchase sorely needed grain. 33

By September 7th, the Jemez had fought their last battle. Spanish soldiers overwhelmed them and they surrendered. The Jemez now joined forces with the Spanish and laid siege to San Ildefonso. Finally, San Ildefonso was captured as were all the other pueblos except for Taos, Picuris and Acoma and Zuñi.

Vargas now prepared for restoration of the missions in New Mexico. He took formal possession of Nambe on September 17th and the next day Pojoaque, San Juan, Santa Clara, San Ildefonso (not the mesa), Jacona, and Cuyamungue were formally reclaimed. 34 The missionaries could now be distributed. Friars were sent into the pueblos and the rebuilding process began.

Meantime pueblo Indians started to visit Santa Fe, and a busy trade with residents thrived. The food problem seemed to be solved, at least for the time being. Now Vargas planned for resettlement of some of Santa Fe's residents throughout New Mexico.

The year 1695 saw fifty families prepared to move north to a new town. The basis for a new villa was in the refounding of the missions. The government felt that to help protect the Franciscans, another Spanish town would be needed. To this end, a proclamation of April 19th established the town of Villa Nueva de Santa Cruz de Españoles Mexicanos del Rey Nuestro Señor Carlos Segundo. This lengthy name was shortened to Santa Cruz de la Cañada. The site was located upriver about halfway between Santa Fe and Taos. It was founded for two reasons. First, the settlement was used to spread Spanish colonists along the upper Rio Grande and secondly it was planned that the city would be maintained for the defense of the many pueblos in this area.

The town was given a military government composed of an alcalde mayor (mayor), a captain of the militia, an alferez (second lieutenant), a sergeant, an alguacil (constable), and four military squad leaders. Each family was provided half a fanega of seed along with implements for farming. On April 21, 1695 sixty-six families moved to Santa Cruz, the first new town established in New Mexico since 1610. 35

That May forty-four new families from New Spain arrived at Santa Fe under Juan Paez Hurtado. They were moved into the recently vacated quarters of the Santa Cruz settlers. The next winter brought starvation occasioned by drought during the previous summer, a plague of worms, and a severe lack of sufficient tools and new cattle. Petitions for more food came from both Santa Cruz and Santa Fe. Vargas had only enough maize to support the twenty-one of the poorest families. The settlers soon bartered with the natives, exchanging
clothing for food. Earlier trading with Indians was so substantial that on May 25th Vargas issued an order forbidding firearms trading with the pueblo Indians. 36 Another problem Vargas faced was a lack of discipline among his soldiers. On September 15th, Antonio Tafoya appeared before alcalde ordinario Lorenzo Madrid to explain the bad conduct of soldiers under the command of Simon de Ortega. The problem was looting private residences throughout Santa Fe. The soldiers behaviour toward some of Santa Fe’s more eminent citizens was not good. Disrespect and sloth were common problems on the New Mexican frontier. 37 In the autumn months hardships became much worse. A report written in 1697 depicted the people of Santa Fe as living on horses, cats, dogs, rats, oxtongues and old bones. Nearly naked gaunt, desperate people were said to be roaming the streets. Some were even hiring themselves to Indians to carry water or chop wood for a little maize. Two hundred were reported to have died of starvation during the winter of 1695. 38 The plight of the Spanish in New Mexico that winter was not lost upon the Indians. Many pueblos, nominally pacified, saw the new unrest as an opportunity. Spanish firmness only increased the restlessness of the natives. The starving settlers were in no position to crush a new revolt. Reports from the missions poured into Santa Fe. An Indian uprising was likely. Quite aware of Spanish vulnerability, native leaders took advantage of the moment. On March 7, 1695 Fray Covera, at San Ildefonso, wrote to Vargas of the danger. Fray Alpunte also wrote from an unnamed location begging for soldiers, while Fray Cisneros at Cochiti likewise asked for protection. Fray Ramirez from San Felipe, Fray Matta from Zia, Fray Trizio and Fray Jesus Marfa from Jemez and Fray Diaz from Tesuque all warned of unrest in the pueblos. 39 Throughout the spring of 1696 the letters came to Santa Fe, but Vargas was helpless because Mexico City refused to send troops. The settlers in New Mexico were so weak that they could not possibly withstand an Indian uprising.

In early June Fray Alonso Jimenez de Cisneros warned Vargas of a possible revolt. He said he heard of open plotting among the Indians of Cochiti. Without question, he wrote, trouble was coming. By June 4, 1696 reports of the new rebellion came in from all directions. Taos, Jemez, and Santo Domingo Indians killed five missionaries and burned churches. It was 1680 again. 40 Despite weakness, Vargas moved swiftly against the Indians. Roque Madrid was ordered to call in all missionaries, while squads of men were sent to certain very dangerous missions to escort the friars. On an inspection tour of local pueblos, Vargas saw that rebellion had indeed occurred among the natives. At San Ildefonso the church was burned, and at other pueblos priests were found brutally slain. 41 Vargas proposed to crush the rebellion by military force. On June 17th he assembled a troop of thirty-seven men and led them to Tesuque, where rebels under the leadership of a half-breed named Naranjo fled. 42 The Spanish seized a large quantity of grain and then scouted the area. They discovered rebel Indians at Nambe, Pojoaque, San Ildefonso, San Juan, Santa Clara, and Chimayo. 43 Upon his return to Santa Fe, in late June, Vargas organized another expedition to reduce the pueblos on a systematic basis. He began at Santa Cruz and worked into the Chimayo Mountains. While these efforts progressed, word came from Sandia that the Jemez Indians were subdued by Miguel de Lara. 44 Heartened by this news, Vargas captured Cochiti pueblo which contained a large supply of grain. Those supplies were rapidly returned to Santa Fe on July 17th. 45 After delivery was made, Vargas began another operation against Taos. As he marched north, the Spanish were harried by pueblo Indians. In each engagement they were soundly defeated. Vargas did not have to take Taos because he engaged combined enemy forces at Santa Cruz and defeated them. This battle relieved Taos. But before returning to Santa Fe, Vargas and his army marched into the San Luis Valley, where they noted the presence of hostile Ute Indians who were not impressed by Onate’s force. Don Diego returned to Santa Fe at the end of July satisfied that the natives were again controlled. Taos Indians came to Santa Cruz to help defeat the Spanish. Once the battle of Santa Cruz was decided, the various Pueblos returned home and the revolt was over. The uprising had taken the lives of twenty-one settlers, and five missionaries. Churches and religious articles were burned, but as Vargas wrote to the viceroy, he was in no way defeated. He said the only way New Mexico could be lost was from hunger not Indians. 46 In August, having defeated the pueblos to the north and east, Vargas turned his attention west and to the
rock of Acoma. On August 14th he laid siege to Acoma without result. Three days later he returned to Zia for more food. As Don Diego pondered how to supply his people, Roque Madrid sent word that the Picuris were about to attack Santa Cruz. This brought about a revival of the Taos plans. In mid-September, Captain Lara reported all quiet in the west, so Vargas ordered troops into the north.

On September 21st Vargas moved northward planning to break the latest rebellion. Without great difficulty he reached Taos only to find it empty. He conferred with the native leader Pacheco and asked that the people come back to Taos. Trusting the natives, Vargas then left for Picuris where he inspected the pueblo before returning to Santa Fe with a pack train of maize, beans and clothing taken from Taos. 47

Although the war in the north was nearly over, pockets of resistance remained. Nevertheless, Vargas prepared to send a few friars back into the field and with the help of Fray Custos Francisco de Vargas, he began to replace lost horses, livestock and religious articles for the missions. Sandia was restored, as were Santa Cruz, Zia, and Santa Ana.

The revolt of 1696 stirred Mexico City to action. In November that year the viceroy and the Junta (de Hacienda) approved Vargas' requests for supplies. Some 1,400 fanegas of the promised 2,000 fanegas of maize were on their way, as were 1,500 varas of cloth, 1,245 varas of heavy flannel, 2,000 blankets, 2,000 goats, 3,000 sheep, 600 cows, and 200 bulls. They arrived at Santa Fe in April, 1697. During May the goods were distributed among 1,007 persons, who were described as follows: natives of New Mexico - ninety six families totaling 404 persons; Mexicans [of the group residing in Santa Fe prior to 1680] - seventeen families totaling seventy one persons; residents from Zacatecas and Sombrerete - 124 families totaling 449 persons with eighty three listed as orphans, bachelors, single women, and half-breeds. 48 1697 promised to be much better than any previous times for the settlers of New Mexico. The revolt of 1696 was crushed. Supplies finally arrived from New Spain. There was little reason to suspect that the next several years would be a time of turmoil, not from external forces but caused by internal politics.

Don Diego de Vargas Zapata Lujan Ponce de Leon may have subdued the pueblos, brought colonists into New Mexico, and saved the province from disastrous defeat, all at his own expense, but he made many enemies in the process.

His troubles were caused by the Spanish colonial system. Vargas was appointed in 1688 for a five-year term, which expired in early 1693. However, he was told to continue his position as governor until relieved; in this case Pedro Rodriguez Cubero. Vargas retained his office until the arrival of Cubero in July 1697.

Meanwhile Vargas administered his governorship as a benevolent dictator, personally handling civil cases and overseeing the troops. For example on June 5th Nicolas Ramieres, listed as a mulatto, and married to Isabel Hazzca (?), was accused of attempting to kill an Indian named Martin. The defendant was found guilty of aggravated assault and sentenced to three years of "working for the good of the general public." 49

On July 2, 1697 Pedro Rodriguez Cubero arrived at Santa Fe to claim the governorship. Vargas, unwilling to hand over the reins of power, wrote to the viceroy seeking a postponement of Cubero's assumption on the grounds that he (Vargas) was not given a fair hearing. Meanwhile, Vargas persuaded the cabildo of Santa Fe to give him a statement of loyalty. Cubero took office over the protests of Vargas (on the basis that Cubero had a letter from the viceroy giving him the power to do so) and promptly instituted a residencia on Vargas. The residencia was a colonial device to keep governors and other officials honest. It was simply a review of the outgoing officer's record. Although Cubero's residencia found Vargas free from any wrongdoing, it was of little consequence. The cabildo, seeing which way the wind was blowing, drew up a petition that charged Vargas with embezzling large sums of money and the summary execution of many Tano captives after the battle of Santa Fe in 1693. Vargas was also blamed for the famine of 1695 and the outbreak of Indian warfare, particularly the uprising of 1696. Further criticisms of Vargas's administration included his refusal to allow the settlers to make slaves of Indian captives. 50

Cubero used this petition as a means of getting rid of Vargas. On October 2, 1697 he declared that in the light of the "new evidence", Vargas was guilty of all charges, despite the previous residencia verdict. He confined the former governor to his home and confiscated his slaves (not Indians), mules, clothing, and fined him 4,000 pesos for court costs. Further, Vargas
was forbidden to communicate with anyone, thus depriving him of appeal to higher authority.

Vargas did not lack friends, for Fray Custos Francisco de Vargas travelled to Mexico City and presented the governor's case. In Santa Fe, meantime, Vargas carried on his own campaign of self-defense by threatening Cubero and the cabildo with reprisals once he was reappointed by the crown.

Vargas' appeal reached the Spanish court by means of Antonio Valverde y Cossio, temporary captain at El Paso del Norte (and appointed to that post by Vargas). Cubero had exiled Valverde. But, on his own, this loyal soul traveled to Spain to present his "master's" case while also asking for personal favors. To counter this threat, Cubero in February, 1699 sent to the court a list of accusations against Valverde. Allegedly the list was given to him by Lorenzo Madrid, Roque Madrid, Tomas Palomino, Jose Dominguez, Antonio Gutierrez de Figueroa, and Jose Antonio Romero, all highly respected citizens of New Mexico who were enraged by Vargas' appointment of Valverde to a high post while they were passed over. 51

Vargas' accomplishments did not go unnoticed by officials in both Spain and New Spain. After a long review of his achievements in New Mexico, the Council of the Indies, recommended that Vargas be reappointed governor, that he should be given an honorary title of "Pacificador," that he be granted the title of Marques de las Navas Brazinas, and that he be given an encomienda of 4,000 pesos. The king approved all these recommendations except for the encomienda. Vargas was not granted an encomienda until August 21, 1698. Valverde, for his effort, was appointed permanent captain of the Presidio of El Paso del Norte by the Crown, a position he sought.

Vargas' struggle was far from over. Even though the crown had agreed that Vargas was in the clear, Cubero still had to be dealt with.

The new governor and the cabildo were desperate. They heard of Vargas' reappointment and drew up new charges in an attempt to stall enactment. These charges included: that Vargas had stirred unrest since 1697, that he offered favors to those who would take his side, and that he had intimidated the opposition. 52 Cubero and his cronies conducted hearings and found Vargas guilty of the new allegations. The Pacificador was placed in chains within his home and forbidden all visitors. He was not allowed to write.

The legal battle continued in Mexico City for several more years. On March 20, 1700 the Vargas case went to the Junta General and cabildo's accusations were found false. The lingering matter of embezzlement caused more concern and the Junta asked that Vargas' reappointment be held up until this matter could be cleared. Vargas, still in Santa Fe, was released under bond and departed for Mexico City in July, 1700. The case was transferred to Spain, where after months of careful consideration, the crown, in 1701, ordered viceregal authorities to clear up the case against the ex-governor and if they found him not guilty, to allow him to accept the privileges granted him.

When word reached Santa Fe, the cabildo was thrown into panic. New charges flowed, but to no avail. Vargas was acquitted of all allegations and after a careful audit, it was discovered that the government owed Vargas 17,619 pesos. Vargas had won the battle with Cubero. The latter was assessed, along with the cabildo of Santa Fe, the entire cost of the case. 53

In August, 1703 Don Diego was on his way back to New Mexico to claim his titles, while Governor Cubero proceeded southward to take up new duties as governor of Maracaibo and Grita. Cubero died in 1704 before he could assume his job. J. Manuel Espinosa, chronicler of the Vargas administration, sums up Cubero's term: "Thus ended the six year Cubero interlude, during which New Mexico witnessed no significant changes, while the Reconquerer underwent perhaps the darkest days of his whole career only to emerge undaunted." 54

On November 10, 1703 Don Diego de Vargas, now Marques de las Navas Brazinas, reached Santa Fe. He quickly established himself in the Governor's Palace and wrote a report to the viceroy describing the conditions of New Mexico, in which he denounced Cubero for: "ignorance of frontier problems," particularly because Cubero had virtually abandoned Santa Cruz, one of Vargas' pet projects. Also, he complained that Cubero had spread the settlers in Santa Fe out too far making defense difficult. 55

In the spring of 1704 Vargas prepared for a campaign into the Sandia Mountains to eliminate some Fararon Apaches raiding along the Rio Grande. He chose Sandia as his headquarters. With fifty soldiers he set out from Santa Fe to that village. From there he went to the
abandoned ranch of Ortega, about 20 miles east of present-day Albuquerque, and on April 1st he pushed into the mountains. On April 2nd Vargas was in pursuit of his enemies when he became ill. Returning to Sandia, he drew up his last will and received the sacrament of extreme unction. Don Diego de Vargas Zapata Lujan Ponce de Leon, Marques de las Navas Brazinas, died at Sandia on April 8, 1704. Exact cause of his death is still unknown. He requested that his body be laid to rest under the main altar of the church at Santa Fe.

The death of Diego de Vargas brought an end to a unique era in New Mexico. In a short time the energetic Don Diego had managed to do what others had failed to do: the recapture and resettlement of New Mexico.

With Vargas’ reestablishment of New Mexico as a viable Spanish colony, Spain was once again committed to her frontier outpost. The Spanish were unable to relinquish this territory and because of this continuing presence in New Mexico, Spain was to face nearly a century of continuing entrapment.
NOTES


4. Ibid. At Santo Domingo, September 11, 1692.

5. Ibid., at Santa Fe, September 14, 1692.


11. January 2, 1693 at El Paso del Norte, in AGI and AGN.


13. A vara is a measurement equaling about 2.8 feet.


15. The inventory for one family is as follows: for the family of Joseph Cortes del Castillo, who had a Spanish wife and three children ages ten, five and one year two months: twelve waterproof overcoats, five fanegas of cheap cotton cloth, six fanegas of floss silk, seven fanegas of quality flax, one piece of Breton linen, four pieces of Silesian linen, one piece of china, one cloak, one book entitled "Hilo de Clemen" and two pairs of shoes. AASF, Loose Documents. 1693.


17. Ibid., October 15, 1693.

18. Ibid., November 5, 1693.

19. Ibid., December 17, 1693.


21. Ibid.

22. Vargas to viceroy, January 20, 1694 at Santa Fe, Official Resume in AGN.

23. Ibid.

24. Vargas to viceroy, December 30, 1693, in Historia, Tomo 39, in AGN.


26. Vargas to Conde de Galve, Santa Fe, March 23, 1694, State Archives of New Mexico. Hereinafter cited SANM.

27. Vargas, Order, at Santa Fe, June 16, 1694, in SANM.


29. Some of the more important citizens were: Luis Granillo, Juan Dios Lucero de Godoy, Jose Tellez Jiron, Francisco de Anaya Almazan, Francisco Romero de Padraza, Antonio de Montoya, Luis Martin, Antonio Lucero de Godoy, Diego de Montoya, Diego de Luna, Roque Madrid, Juan del Rio and Arias de Quiros.

See Vargas, *Bando* providing for reception of colonists, June 16, 1694, at Santa Fe in SANM.

Vargas Journal, July 5-6, 1694, *Historia*. Tomo 39, in AGN.

Vargas Journal, to viceroy, September 6, 1694, at San Ildefonso, in *Historia*, Tomo 39, AGN.

Ibid., September 17, 1694.

Vargas Journal, April 22, 1695, *Historia*. Tomo 39, in AGN.

Order of Don Diego de Vargas, May 31, 1695, at Santa Fe in SANM.

Appearance of Antonio Tafoya, squadron leader, before Lorenzo Madrid, *alcalde ordinario*, September 15, 1695 at Santa Fe, in SANM.

Accusations of the cabildo against Don Diego de Vargas, October, 1697 at Santa Fe in SANM.

*Loose Documents*. 1694; December 23, 1694, Number 2 and Number 2 [No. 9], December, 1695-April, 1696 in AASF.

Cisneros to Vargas, June, 1696, SANM.

*Guadalajara*, Vargas Journal, Legajo 141, AGI.

Ibid., June 17, 1696.

Ibid., June 20-26, 1696.

Ibid., July 21-23, 1696.

Ibid., 1696 and Athearn, op. cit., p.15.

Vargas to viceroy, July 30, 1696, at Santa Fe, SANM.

Ibid., October 11-12, 1696.

Vargas Journal, Records of Distribution, May 1, 1697, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

Criminal proceedings against Nicolas Ramieres, June 5, 1697, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

Accusations of the cabildo against Don Diego de Vargas, October, 1697 at Santa Fe, in SANM.


Vinculos Tomo 14, “Autos hechos sobre causas criminales contra el general Don Diego de Vargas . . .”, in AGN.

See Lansing B. Bloom, “The Vargas Encomienda,” *New Mexico Historical Review*, XIV (October, 1939), 390-391.


Report of Vargas to viceroy, December 1, 1703, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
Chapter III
New Mexico After Don Diego, 1704-1714

Upon the death of Diego de Vargas, a political vacuum was left in the province. He was the governor of New Mexico for ten years, twice the normal term of office and his death was bound to cause some distress. 1 Francisco Cuervo y Valdes was appointed to replace Vargas. Cuervo was able to continue the orderly flow of government. A good deal of concern must have existed among the settlers after Vargas’ death, for a strong personality such as the Marques’ was one of the most enduring ties between the community and the government. While the order of succession was carried out with little trouble, settlers had to contend with a new man.

Tensions appeared after Vargas’ death. In November, 1704 a petition from fifteen Santa Fe settlers requesting permission to leave New Mexico was denied by the cabildo which was delegated by the governor to handle this matter. Reasons given by the petitioners included illness, inability to make a reasonable living, poor living conditions, the constant threat of Indians, and personal reasons. 2 Other requests to leave were filed in 1705. In March, 1705, Nicolas Moreno de Trujillo petitioned to leave the province to trade in New Spain. This was granted. 3

Any resident in New Mexico wanting to leave had to petition the cabildo (or the governor) and had to present his reasons. Settlers were kept under strict control and movement was severely restricted. Apparently the government feared a mass exodus. To prevent this, a system of passes was developed. Note, however, that during the time of Vargas’ regime not a single person applied for permission to leave. If ever there was reason to leave, the difficult years 1695 and 1696 were it. However, the records show no movement from New Mexico during those critical times. 4

Movement within New Mexico also was restricted. To move from one place to another required permission, as is seen in the petition of Luisa Navarro of Santa Fe, a widow, who asked that she be permitted to live in El Paso del Norte. On April 29, 1705, her petition was granted. 5 Reasons for restrictions upon the movement of residents are not hard to understand. With a small population in a large area, surrounded by hostile Indians and containing untrustworthy pueblo Indians, the threat of warfare, raids or massacres were always present. To keep the populace in one place benefited not only the government but also the settlers. Unrestricted movement or a mass exodus (a real possibility) would place the province in a tenuous situation. The government knew that every person was needed for defense.

However, despite efforts at total control of movement, people did slip away. Stiff sentences like jail or banishment were meted out to those caught leaving. On the other hand, the governor was generally indulgent in granting permission to leave. A weak excuse would suffice and the petitioner would be permitted to go.

After Vargas’ death, conditions in New Mexico were not good. An undated document (probably 1705) in the form of a petition to the cabildo of Santa Fe asked for help for the residents of that town, particularly the poor and widows who were on the verge of starvation.

In the petition residents accused Cuervo of having done nothing to relieve the plight of the capital and of New Mexico in general. No requests for aid from Santa Fe were made to Mexico City, but considering the petitions of the residents of Santa Fe and Santa Cruz, a serious lack of foodstuffs and clothing existed throughout the province.

Cuervo had to deal with other problems too. An increase in crime and a failure of discipline within Santa Fe caused problems. Orders prohibiting gambling were issued, as were bandos requiring the people of Santa Fe to attend church every Sunday. 6 A further concern was of settlers living among the Indians. The governor, fearing trouble ordered all Spanish people living in pueblos to leave and not re-enter without his express permission. 7 To prevent a repetition of the revolt of 1696, he proposed to keep the Indians and Spanish apart. It was reasoned that the natives should live by themselves and not be influenced by the Spanish, many of whom had undesirable habits that Indians learned all too quickly.
However, the Spanish were insistent that Franciscan friars remain in the pueblos so that the Catholic religion, as well as moral standards, could be taught.

The Church, namely the Bishop of Durango, who claimed that New Mexico was in Durango's bishopric and, therefore, that he should control the actions of the Franciscans in New Mexico, ordered all priests to stop interfering in governmental affairs. He prohibited the friars from going to Santa Fe without permission. This was done to prevent a repetition of the Church-State strife that precipitated the revolt of 1680. 8

Fears that Spanish settlers would estrange the Indians were not unfounded. In many cases those Spaniards living within pueblos attempted to take land from the natives or use them as "free" labor. Worse, the they sometimes killed Indians who did not submit to them. In October, 1705 Francisco Ortiz was banished to Bernalillo (Sandia) for slaying friendly natives. The murders occurred over disputed land. 9 Killing natives was a serious crime as banishment meant loss of land, privileges and food rations.

Meantime in Santa Fe, now a city of 300 people, life went on as in the seventeenth century. Society and government revolved around the fact that the capital was not secure from hostile natives. The military was the key to the province. It kept the Indians at bay. Every man was required to serve in the militia, although exceptions could be made. Francisco Duran y Chavez, for example, petitioned the governor asking that his son be permitted to miss military duty because of illness. Young Chavez was excused. 10

The military and its domination of the province caused the governor other problems. Cuervo issued an order forbidding gambling among the soldiers. 11 Army discipline had not improved since the days of Vargas. No real protection against sudden Indian raids was afforded Santa Fe's residents. The cabildo petitioned Cuervo in May 1705 for more soldiers to stave off threatened attacks from Apaches to the west. Santa Fe was not in danger yet, but the Apaches were in western New Mexico and the cabildo felt that more troops should be in the capital. The governor had no men to spare and he turned down the request. 12

The military-Indian problem not withstanding, settlers traded horses and guns with the Apaches. A barter system, established during the winter of starvation in 1695, was still the basic economic system of New Mexico a decade later. Since guns and horses were the main trade items, the obvious threat of armed Indians caused the Spanish government to repeatedly order this trade stopped. Cuervo issued a bondo in August 1705 forbidding settlers from trading with any natives other than pueblo Indians. The governor pointed out that trade with hostiles was against royal law. This edict was sent out to the settlements at Santa Cruz and Santa Fe on August 25th. 13

The Spanish, had little more than imported goods purchased with precious hard cash. These were acquired through a limited trade with Chihuahua and used to buy food, fuel and clothing from pueblo Indians. An intricate scale of worth was developed with a horse or mule or blanket being worth so many fanegas of maize or beans. A trade in horses, sheep, cows, blankets and other goods kept New Mexico going. A tiny trade between New Spain and New Mexico existed, but the balance was heavily tipped in favor of the merchants of Parral and Chihuahua. The residents of Santa Fe had little to export and a great need for imports. 14 Considering the internal economic situation, there is little doubt that Chihuahua and Parral benefited most by any trade. Salt was one of the most important exports. Parties to gather salt were sent from Albuquerque to bring this valuable product back for transshipment to the south.

The need for an Indian trade to insure the economic viability of New Mexico caused the Spanish and Pueblo natives to become interdependent. New Mexico had no industry as of 1705. The sheep, cattle and horses imported during the Vargas era were just beginning to become productive. Therefore Indians still provided most of the foodstuffs for the settlers as they reestablished their farming enterprises. 15

The closeness of Indian-Spanish trade led to intimate relations between the two groups. Spaniards who came to New Mexico were generally folk from central or northwest New Spain. Most often they brought their families with them. The government preferred families because they were far more stable, and less likely to cause trouble than single persons might. Spanish were not allowed to intermix with the pueblo Indians.

This can be seen in the fact that Spanish settlers were clustered in two (later three) areas of New Mexico; Santa Fe, Santa Cruz, and after 1706, Albuquerque. Little attempt to settle in or around Indian pueblos was made.
However, as time went on, the Spanish hired Indian servants who "lived in" and who were generally counted as family members when a census was taken. In many cases children of servants were literally family. From this came families in which illegitimate children were born of Indian servants. The result was an infusion of mixed-blood into New Mexican society. 16

Franciscans who maintained the pueblo missions were opposed to having Spanish settlers near them. They were considered bad influences, since when Spaniards were about, the natives adopted such nasty habits as drinking, gambling, and prostitution. No fixed Spanish colonial policy prohibited miscegenation. Nevertheless New Mexico was a veritable melting pot of races. The Church frowned upon interracial marriages because they "depurified" the natives (not the Spanish) and made it even harder to keep them in their pueblos. 17

Meanwhile pueblo natives provided supplies for New Mexicans as the merchants of Chihuahua and Parral imported "luxury" items for the pioneers. By the time goods reached New Mexico they sometimes increased by 500 percent. 18 This great inflation was due largely to the high cost of transport as well as middlemen's profits. The result was a serious trade imbalance. From this early date New Mexico was continually in debt to the merchants of northern New Spain. 19 It took governmental subsidies to bail out the New Mexicans.

Local agriculture developed slowly. Losses from the weather and predators took their toll on horses, cattle and sheep, while a severe lack of replacements caused problems. The same situation existed in farming. Seeds, tools and grains were stolen. Complicating this situation was constant raiding by Ute, Apache and Comanche Indians.

The problem of Indian raiders in New Mexico was hardly new. Raiding plains Indians supplemented their food supplies, particularly when game was poor, with the foodstuffs of pueblo natives. The Spanish inherited this problem when they settled in the valleys of New Mexico.

During the eighteenth century, the crown was obligated to protect not only Spanish settlers but also pueblo Indians from the raids. However, because there were not enough troops to handle the situation, losses of critical foods such as grain and beef were considerable. Outlying districts like Taos or Pecos were most vulnerable and protection was virtually impossible.

These troubles, along with blazing summers and freezing winters made crops hard to maintain.

Although Albuquerque, Santa Cruz and Santa Fe were three major European settlements, they too were not immune from raiding Indians, a lack of proper tools, flash floods, and poor soil conditions. 20

As the Spanish realized that they faced a harsh environment, they accordingly were forced to make adjustments. From self-supporting agriculture came a need to diversify into cattle and sheep raising. The land was better suited to such endeavors. Sheep took little water and could graze on the poorest of lands. Cattle, too, could be raised on the relatively bad forage. For these reasons the hide and wool trades became major industries.

Another area of interest was mining. Early in the eighteenth century, royal grants were made for mining. The Spanish long hoped that minerals of great wealth could be found in the province. The legend of Cerro Azul and other tales caused the Spanish to consider the place ripe for mining ventures. As it turned out no great lodes of gold or silver were found. Only lead proved to be of local value. The government did give several grants for mines near Santa Fe. Diego Arias de Quiros got a claim five leagues from the capital in 1717. Lead mining was on a small scale in New Mexico. Most minerals produced in the area were locally consumed with little surplus. 21

The people who came to New Mexico had to change their habits and ways of life. Of the residents listed in 1695, thirty percent were artisans and craftsmen, while others were skilled laborers. Still more were unskilled. All soon learned that in order to survive they had to work together and do necessary jobs. These people were forced by the environment to become shepherders, farmers, and ranchers. Of course, in Santa Fe and the pueblos, bureaucracy absorbed some of the more educated colonists. But the frontier tempered a Spanish settler into a man of the land. 22

The missions of New Mexico were the only institutions to see major growth during the early eighteenth century. Vargas reestablished them in 1695, and after interruption during the revolt of 1696 they were put back into operation. Franciscan friars went into each mission to minister to the natives. They recorded baptisms, births, and deaths as part of their duties. Not only did the friars record the vital statistics, they also taught the
natives Church rituals. Generally Spanish language was used so that in some cases the Indians picked up a limited vocabulary. But evidently no concerted effort was made to teach Spanish to the natives, other than to have them memorize the catechism. This was despite a royal decree, issued in 1717, ordering that Spanish be taught Indians in all provinces of the Empire. The natives were not taught to read or write nor did the friars often bother to learn native languages. It was, however, decreed that the friars should learn local languages or they should teach the natives Spanish in order to assist the missions more fully.

The missions were also used to "concentrate" Indians into defensible and easily controlled groups. Within each pueblo an Indian militia group was formed to defend the local mission against raiding Apaches or Utes. Along with protection, natives were kept under control by the friars. That this surveillance was effective can be seen by the reports from the missions about the revolt of 1696. The friars gave the government ample warning of an impending uprising. The natives were required to be self-sufficient. Thanks to the pressure of the friars, the missions continued to produce enough food for both Spaniard and native.

Mexico City was always interested in the progress of New Mexico. In 1706, Viceroy the Duke of Alburquerque wrote Governor Cuervo y Valdes inquiring about conditions in New Mexico. He asked about the Apache threat, the conduct of the war against the Moqui (Hopis), and details of Vargas' death two years earlier. He requested that the number of soldiers and settlers killed in campaigns against the Indians be listed, and he asked for an outline of New Mexico's defense needs.

Cuervo y Valdes was ordered by the viceroy to do something about the Moquis in northern Arizona. He organized a campaign against them in September 1706. The purpose of the Moqui expedition was to capture their pueblos. In September, the governor dispatched a force of Spanish soldiers, pueblo allies, and some settlers under the command of Roque Madrid. They managed to capture two pueblos and by the end of 1706 Cuervo could report to Mexico City that the Moqui were pacified.

In addition to this expedition, Juan de Ulibarri led an force east from Taos and north to the Arkansas River where he chased fleeing pueblo Indians. He arrived at El Cuartelejo in 1706 and claimed the site for Spain.

He appointed an Apache chief as New Mexico's official representative and captured some 62 pueblo Indians who were returned to New Mexico. This expedition made El Cuartelejo the most northern outpost of New Spain.

The new peace caused the governor to concentrate on construction of new Spanish settlements south of Santa Fe. He resettled the vicinity of Galisteo, about twenty miles south of Santa Fe, establishing the Indian town of Santa Maria de Galisteo. The population was mainly Tanos Indians consisting of 150 families or 630 persons.

By order of the viceroy, another town was established near the pueblo of Sandia. It was to be Spanish and was designed to provide defense for southern New Mexico. In addition it would provide new agricultural lands. The area was peopled by settlers from Santa Fe and families recruited in New Spain. In July 1706 the viceroy's orders were received at Santa Fe. In a gesture of loyalty, Cuervo named the site Albuquerque, after the Duke of Alburquerque, Viceroy of New Spain. Thirty families moved south and set up housekeeping at Albuquerque that same year. As time passed, the little town grew to become the third largest city during the Spanish period. It served as a way station between Santa Fe and El Paso del Norte and, as was planned, it helped defend the Camino Real. Cuervo had greater ambitions; he wanted to found a presidio at either Zia or Socorro, but these projects were not fulfilled.

Cuervo's term of office expired in 1707 and, on August 1, 1707 Admiral Don Jose Chacon Medina Salazar y Villaseñor, Marques de la Peñuela, took over as governor of New Mexico. The Marques began his administration by reviewing the province. He then called for immediate reforms. His first order dealt with the problem of illegal sales of guns and horses to hostile natives. He also ordered that officers could not sell horses from the royal horseherd without his permission. Such sales of horses were a serious matter, for without the animals the defense of the whole of New Mexico, would be seriously damaged.

Another problem left behind were social ills. The Marques, noting that Santa Fe suffered from a debilitating lack of discipline, ordered that gambling be halted. Since this vice was especially common among the soldiers his order did little to make them happy with the new governor.
The next concern of Peñuela was the inspection of citizens and their arms. He ordered the men of Santa Fe, Sandia, and Santa Cruz to stand for inspection in September. He told all to have their weapons in order and he declared that he was calling the inspection because of “the threat of the infidel enemies of the Apache nation.” The purpose of the muster was to make sure that all residents had weapons. That is, guns, and that they were cleaned and prepared for use in case of attack. Further, the occasion was to be used for instruction in the use of firearms.

Every man was required to have certain weapons on hand. 34 Each household was supposed to have at least one gun, several swords, lances, and pikes for defense. Often the poorer families relied on gifts of weapons from the crown. Otherwise their richer neighbors could defend them in case of attack. That there was a problem in keeping weapons available is seen in the Duke of Alburquerque’s order that: “twenty-five guns must be kept in working order at all times.” 35

The new governor faced other difficulties than threats of Indian attacks. In 1707 the Indians of San Juan pueblo petitioned him, complaining about maestre de campo Roque Madrid. They charged that Madrid was exercising “dictatorial control” and that he forced them to work on Sundays, which was illegal. The petition was signed by the alcaldes of San Juan. 36 The Marques took note of the petition but the matter died at Santa Fe. Roque Madrid retained his position at San Juan, perhaps being reminded not to over-exercise his power.

The lingering matter of Indian rituals and superstitions gave the Church continual worry. One of the reasons for the Revolt of 1680 was the Church’s determination to suppress Indian religion. In the early eighteenth century the problem came to the surface in the form of witchcraft among the natives. In 1708 three Indian women were accused by Leonor Dominguez of practicing demoniacal arts. The acts were said to have caused the Dominguez woman to lose the use of her legs. After considerable testimony the case came to naught for it turned out that the three Indian women were accused out of revenge. The Dominguez woman, in her complaint, also accused the three of sleeping with her husband. The governor ruled that the witchcraft complaint was false and the three women were freed. In his order the Marques stated that the complaint was “false, futile and despicable.” 37 Cases of “witchcraft” were usually nothing but petty fights over small matters.

The Marques de la Peñuela felt increasing pressure from Mexico City to make the province more self-supporting. On July 4, 1708 he received an order from the Duke of Alburquerque demanding that New Mexico should practice strict economy in the operation of the province. He complained that the cost to the government, 76,000 pesos a year, was far too much and ordered the province to spend less royal money. 38 On July 7th the viceroy also ordered the governor to protect the Indians from the settlers and soldiers of the area. 39 He also issued an order to stop extortion and bribery by Spanish officials. In some cases local officials had extorted land and services from natives. Peñuela felt that this must stop in the interest of the entire colony’s welfare. 40

A final order was that more protection be provided against the Apache (who had invaded El Paso del Norte in 1708). 41 In a manner typical of most administrations, all of these rules came in the wake of an order to practice economy in government.

When a crisis developed in New Mexico, the viceroy demanded action, which in most cases was expensive. A militia needed to be raised, horses and arms had to be found. The Indian allies had to be compensated for their help. A policy of constant defense and aid to New Mexico probably would have been cheaper than the haphazard method of crisis financing that Mexico City followed.

Viceregal authority, on the other hand, carried little real weight in New Mexico. Orders were given to the governor who generally executed them. However, local officials time and again refused to put into effect some policies demanded by Mexico City. The governor was interested in carrying out viceregal orders, but often they were so impossible that all he could do was hope that bureaucrats at lower levels would do what was right. The frontier situation in New Mexico demanded that orders from higher authorities be simple and easy to fulfill; if they were not, the matter was decided locally, for good or for bad. 42 Mexico City was forced to modify its policies to existing conditions. Sadly, authorities in the capital did not see it that way, while at Santa Fe they did. Since flexibility meant survival in New Mexico, viceregal orders were regarded as formalities and acted upon thusly.
A New Mexican felt his way along, day to day, and learned survival by trial and error. The Spanish, having made a major mistake in 1680, were determined not to let such a disaster befall them again. In this respect, the viceroy was well-informed, for he tried to keep the Spanish in New Mexico from abusing the natives. Yet in doing so the viceroy overestimated the dangers and put the governor in a position where in some cases such basic institutions as the barter system were endangered. 43

The governor of New Mexico depended heavily on the military to keep the province secure. The army had problems and in 1708 the Marques had to order the officers of the presidio at Santa Fe to keep the troops in better order. The problem was familiar. Looting, mistreatment of local residents, and disobeying orders were the chief complaints. The soldiers often caused as many problems for New Mexico as the natives. The troops were poorly paid or, more often, not paid at all. They were required to supply their own horses, weapons and clothing from a most meager salary. Further, they were brutalized by the officers. Hence, hostilities were sometimes taken out on those who could not defend themselves, particularly the Indians. These problems caused the government no end of worry so that from time to time the governor had to issue orders demanding better discipline and less sloth. 44

In 1709 Peñuela undertook one major military expedition against the Navajos to the west. He raised a militia and prepared to protect the westernmost pueblos of Acoma and Zuñi. 45 It took nearly a year to organize the expedition, as seen in the fact that late in 1709 the governor still was issuing orders for the muster of militiamen. 46 The Spanish were successful in driving back the Navajos. A peace was developed in late 1709 and early 1710.

One of the last incidents in the era of Peñuela was a suit between himself and former governor Francisco Cuervo y Valdes. This legal battle became complicated because the Church, particularly Fray Juan de Tagle, Franciscan custodio, took the side of Cuervo while the cabildo of Santa Fe sided with the Marques. 47 In October, 1710 the cabildo took up the case; of complaints by Cuervo against Peñuela. Peñuela accused Cuervo of misdeeds in office and the former governor sued for slander. The upshot was that Peñuela was found not guilty of slander by the cabildo and Cuervo shrank back into obscurity. 48

The balance of Peñuela's term was quiet. Other than the normal court cases and the flow of viceregal decrees, life in New Mexico became more and more peaceful. In 1712 the Marques notified New Mexicans that a caravan would leave for New Spain in May and asked that those who wished to join it report to him. 49 Other events included the distribution of tools at Santa Cruz in early 1712 along with petitions of soldiers trying to recover back pay or win promotions. 50 An investigation of administration by former governor Cuervo y Valdes was also carried out, but without any conclusive findings. 51

Final decrees made by Peñuela were that September 16th should be celebrated as the official anniversary of Diego de Vargas' conquest, an order which has been carried out to this day. 52 In 1712 when term of governor expired for the Marques, he was replaced by Juan Ignacio Flores Mogollon, former governor of Nuevo Leon. After he assumed office on October 5, 1712, one of his first orders was a residencia of the Marques de la Peñuela. The residencia was favorable for the former governor who left New Mexico with a good record. 53

The terms of governors Cuervo y Valdes and the Marques de la Peñuela can be characterized as generally efficient administrations that tried to keep New Mexico on an even keel. Neither man's term was marked by any brilliance. Both managed to keep hostile natives at bay. Both were able to expand outward from Santa Fe and Santa Cruz. The establishment of Albuquerque was a major step in the continuing commitment of Spain to New Mexico. The establishment of new Indian pueblos such as Galisteo was equally significant. Cuervo y Valdes was probably more active and productive than his successor. He tried to spread the population of New Mexico more evenly. The Marques de la Peñuela's government was more a "housekeeping" administration.

Both men, following Vargas' great conquests, were overshadowed by greatness. In order to function both governors did their best to look good in the eyes of the viceroy. In doing so, they were able to keep the province under control and to expand it on a modest scale.
NOTES

1 Notification of death of Marques de las Navas Brazinas, to Viceroy, Duke of Alburquerque, also inventory of estate, April 20, 1704, in SANM.
2 Petition of residents of Santa Fe to cabildo, November 5, 1704 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
3 Petition of Nicolas Moreno de Trujillo to Governor Cuero y Valdes, March 15-March 27, 1705 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
4 The years 1695-1705 show no record of petitions asking to leave.
5 Petition of Luisa Navarro to move to El Paso del Norte, April 29, 1705, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
6 Petition of citizens of Santa Fe and Order of Governor Cuero y Valdes, March 28, 1705, in SANM.
7 Order of Governor Cuero y Valdes, August 25, 1705 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
8 Order by Fray Juan Alvarez forbidding friars to come to Santa Fe without permission, November 12, 1793. Read at Santa Fe, Pecos, Bernalillo (Sandia), Zia, Jemez, Acoma and Cochiti, in Patentes, AASF.
9 Order banishing Francisco Ortiz, October 22, 1705 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
10 Petition of Francisco Duran y Chavez, February 2, 1705, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
11 Order forbidding gambling, Governor Cuero y Valdes, May 8, 1705, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
12 Cabildo of Santa Fe to Governor Cuero y Valdes, June 1-8, 1705, in SANM.
13 Governor Cuero y Valdes, order against illegal trade with hostiles, August 25, 1705 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
14 See Max L. Moorhead, New Mexico's Royal Road (Norman, 1958), for a description of New Mexican trade.
16 Lagojo 10, 1793, BNM, Census for 1793. This census, while late, shows large families, often in excess of twenty people.
17 Order of Governor Cuero y Valdes, August 25, 1705 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
19 Francisco Ramieres vs. Baltasar Romero, April 27, 1705, at Santa Fe, in SANM. This lawsuit over a modest Sonoran trade reveals that New Mexico was importing far more than she could ever hope to export.
20 Hubert Howe Bancroft describes New Mexico's climate and soil conditions thus. See: H. H. Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico (San Francisco, 1889), p. 28.
21 Grant to Diego Arias de Quiros, at Santa Fe, March 23, 1717 in Ralph E. Twitchell, The Spanish Archives of New Mexico (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1914), 2 Vols.
22 Distribution records of 1695, May 8, 1695, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
23 Royal Proclamation, April 7, 1717 in Ritch Collection, Huntington Library.
24 Loose Documents, Santa Fe, No. 1, 1707 and Mexico City, No. 1, May 18, 1709 in AASF.
25 Loose Documents, Santa Fe, No. 2; San Ildefonso, No. 3; San Felipe, No. 4; all 1696 and Santa Fe, No. 1, 1696, in AASF.
26 The Duke of Alburquerque's name was originally spelled with an extra "r" that was dropped years after his death. The town of Albuquerque appears to have been spelled in the "modern" fashion from its founding.
27 Duke of Alburquerque, to Governor Cuero y Valdes, February 28, 1706, at Mexico City, in SANM.
28 Governor Cuero y Valdes, Order for Moqui campaign, September 18, 1706, at Santa Fe, in SANM. The Duke of Alburquerque also ordered this campaign on July 30, 1706, in SANM.
30 Duke of Alburquerque to Governor Cuero y Valdes, July 30, 1706, at Mexico City, in SANM.
31 Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, pp. 228-229.
32 Marques de la Peñuela, Order forbidding sale of horses from royal horseherd without permission, August 11, 1707, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
33 Marques de la Peñuela, Order forbidding gambling, August 31, 1707, at Santa Fe, SANM.
34 Marques de la Peñuela, Order for inspection of arms, September 15, 1707, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
35 Duke of Alburquerque to Marques de la Peñuela, Order to keep guns in working order, July 7, 1707, at Mexico City, in SANM.
36 Indians of San Juan, petition to governor, December 29, 1707, at San Juan, in SANM.
37 Proceedings against Catherine Lujan, Catherine Rosa, and Angelina Pumazho of San Juan, May 13-31, 1708, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
38 Alburquerque to Peñuela, Order for economy, July 4, 1708, at Mexico City, in SANM.
39 Alburquerque to Peñuela, Order to protect Indians, July 7, 1708, at Mexico City, in SANM.
40 Alburquerque to Peñuela, Order to start proceedings against Juan Paez Hurtado for extortion of Indians, July 7, 1708, at Mexico City, in SANM.
41 Alburquerque to Peñuela, Order to protect settlers, July 7, 1708, at Mexico City, in SANM.
42 There are a number of cases that lack compliance on the local level. For example, the governor was forced to issue a strong order to the residents of Alburquerque who refused to muster for inspection in 1708. This was in addition to the July 7, 1708 viceregal order. Peñuela to cabildo of Alburquerque, July, 1708, in SANM.
43 Alburquerque to Peñuela, Order to use care in securing allegiance of Indians, December 4, 1708, at Mexico City, in SANM.
44 Marques de la Peñuela, Order concerning the lack of discipline among the troops, July 11-13, 1708 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
45 Marques de la Peñuela, Order raising militia for campaign against the Navajo, February 28, 1709, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
46 Marques de la Peñuela, Order raising militia for campaign against the Navajo, December 8, 1709, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
47 Cabildo of Santa Fe, complaint against Cuervo y Valdes, April 7-8, 1710, at Santa Fe in SANM.
48 Cabildo of Santa Fe, proceedings in the case of Francisco Cuervo y Valdes vs. the Marques de la Peñuela, October 10-13, 1710 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
50 Orders of the Marques de la Penuela for the distribution of tools at Santa Cruz, January 10, 1712 and petitions of the soldiers of Santa Fe to the cabildo and governor, August 1, 1712, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
51 Transcript of investigation of Francisco Cuervo y Valdes, May 28-May 31, 1712 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
52 Marques de la Penuela, Order to celebrate September 16 as Vargas day, September 16, 1712 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
53 Juan Ignacio Flores Mogollon, Order for residencia of Marques de la Peñuela, October 21, 1712, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
Chapter IV

New Mexico’s Time of Troubles, 1710-1723

With the arrival of Juan Ygnacio Flores Mogollon, the Spanish further committed themselves to New Mexico. Flores Mogollon found that he was faced with many of the same matters that plagued his predecessors: continuing defense, population growth, and a growing government. The situation with the Indians was brought to his attention in 1712 when twenty-one residents of Albuquerque petitioned him for six soldiers to help guard against raiding Apaches. The governor agreed and dispatched six men from the Santa Fe garrison. 1

Flores Mogollon also dealt with emigration. On November 1, 1712 he reported that forty-seven persons were absent from the province, thirty-six of them without permission. 2 The system of passes was still in effect and the government tried to keep track of its residents, for every man was needed to defend the area.

Another matter that caught the attention of the governor was that of an illegal trade in horses and guns with the Apache, Utes, Comanches, and other tribes. In December the governor ordered that trade with non-Christian Indians be stopped. His reason was that such trade encouraged further depredations, and New Mexico was in no position to defend itself against massive Indian raids. 3 Hostiles trading with both Pueblo Indians and Spaniards were allowed to come to the fringes of population centers where exchanges occurred. The fact that Indians were able to get so close to settlements caused them to consider raiding these areas. Flores Mogollon felt that it was better to keep the raiders a good distance from the valleys of New Mexico.

Another major concern of the government was that of army morale, especially lack of pay. Petitions asking for back pay, can be found in every administration; Flores Mogollon’s was no different. In 1713, 1714, and 1715 petitions were submitted to the governor. It was not the fault of local government that New Mexico’s soldiers were not paid. The troops belonged to the King’s army and merely had the misfortune to be sent to New Mexico. When funds from the central government were not available, the army was simply not paid. Worse, local monies were not sufficient to support troops, and even had the local government raised the money by taxation, the tax base undoubtedly was too slight for a self-sustaining army. Despite the fact that troops did not get paid regularly, they remained loyal and continued the fight against hostile Indians. 4

The years 1713 and 1714 were plagued with Indian problems. In August, 1713 some of the soldiers in Santa Fe testified that while they were on a mission escorting travelers to El Paso del Norte, they were attacked by Apaches. The governor wanted to know the strength of the raiders. He also asked about the vital route to El Paso which, as of August, appeared to be in danger. He was told that the Apaches were working out of the Sandia Mountains near Albuquerque and appeared to be only a small raiding party. Satisfied, Flores Mogollon took no further action. 5

Another situation that affected both the Spanish and the hostiles was the matter of stray animals. In April, 1714 Flores Mogollon ordered that strays should be recovered in order to prevent Indian raids. The governor noted that loose stock gave the hostiles a reason for raiding. Keeping animals together reduced the danger of raids against the herds. 6

Another matter that concerned Flores Mogollon was with Indian marriages. In April 1714 he ordered that married couples in Indian pueblos should live together rather than with their individual parents, as was the custom. He expressed the fear that the old way of Indian life, that is, living with one’s parents would cause bad marriages and represented reversion to Indian habits that the Spanish were trying to break. The governor also cited the Church as wanting couples to obey the rules of marriage and “live together according to the order of our holy mother Church.” 7

The early years of the eighteenth century saw a growth of court cases. Naturally, the civil and criminal case load rose as did the population. Numerous cases came before the governor and included crimes such as slander, desertion, murder, assault, rape, wife-beating, and robbery. 8

Two basic types of cases appeared in New Mexican justice. A civil matter usually dealt with lawsuits for damages. For example, in the suit of Miguel de Dios
and Ramon de Medina over the death of Dios’ mule while in the care of Medina. When Dios sued for damages, the court found Medina negligent and ordered him to pay Dios the cost of the mule. 9 The value of mules and horses in the province was undisputed, and the death or injury of such animals could prove to be a financial disaster for the owner.

The other type of case was criminal, which included crimes such as murder, assault, rape, and robbery. However, Spanish justice was flexible and when a wrong was done, the person to whom the harm had occurred was often compensated by payment. In addition, the criminal was subject to fines, sometimes banishment, jail for a short time, or to being put to work “for the public good.” Other sentences were more severe. Murder rated exile to some horrible place like Bernalillo (Sandia), Pecos, or Acoma, while if committed with malice, hanging was standard fare.

Above all, justice in New Mexico had to match the frontier situation in which it operated. For example, the case of Nicolas de Chavez shows that criminals were treated in a manner that punished them, yet left them usable members of society. In the case of Chavez, July 10-20, 1714, the defendant was charged with raping Juana Montaño, the widow of Pedro de Chavez. Nicolas was indicted in November and tried during that month. Testimony shows that he promised to marry the Montaño woman and, after having taken advantage of her, he refused to carry out his agreement. The woman charged him with breach of promise and rape. Chavez confessed to his crime and was found guilty of both charges. His penalty was that he had to marry Juana Montaño as agreed, truly a life sentence! 10

New Mexico cannot be said to have been a crime-ridden province. There seems to be the normal indiscretions among its citizens. Adultery, rape, and other mistreatment of women, along with occasional murders was committed. Figuring the population of New Mexico in 1710-14 at around 20,000 including Pueblo Indians and Spanish settlers, the murder rate is one percent. The assault rate is four percent, while the rate for rape during the years 1710-14 is one-fourth of one percent. This figure indicates a low crime rate for the frontier. 11

Law enforcement was left to the governor, the cabildo, and local alcaldes. Generally, crimes were of a nature that permitted swearing out warrants by the victims. In those cases that were undertaken by the provincial government, the governor could swear a warrant for arrest. In a major crime, such as the murder of a high official, mutiny, or sedition, the viceroy would order the arrest of the offender. The incidence of viceregal intervention was very low. 12

The judicial system worked downward from local level to the governor. Should a person be charged with a crime, the alcalde mayor took testimony from witnesses, the victim and the person charged. Then there might be a local trial or the case might go to Santa Fe, where the cabildo and governor would sit in judgment. In some instances, local difficulties were settled on the spot and the results were sent to Santa Fe for the governor’s approval. The governor had final say in all cases and he could increase or decrease a sentence as he saw fit. Generally, the governor pronounced sentence himself. All records then were sent to Santa Fe, where the governor signed them and sent copies to Mexico City for the files. Most trials of any consequence were transcribed in triplicate to provide copies for local files, the Mexico City archives and the repository at Seville. Because local officials and the government at Santa Fe kept tight control over its residents, vigilante groups were not needed in the province. The appearance of a “lawless” society never came about in New Mexico. The threat of Indian attacks kept the people of New Mexico armed, thus there was always a danger of violence. Certainly brawls broke out at cantinas and occasionally someone was knifed, but almost never shot. Shooting was rare because the guns themselves were muzzle-loading long-barreled weapons that were unwieldy to use and were good for one shot a minute, with luck. Visions of a showdown at high noon between a black clad villain and the town sheriff were not found in New Mexico. There were limited numbers of “bad guys” and no alcalde would ever consider facing them down; soldiers were sent to make the arrest.

More common than guns was the use of knives and clubs. It was cheaper and easier to use a knife or stick, and usually no one was killed in the fights that took place. Sentences for scuffles were light, and generally the victim was compensated for his injuries. Despite a rough frontier society in New Mexico was more civilized than might be expected. 13

New Mexico’s major problem remained Indians. An uneasy peace had prevailed for nearly twenty years, but in 1715 a new state of unrest occurred, caused in
part by poor conditions among the natives and in part by the Spanish. In early 1714 Lorenzo Rodriguez, a Spaniard, was tried and found guilty of trying to start a rebellion among the Apache Indians. He was jailed for eight months for his part in the plot, which failed due to lack of Indian support. There is no indication of what happened to any native conspirators. In June of that same year, the governor investigated another attempted rebellion, among the Jemez Indians. He found that the natives resented the presence of Franciscan friars in the pueblos of Pecos and Jemez and also because of unusual weather the crops were poor. The normal discontent of a few natives was transmitted to the entire tribe which decided to revolt and remove the friars. The plot was reported and broken up by the Spanish. Wisely, the Jemez tribe was treated with kindness by the Spanish and there were no prosecutions.

The threat of insurrection among the Pueblos kept the Spanish alert, and in the year 1715 they were particularly wary. Everyone available was needed in case one of the several plots should jell. Because of the desperate need for manpower, few residents were permitted to leave. June of that year saw five persons on trial in Santa Fe for having left the province without permission. They were captured in New Spain and brought back by the military for trial. Bartolome Fardoño, Bernardino Fernandez, Carlos Lopes, Ramon Garcia Jurado, and Cristobal de Orellano were found guilty of deserting the province in time of dire need. They were sentenced to jail for indefinite terms.

From the time of Vargas, the army in New Mexico grew. In 1715 a muster roll of the Santa Fe garrison showed one hundred names. However, the number of men in the garrison was variable, since in 1715, 150 men signed a petition asking that Nuestra Señora de los Remedios be made their patroness. There is a difference of fifty men between the June 3 list and the June 4 petition.

Other settlements needed fewer soldiers. Albuquerque had six men in 1709, while Santa Cruz appears to have none. The Santa Fe garrison was large to provide for a more mobile defense unit for the province. In times of Indian raids the garrison might be reduced to a minimum and a “flying squad” of horsemen would be dispatched to a trouble spot.

The Santa Fe garrison contributed its share of criminal activity in the city. In August, 1715, Juan Lopes and Francisco de Rosas were charged with being drunk and attempting to rape an unidentified woman. Case records are not complete so the verdict is not known. Other matters involving the soldiery included problems like the situation of soldiers’ widows. In November, Antonia Duran, widow of Sergeant Pasqual Trujillo, petitioned the governor for help after the death of her husband. Since the families of deceased soldiers were left to the mercy of the government, the Spanish often had to provide for them until remarriage or removal to New Spain could occur. Certainly a soldier’s widow was confronted with the necessity of remarriage since neither widow’s benefits nor death benefits for soldiers existed. If a woman did not find a new husband, the chances of her and her children starving were quite good. However, remarriage does not seem to have been prevalent. The records do not show if Senora Duran got help.

The waning days of the Flores Mogollon administration saw a trial held in Santa Fe involving the deaths of cattle belonging to the Santa Cruz Indians. Santa Cruz residents, Francisco Lujan Romero, Joseph Vasquez y (?), and Santiago Romero, were the accused. They admitted the offense, arguing that it was done in order to prevent starvation of their families and since the natives never took good care of the stock, there was little harm in killing a few cows. The government took a different view. Anything that could upset the Indians was considered highly dangerous. These men had killed cattle belonging to friendly natives. The men were found guilty.

One might suspect, from the testimony, that Spanish residents were justified in their needs. But to insure peace among the natives, the government was willing to consider only the Indians’ side of the story and condemn the men. This makes sense, considering the danger of Indian uprisings. Earlier that year Pecos and Jemez were reported near rebellion. The Spanish invariably tried to appease the natives even to the detriment of Spanish citizens.

A final judicial matter that required the attention of Flores Mogollon was that of will settlement. The estate of Gregorio Ramirez was brought to probate. His widow requested that she be given the power of attorney. A hearing was held and the deceased’s children, Angela,
Gertruda, Maria, Gregoria, Lupanda, Santiago, Bartolome and Roque Jazinto [large families were common] were put in the custody of their mother, Maria Fresque Ramirez. While a simple settlement is of no real interest, the composition of the family is of great importance. This was a middle-to-upper-class Santa Fe family in 1715. The settlement of the estate was sizeable, a house, land, cattle, and belongings being left to the widow. Indications are that this wealth was unusual in Santa Fe and that the estate was of a man of considerable standing in the community. 

In November, 1715, Flores Mogollon was replaced by Felix Martines, who was appointed governor ad interim on October 30, 1715. A former captain of the presidio at Santa Fe, Martines, upon gaining power, imprisoned Flores Mogollon and kept the former governor embroiled in lawsuits for two years. While Martines was governor, his lack of concern toward the residents of New Mexico and his shabby treatment of Flores Mogollon did not make him a popular figure in the province. Martines took over on November 23, 1715 and at once issued orders. His first order prohibited carrying weapons in “cities, towns and villages.” The prohibition included knives, clubs, large swords, pistols and carbines. Violations would be punishable by fine and/or jail. It is significant that the governor felt the problem of too many weapons was worth dealing with to prevent violence.

Felix Martines’ term differed from his predecessors in that it began with a legal battle over the governorship, and ended with Martines being recalled. For the first time since Vargas’ days, a governor was in jail while his successor fought to retain his title.

Day to day concerns also kept Martines busy. These included judicial review, appeasing the military element in Santa Fe, dealing with natives, the election of local officials and consideration of various petitions. The governor also desired that certain civic improvements be made. In 1716 he ordered that all alcaldes should see that the roads of the province were kept clear and secure and roadsides should also be cleared to prevent bandits hiding in the bushes.

One of the most important efforts of Martines’ administration was the continuing campaign against the ever hostile Moqui (Hopi) Indians. This was more or less an annual event in New Mexico. Despite the fact that the Moqui were not harming anyone and their depredations were generally ineffective, the Spanish saw their stand atop the mesas as defiance to Spanish order. Other Indians could look to the Moqui and see that they were not crushed. The Spanish, always fearing rebellion, believed that to conquer the Moqui would destroy the last inclinations of resistance in New Mexico.

Martines planned to carry out his efforts against the Moqui by using Spanish soldiers and Pueblo Indian allies. His idea was to force the Moqui to move to the Rio Grande valley in order to prevent raiding. In 1716 Martines gathered a detachment of seventy Spanish soldiers from Santa Fe. He also levied a manpower quota on the settlers in Albuquerque and Santa Cruz. Also, he ordered the alcalde of the pueblos to send men to help in the campaign.

He stated that as of August 18, 1716 the following pueblos were to furnish these numbers of men: Taos, fifteen; Picuris, ten; San Juan, ten; Santa Clara, four; Cochiti, twenty; Santo Domingo, ten; San Felipe, twenty; San Ildefonso, ten; Pojoaque, five; Nambe, five; Tesuque, ten; Pecos, thirty; Galisteo, four; Santa Ana, twelve; Zia, twenty-five; Jemez, twenty; Isleta, five; Laguna, ten; Acoma, twenty-five; and Zuñi, twenty, for a total of 282. The governor offered further inducements by providing pardons for Spanish or Indian men who were sentenced for crimes, since those who wished to join the expedition would be freed.

Antonio Lopes, Marcos Montoya and Felix Martines (no relation) seemed to be the only pardoned members of the expedition.

The Moqui campaign began with peaceful gestures, such as the presentation of a large cross and handfuls of tobacco. The Indians accepted these tokens of amity but refused to come down from the heights. Pueblo Indian representatives were sent in twice but failed to obtain results. Finally, Martines, following the advice of his junta de guerra decided to reduce the pueblos (there were three mesas) by direct attack. He determined to starve out the natives so he burned crops surrounding the mesas and ran off Moqui livestock. This did no good, and after sixteen days of siege and facing a water shortage Martines retreated to the Rio Grande and the Moquis remained undefeated on their mesas.

Martines’ other major expedition was against the Utes and Comanches. The Comanches were the dominant tribe in the northeastern part of New Mexico. They
were nomadic plains Indians that hunted buffalo and moved as demanded by the movement of their food. The Comanches raided Pueblo Indians for food and clothing. The Spanish found that their threat had to be dealt with before the province's economy was destroyed. For several hundred years, however, the Comanches had complete control of the southern Great Plains, forcing the Spanish forcing to use Jicarilla Apache and Carlan Apache as buffers against the Comanches. The Utes, on the other hand, roamed the rugged lands just north of Taos into what is present-day Colorado. This tribe was also nomadic and it preyed upon the tribes of the Rio Grande. The Utes also controlled the San Luis Valley and the San Juan Mountains. Their hunting grounds were the Sangre de Cristo Mountains, the San Juans, and the Colorado Plateau. When the Spanish moved into New Mexico, the Utes were a problem that needed to be solved. For over a hundred years nothing could be done because the Utes dissolved into the Colorado mountains and all efforts to bring them out of their wilderness hiding place were total failures.  

Diego de Vargas found the Utes to be strong adversaries when he visited the San Luis Valley [Colorado] in 1696 as part of his pacification program around Taos. Martines, determined to stop raiding by these two tribes, sent 112 men to Taos in October 1716, where a few minor engagements resulted. However, no solid results were obtained. 

On September 20, 1716 Martines was informed that he was being replaced by Antonio Valverde y Cossio, a former captain of the presidio at El Paso del Norte. The viceroy, hearing of the sorry state of affairs in New Mexico, appointed Valverde to replace the incompetent Martines. Martines was then told to report directly to the Viceroy Marques de Valero to explain his actions and why the province was progressing so poorly.

In the meantime, Valverde, the man who had defended Vargas before the Spanish crown fifteen years before, came to Santa Fe to take office. However, Martines refused to turn over his records or to vacate the governor's palace. New Mexico now had two governors as Valverde and Martines vied for control of the province. When Valverde went before the cabildo of Santa Fe to gain support for his appointment, he was given its help. Martines, however, refused to recognize the new governor and continued issuing orders, including permission for citizens to leave the province, as if nothing had happened.

It was only in 1717 that Felix Martines left, first for El Paso del Norte and then, under viceregal orders, to Mexico City. Before he left Santa Fe he appointed Juan Paez Hurtado, scion of an old and distinguished New Mexican family, to succeed him. This further complicated the situation, for now there were two "governors"; one appointed by the viceroy and one elevated by Martines.

Hurtado's first and only administrative act was the announcement of the betrothal of King Philip V of Spain to Isabel Farnesio, Princess of Parma. While Hurtado was in nominal command at Santa Fe. Martines went on to Mexico City, taking with him former governor Juan Ygnacio Flores Mogollon as a favorable witness. Valverde also was ordered to appear before the Viceroy Marques de Valero, who would decide the legitimate governor of New Mexico. However, Valverde, under viceregal orders to take Martines to El Paso, claimed he was ill and remained in Santa Fe. Valverde had no intention of becoming involved with Martines at Mexico City. Valverde took refuge with his friend Fray Juan de Tagle so that his "illness" could be verified if necessary.

In Mexico City charges were filed against Martines, largely based on testimony of Flores Mogollon. In response, Martines filed counter-charges against Flores Mogollon and Valverde. After months of litigation, Antonio Valverde y Cossio was finally confirmed governor of New Mexico in 1718, a post he held for the normal five year term.

A residencia was held for Martines in 1723, and the examiners found against the former governor, disgracing him and putting an end to his political career. Flores Mogollon, also examined by a residencia, was cleared of all charges and he retired peacefully.

Valverde's term began with a controversy caused by Felix Martines. The turmoil that occurred did not represent the usual orderly transition of government in the province. Nonetheless, Valverde upon taking office found that certain ills had to be corrected. In 1718 he issued an order prohibiting the sale of horses from the royal horse herd by soldiers. He also took depositions by the soldiers from Santa Fe against Felix Martines which were forwarded to Mexico City and used against the former governor. The continuing problem
of Spanish trespass on Indian lands also concerned the new governor. In August, 1717, Lieutenant Governor Pedro de Villasur issued an order forbidding trespass on the lands of San Juan pueblo. He ordered "all citizens of this jurisdiction to cease and desist feeding their cattle on the said land. . . ." 43

Valverde’s career included several campaigns against hostile natives. In 1719 he organized an expedition against the Utes, who were raiding in the north of New Mexico. He led a force of 105 New Mexicans with 30 Indian allies into southeastern Colorado and southwestern Kansas looking for Comanches, but with no results. 44 Valverde’s other Indian campaign was the annual attempt to conquer the Moqui. Despite raising an assault force in 1721, he never managed to get started, for in that year the Spanish government sent Juan de Estrada y Austria as juez de residencia (resident judge), and Valverde was too busy attending to him to continue the Indian wars. 45 In that year, Valverde was succeeded as governor by Juan Domingo de Bustamante. As governor, Valverde was little more than a caretaker until a governor from New Spain could be appointed. His administration saw little advance. He did organize several Indian campaigns, including what became known as the Villasur disaster. He was able to keep the judicial and governmental systems of New Mexico functioning until his successor arrived.

Of the various cases and petitions he handled, several indicate the type of society that he ruled. A limited number of cases dealt with murder and robbery. Others included petitions such as that given by Joseph Garcia for permission to instruct the youth Bisente de Armijo in the art of tailoring. 46 This indicates that an artisan class had developed in New Mexico. That such a youth was being apprenticed suggests that the economic situation in the province was improving. Other indicators of economic recovery can be seen in the fact that for the first time a brand for cattle was registered in 1716.

It showed that enough cattle were raised so a register had to be established to stop thieves and to prevent the mixing of cattle.

During this period most of the civil suits dealt with economic matters. Cattle, horses, and land deals all came into the courts. There may have been a good deal of internal business in the province, for the number of debt cases, contract settlements, and land sales increased considerably from 1710 to 1720. 48

The Spanish also had problems with the Indians and their insistence on adhering to old ways. In one case an unnamed native of Taos was accused of using peyote for religious purposes. He said that he used this drug in order to gain knowledge of his native gods. The Church said he refused to recognize the true god. For his offense he was sentenced to jail. 49 The significance of this case is not in the use of peyote, but rather that the natives had not given up their own religion despite continued teachings by Franciscan friars. The Indians were certainly interested in the old ways of life that many of the older tribe members could recall and, much to the dismay of the Spanish, secret religious rites were held by nearly all the tribes of the jurisdiction of New Mexico.

On March 22, 1722 Juan Domingo de Bustamante took office as governor of New Mexico. He was a royal appointee and he held office for two terms, his administration ending in 1731. 50 One of Bustamante’s first duties was to host the visitation of juez visitador of presidios, Antonio Cobian Busto. Cobian Busto, having toured the province, ordered that new settlements north of Taos be established to prevent further Indian intrusions. He suggested a permanent establishment at El Cuartelejo, on the far southeastern Colorado plains [or southwestern Kansas]. Taos should be strengthened as the most expedient method of solving the raiding Indian problem. 51 Apparently Cobian Busto found the presidio at Santa Fe sadly lacking in protection and, more importantly, he questioned why New Mexico was not more fully settled and economically self-sufficient. In October 1722 a junta was held in Santa Fe to determine why the country from Chihuahua north to Santa Fe was not more fully populated by “prosperous and tribute-paying Spaniards.” 52

The reason was the small numbers of Spaniards in the area. These people feared Indian raids. Others, hearing about the terrors of the north, refused to settle the area. It was suggested that a presidio of fifty men and a settlement of 200 families be established at Socorro, and another presidio of fifty men be settled in the “mineral rich” area of Aguatuví. 53 These settlements apparently got nowhere, due to the fact that the Spanish government would have to spend money in recruiting settlers and then would have to support them until the area could be fully self-supporting. The expenses

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involved made the viceroy settle for what he already had.

As of 1722 New Mexico seems to have expanded by possibly 3,000 souls, not nearly enough to satisfy officials in Mexico City. 54

Indications are that some limited economic growth took place during the period. Small items like the registry of brands, the apprenticeship of young boys to skilled masters, the legal battles over land, cattle, and businesses, the problem of debts and debtors, and contracts between merchants all point to an economic upswing. As the province became stronger, more and more civil suits were recorded.

Over a period of ten years, 1710-1720, the number of suits dealing with business matters doubled. This may be due to better record keeping on the part of the government or to the fact that the earlier documents of this nature were lost. Nonetheless, there are indications that New Mexico was on its way to economic recovery.

Another indicator of growth in New Mexico was in the increase of crime in the province. There are two possible reasons for this. One, the population indeed did grow, as did the economy, and this led to an increase in criminal activity. Another possibility is that so little growth occurred that men took to crime in order to survive the rigors of a frontier world. If this is true, then there should have been more burglaries, cattle thefts, and robberies than indicated. Proportionally, there were more crimes of passion such as rape, murder, adultery, and assault than crimes like theft.

The period also saw continued actions against raiding Indians such as the Apache, Moqui, and Utes. Invariably campaigns against these tribes were failures. This was because, with the exception of the Moqui, the natives were raiders who could easily sweep down upon the Spanish and then be gone by the time a force could be assembled. Organized expeditions were doomed to failure because they hunted shadows among the mountains in the north. To find a group of raiders in such terrain was just beyond the capabilities of the Spanish, even with the help of Pueblo auxiliaries.

The Moqui were another matter. They were pueblo people who had excellent fortresses. The Spanish tried to starve them out, burn them out, and then force them out by direct attack. But the Moqui could easily repel invaders and keep them at bay. In short, the Indian campaigns of the period were of little value and did nothing to control the raiders of the plains.

The period from 1713-1723 was one of continued defense, limited growth, and mediocre government. Infighting among various officials did little to help New Mexico develop, and Bustamante's arrival was the first real hope for New Mexico's future since the death of Vargas. In Bustamante, it was hoped New Mexico had a governor who was willing to help the province grow and prosper.
NOTES

1 Petition of residents of Albuquerque, October 13, 1712, at Albuquerque, in SANM.
2 List of residents absent from New Mexico, November 1, 1712, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
3 Order of Juan Ygnacio Floreis Mogollon against trade with non-Christian Indians, December 16, 1712 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
4 Soldiers of Santa Fe, petition to governor, July 15, 1713; Petition, November 2-19, 1715; petition to governor, November 2-June 12, 1714-1715, and power of attorney for soldiers May 30, 1714, all at Santa Fe, in SANM.
5 Testimony of soldiers, August 2-9, 1713 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
6 Order of Governor Floreis Mogollon, April 30, 1714, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
7 Ibid, April 30, 1714.
8 The following cases are examples: Maria de Benavides vs. Antonia Moraga for slander, July 12-August 7, 1713; Trial of Pedro Lopes for desertion, October 30-November 16, 1713; Proceedings against Bartolome Fardoño, May 4-July 4, 1715; Proceedings against Miguel Lujan, April 20, 1713; and Proceedings against Phelipe Lujan for mistreatment of wife, July 14-August 22, 1713.
9 Suit of Miguel de Dios vs. Ramon de Medina, October 18-20, 1712, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
10 Proceedings against Nicolas de Chavez, July 10-July 20, 1714 and October 2-November 10, 1714 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
11 These figures were determined by computing the numbers of each crime committed during a four year period and then comparing them to an estimated population of 20,000 persons. All cases were drawn from SANM.
12 From 1696 to 1776 there were recorded three instances of viceregal orders for arrest, one being the Duke of Linares' order for the arrest of Sebastian Maldonado, April 23, 1715, at Mexico City, in SANM.
13 Records in SANM indicate that the principal weapons used were knives and clubs. For example, Governor Felix Martines had to order in 1715 that the carrying of arms such as knives, clubs, large swords [espadas largas] as well as guns in population areas was illegal. Order of Governor Felix Martines, December 14, 1715, at Santa Fe in SANM.
14 Criminal proceedings against Lorenzo Rodriguez, November 23-1715 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
15 Proceedings regarding the insurrection attempt among the Jemez Indians, June 1715, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
16 Criminal proceedings against five residents, June 25-29, 1715 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
17 Muster List of Santa Fe presidio, June 3, 1715, at Santa Fe in SANM.
18 Petitions of soldiers of Santa Fe, June 4, 1715, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
19 Muster List, above, and Petitions, above, show totals that reflect the strength of the garrison in 1715.
21 Proceedings against Juan Lopes and Francisco de Rosas, August 14-19, 1715 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
22 Petition of Antonia Duran for aid, November 2-11, 1715, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
23 Proceedings against three citizens of Santa Cruz, August 28, 1715-April 28, 1716, at Santa Cruz and Santa Fe, in SANM.
24 Proceedings in the settlement of the estate of Gregorio Ramirez, November 11, 1715, at Santa Fe in SANM.
25 Certificate to King [for assumption of power by governor], November 23, 1715, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
26 Order of Felix Martines, forbidding carrying of arms in towns, December 14, 1715, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
27 Election of local officials, January 1, 1716, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
28 Order to maintain roads, Felix Martines, April 16, 1716, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
29 Oakah L. Jones, Pueblo Warriors and Spanish Conquest, pp. 94-95.
30 Orders for pardons for those wishing to enlist in Moqui campaign, by Felix Martines, August 3, 1716 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
31 Petitions of three volunteers for the Moqui campaign, August 3-8, 1716, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

33 Felix Martines, *Junta de guerrea*, regarding campaign against Ute and Comanche, October 14-December 10, 1716, at Santa Fe in SANM.

34 Marques de Valero, Orders to Felix Martines to surrender government of New Mexico to Antonio Valverde y Cossio, September 30, 1716, at Mexico City, in SANM.

35 Valverde y Cossio, to cabildo of Santa Fe, notifications, December 7-9, 1716 at Santa Fe, in SANM.

36 Felix Martines, Permission to Juan de Atienza Alcalá to leave province, December 15, 1716, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

37 Felix Martines, Order to Sergeant Domingo Misquía for escort to El Paso del Norte, January 10, 1717 at Santa Fe, in SANM.

38 Juan Paez Hurtado, Order directing celebration of betrothal of King Philip V, February 6, 1717 at Santa Fe, in SANM.

39 Juan Ygnacio Flores Mogollón, to Francisco Buenode Bohorques, regarding the charges of Felix Martines, September 26, 1717, at Mexico City, in SANM.

40 *Residencia of Felix Martines*, unfavorable judgment, August 16, 1723, at Mexico City, in SANM.

41 Order of Valverde y Cossio, prohibiting the sale of horses from royal horseherd, July 17, 1718, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

42 Depositions of soldiers of Santa Fe against Felix Martines, July 30, 1718, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

43 Pedro de Villasur, Order forbidding trespass on the lands of San Juan pueblo, August 11, 1718 at Santa Fe, in SANM.

44 *Junta de Guerra and correspondence of the Ute campaign*, August 9-19, 1719, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

45 Order of Valverde y Cossio for muster of citizens for proposed Apache campaign, August 9, 1720, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

46 Petition of Joseph Garcia to instruct youth, October 21, 1720 at Santa Fe, in SANM.

47 Diego Marques, Registry of brand, October 24, 1716, at Santa Cruz, in SANM.

48 For example: *Civil and criminal complaint of Juan de Dios against Juan Antonio Lopes, June 20-July 3, 1719, at Santa Cruz*, and Ygnacio Roybal, petition regarding the collection of debts, November 26, 1718, at Santa Fe, both in SANM.

49 Proceedings in case of Taos Indian for use of peyote, February 3-8, 1719, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

50 Juan Domingo de Bustamante, *Act of possession of government*, March 2, 1722, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

51 Antonio Cobian Busto, Order for council, October 10, 1722 at Santa Fe, in SANM.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

Chapter V

Rumors of the French in New Mexico, 1723-1737

In 1723 Juan Domingo de Bustamante took office and promptly issued new orders. He again banned the sale of horses and guns, to Indians and settlers. This suggests that the military of Santa Fe still suffered from inadequate pay, for they sold horses and weapons to raise funds. This problem evidently had not improved since the last petitions for pay were submitted in 1713, 1714 and 1715.

Additionally, the governor certified the number of soldiers at the presidio of Santa Fe at twenty-two men, a decline from the 100 to 150 men listed in 1715. Possibly the figures given in 1715 were for the whole of New Mexico, and included the mozos (small boys who helped the soldiers), volunteers, and local militia. The figure of twenty-two soldiers seems more reasonable, considering Albuquerque had only six military men stationed there. Spanish soldiers in New Mexico probably never exceeded 100 at any one time during this period.

Bustamante also kept busy with criminal cases. In 1723 he supervised proceedings against Martin Hurtado, alcalde mayor of Albuquerque, charged with malfeasance in office. The Hurtado case was alleged misuse of funds, favoritism, and general abuse of authority.

An entrenched bureaucracy developed in New Mexico. Many local officials were elected by their cabildos and were subject to the governor's approval before taking office. In principle this system offered local officials that were elected by those whom they would govern.

The major flaw in this system was that when one governor approved the election of local alcaldes and other officials, they could remain in office for a very long time. Spanish standard colonial policy was a five year term of office for governors. This was an increase of two years over the seventeenth century and was instituted because of the time lag in taking office. In any case, it was thus possible for one governor to approve of the election of local officials and then promptly leave office. The newly appointed man was thus provided with a ready-made local bureaucracy. While this system insured a continuous flow of government, it also bred a group of officials that were hard to eliminate. In no case could a new governor come to New Mexico and make a clean sweep of local officialdom.

Since the governor of New Mexico did not truly control the province and local officials did, each appointee had to get along with these men in order to make his term of office successful. Friction between a new governor and local bureaucrats would surely lead to trouble for the appointee, not some local alcalde.

Where local officials ruled, it was possible to engage in petty venality. On this level extortion, bribery, and favoritism often took place. Generally, bribes took the form of cattle, maize, permission to use someone's land, and sometimes cash. The problem of corruption in office was more prevalent in the pueblos than in Spanish settlements. In the case of pueblo (Spanish) officials, it was easy to browbeat the Indians into submission. There were numerous cases of extortion, forced labor, and the misuse of office in the Indian pueblos while the Spanish settlements saw far less abuse.

It must have been discouraging for a new governor to take office with great plans only to find that he had to face an established, venal bureaucracy that put a damper on his ideas and desires. Probably most men left disillusioned about the possibilities of any real progress. The status quo in New Mexico was maintained by local officials and any hopes for further settlement, economic expansion, and the continued existence of New Mexico as a viable Spanish province rested in their hands.

In 1724 Bustamante faced a major crisis. The problem was not the Indians, but the discovery that New Mexicans were trading with Frenchmen. This was indeed a disturbing development for the government. Testimony indicated that residents of northern New Mexico (Taos) traded with French intruders during the early 1720s. However, the reports also showed that nobody could report actually seeing a Frenchman, casting considerable doubt as to the whereabouts of the intruders. Most probably the goods, without question French, came from the Jicarilla Apache who obtained them from tribes to the east.
The rumors of French in New Mexico were not new. In 1695-1696 there were reports of a French visitation to the pueblo of Pecos. It was reported that “white men” traded with the natives there. An investigation revealed that, if anyone had been at Pecos, they were long gone and nobody could identify them. This information was passed on to Mexico City where it was viewed with alarm, but nothing was done.

The problem of France in the greater southwest began in the late seventeenth century when French explorers pushed southward from Canada. The first major effort at settlement came in 1685 when La Salle attempted to establish a colony along the Texas coast. It was wiped out by Indians and starvation. The disaster that befell La Salle put an end to French expansion until 1699 when Biloxi was founded along the Gulf Coast. In 1702 the French settled on Mobile Bay, whence they moved their capital to Louisiana. French interest in trade with the Spanish and Indians drew them westward during the early eighteenth century. In 1713 Louis Juchereau de Saint-Denis was dispatched to the Red River with trade goods worth several thousand dollars. He founded the town of Natchitoches. In 1714 he set out to trade with Spanish along the lower Rio Grande.

Learning of Saint-Denis' settlement, Spain worried about encroachment on what was traditionally Spanish soil. Since she did not have enough troops to drive out the French, nor could the French force the Spanish to give way, both sides courted the Texas Indians for support. It grew into a clash of systems: the Spanish missions versus France's free trade policy.

Spain in a countermove, occupied Texas in 1716. Once the Spanish settled, missions secured the land against all intruders. In 1716, the year of occupation, San Miguel de Linares was founded. In that year, Nuestra Señora de los Dolores, also in east Texas, was added. Other missions later founded in Texas included La Bahia, San Francisco de los Tejas, and San Antonio de Valero. In 1717 the presidio of San Antonio de Bexar was founded by an expedition led by Martin de Alarcon. This effort resolved questions about Spanish occupation of Texas and her defense of the Texas-Louisiana border.

The French had good reason to risk the dangers of Indians, Spanish, and nature, to reach settled areas like northern New Spain and New Mexico. Since France depended on trade to secure her claims, travel and exchange was of utmost importance. France did not have the population to settle an area as large as Canada and/or the Mississippi Valley, so she had to win the friendship of the natives and to depend upon them to hold the land “in trust” until the nation was ready to settle on a permanent basis. In order to win the Indians over, France found it cheaper and more reliable to trade with them rather than to attempt to settle the natives in villages. In exchange for furs, some minerals, and a few types of wood, the natives received items such as iron goods, blankets, cloth, cheap jewelry, liquor, and sometimes guns.

This policy was diametrically opposed to the Spanish notion of controlling the natives. Spain saw the Indians as childlike creatures that should be taught Christian virtues and that could be organized into permanent settlements in order to become trustworthy citizens of the Spanish Empire. While this system worked for the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, nomadic Texas natives were not about to be settled around missions. It is small wonder that the French were far more popular with the natives of Texas.

The French in Louisiana, and the Illinois country, presented New Mexicans with an attractive alternative to high Spanish prices. Why pay exorbitant prices to the merchants of Seville and Cadiz when one could buy quality French linens, ironware, or guns at much lower prices? Even with the costs of importing both French and English goods into Canada, transporting them down the Mississippi and then moving them overland to Santa Fe, goods were still cheaper than from Spanish sellers.

It is no wonder that the New Mexican populace was interested in reported French settlements to the east. An enterprising soul like Saint-Denis could make fine profits by finding his way overland to New Mexico. To be sure, dangers abounded. French traders not only had to run the risk of interception by Spanish troops in Texas, but they also faced plains Indians, like the surly Comanche, who resented any intrusion onto their land. Fortunately, French traders had an engaging air about them and were generally able to win the Indians' friendship. Rarely were Frenchmen molested, especially when they explained to the natives what they were doing to the Spanish.

While New Mexicans thought that French trading would be a boon, Spanish officials were far less enthusiastic.
Since it was illegal to deal with French traders there were efforts at stopping the trade. However, it amounted to naught, for despite the efforts to prevent interchange, there were always New Mexican citizens who were willing to risk jail for cheap goods. The actual incidence of intrusion was quite low but any time a threat of foreign trade existed, officials in Mexico City became nervous and these fears were transmitted to the government of New Mexico.

New rumors of the French in the trans-Mississippi west arose once again in 1719. At the same time Governor Antonio Valverde was ordered by the viceroy to prepare an expedition to punish some Comanche who raided near Taos, to reestablish the presidio at El Cuartelejo, and finally to look for “white men” presumed to be French.

Valverde assigned the task to his lieutenant governor, Pedro de Villasur, who, with a command of forty-two Spanish soldiers, three settlers, and sixty Indian allies set out in June, 1720. Also included in the expedition was a Frenchman, Jean l’Archeveque, a survivor of the La Salle expedition, who had since cast his fortunes with the Spanish.

By August, 1720 the group reached the South Platte River, having marched across eastern Colorado. Here they sighted a Pawnee encampment. The Spanish camped nearby and tried to talk with the Indians. In the ensuing conversations, they learned that Europeans were living in the Pawnee village. The Spanish wrote to them in French, but got no reply. Meanwhile the Pawnee stampeded the New Mexican’s livestock and attacked their camp site. They killed all but thirteen Spaniards and twelve Indians. The badly mauled expedition fled back to Santa Fe, arriving there on September 6, 1720.

In 1724 the French were again rumored to be in northeastern New Mexico with their goods. Bustamante was forced to make some rapid decisions regarding the dangers of illegal trade. The governor, in testimony given during 1724, noted that illegal trade with the French took place from New Mexico and that those responsible violated Spanish law. Without naming names, Bustamante said that this trade had to be stopped before the French gained a foothold in the Texas-New Mexico area and, in order to stop it, all loyal Spaniards must be on the alert against French traders. In the testimony, he concluded that no major violations had taken place, but that, in the future, traders who wandered into New Mexico would be picked up and brought to Santa Fe for immediate interrogation. The governor again stated that all trade between foreigners and New Mexicans must stop. Bustamante further noted that he was going to deliver his report to the viceroy and that the information contained in it would be bad news for those who traded illegally.

A further development occurred in 1727 when the viceroy requested that the details of the Villasur massacre be sent to him. He also asked that the status of foreign intrusions be noted. Bustamante notified the viceroy that Frenchmen had been spotted at El Cuartelejo and Chinati, the latter a mere 160 leagues from Santa Fe. The governor then asked for more troops from New Spain “in order to launch an expedition to determine the whereabouts of these foreigners.” The viceroy, always interested in conserving royal funds, decided that any needed information could be obtained from Jicarilla Apache who frequented the region.

Prior to 1740 only one French party actually found its way into Santa Fe. In 1739 Pierre and Paul Mallet, from Illinois, arrived in New Mexico where they were well-treated and then allowed to return to the Mississippi River country. The Mallet expedition was purely for trade. The good treatment of these men was unusual. Normally, they would be sent south to New Spain and then deported to France or Spain.

The late 1740s saw the arrival of more French traders in Santa Fe. They were quickly captured, relieved of their goods, and sent south to be questioned. In many ways, the Bustamante Testimonio of 1724 shows that there was indeed a trade with someone and not much could be done about it. The kind treatment of the Mallet brothers in 1739 makes one think that the Spanish did not consider them a threat. While there were early rumors about the French, the Mallet party was the first incursion actually into the area. One also has to wonder if the New Mexican governors tried to use the French scare to apply pressure on Mexico City. By raising the cry of French intrusion, the viceroy might be forced to provide more troops and funds for the defense of New Mexico. If indeed the scare was a ruse, officials in Mexico City saw through it and refused to send more aid without living Frenchmen as proof. Sadly, Governor Bustamante was one of the victims of the “French scare”. Soon after he left office in 1731 his residencia
was held and the former governor was found guilty of permitting trade with the French, [whose existence was never proved]. The Villasur disaster also led to a major investigation. The government decided to reconsider its position on the plains, especially the value of hunting for phantom Frenchmen. After having had one expedition quite literally wiped out, it was small wonder that the viceroy hesitated to send out any more. Bustamantes’ cries went unheeded; the risk was not equal to the danger. 17

In the wake of the Villasur disaster, Mexico City sent an inspector to the frontier to determine what problems the New Mexicans faced and how the situation was handled. Pedro de Rivera, dispatched in 1724, arrived in New Mexico during 1727. The Brigadier inspected New Mexican defenses and, in an effort to cut costs, proposed several plans, that while money saving, were totally impractical for New Mexico.

Rivera also toured Texas and northern New Spain, which took three years. In a major effort to bring information back to the viceroy, Rivera travelled into all corners of the empire. In general, the Rivera inspection was of little use in New Mexico for he was unfamiliar with the area, and therefore could not make appropriate recommendations. 18

Among the things that Rivera decided against was the establishment of a new presidio among the Jicarilla Apache. 19 The Jicarilla were valuable allies of the Spanish living in the northeastern sector of the province. They were a semi-Christianized nomadic tribe who early on became friends of the Spanish. The Jicarillas were the first Apache group with such status. The Carlanas also were sometimes friendly, but they could not always be trusted. The Jicarillas were supposed to have been protected by the Spanish since they were the main buffer between the Pueblo tribes of the river valleys and the hostile Comanche to the east. The New Mexicans, trying to protect Jicarilla villages from raids by the Comanche, requested a presidio.

The viceroy did grant permission for a presidio, but the plan was short-lived because in 1727 Rivera suggested that the Jicarilla be encouraged to migrate to Taos, where they could settle. Afraid to mix Apaches with the Pueblo natives, and not liking the idea of “non-Christian” Indians living so close to Spanish settlements such as Santa Cruz and Santa Fe, the idea was quickly vetoed. This impasse resulted in the Jicarilla being absorbed by the Comanche and Ute, leaving northeastern New Mexico without a buffer. Hence, New Mexico was thwarted by a man who knew little of the actual conditions of the frontier and who, to save a little money, was willing to ignore Bustamante’s pleas that the Jicarilla should be protected. 20

The threat of Comanche raiders was the most serious Indian problem New Mexico faced after 1720. The Comanche edged slowly toward eastern New Mexico. These plains dwellers created the so-called “Comanche Barrier” between New Mexico and the Missouri River, which was a key reason more Frenchmen did not come into New Mexico.

In 1724 Governor Bustamante held a junta de guerra to discuss the possibility of organizing an expedition against the Comanche who continued to raid Jicarilla lands. In that year the Comanche had forced the Jicarilla to give up half their women and children, and then they burned several villages, killing all but sixty-nine men, two women, and three boys. 21 In response Juan Paez Hurtado was ordered to get together an expedition of 100 men. 22 No doubt the Spanish were unable to find and engage the elusive Comanche, so that this expedition probably ended as had so many other efforts at Indian control.

Visitadores were not the only officials to come to New Mexico. Every few years the Church sent a visitador into the province to check on the performance of Franciscan friars in New Mexico. In 1730 the Bishop of Durango, Fray Benito Crespo, visited New Mexico and reported on conditions. In his report to Viceroy Marques de Casafuerte, he found that the Province lacked seven priests for the missions. Some forty were authorized. He also noted that the land: “where there is so much grain which fails to bear fruit for lack of cultivation, can be increased”, [with the addition of just a few friars]. 23 He described the various settlements of noting mainly their churches and the number of padres available to serve each town. Santa Fe, Crespo stated, had a good church, paid for by the people of that town, and the priest was well provided for. Santa Cruz had a church, built by the Spanish, but no resident priest. Since the same situation also existed in Albuquerque, Crespo recommended that priests be placed in each Spanish settlement. 24

Crespo’s descriptions of the Indian pueblos are more complete. He provided population figures in addition
to an analysis of the needs presented by the citizens of each pueblo. Crespo concluded that in Tesuque, Nambe, and Pojoaque 440 persons were served by a priest residing in Nambe or Tesuque. In San Juan (de los Caballeros) 300 persons resided, San Ildefonso had 296 residents, and Santa Clara 279; all three were served by the head mission at San Ildefonso. The pueblos of Taos and Picuris had total populations of 732; Crespo suggested that one friar might handle them. He also said that if a friar were stationed at Taos, the "last one [town] of Christianity," he could minister to the Jicarilla at El Cuarte tejo, "fifteen or twenty leagues away." Other pueblos that Crespo visited included Santa Cruz where he noted it was "very fertile for grains." He gave no population figures for this area. However he noted that Pecos had 521 people, Galisteo numbered 188, and Jemez 307 contained souls. Zia's population was 318; Cochiti had 372, Santo Domingo, 281; and San Felipe, 234. The Bishop further noted that the pueblos of Zuñi and Acoma had 860 and 600 residents respectively. Laguna numbered 400 strong. One friar was in charge of the missions at Acoma, Laguna, and Zuñi.

The Bishop concluded his report by stating that he felt the Navajo showed signs of willingness to be converted because they: "plant and because of their great worship of the holy [cross] which they keep in their homes like the Jicarillas. . . ." Crespo then recommended that missions be placed among the Jicarilla and the Navajo, pointing out that this would cost very little and would provide a border defense system. Converting the Navajo would be easy because they already traded with the Pueblos and could also be easily reached. Crespo also told the viceroy that to provide missionaries from the north rather than from the south of New Spain would be easier and cheaper.

Crespo made mention of El Paso del Norte. He noted that the Catholic church would build a facility there if a priest were provided. In addition, some 900 Indians had no priest working among them. Crespo recommended that they be provided with one missionary. He told the Cassfuerte that: "for five years the five or six missions of the north at the Junta de los Rios [at the Rio Grande and the Rio Concho], also belonging to this Custody, have been without ministers."

In addition to the Rivera and Crespo visits, the ongoing French threat, and concerns about the defense of the Jicarilla Apache, Bustamante's administration also faced most of the same problems that burdened his predecessors. He ordered that trade with unchristianized Indians be stopped and that the Spanish leave the Indians at Pecos pueblo alone. Of course, he had to deal with the normal court cases, both civil and criminal.

The governor also had matters from Spain to consider. In 1724 he ordered the publication of a royal cedula explaining that King Philip V had abdicated in favor of his son Louis. In 1725 he notified the public that King Louis I had died on August 31, 1724. Later that same year Bustamante published a decree that Philip V had restored himself to the throne.

Bustamante organized only one Indian campaign, that of 1723, and it proved a total failure. He faced difficulties with the Indians in other ways too; dealing with Indian crimes, like murder and theft. There seems, however, to have been less activity in the criminal courts than prior to 1722. The number of cases dealing with Spaniards also declined during this period. The number of civil cases remained about the same.

Bustamante's term, though interesting, was not as dynamic as might have been expected. There was little trouble among officials in although the cabildo of Santa Fe suffered from internal difficulties. Rivera discovered this during his visit to Santa Fe and reported that, due to irregularities in elections, there was some dissension among the members of the cabildo. When the viceroy received Rivera's report on the cabildo situation, he ordered changes in election procedures to guarantee a more representative council and to do away with the entrenched members of the old cabildo.

On the whole, Bustamante did little more than hold New Mexico for Spain. He initiated no new expansion, yet he did manage to secure a shaky peace with the Apache and Comanche. The Rivera visit had a good deal to do with this inactivity. Rivera vetoed nearly everything the governor proposed for the defense of New Mexico. Bustamante tried scare tactics to force the viceroy to hand over more funds and soldiers, but he failed. With Spain at war with France in Europe all the Americas suffered from lack of funds and soldiers. Understandably New Mexico, the most remote part of New Spain, received little attention. Even the Rivera visit was one of retrenchment, not one of dynamic expansion.
Bustamante's term of office expired in 1731, and Gervasio Cruzat y Gongora was appointed to succeed him. The new governor, facing an upcoming Indian campaign against the Apache, ordered a junta de guerra to discuss the matter.

In 1732 he ordered that gambling, drinking, and prostitution be forbidden in Indian pueblos. At the same time he ordered published a bando [edict] against idleness and vagrancy within the confines of the province. A little later he ordered the settlers of Santa Cruz to take better care of their stock, noting that loose animals were a temptation for raiding Indians. Other orders included notification that an escort for those wishing to leave New Mexico would depart from Albuquerque for El Paso on November 1st. Further edicts said a crossing must be established on the Rio Chama near the pueblo of Chama. His final order during 1732 prohibited the sale of Apache captives to Pueblo Indians. The governor issued this order in response to the fact that the Apache campaign had brought about the capture of some natives who were sold into slavery, a tradition that continued into the 1860s.

That moderate economic growth occurred in New Mexico during the 1730s is seen in the fact that numerous cases dealt with cattle and land. Albuquerque showed signs of expansion when Cristoval Garcia petitioned the governor for permission to build an acequia (water ditch) through the town to help water the desertlike lands around it. The residents of that town objected to Garcia crossing their lands, and eight signatures on two petitions indicated that they did not want the ditch. Governor Cruzat ruled that if Garcia agreed to respect the rights of landowners, he would be permitted to build the acequia.

Other economic indicators include a petition from the citizens of Santa Cruz to build a new church to replace the smaller, older structure. Obviously, that city was wealthy enough to provide the funds for such construction and the petition was granted.

On June 23, 1733, Cruzat ordered that all citizens of New Mexico be ready to pass muster, indicating again that the defense of New Mexico was uppermost. Further indication of this concern was found in 1734 when Juan Paez Hurtado held a junta de guerra at Albuquerque to discuss a possible Apache campaign. However, nothing came of this proposal.

It is significant that within a period of two years three cases of malfeasance in office occurred, involving three different pueblo alcaldes. The last such case happened in the early years of the eighteenth century.

Governor Cruzat had to face several such cases during his term. In 1733 proceedings were held against Ramon Garcia Jurado, alcalde of Bernalillo (Sandía) was charged with extortion against the Indians of Zia, Jemez, and Santa Ana. He was also alleged to have used these Pueblo Indians for forced labor. These were serious allegations, because they upset the balance of trust and friendship between Spaniard and native. Garcia Jurado was found guilty and dismissed from office.

In 1733 another complaint against a local official was filed at Acoma. Here Bernabe Baca, alcalde mayor of Laguna and Acoma, was accused of a number of felonies, including extortion, false taxation, and the misuse of natives in these pueblos. Found guilty, he was dismissed and fined. In 1735 lieutenant alcalde Diego de Torres of Chama was accused by Juan Garcia de la Mora of illegally trading with the Comanches. Torres was found guilty of all charges and fined ten pesos plus he made a substantial contribution to the local church fund.

It seems that with the restoration of Spain's power in New Mexico and a growing confidence by local alcaldes, abuses were bound to occur despite warnings from the central government that the Indians must be left strictly alone. No serious Indian troubles occurred for a number of years. Local officials took the situation for granted. They found to their dismay that the natives were not afraid to report abuses to Santa Fe. The natives realized that Santa Fe would not tolerate actions endangering the Spanish position in New Mexico and therefore they were willing to turn in miscreant officials. This shows that the Indians of the pueblos were by no means completely cowed by local officials.

Governor Cruzat's administration lasted five years and was unable to accomplish much. A mission to serve the Jicarillas was founded in 1733 at Las Trampas, about five leagues from Taos. It was directed by Father Mirabal. Other than the one small campaign against the Apache, the Cruzat government was, at best, dull.

In 1735 when Cruzat's term expired, he was replaced by a new royal appointee, Henrique de Olavide y Michelen, whose office ended in 1739. As in the past, Olavide began his administration with a flurry of orders.
and commands designed to improve the quality of New Mexico.
The years from 1722 through 1735 were relatively quiet. No major Indian scares occurred. Local natives remained peaceful. The French fright of the mid-1720s was the most important event of the period. New Mexico continued to grow slowly, as indicated in the Crespo report of 1730. The governors' various commands against vices such as gambling, prostitution, and idleness were nothing new and they were duly ignored. The new governor had his work cut out for him.
NOTES

1 Juan Domingo de Bustamante, Order prohibiting the sale of guns and horses by the soldiers of Santa Fe, April 3, 1723, at Santa Fe in SANM.

2 Certification of soldiers at presidio of Santa Fe, March 2, 1723, at Santa Fe in SANM.

3 Proceedings against Martin Hurtado, former alcalde of Albuquerque, February 22, 1723, at Santa Fe in SANM. Other examples of abuse of office include a petition from the Indians of San Juan Pueblo against Roque Madrid for extortion and abuse of native labor. See: Petition of Indians of San Juan Pueblo to Marques de la Peñuela, December 29, 1707, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

4 For a complete description of New Mexican government, see: Marc Simmons, Spanish Government in New Mexico.

5 For example, Criminal proceedings against Baltasar and Bernabe Baca for disobeying order of the governor regarding employment of natives, August 2-September 8, 1752, at Albuquerque, in SANM.

6 For example, Proceedings against Ramon Garcia Jurado, alcaldes mayor of Bernalillo (Sandia) for forced labor and other extortions against Pueblo Indians at Zia, Jemez, and Santa Ana, April 6-January 6, 1723, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

7 Fray Diego Zeinos of the Pecos Mission reported these rumors to Vargas in 1695. See: Fray Diego Zeinos to Vargas, October 27, 1695, at Pecos in SANM. Herbert E. Bolton also alludes to this event in “Defensive Spanish Expansion and the Significance of the Borderlands,” in: The Trans-Mississippi West (Boulder, Colorado, 1930), p. 31.

8 Juan Domingo de Bustamante, Testimonio. Testimony taken in regard to illicit trade with French, April 19-May 4, 1724 at Santa Fe, in SANM.


10 Juan Domingo de Bustamante, Testimonio taken regarding the illicit trade with the French, April 19-May 4, 1724, at Santa Fe in SANM. This testimony shows that many New Mexicans traded willingly with the French and that they found such a trade profitable.


12 Ibid., pp. 80-81.

13 Juan Domingo de Bustamante, Testimony regarding the presence of French trade in New Mexico, April 19-May 4, 1724, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

14 Marques de Casafuerte, decrees and decisions regarding the Villasur expedition (1719), May 29,1727, at Mexico City, in SANM.

16 Ibid.

18 See: Bolton, “French Intrusions into New Mexico, 1749-1752.”

19 Marques de Casafuerte, decrees and decisions regarding the Villasur expedition against the French and Pawnee, May 29, 1727, at Mexico City, in SANM.


21 Juan Miguel Enriquez, Certification of viceregal order of September 17,1723, authorizing the location of a presidio among the Jicarilla Apache, November 8, 1723, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

22 The entire Rivera report is contained in Vito Alessio Robles, Diario y derroteo de lo caminado visto y observado en la visita que hizo a los presidios de Nueva España septentrional el Brigadier Pedro de Rivera, (Mexico, 1946).

21 Juan Domingo de Bustamante, junta de guerra to discuss campaign against Comanche for attacks upon Jicarilla settlements, February 2-8, 1724, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
22 Ibid.

23 Adams, Bishop Tamaron's Visitation, pp. 95-96. The Crespo Report is found in the Appendix.

24 Ibid., p. 96.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., pp. 96-97.

27 Ibid., pp. 97-98.

28 Ibid., p. 98.

29 Ibid., pp. 98-99.

30 Ibid., p. 99.

31 Juan Domingo de Bustamante, Order for publication of enclosed royal cedula announcing abdication of Felipe V in favor of his son Luis, September 3, 1724, at Madrid and Santa Fe, in SANM.

32 Joseph Ygnacio de la Plaza, alcaldé, publication of royal cedula announcing death of Luis I, June 22-23, 1725, at Albuquerque, and Bustamante, Order for publication of decree announcing the resumption of the throne by Felipe V, July 12, 1725, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

33 Proceedings against Indian of San Ildefonso, August 23 - December 7, 1725, at Santa Fe, also notebook of criminal proceedings, June 9 - August 1, 1728, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

34 Cabildo of Santa Fe to visitador general [Rivera], July 7, 1724, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

35 Juan Domingo de Bustamante, certification of viceregal orders regarding the election of the Santa Fe cabildo, March 8, 1727, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

36 Gervasio Cruzat y Gongora, Order prohibiting gambling in Indian pueblos, March 16, 1732, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

37 Gervasio Cruzat y Gongora, Order against idleness and vagrancy, March 16, 1732, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

38 Gervasio Cruzat y Gongora, Order to Santa Cruz settlers to take better care of their livestock, June 1, 1723, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

39 Gervasio Cruzat y Gongora, Notice that escort would leave Albuquerque on November 2, October 23, 1732, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

40 Gervasio Cruzat y Gongora, Order to establish crossing on Rio Chama, October 18, 1732, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

41 Gervasio Cruzat y Gongora, Order forbidding sale of Apache captives, December 6, 1732, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

42 For instance, Luis Romero vs. Ambrosio de Villalondo, March 7-11, 1732, at Santa Fe and Francisca Real Aguilar vs. Joseph Luján regarding payment of debts, April 21-May 2, 1733, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

43 Petition of Cristóbal Garcia to build an acequia. August 19-November 12, 1732, at Albuquerque, in SANM.

44 Complaint of citizens of Albuquerque against Cristóval Garcia, January 7-February 9, 1733, at Albuquerque and Santa Fe, in SANM.

45 Petition by citizens of Santa Cruz to build a new church, June 15-21, 1733, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

46 Order of Cruzat y Gongora for all citizens to be prepared to pass muster, June 23, 1733, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

47 Juan Paez Hurtado, Proceedings in junta, January 29, 1733 and Cruzat y Gongora to Hurtado regarding proposed campaign, January 31, 1733 at Santa Fe, in SANM.

48 Proceedings against Ramon Garcia Jurado, alcaldé mayor of Bernalillo, April 6, 1732-January 6, 1733, at Bernalillo, in SANM.

49 Proceedings against Bernabe Baca, alcaldé mayor of Laguna and Acoma, December 21, 1733-January 26, 1734, at Acoma and Santa Fe, in SANM.

50 Proceedings against Diego de Torres, of Chama, April 13-May 16, 1735, at Chama and Santa Fe, in SANM.
Chapter VI

The Church in Frontier New Mexico

From the time of initial Spanish conquest in New Mexico, the Franciscan order was committed to converting the numerous natives residing in the region. However, in their zeal to convert and control the Indians, Franciscan missionaries went too far in trying to also control civil government. This, among other reasons, encouraged the Pueblo Indians to revolt in 1680. With the exiled Spanish went the Church and eighty years of work.

In 1693 the Spanish returned under the leadership of Diego de Vargas. The Franciscans who went back to work setting up missions and reconverting the natives. It was this deep moral commitment on the part of the Church that helped Spain decide that she must retake New Mexico.

The first and most important step taken by the Church on its return was the decree that priests should not interfere in any way with the political situation. Further, they were ordered to remain away from Santa Fe and were enjoined not to communicate with any government officials without permission from the Bishop of Durango. In addition, the friars were told not to write to one another without approval.

As a result, the missions developed into single small communities devoid of Spaniards, except for the friars, and perhaps some of their helpers. Each mission was accountable to the Custos of New Mexico, a Franciscan superior. New Mexico was under the jurisdiction claimed by the Bishop of Durango. Hence ecclesiastical control was exercised from that city. The missionaries reported on the condition of their missions and recorded deaths, births, and marriages. As the tour of Bishop Crespo proved, there were occasional visits of high church officials who examined the missions and tried to suggest improvements for those lacking essentials such as friars. The missions and their records provide revealing examples of vital statistics about the natives.

These records cover long periods of time and are indicators of the development of the missions in New Mexico. For example, at Pecos and Nambe lists of Indian marriages, baptisms, and burials covering a period from 1706-1728 are found. In Tesuque from 1694-1728 a number of burials were recorded, including nineteen persons buried between December 21st and 30th, 1706. This clearly indicates that an epidemic or some sort of battle took place.

Devastating smallpox epidemics and other diseases brought to the pueblos by the Europeans caused much concern among the mission friars. In Jemez a series of epidemics resulted in the burials of a large number of natives in 1728 and again in 1733. More than 100 Indians died from the 1728 epidemic. Fray Camargo recorded these many deaths. In Zuñi, according to Camargo, some 200 natives died of smallpox but were not recorded by the mission priest because the Indians insisted that their dead be buried secretly with native rites. In 1729 "many died" at Acoma from an epidemic lasting two years. At Isleta, in that year, two men were killed by Apaches. A smallpox epidemic at Bernalillo killed a number of natives between April and August in 1733. In 1719 more than forty Indians were buried at Nambe by Fray Camargo between January 1 and January 13. In 1738 Pecos was struck by smallpox and again in 1748 another epidemic wiped out an undetermined number of natives. In that same year, 1748, thirteen men were killed by Comanches.

The number of natives who died from smallpox and other contagious diseases is greater than those killed by raiding Apaches, Utes, or Comanches. Although the friars looked upon the natives deaths with despair, they also realized that nothing could be done about it. They felt that it was God's will that the natives should die in this fashion. On the other hand, the killing of Indians by hostile raiders caused the Fathers to demand protection from the government.

The friars objected to having Spaniards among the Pueblo Indians, which made it hard to keep garrisons in the missions. In the end, the friars realized that their best protection was a local Indian militia operated from the missions and that could be used as supplementary troops to the Spanish garrisons at Santa Fe, Albuquerque, and Santa Cruz.

In addition to recording deaths, the friars in each pueblo also kept careful records of marriages. The Franciscans decided that in order to christianize their wards,
marriage had to be considered a sacred rite that bound a couple together for life. This was in many cases distasteful to the Indians who were used to rather informal unions in which the husband could take another wife if he so desired. To discourage polygamy, all marriages were recorded. In Nambe all but one marriage were between Indians, while Pecos recorded nothing but Indian marriages. 11

Likewise, Jemez held only Indian marriages until 1769, when some Spanish marriages were recorded. These were, in fact, from the nearby settlements of Vallecito and Nacimiento. 12 At Laguna, all marriages were native until 1756 when a Spanish marriage was noted in June. Between 1761 and 1764 nine more marriages from alcaldes mayor Baca’s family were noted. 13 In addition to Pueblo Indians, other tribes were also baptised. In 1708 seventeen adult Apaches, reportedly owned by Antonio Valverde were baptized at Albuquerque. Early entries also show some Tiguas and a few Apache as having also been baptized in that city. 14

Generally all baptisms were Indian. When, on October 15, 1744, Fray Irigoyen of Jemez baptized seventeen men and women, he named all the women Barbara and all the men Cristoval. 15 In the case of baptisms at Zia, most were multiple and all were Indian. In 1770 seventy-five were baptized; in 1773 more than 100 Indians received this sacrament at Zuñi. 16 The Santa Fe baptismal records included a separate book for Indians. Even “hostiles” were recorded since in 1759 eleven Apache children were baptized at Santa Fe. 17

Most of the pueblos were located in areas near Santa Fe, Santa Cruz, and Albuquerque. In these localities a rare Spaniard was included in the baptismal lists. 18 However, Galisteo showed that marriages were much more rare than baptisms at that pueblo. 19 Fray Angelico Chavez, compiler of the documents at Santa Fe’s archdiocese, states that at Cochiti Spanish baptisms were classified by Fathers Junco and Marulanda as “mulattos”. As Chavez notes, presence of Negro blood among the Spanish was not proved. 20

The outlying pueblos of New Mexico had baptismal records of Indian entries almost exclusively. More instances of the baptism of hostile natives occur at these missions than nearer the centers of population along the rivers. At Isleta in 1742 and 1743 a hundred Moqui children and adults, moved to this location by the Spanish, were baptized by Fray Carlos Delgado. 21 Fray Andres Garcia also baptized several Moqui in 1743 at Laguna. 22 At Acoma all the baptisms were multiple and included numerous hostiles among them. Over a period of fifty years only four Spanish baptisms were recorded at Acoma. 23 Other outlying pueblos such as Pecos recorded occasional baptisms of Apache and other tribes. 24 In Taos baptismal entries for Indians were found exclusively. Three names had Spanish surnames, but since they were not listed as españoles they were probably mulattos. 25 When Taos began to grow, after 1776, a great increase in Spanish surnames was recorded. In addition, many plains Indians were baptized after that date because of the increase in trade through Taos. Also, the establishment of an annual fair helped bring in more plains natives. 26

Baptisms were of great importance to each mission priest because every Indian who sought Christianity gave credit not only to his mission, but to the Bishop of Durango, the Archbishop of Mexico, and the Catholic Church. The natives gained some benefits other than purely spiritual in that they who were baptized were looked upon with favor by both the Church and the government.

While the purpose of the missions was to help christianize and civilize the natives of New Mexico, the Catholic Church also felt that these installations should pay for themselves. Since in other parts of New Spain the missions and churches did so, the work in New Mexico should be no different. The missions could pay their own way in several manners. In wealthy areas, such as those near Mexico City and around the mining cities of New Spain, the Church could count on donations, gifts from estates, tithes, fees for weddings, baptisms, and burials, plus a number of sources that would keep the Church on a paying basis. In New Mexico the poverty of the land itself made it difficult for the missions and churches of the province to depend on gifts and donations. In a few cases, estates were willed to the bishopric of Durango and these gifts were used to defray the cost of the missions. But in most situations, fees for services rendered were the mainstay of the missions.

The missions were by no means rich, as inventories showed. The August 7, 1753 inventory at Laguna listed as having on hand: ten fanegas 27 of wheat, ten fanegas of corn, half a fanega of beans, half a barrel of salt, six strings of chili, a small quantity of butter, and ten
beds—that is, room for ten men. The list was signed by Fray Juan Padilla. Such an inventory makes it clear that the missionaries lived on a modest basis. The Cochititi inventory of July 31, 1753 shows exactly the same inventory as that of Laguna, indicating that these two missions were of the same size and probably were supplied from a central commissary.

Rarely would a mission come out ahead financially. In the case of the mission/church complex at Santa Cruz, a deficit resulted. Even in predominantly non-Indian churches such as that at Santa Cruz an expense ledger of 1763 shows that the year’s expenses totalled 1,874 pesos while the church’s income was only 1,783 pesos leaving a deficit of ninety pesos. Not bad considering the difficulty in raising funds. On the other hand, Santa Cruz’s church was fortunate because it served a Spanish population and was able to collect nearly enough money to break even. The Indian missions had no hope of doing so, and consequently continually drained the treasury of the Bishop of Durango in order to make up deficits that the royal subsidy failed to meet.

The missions and churches could raise revenue by charging fees for burials, marriages, and sometimes baptisms. The Santa Cruz church, which was not a mission, had a set scale of burial fees that ranged from nineteen pesos for burial in the center of the church to two pesos for interment away from the nave.

The New Mexican missions were successful in some areas of endeavor. One of the most worthwhile works of the missionaries of the province was the settlement of the natives. The Pueblo Indians, sedentary by nature, were encouraged by the government, the Church, and various leaders of the Indians. Most pueblos were at least run on a self-sustaining basis. However, this did not always apply to the missions themselves. A serious lack of supplies existed among the missions. Imports were necessary and, because of a constant shortage of food, the missions never were self-supporting. An attempt to raise cattle and sheep, for the wool and hides, in order to bring a balance of trade to the missions, was not successful until near the end of the eighteenth century, when the whole of the New Mexican economy saw an upswing. The missionaries of the province made great sacrifices in order to Christianize the natives. Living conditions were extremely poor. The friars rarely lived better than their wards. The missions of New Mexico never were like those of California, which were not only self-supporting, but also brought considerable income to the Church.

New Mexico’s missions were also failures regarding native education. Little real effort was made at teaching the Indians how to read and write Spanish. In most cases, the mission priests contented themselves with teaching the necessary catechism in Spanish without worrying about comprehension. Probably most pueblo natives who knew Spanish were able to recite rote verses and little else. They never learned fully to communicate in Spanish and they certainly did not learn to write.

The Church realized that the education of the pueblo natives was a major problem. During his visitation of 1760, Bishop Pedro Tamarón y Romeral saw the weaknesses of the educational system and urged that the friars teach the natives Spanish so that they could at least confess annually or, failing that, produce an Interrogatorio in native languages for this purpose.

The friars really could not be blamed for the lack of education among the natives. Far too few priests were available for masses of natives. In 1730 Bishop Crespo noted that there were not enough priests to serve the missions, while in 1760 Bishop Tamarón made the same observation. Considering the number of friars in the field and the huge numbers of Indians wanting conversion, the missions did a creditable job.

In another way the missions were successful. As has been seen, the Revolt of 1680 was due partly to the missions and the friction they caused between the Church and the Spanish government. After Vargas’s return, the Church was determined not to deal with secular issues without specific permission. Another problem that the 1680 rebellion pointed out was the constant bickering among mission priests. Again, the Church was determined to stop this and forbade communication between missionaries and secular individuals, and between the missionaries themselves. Only when permission was granted could they write to one another. It was hoped that there would be less fighting for the local Indians to observe. There would also be far less quarreling over the missions themselves. Possibly these orders stopped what could have been excellent cooperation among the missionaries that could have
resulted in a better system for New Mexico. But considering previous experience, the Church was wise to forbid communication and to demand that the civil government be left alone. 37

In addition to the friars, New Mexico also had several parish priests. The principal centers of Spanish population, Santa Fe, Santa Cruz, Albuquerque and El Paso del Norte each had their own churches, but not necessarily their own pastors. Santa Fe was given a pastor in the 1740s while El Paso got one later. 38 Santa Cruz and Albuquerque had friars who worked as pastors among the Spanish population and then did missionary work with the natives. 39

The Catholic Church developed a system of checks to keep its worshipers tied closely to it. One of the primary instruments was the Santo Oficio [Holy Office], commonly known as the Inquisition. The Inquisition was a product of late medieval Spain. When the first Catholic monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella, took the throne in 1474, Spain was beset by Moors and, in the opinion of the Crown, Jews. In order to root out these alien religions, the Inquisition was established to determine exactly who was faithful and who was not. The Protestant revolt helped strengthen the Inquisition in that the crown took steps to prevent the seepage of Protestantism into Spain. Within a hundred years of its establishment, the Inquisition became an feared and hated institution within the greater Spanish bureaucracy. 40

The natives of America were exempted from the Inquisition and despite the protests of the Church that native practices continued, the Inquisition was unable to prevent native religious activities. 41

The Inquisition in eighteenth-century New Mexico, as in the rest of the Spanish Empire, was primarily a force to keep worshipers in line. Instead of the earlier ruthlessness of the Inquisition, the Holy Office was a system of ecclesiastical courts that kept track of misdeeds and, much in the same fashion as a modern day grand jury, turned over the results of its investigations to civil authorities to determine if criminal action had occurred. If there was cause for a trial, officials of the Inquisition might be brought in to testify against the accused. The worst the Catholic Church could do, in New Mexico at least, was to excommunicate the offender. 42

Not only did the Inquisition of the eighteenth century deal with offenders of Church policy, but apparently it also approved or disapproved appointments of clergy. It further dealt with matters of clerical indiscretion by removing and punishing priests for unbecoming activities. 43 In 1740, for instance, the Holy Office appointed Lorenzo Saavedra as the comisario for New Mexico’s missions and also for Santa Fe. He had charge of seeing that the Church’s interests were upheld in the province. 44 Another function of the Inquisition was naming notaries for the province. The notary was of utmost importance to the Church, for he kept the records, made legal notations of violations and also served as notary public. His was an important position and the Church passed on the appointments of such worthy men. Very often these appointees were laymen, citizens of the province, who could be trusted. 45

Inquisition records show that very few cases were prosecuted in New Mexico during the eighteenth century. The population of the province was small and probably produced little activity to interest the Inquisition. Most of the denunciations for New Mexico are dated at El Paso del Norte. It was from here that the Inquisition worked. There is no indication as to why El Paso was the center for the Inquisition in the area, but probably cases from Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and northern New Spain were sent here from whence they went to the tribunal at Mexico City. There are also indications that a visiting Inquisitor worked from El Paso and semiannually went into New Mexico to hear cases in order to determine if they were worth sending on to Mexico City.

The New Mexican Inquisition had two types of cases that predominated. The first, and possibly most serious, was witchcraft and non-belief. The second (and more common) were cases that dealt with marriage and the violation of the holy vows. 46

Generally a person was not investigated unless he had been denounced by another citizen. With a denunciation (to a priest), the Inquisition would then take steps. Testimony was taken by either a local priest or by a notario. Often proceedings would last several years while the Inquisitors tried to determine the guilt of the accused. The case, having been brought in New Mexico, would be sent on to El Paso where the tribunal sat. Here the merits of the case were decided. If there were serious violations, the case would go on to Mexico City.
Often the results of an investigation ended with nothing having been found and the whole matter was simply dropped. In the case of Joseph Antonio Dias, alias “el Cuchillo” [the Knife], the defendant was accused of being married twice. He was a Spaniard, and since he was not a widower, the charges seemed valid. Testimony began on February 6, 1734 at Socorro, and was completed two and a half years later on October 14, 1736 at El Paso del Norte. The results were so confusing that no sentence was handed down and no criminal charges could be filed. 47

Other Inquisition matters included investigations of “superstitions,” another term for witchcraft. While witchcraft was common among natives, and was prosecuted by civil authorities, Indians were not subject to the Inquisition. However, Spaniards were and when one of them was accused of such a crime, it was serious. No Spaniard was actually accused of witchcraft but “superstition” was the same thing in the eyes of the Church. Superstition further implied that the person involved did not believe in the Catholic faith.

Women tended to be more vulnerable to such charges. Michaela de Contreras was accused by Isidro Sanchez and Juana Rosa Contraseras of superstitions and trickery. She was denounced to Fray Andres Vaso, who took the matter up with the Inquisition at El Paso del Norte. Señora Contreras was found guilty perpetrating “frauds and trickery” as a midwife and was excommunicated. There was no record of criminal charges against the woman. The fact that Juana Rosa Contreras was Michaela’s sister indicates that a family feud was the real cause for denunciation. 48 In the same year, Beatriz de Cabrera was accused of “superstitions,” but after extensive testimony she was found not guilty and no further charges were pressed. 49

The Inquisition went to great lengths to gather testimony both in favor and against the accused, and after weighing the evidence, handed down sentences. Most cases were fairly handled and those accused got what they deserved.

The Inquisition handled all cases that dealt with the Catholic faith. One of the hardest was the matter of belief. Although many Indians professed to believe, their faith was open to question. Anyone questioning faith could count on trouble.

A major case occurred when Francisco Arias, a Spaniard, was denounced by Fray Pedro Montano for not being a believer in the holy faith. A series of witnesses was produced and testimony was taken, Arias was found to be shakey in his faith but the trial produced so much confusion and conflicting testimony that the defendant was found not guilty. It was Fray Montano’s word against Arias’. Probably the whole matter was caused by a personal feud between the two men, and Montano saw his denunciation as a way to get even with Arias. 50

The case is of interest, not because of the philosophical question of faith but because the Inquisition was unable to decide. Two hundred years earlier, Arias would not have had a chance; he would have been automatically condemned and probably put to death. Clearly the powers of the Inquisition were been greatly moderated and the Holy Office was now little more than a board that governed morals and protected the faith. No longer was it a dreaded office for purification of the church. Those powers had long ago been lost. All the Inquisition could do in the eighteenth century was to excommunicate non-believers in the hope that such actions would discourage others from temptation. 51

The Inquisition had other duties than handling cases dealing with civilians. Fray Pedro Diaz de Aguilar of an unnamed mission in New Mexico was charged with inciting the Indians of his mission to rebellion. He was removed and the Indians were given a severe warning about attempting a revolt against Spanish authority. The case was investigated by the Inquisition and it was handled without the aid of civil authorities. 52

The Inquisition in the eighteenth century was not a feared institution but rather it performed much of the investigative work for the government. In this way it helped to keep the Church pure and it was certainly of importance within the societal structure of New Mexico. 53

The primary features of the Catholic Church in eighteenth-century New Mexico were the missions and the Inquisition. Neither institution was powerful and each had its own functions to fulfill.

The missions did their job, but they fought an uphill battle of too few priests, too little money, and far from cooperative Indians. New Mexican missions cost the Franciscans a good deal and, other than large numbers of baptized Indians, returned very little. The initial conquest of 1598 was said to have provided some 50,000 Indians ready for baptism. However, after an early surge of Christianization the number of natives baptized
greatly decreased. During the eighteenth century, records indicate that possibly 4,000 to 5,000 natives were baptized over a hundred year period. 64

This is why the mission friars were so anxious to baptize as many natives as possible; baptismal statistics provided the only method of proving that the missions justified their continuance. The New Mexican missions did nothing for native education and were of precious little value to the whole of society. Perhaps the real value of the New Mexican missions lies in keeping the natives submissive and in doing so providing the Spanish with security.

The overall picture of the missions in New Mexico, however, was bleak. Much of the same can be said for the Inquisition in New Mexico. It did indeed function and cases were brought before it, but the powers that it once had were long diminished. It could do little more than warn the faithful that should they misbehave they would be punished, perhaps lightly in this world, but certainly harshly in the other.
NOTES

1 Patentes, Fray Martin de Aguirre, Order forbidding communication, 1710, at Mexico City, in Archives of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe. Hereinafter cited AASF.

2 Marriages. Nambe, Box 10 and Pecos, Box 11, 1699-1728, in AASF.

3 Baptisms. Tesuque, Box 79, 1694-1724, in AASF.

4 Marriages, Box 9, Jemez, 1720-1776, in AASF.

5 Marriages, Box 42, Zuñi, 1705-1776, in AASF.

6 Burials, Box 1, Acoma, 1726-1777, in AASF.

7 Burials, Box 7, Isleta, 1726-1776, in AASF.

8 Burials, Box 8, Nambe, 1707-1725, in AASF.

9 Burials, Box 9, Pecos, 1726-1772, in AASF.

10 Burials, Box 7a, Laguna, 1726-1776; Box 7a, Santa Ana, 1739-1752; Box 20 Santa Clara, 1726-1843; Box 22, Santa Cruz, 1726-1768; Box 26, Santa Fe, 1726-1780; and Zuñi Box 37, 1706-1719, in AASF.

11 Marriages, Box 10, Nambe, 1707-1728 and Box 11, Pecos, 1699-1706, in AASF.

12 Marriages, Box 9, Jemez, 1720-1776, in AASF.

13 Marriages, Box 9, Laguna (Jemez Box), 1720-1776, in AASF.

14 Baptisms, Box 2 Albuquerque, 1706-1736 in AASF.

15 Baptisms, Box 19, Jemez, 1701-1726 and 1720-1829 in AASF.

16 Baptisms, Box 84, Zia, 1694-1772 and Box 85, Zuñi to 1774, in AASF.

17 Baptisms, Box 53, Santa Fe, 1747-1770, in AASF.

18 Baptisms, Box 79, Tesuque, 1694-1724, in AASF.

19 Baptisms, Box 17, Galisteo, 1711-1729, in AASF.

20 See: Angelico Chavez, Archdiocese Records of Santa Fe, New Mexico Archives, 1678-1900 (Washington, 1957), listed under Cochiti, 1736-1775, Baptisms Box 15.

21 Baptisms, Box 18, Isleta, 1720-1776, in AASF.

22 Baptisms, Box 20, Laguna, 1720-1776, in AASF.

23 Baptisms, Box 1, Acoma, 1725-1777, in AASF.


25 Baptisms, Box 69, Taos, 1710-1727, in AASF.

26 Baptisms, Box 69, Taos, 1777-1798, in AASF.

27 A fanega is about 1.60 bushels.

28 Accounts, Box 11, Laguna, August 7, 1753, in AASF.

29 Accounts, Box 11, Cochiti, 1753, in AASF.

30 Accounts, Box 1, Santa Cruz, 1760-1860, in AASF.

31 Accounts, Box 2, Santa Cruz, 1760-1860, in AASF.


33 Both Tamaron and Bishop Benito Crespo made observations to this effect. See: Adams, Bishop Tamaron’s Visitation to New Mexico, 1760, p. 95.
34 Ibid.
35 Patentes, Petition of New Mexican friars for thirteen new priests over and above the twenty-one already there, 1708, at Mexico City, in AASF.
36 Patentes, Order of Fray Juan Alvarez, Visita dor for New Mexico, November 12, 1703, at Santa Fe, in AASF.
37 Patentes, Fray Martin de Aguirres, Vicar- Provincial, Order forbidding communications, 1710, at Mexico City, in AASF.
38 Baptisms, Box 53 (Santa Fe), in AASF.
39 Accounts, Santa Cruz, 1760-1860 and Albuquerque, 1706-1736, in AASF.
42 Inquisition records from the Archivo General de las Indias indicate that the Santo Oficio in New Mexico was not a potent force. Sentences handed down were light in that the most severe on record was excommunication. See: Inquisition, 902 and 912, 1740, in: Archivo General de las Indias, hereinafter cited AGI.
43 Records of the Inquisition in New Mexico indicate that appointments were approved or disapproved by the tribunal at Mexico City and then the results were forwarded to the appointee. See also: Kessel, op cit., for a discussion of the Santo Oficio at Pecos pueblo.
44 Appointment of Lorenzo Saavedra, Inquisition, 902 and 912, 1740, in AGI.
45 Appointment of Joseph de Bustamante Tagle, as notario for Santa Fe, Inquisition, 941, 1758, in AGI.
46 For example, case against Joseph Antonio Dias for having been married twice, April 23, 1736, at El Paso del Norte, in Inquisition. 890, 1736, AGI.
47 Case against Joseph Antonio Dias, February 6, 1734-October 14, 1736, at Socorro and El Paso del Norte, Inquisition, 890, Part XXII, 1734-1736, in AGI.
48 Case against Michaela de Contreras, November 1745, at El Paso del Norte, Inquisition, 892, 1745, in AGI.
49 Case against Beatriz de Cabrera, May 12, 1745, at El Paso del Norte, Inquisition, 913, 1745, in AGI.
50 Denunciation of Francisco Arias by Fray Pedro Montañ, September, 1751, at El Paso del Norte, Inquisition, 932, 1751, in AGI.
51 Ibid.
52 Case against Pedro Díaz de Aguilar, May 10, 1736, Inquisition, 862, 1736, in AGI.
53 Case against Miguel de Quintana for questioning the faith, May 22, 1732 at Santa Cruz; 849 Case against María Domínguez for being married four times, July 12, 1732 at Santa Fe; 849, Juan García de la Mora, gauchupin, for being married twice, November 5, 1734 and 872, Augustín Miguel de Estrada, half-breed, for being married twice, July [?] 15, 1736, at El Paso del Norte and appealed at Guadalajara, Inquisition, 849, in AGI.
54 See Chavez, Archdiocese Records of Santa Fe, New Mexico Archives, 1678-1900.
Chapter VII

Indians, Traders and Trouble, 1735-1750

Cruza's term of office expired in 1737 and he was replaced by Henrique de Olavide y Michelena, who, not surprisingly, found a number of problems in the province. Among them was continuing trade with hostile Indians. He ordered that all trade be stopped and commanded that this notice be published by all alcaldes. 1

That Olavide was worried about illicit commerce was understandable for it was growing rapidly. This was the result of years of interchange between Pueblo Indians, non-Christian natives, and the Spanish. When the latter came to New Mexico, they found that survival depended upon barter with the Pueblos. As time went on, external commerce failed to develop. The Pueblo Indians found that their interchange with the Spanish was simply not enough for the survival of either party. In this way, the Pueblo tribes, the only ones allowed to trade, started to deal with the Comanches, Utes and Apaches. By 1695, commerce was well-established and the Spaniards, out of necessity, found that they had to barter with all native groups for survival. 2

Olavide's first order had no effect. He found that a month later he had to issue another prohibiting further dealings with hostiles. The relationship that built up over a number of years was not going to be stopped overnight. Unfortunately, trade with the plains Indians was just too lucrative for poverty-stricken New Mexicans to abandon. 3 Further, the exchange in guns, horses, and goods made the military situation even more unstable in New Mexico. Each gun and horse acquired by Plains raiders increased the danger of their overwhelming New Mexico.

While the plains trade might be necessary for New Mexico, in actuality only a small number of men interested in little else but profit engaged in it. The Comanches, Utes and Apaches had few of their own goods to sell. Sometimes the Comanches could hawk hides that were stolen, while the Utes brought furs from the Colorado Rockies along with small amounts of gold and silver. 4 This was not enough, however, to sustain a trade of the proportions needed. In order to gain barterable goods, plains Indians raided settled areas to drive off cattle, horses, and sheep. They would remove anything of value. Often hostages were taken and subsequently ransomed. In this way the Comanches, and other tribes, kept up their inventories and were able to offer goods to Spanish and other Indian traders. The whole process was self-defeating in that the Spanish were paying twice for their own items. In poverty-ridden New Mexico, the Pueblo Indians suffered the most from this circular trade. They could hardly afford to buy back what had been stolen from them. Only wealthy Spanish speculators might deal with Plains raiders.

This system undermined the New Mexico's economy and it was small wonder that every governor who came to New Mexico saw that this commerce had to be stopped. The whole process was an endless circle, one that could be broken only if the Indians were subdued and if New Mexican's economy could develop to the point where there were surpluses for export. This vicious trade was broken finally during the mid-eighteenth century when the Bourbon regime radically reformed colonial trade laws. By relaxing earlier restrictions it became cheaper and easier to import goods into the New World. 5 Records for this period are hard to find, but the bandos issued and campaign records indicate that a major trade did take place among the Spanish, Pueblo natives, and certain hostile tribes, particularly Utes, Comanches, Apaches and later Navajos. It was to the advantage of both sides because the suppression of this trade by the New Mexican government was all but impossible.

New Mexico was absorbed in 1772 into the western province of the newly created Provincias Internas and to some extent lost its identity. However, what was important was that trade could be conducted within the two new provinces including far larger areas. New Mexico could now trade in Texas, Arizona, California, Nueva Vizcaya, Nueva Leon and most of northern New Spain. Prior to the reorganization, New Mexican trade was limited to Chihuahua City, Parral, and sometimes Durango. Another impact of the change was that the central provincial government of New Mexico was removed to Chihuahua City where a governor ruled the province. 6
New Mexico under Governor Olavide remained unchanged. Gambling was of great concern to him. He ordered that all soldiers found gambling with dice [and other devices] be jailed. 8 He later expanded this order to include the entire population. 8 The New Mexican frontier was one of the most hostile and boring environments these men had ever known. The government tried to protect its employees who gambled away their guns, horses, bedsrolls, and even clothing. The total lack of anything to do caused soldiers to seek entertainment no matter how vile. He gambled, he drank, and wherever possible he enjoyed the company of disreputable women [ putas]. But such is common with all troops and those stationed in New Mexico were no exception. 9

Spanish soldiers were not the only ones to suffer from frontier conditions. The ordinary resident of New Mexico found life quite dull too. While most of the population was hard-working, thrifty, and religious, it was normal for a man to want to work off some of his frustrations in the gambling hall or at the local pulqueria (bar). Excesses led to fights such as the case in Albuquerque where Diego and Cristoval Garcia were charged with assaulting Juan Montano. Under questioning Montano admitted that they all were “muy borracho” (very drunk). The court found the defendants not guilty based on self-defense. Alcoholism was likely prevalent in the province, but it was not as directly costly as gambling.

Prostitution, was not considered a particularly serious offense in eighteenth century New Mexico. Women charged with this crime were normally considered adulteresses. Some were exiled by the Holy Office. Very few cases of probable prostitution are recorded after the first ten years of the eighteenth century. Most of this illegal activity either was underground or it was so carefully monitored it was impossible to conduct business.

There were social problems with women and men on a daily basis, the most common of which was adultery. In the case of Manuela Beytia and Juan Marques, 1740, the couple was charged with immoral conduct. They were found guilty of adultery and fined. They also were required to renounce one another publically. Presumably this calmed both the outraged public and the cuckolded husband. 11

Olavide was concerned about raiding by Plains Indians. There were rumors of an impending Indian revolt in Laguna. In 1737 Francisco Padilla, a Spaniard, was charged with inciting the natives of that pueblo to revolt. He was arrested and charged with sedition. However, testimony showed that there was much more rumor than fact to the charges and he was freed. The verdict did little to calm the fears of the Spanish that another 1680 was about to occur. 12

Olavide was convinced that a massive Indian attack was soon to take place in New Mexico. To prevent it he ordered the men of Santa Fe, including pueblo natives, to get ready for a campaign against the Comanches. However his plan was cancelled. 13

The trade situation was again brought into focus during 1739 with the trial of Miguel de Salazar of Taos. The defendant was charged with trading among the Comanches east of Taos. Salazar was caught with goods going into Comanche lands and on this basis the case went to Santa Fe for judgement. 14 This trial underscored continued exasperation over an illegal trade that could not be stopped. Many were caught and tried, but it had no effect.

Governor Olavide y Michelena’s term ended in 1737 with the appointment of Gaspar Domingo de Mendoza. Olavide was an interim official and because of his short tenure he accomplished little. The one major project that he undertook was the visitation of all pueblos in 1736. On this visit he called for each pueblo to submit any grievances it had against the alcalde or other individuals. Only a few petty problems were brought forth, usually concerning the payment of debts. Believing that the pueblos were happy, Olavide retired to Santa Fe and reported that conditions in New Mexico were good. 15

Gaspar Domingo de Mendoza, who assumed office in January, 1739, began a residencia for Olavide with Juez (Judge) Juan Jose Moreno in charge. The residencia heard twenty-four witnesses, half of whom were Indians. It found that the former governor had done no wrong while in office. A favorable report was returned and Olavide left for New Spain to assume another assignment. 16

Mendoza’s regime was interesting because when he took office there was no initial flurry of orders. For example, in 1740 only two official orders are on record. First the governor notified the residents of New Mexico that an
escort would be provided for a trip to the salt flats about fifty miles southeast of Albuquerque, via Galisteo. 

Secondly, he announced that the escort would depart in late July, 1740 and those who wished to go should be at Galisteo by July 27th. 

While not much is known about the internal workings of Mendoza's civil administration, the Governor had major problems during his term. In 1739 nine men arrived at Taos from across the eastern plains. They were questioned and it was discovered that they were traders under the leadership of Paul and Pierre Mallet, from the Illinois country. The men said that they had come from the Missouri River at the Arikara Villages and then followed the Platte River across the Colorado plains, turning south down the front range into New Mexico. The Spanish, for the first time, had a confirmed group of Frenchmen in New Mexico. However, they were not sure that the Mallet party was just a trading group. The mystery of what the Mallet brothers were doing in New Mexico is a point of contention among historians. Bancroft, writing in 1889, states that: "certain writers [connect] them with a plan to take possession of the Rio Colorado [New Mexico] area." However, Bolton, in 1917, saw the party as only an expeditionary force determined to penetrate the Comanche barrier. Henri Folmer, in 1953, considered the Mallet party merely a trading group that came into New Mexico for several reasons; to trade and also to look the area over and to penetrate the Comanche barrier to establish a trade route into New Mexico. 

The arrival of Frenchmen in New Mexico stirred considerable interest throughout the province. The Mallet party was brought to Santa Fe where they were questioned by Mendoza. Then the men were allowed to either stay in New Mexico or to go back to the Mississippi valley. Upon hearing of the penetration of the Comanche barrier by the Mallets, French Governor Bienville, sent Fabry de la Bruyere from Louisiana with a letter to Mendoza. The Bienville party was instructed to survey a possible route into New Mexico and open it to commercial traffic. However, Fabry was not successful in his mission. Having approached New Mexico from across the Red River, he heard about the capture of the Mallet party. This discouraged him to the point of returning to New Orleans. Any further attempts to open New Mexico were foregone. The Mallet party remained in New Mexico until 1741 when they were quietly released by Mendoza. The French intrusion of 1739 was nearly forgotten. Two Frenchmen remained in Santa Fe. One, Jean d'Alay, married and became a citizen [and barber]. The other, Louis Marie, was executed for being involved in a plot against the government. Mendoza's successor, Joachin Codallos y Rabal provides records of proceedings against a Frenchman, one Louis Marie, in 1744.

Nothing else came of the Mallet visit of 1739-1740 immediately. Apparently New Mexicans were not overly concerned about the intruders. Perhaps remembering the great French scare of the 1720s, Mendoza decided that it was better not to risk his official neck like Bustamante had. Mendoza faithfully reported the Mallet expedition to Mexico City, hearings were held, and no results were forthcoming. 

Mendoza also undertook a campaign against the Comanches. There are no juntas de guerra describing the action, but several orders by Mendoza indicate that the campaign did occur and it was, as usual, a failure. This may have been the same expedition Olavide had proposed in 1737. Whatever the case, the Spanish attempted an expedition into eastern New Mexico to prevent Comanches from raiding the Rio Grande valley. An order of 1741 indicates that a campaign indeed was begun. Mendoza cautioned that the sacking of non-Christian Indian villages was prohibited. Those found guilty would be punished without mercy. That the campaign was a failure can be surmised from a 1742 order that told the alcaldes mayores of pueblos and towns throughout New Mexico to be extra vigilant against Indian raids owing to the setbacks of the recent campaign. 

Despite Mendoza's meagre military accomplishments, the governor was kept busy from day to day with ordinary civil and criminal cases. Most criminal cases involved assault. For some reason there was a sudden increase of cases of servants against their masters. For instance, Antonio de Ortega, in 1740 was charged with raping his several female Indian servants. He was found guilty. In 1741 Manuel Martin and Salvador de Torres, both of Santa Cruz, were found guilty of assaulting the Indian servant of Bernardo Roybal. They were found guilty, fined, and ordered to pay personal damages to Roybal. 

This increase of servant abuse may be an indication that the Spanish felt secure enough that they could get
away with it. In this they were wrong, for the natives had no fears about speaking out. Other criminal cases of import during Mendoza’s administration are trespass and neglect cases. Joseph de Reano sued Francisco Saes for the careless handling of Reano’s flocks for which the defendant was found guilty and fined. In 1743 charges were brought against Baltasar Baca and Gregorio Benevides for trespassing on Nambe pueblo. They were found guilty of grazing their sheep on Indian lands and were fined twenty pesos each. Indian servants were nominally free. In reality they were often slaves. However, they were not reluctant to charge their masters with cruelty. They were liable for severe sentences like jail or exile should escape be attempted. Servants were personal property and, if hurt by others, their owners could be compensated. Yet, if they tried to run, they would be hunted down and brought to trial. In 1741, an Apache servant named Luis Quintana, [owned by Juan de Tafoya], along with several other servants, were charged with flight and crimes of theft, assault and banditry. The men, were caught, brought to trial at Santa Fe and found guilty and sentenced to one year of banishment and hard labor. There is no record of compensation to Tafoya for loss of a servant. It is worth noting that most servants were either Apaches, Utes or Navajos. Since these were the tribes that the Spanish spent the most time trying to control, it was inevitable that captives were brought back from campaigns. By law, no Pueblo Indian could be used for “personal labor” and, abuses of this injunction were punished by jail and fines. However, the status of non-Christian natives was different. The Spanish felt nothing was wrong with taking captives into their homes and Christianizing them. In fact, the government and Church encouraged it because at least a few hostiles could be Christianized and trained in the manual arts.

The records of the period are unclear as to the exact status of these captives. It is difficult to tell if they were slaves or whether they could leave after a period of time, much like an indentured servant. Indications are that early in the eighteenth century captives, mostly Apache, were sold into slavery. References are made to “Apache slaves” in 1705 in Church and government documents. However, by the mid-eighteenth century, Apaches are referred to as “servants”. The status of captives changed over a period of years and by the 1740s they were used as servants who could be criminally punished since they were not exactly slaves. The implication of exile was that the servant’s master was responsible for him and to lose an errant worker for a year punished the offender and his owner.

Joachin Codallos y Rabal took office in 1743 and remained governor of New Mexico until 1749. When he came to the office, New Mexico was still a small province. The chronicler of New Galicia, Mota Padilla, reported in 1742 the population of Spaniards in New Mexico was 9,747 not including soldiers. He stated that there were twenty-four settlements and he reported that Albuquerque, which he said had a garrison of eighty soldiers. He also claimed that it was the capital. Bancroft notes that the population estimate “...is more than twice too large.” In fact, Padilla was about ten times over the actual population of Spanish in New Mexico and probably that much over in his guess as to the garrison at Albuquerque.

An official census of 1745, conducted by Joseph Antonio Villaseñor author of the Teatro Espanol, shows that New Mexico’s population was far smaller than Mota Padilla claimed. The principal Spanish settlements of Santa Fe, Albuquerque and Santa Cruz had 300, 260 and 100 respectively while no mestizos or mulattos were listed. Nor were Indians listed in this census. Spanish censuses were strange since one person would count every living being in a province and come up with overinflated figures while others like Villaseñor counted only Spaniards and came up with grossly low estimates. In any case, the settlements of Bernalillo, Chama, Rancho de Aguas Calientes, Alameda de Mosa, Hacienda (?) del Rio and other small settlements listed only Spanish residents totalling 160 persons.

The same census showed that the Indian pueblos were small, varying from ninety persons to 125 and as low as eighteen. Santa Clara recorded 100 residents while San Felipe had a population of only sixty as did San Juan (de los Caballeros). The smallest pueblo was Peconaque, with a population of eighteen. The average size of the pueblos in 1745 was between eighty and ninety persons.

The 1745 census showed 3,047 persons residing in the province of New Mexico. Of these 910 were Spaniards. El Paso del Norte was not listed under New Mexico (as it should have been). The 1745 census probably was somewhat inaccurate in that it did not include all of the pueblos and therefore underestimated the total
population of the province. Nonetheless, it does show that since 1695 New Mexico grew by about one hundred percent.

Upon assuming office, Codallos y Rabal issued the usual number of orders to the province. These included bans on illegal trade, prohibitions on gambling, notices of caravans for New Spain, the Gallisteo salt lakes, and points south like El Paso. In general, he followed the direction of previous governors. 39

In addition to the social and military welfare of New Mexico, Codallos also was concerned about the economic development of his province. A petition presented by the citizens of Albuquerque asking for permission to sell wool both locally and for export was submitted to the governor. 40 After considerable debate among officials at Santa Fe, sanction was granted and a wool trade began between Albuquerque, Santa Fe, and Santa Cruz. Some of the excess wool was exported to New Spain, which helped the trade balance in the province. 41

There was an Indian campaign proposed early in the governor’s term. He issued orders that women and children of hostile tribes not be mistreated during campaigns. 42 This would suggest that Codallos was concerned with keeping the Comanches and the Utes at bay. If any campaign took place, apparently it had little effect, for it was not recorded. Later in his career Codallos did prepare a campaign against the Gila Apache, with the usual lack of success. 43

The governor undertook a visita general in 1745 during which time he toured the entire province and asked that any problems be brought to his attention. Codallos went into each pueblo and town. There he questioned the alcalde about conditions. Following this event the entire populace was gathered in the square where the governor asked that any complaints against either local officials or the government be aired. Citizens from each town presented petty grievances against local officials, all duly noted by Codallos. Codallos y Rabal visited most pueblos and all Spanish settlements except Acoma and Zuñi which were too far. 44 The visita was for the benefit of the natives more than for the Spanish, and as Olavide found during his inspection, the complaints were minor. Codallos returned to Santa Fe satisfied the province was in good condition. 45

It was also during the Codallos regime that another effort was made to convert the Moqui. In 1745 the governor authorized the use of troops to provide escort for Fathers Carlos Delgado and Joseph de Yrigoyen to the Moqui pueblos in order that another attempt to Christianize them might be made. Nothing came of it and the Moqui remained immune to the efforts of the Spanish to reconquer them. 46

While Codallos was busy with Indians and visits, he also continued to keep Santa Fe functioning. There was little increase in the level of crime. Only a few were serious enough to be sent to Chihuahua (and thence to Mexico City) for viceregal attention. 47 The case of Manuel Sanz de Garvisu was a major trial for this period. It dealt with sedition and failure to obey the governor. For his crime, the accused was sent to Chihuahua City under armed escort and then on to Mexico City where he was tried before the viceroy, and found guilty. 48

In 1748 Codallos ordered all persons who had left the presidio of El Paso del Norte to return at once. This indicated that a large number of persons were missing and the city was threatened. After the Gila campaign of 1747, Indian retaliations were likely to follow. To prepare for this, the Governor wanted the town up to full strength for defense. 49

In that same year, the governor received a statement from a Genizaro [half-blood] Indian pertaining to conditions in the Navajo country. The Genizaros were made up of semi-Christianized Indians, some captives who were given their freedom, Indian half-bloods, natives who were in the process of being Christianized and a few outcasts.

The Genizaros had villages well away from the centers of population. Neither the Spanish nor the Pueblo Indians wanted them nearby, so the outcasts were placed along the outskirts of New Mexico. The largest Genizaro village was Abiquiu, along the Chama River. Here a mission was established and a priest worked among these natives.

In any case, the governor heard from a Genizaro that the Navajos were being raided by the Utes, yet they were loyal to the Spanish. The Spanish noted that if only they could promise Navajo safety, they would be even more loyal and anti-Ute. Probably this Genizaro was himself a Navajo. The Spanish failed to provide help to the Navajo, leaving this tribe subject to continued depredation by the Utes. 50
Codallos y Rabal’s term expired in 1747 and Francisco de la Rocha was named to succeed him. However, Rocha declined the appointment, claiming he was too ill and too old to fulfill the duties of governor. So Codallos remained in New Mexico until 1749 when the crown appointed Tomas Velez Cachupin. Velez took office in May, 1749 and continued in his post into the 1760s. The governorships of Olavide y Michelena, Mendoza, and Codallos y Rabal were like most who preceded them. These men were able bureaucrats who, given the situation, kept New Mexico on an even keel. They worked to make the province viable and were far more sensitive to the needs of the community than were governors like Felix Martines. Olavide y Michelena showed his concern by personally visiting the pueblos. Mendoza’s term, on the other hand, was filled with excitement such as the Mallet brothers unannounced visit.

Joaquin Codallos y Rabal

Joaquín Codallos y Rabal
NOTES

1 Henrique de Olavide y Michelet, Order forbidding trade, January 7, 1737, at Santa Fe in SANM.
2 For further details on this trade, see Jones, Pueblo Warriors and Spanish Conquest.
3 Henrique de Olavide y Michelet, Order forbidding trade, February 1, 1737, at Santa Fe in SANM.
4 While records for this period are scarce, Bancroft offers documents that the Indians had goods to trade. See: H. H. Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, pp. 223, 249-250, and 267.
5 See: trade records in: SANM, years 1730-1750.
6 Little has been written about the trade with New Spain from New Mexico. The major work in this field is Max L. Moorhead, New Mexico's Royal Road (Norman, 1956), that does not cover the early eighteenth century. See also: Max L. Moorhead, "The Presidio Supply Problems of New Mexico in the Eighteenth Century," New Mexico Historical Review, XXVI (July, 1961), 210-230.
7 Henrique de Olavide y Michelet, Order forbidding gambling among the soldiers, January 21-22, 1737 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
8 Henrique de Olavide y Michelet, Order forbidding gambling among the general populace, March 24, 1737, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
9 The military and its role on the Spanish frontier is discussed by Sidney B. Brinckerhoff and Odie B. Faulk, Lancers for the King, (Phoenix, 1965) and by Max L. Moorhead, Jacabo Ugarte and the Apache Frontier (Norman, 1968).
10 Proceedings against Diego and Cristoval Garcia, July 9-24, 1737, at Albuquerque, in SANM.
11 Proceedings in case of Manuela Beytia and Juan Marques for immoral conduct, July 20-October 4, 1740, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
12 Proceedings in case of Francisco Padilla, for sedition, March 8-June 4, 1737, at Albuquerque and Santa Fe in SANM.
13 Henrique de Olavide y Michelet, Orders to Santa Fe citizens to stand ready or expedition against the Comanche, March 30, 1737 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
14 Proceedings in case against Miguel de Salazar for illegal trade, June 11-20, 1739, at Taos and Santa Fe, in SANM.
15 As related by H. H. Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, pp. 242-243.
16 Ibid., p. 243.
17 Order of Gaspar Domingo de Mendoza regarding the departure of escort for salt lakes, September 19, 1740, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
18 Order of Gaspar Domingo de Mendoza, regarding the departure of an escort to the salt lakes, July 27, 1740, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
19 See: Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, p. 243, n.29.
21 Other writers who dealt with the Comanche Barrier include Henri Folmer and Alfred B. Thomas. For a discussion of the French-Spanish problems on the plains see: Henri Folmer, Franco-Spanish Rivalry in North America, 1524-1763, (Glendale, California, 1953) and Alfred B. Thomas, After Coronado, Spanish Exploration Northeast of New Mexico, 1696-1727 (Norman, 1935); The Plains Indians and New Mexico, 1751-1778, Coronado Cuarto Centennial Publications, XI Ed. by George P. Hammond (Albuquerque, 1940).
22 Testimonio in regard to French intrusions in New Mexico, Provincias Internas. Tomo 34, in AGN, 1744.
23 See Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, p. 243, n.29.
24 Joaquin Codallos y Rabal, Proceedings against the Frenchman, [Louis Marie], June 10-July 14, 1744, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
25 Testimonio In Provincias Internas. Tomo 34, 1744, in AGN.
26 Gaspar Domingo de Mendoza, Order forbidding sacking of non-Christian Indian villages, March 21, 1741, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
27 Gaspar Domingo de Mendoza, Order for extra vigilance, February 2, 1742, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
28 Proceedings in case against Antonio de Ortega for raping his Indian servants, May 29-July 16, 1740, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
29 Proceedings against Manuel Martin and Salvador de Torres, June 4-10, 1741 at Santa Cruz and Santa Fe, in SANM.
30 Proceedings in case against Francisco Saes for mishandling of flocks, October 31-November 8, 1741, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
31 Proceedings in case against Baltasar Beca and Gregorio Benevides for trespass, September 11-24, 1743, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
32 Proceedings against Luis Quintana, Apache servant, and others for flight and assorted crimes, July 8-11, 1741, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
33 The year 1705 is referred to in SANM as having had “slaves”, while 1707 refers to “slaves” in AASF. 1743 has information that Apache captives were now servants, in SANM.
34 As related by Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, p. 244. This document is found in Padilla’s Conquista de Nueva Galicia, pp. 319 and 515-516.
35 Census of Joseph Antonio Villaseñor, Audiencia of Mexico, Legajo 3189, f. 466, 1745, in AGI.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Joachin Codallos y Rabal, Notebook of bandos and orders, February 4, 1744-July 20, 1748, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
40 Petition to sell wool outside of New Mexico, May 22, 1744, at Albuquerque, in SANM.
41 Permission from governor to sell wool, June 16, 1745, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
42 Order of Codallos y Rabal, prohibiting mistreatment of women and children during campaigns, May 30, 1744, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
43 Order from viceroy to governor, ordering troops for Gila campaign, June 22, 1747, at Mexico City, in SANM.
44 Record of visita general of Governor Codallos y Rabal, June 20-October 20, 1745, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
45 Record of visita of Codallos y Rabal, June 20-October 20, 1745, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
46 Order for escort for two frayles to Moqui, September 14, 1745, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
47 For example: Proceedings in case against Manuel Valerio for mistreatment of Juan Antonio Salazar, July 31-September 6, 1745, at Santa Cruz; Proceedings against Francisco Mondragón for abducting the wife of Jacinto Sánchez, November 29-December 19, 1745, at Santa Cruz; Proceedings against the Indian Pedro de la Cruz for trying to desert to the Comanche, February 22-July 15, 1747, at Santa Fe; Proceedings against Gregorio Jaramillo de Fuencila for assault on Thadeo Romero, January 7-March 13, 1747, at Albuquerque; Settlement of livestock suit, December 14, 1745, at Santa Fe; Proceedings in dowry settlement for daughter-in-law of Nicolas Duran y Chavez, April 15, 1747-October 15, 1751 at Albuquerque; and Soldiers of the presídio of Santa Fe, granting power of attorney, December 31, 1748, at Santa Fe, all in SANM.
48 Order to presidio of El Paso del Norte to send prisoner Manuel Sañz de Garvisu on to Chihuahua when he arrives, July 2, 1748 and requisition upon governor of Nueva Vizcaya to make provisions to send Manuel Sañz de Garvisu to Mexico City, July 2, 1748, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
49 Codallos y Rabal, order that all residents of El Paso del Norte who are gone must return at once, June 25, 1748, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
50 Copy of statement of the Genizaro Indian, Bentura, regarding status of Navajo, July 20, 1748, at Santa Fe, in SANM. The Genizaros, a diverse group combining Carlana, Jicarilla and Fararon Apache, Comanche, Ute, and Navajo, were used as servants as early as the reconquista a practice that was eliminated in the eighteenth century.
Chapter VIII
New Mexico’s Renaissance, 1749-1761

Tomas Velez Cachupin took office on April 6, 1749. Unlike many of his predecessors, the new governor found it unnecessary to issue orders. As will be recalled, previous governors continually forbade gambling, the sale of soldiers’ horses, while demanding road improvements, or demanding the supression of banditry and the like.

By mid-century, the New Mexicans were no longer the frontier settlers of earlier years. Civilization had come to New Mexico, even if it was no more than a veneer. There were fewer court cases, both civil and criminal, and the incidence of trouble among New Mexico’s soldiers decreased. At the outset it looked as if Velez was going to have an uneventful term in New Mexico.

But this was not to be. Problems began with the arrival of Juan Antonio Ordenal y Masa, a Franciscan friar from Durango, in 1748. He visited the missions in his capacity of visitador. He was responsible to the viceroy. Ordenal wrote that he found the friars of New Mexico “neglectful” in the fulfillment of their duties, that they oppressed the natives, that often they were absent from their posts, that they refused to teach the Indians Spanish and that they were unwilling to learn native languages. These criticisms were remarkably similar to those of Bishop Crespo in 1730. Ordenal suggested that the missions of New Mexico should be consolidated to reduce expenses.

In response, the Franciscans brought forth a report in which all charges by Ordenal were denied. The writer accused him of being a mouthpiece for Velez Cachupin whose “well-known hatred of the priests” was acknowledged in New Mexico. Meanwhile, at the behest of the order in Mexico City, Fray Carlos Delgado, a long-time New Mexico resident and the friar at Isleta, was asked to write of his forty years in New Mexico. In his report, he portrayed the governors and alcaldes of New Mexico as brutal tyrants who forced the natives into slavery and who took the products of these miserable creatures from for personal gain. He further accused the government of forcing the priests to remain quiet under threat of withholding their sinodos (annual subsidies). Delgado claimed that this, in turn, caused the Indians to become apostates because the Church could not function freely in the province. Bancroft said that Delgado was “a crank” since he clearly overstated the conditions in New Mexico. There is no evidence that the governors were as corrupt as Delgado would have the reader believe. As noted, the provincial government was quite active in stopping local corruption and the natives were not afraid to report illegal demands made upon them.

Delgado’s accusations were most violent. He stated:

“From each pueblo they [the alcaldes] take a squad of thirty or forty individuals to do all their work of tilling the soil, making adobes, building, etc.; others are employed to work with gentiles and drive livestock to Chihuahua, none receiving other pay than an occasional handful of tobacco or glass beads. The Indian women are used for the gratification of [carnal] lust. Once, in the padres’ presence, a woman came to upbraid the governor for taking her daughter, whereupon he gave her a buffalo-skin to make it all right. Any slight disobedience is punished by the stocks and flogging. On an unsupported charge of stealing three ears of corn, an Indian was shot by orders of a captain. On a march, three Indians who were footsore and could not keep up were killed and their children sold as slaves for the commanders’ profit.”

Such damning stories by Delgado were unlikely totally true, considering other evidence that is available on the subject. Certainly some abuses took place, but most of them were punished. The matter of the governor taking an Indian woman is highly unlikely as is the Indian being shot for the theft of corn. Bancroft stated: “I find in the records nothing to support and much to contradict the [Delgado] supposition that the rulers [of New Mexico] were for the most part blood-thirsty brutes....”

Governor Velez was thrust into the middle of the Church-State controversy. He was a marked man as far as the Franciscans were concerned. Although there were no more reports and the accusations faded, Franciscan feathers were ruffled and they were hard to live with. Velez realized this and avoided any further
conflict. The Delgado report was ignored in Mexico City. The viceroy preferred to believe his own man rather than some “crank” priest. There were no communications from Mexico City regarding the matter. Even the Franciscans were not interested. Nothing was heard from the Bishop of Durango.

New Mexico during the mid-eighteenth century seems to have grown and changed rapidly. In addition to the increase in population trade also grew. There is evidence that a major trade between Chihuahua and Santa Fe developed during this period. Extensive lists of goods imported to El Paso del Norte indicate that a massive trade was channeled through that city. El Paso was the stopping point for all goods going into and out of New Mexico. The lists of imports are not only extensive but include items such as quality cloth, books, ready-made clothing, horses, china, metal goods, guns, soap, and many other items that were considered “luxury items” prior to this time. 6

New Mexican exports also seem to have grown. The Delgado report mentioned the illegal use of Indians to drive cattle and sheep to Chihuahua City. This suggests that in New Mexico a trade with New Spain in cattle and sheep developed. Apparently livestock was driven to Chihuahua for slaughter and processing, suggesting a tanning and wool industry had not yet fully blossomed in New Mexico. But the fact that there were exports of value to New Spain shows that the imbalance of payments was lessened and that imports arriving at El Paso were paid for with New Mexican products rather than with hard currency.

When Governor Velez Cachupin took office, New Mexico’s population was 3,779 Spaniards, an increase from the census of 1745. 7 In his work, Testo Espanol, Joseph Antonio Villaseñor gives a population of 536 Spanish families and 1,428 to 1,570 families of neophytes (Indians learning Christianity) not including between 220 and 330 families residing in El Paso del Norte. 8 The Bonilla census of 1749 shows that New Mexico contained about 12,142 Christian Indians and about 1,400 Spaniards. 9 Villasenor and Bonilla list Santa Fe as having 965 Spaniards and 570 Indians, Santa Cruz with 1,204 Spanish and 580 Indians, and Albuquerque had 500 Spaniards and 200 Indians. 10

A census taken in 1752 during the general visita of Velez Cachupin shows a population of 4,448 persons, but there is no breakdown of Indians and Spaniards. It should be assumed that with a number as small as 4,000 the governor must have considered only Spanish and not Indians or half-breeds. For Santa Fe he lists 605 persons, in Santa Cruz 556 residents, and for Albuquerque 476 residents. Other pueblos included Taos, seventy-four, Bernalillo eighty, Chimayo 355, Chama 242, Abiquiu seventy-three, Fuencila 225, Quemado 355, and Cochiti thirty-seven. 11 The figures for places such as Quemado, Fuencila, Chama, and Chimayo seem too large for Spaniards only and must have included the natives living there, based on the 1745 census where figures are much lower. The numbers for Santa Fe, Santa Cruz and Albuquerque seem too small for everyone residing in these cities and must reflect only the Spanish populations. Even more confusing are totals given in the census. The governor lists 957 heads of families, 2,881 children, wives and others living in the households, which is a total of 3,847. But his final total is 4,448. 12 Where the difference of some 400 came from is unclear.

Velez also counted the arms and horses to be found among the general population. He discovered that there were 2,002 horses, 553 muskets, 432 lances, 401 leather jackets (for protection against arrows), 221 swords and 83 pistols for the companies of cavalry. 13 These weapons would outfit ten companies of fifty men each, given that each man was allotted six horses and one musket. This breakdown was of eighteen companies varying from seventy-one men to twelve soldiers. The number of soldiers in New Mexico in 1752 might sound like enough to handle any situation that could arise, but in fact they were just able to hold their own, for the Comanches, Apaches, and Utes had more men and probably as many horses and guns as the Spanish. 14

The governor’s report also included a detailed description of each pueblo where the population was counted, the number of weapons among the natives was recorded and totals were listed. For example, at Tesuque (near Santa Fe) there lived 2,470 persons who had 1,262 arrows, nine lances, one sword and four leather jackets. 15 In addition, forty three horses were available. The pueblos nearest Spanish garrisons were unable to defend themselves with a small numbers of weapons. Equally, the Spanish were unable to dispatch troops fast enough to protect these in-lying areas. But it was felt that the fewer weapons in the hands of Indians reduced the chance of an uprising. On the other hand,
Taos was one of the most remote outposts and one of the more self-reliant places. Here 451 people had 155 horses, 2,276 arrows, forty-eight lances, six swords, and thirty-eight leather jackets, but no guns. 16 A total of nineteen pueblos, including Abiquiu, had a population of 2,902 people, 4,060 horses, 6,045 arrows, 414 lances, 57 swords, and 151 leather jackets. 17 Again, it is hard to tell whether this represents Indians or Spanish. The numbers seem much too low to be native populations but far too high for Spaniards living in the pueblos. Velez counted only Indians that were unquestionably Christian and he refused to record neophytes or non-Christians.

The census of 1752 was, of course, interesting for the information it contained, but it was also unique because it was the first printed census of New Mexico. 18 Prior to 1752 all official documents were hand-written by trained scribes. The fact that the census was printed also suggests that the government at Mexico City was doing the printing for New Mexico had no press. The census was printed at Mexico City and used in the compilation of statistics for the whole of New Spain. The original was handwritten and then sent to the capital. It is possible that there are errors in transcription which would explain some of the very low Indian population estimates. 19

The Villaseñor census of 1745 listed 536 Spanish families living in New Mexico, or a population of about 3,000. The 1752 census stated that 3,847 to 4,440 persons lived in the major cities of New Mexico. Hence over a period of seven years the Spanish population increased about 800 or twenty-five percent. The statistics compiled were not overly accurate, but even if they are off by ten percent, the overall increase in Spanish population would still be on the order of ten percent. This reasonably rapid growth reflects growing confidence in the government's ability to protect the province. More settlers came in during the mid-eighteenth century years. The sudden increase indicates that people came to New Mexico because it offered something. Land was still available and New Mexico was more free from control than was New Spain. Minerals could be found. The frontier now was safe enough to take one's family.

Governor Velez not only had the increased Spanish population to consider but he also hosted foreign visitors. In 1750 three Frenchmen made their way into Santa Fe to trade. They had come to the Taos fair but were brought to Santa Fe by Lieutenant Governor Bernardo Bustamente y Tagle. Here they were questioned and a report was sent on to Mexico City. The men were identified as Luis Febre, Pedro Satren and Joseph Miguel Riballo. 20 Two months later, the governor reported that the foreigners were working quietly in Santa Fe, two of them being carpenters while Febre was a tailor, barber, and bloodletter. Velez added that since these skills were lacking in the province, he felt that the Frenchmen should settle in Santa Fe where they could teach "many boys here who are vagrant and given to laziness." 21 Velez continued: "It is very lamentable that the resident who is now employed as barber and bloodletter is so old that he would pass for seventy years of age; as for a tailor there is no one who knows the trade directly. A resident carpenter, there is none. . . ." 22 A year later the governor's request regarding his prisoners was acted upon and the French were allowed to remain at Santa Fe. 23

In 1750 another group of seven Frenchmen arrived from an Arkansas River post. Among them was a Spanish deserter named Felipe de Sandoval who reported that the party was a trading group and that it had come from Comanche country. Velez reported this new intrusion and a year later Auditor General Marques de la Altamira wrote Velez suggesting that the French not only be kept out, but that New Mexico establish more direct and permanent communication with Spanish Texas in order to monitor the movements of the French. He approved sending the six Frenchmen into the interior of New Spain because this would make it difficult for them to escape. 24

In 1751 another party of four Frenchmen reached New Mexico. They were taken to Santa Fe where they were questioned. Their names were not recorded and the men were sent to Chihuahua City for further interrogation. 25

On August 6, 1752 two Frenchmen were brought into Pecos by a band of Jicarilla and Carlana Apaches who apprehended them fifteen leagues east. They were sent to Santa Fe by Fray Juan Toledo. Luis Febre interpreted and found that their names were Jean Chapuis and Luis Feuilli. 26 The French said that they had come from the Illinois country under a passport issued by the commander of Michillimackinac for the purpose of establishing a trade route to Santa Fe. The men stated
that the Comanches guided them to New Mexico until they approached Pecos where the Apaches took over. Velez informed the men that their venture was illegal. The two were then dispatched to New Spain. Later their goods were confiscated and sold to Thomas Ortiz, a Santa Fe merchant, for 404 pesos, three reales, eleven granos. The proceeds were used to send the men south. The governor took 100 pesos for their expenses in New Mexico. 27

In 1754 the Auditor General suggested that Chapuis and Feuill be sent to Spain. This was done and French intrusions into New Mexico came to a temporary end. The crown reprimanded that in the future the matter of French incursions was not a local issue. Rather the entire border from Santa Fe southeastward to the mouth of the Trinity River should be treated as one. In this way Spain consolidated her northernmost border against the French and paved the way for further major reforms in the 1760s and 1770s. 28

In addition to combatting the French problem, Governor Velez ordered a campaign against the Comanche who had perpetrated a raid on Galisteo. In addition, the governor probably felt that the Indians allowed the French to come through a “barrier” that was supposed to be impenetrable and to stop this he would seal up the Comanche’s plains to the east.

In the fall of 1751 Velez marched into Comanche country in eastern New Mexico with 164 men. He drove 145 Indians into a hut and then set it afire, killing 101 natives. He lost one man and returned to Santa Fe in late 1751 with forty hostages. He later released the hapless Comanches. 29 Velez, despite his campaign, failed to stop the raiding Indians. However, his success in killing Comanches made an good impression on the viceroy who rewarded Velez with a commendation.

While the governor was busy on the eastern plains of the province, Franciscan friars attempted to convert the ever-hostile Moquis. Earlier several frailes had been received by the Indians who willingly listened to their preachings. But when the priests wanted to baptise the natives, the atmosphere turned unfriendly and the Spanish were obliged to retire. 30 In 1753 the Franciscans again decided to convert the Moqui tribe and sent several men into the pueblo. The effort was to no avail for the natives still did not trust the Spanish.

Governor Velez’s other preoccupations dealt with criminal and civil cases. The criminal cases included the misuse of Indian labor, an example of which was the case of Bernabe and Baltasar Baca who were charged with disobeying the orders of the governor regarding employment of Indians for personal use. The two men were found guilty and fined. 31 Another case involved a petition from Juana de Analla complaining that her sister, the wife of an Indian named Pascual, was being mistreated by her husband. After hearing testimony in the matter, Governor Velez decided that Pascual was not guilty and he was absolved of any guilt. 32

The civil cases dealt mostly with debt and contracts. In the case of Salvador de Garcia vs. Juan Garcia de la Mora the issue was the ownership of a blacksmith shop. Apparently the men were partners and, when the books failed to balance, they accused each other of fraud. Garcia sued de la Mora for damages. De la Mora accused Garcia of participating in a plan to defraud the public through bad workmanship. The court found de la Mora guilty of having taken funds from the partnership and he was sentenced to ten months in jail. Garcia, it was decided, had defrauded the public and he was fined 100 pesos. Certainly this must have been one of the earliest consumer protection cases on record in the present day United States. 33

Another case dealt with a suit brought by Vicente Jiron against Bentura Mestas to collect of a debt of 1,653 pesos due Jiron. 34 The suit was settled for 1,150 pesos in favor of the plaintiff. Other debt cases included that of Joseph Fresques against Antonio Gallegos, but no settlement was recorded in this case. 35

The Velez administration ended in 1754 with the appointment of Francisco Marin del Valle as governor. Bancroft thought that he might was appointed ad interim but since Marin served from 1754 to 1761, it seems that he was a full term governor. 36

Tomas Velez Cachupin was a good governor who was able to handle most anything that came his way. There were no major difficulties during his term of office and he retired with honor. While no residencia is available for him, he must have done an excellent job for he was reappointed in 1761 and he ruled for another five years.

Marin del Valle took office in 1754 and suffered from many of the problems that plagued his predecessors. There were still thefts of royal supplies, an illegal Indian trade thrived, livestock still strayed and the hostile raids
continued. One of Marin's first orders prohibited the sale of horses and guns to non-Christian Indians. 37 Two years later he ordered the citizens of Albuquerque to watch more closely their livestock so that ranging animals would not be a temptation for raiders. 38 The army also was a major concern for Marin. In 1755 the governor appointed Manuel Sañz de Garvisu as an officer in the presidial garrison of Santa Fe. This drew considerable protest from the soldiers and their officers, for Garvisu was in serious trouble with the viceroy in 1748-1749. He was sent to Mexico City for trial, but apparently was acquitted since he returned to Santa Fe in the early 1750s. Now he was being considered for a major military position. Thomas Madrid, captain of the presidio penned a violent protest against Garvisu's appointment, noting that his prior record was deplorable and that he would be of little credit to the army. Further, he reminded the governor, Garvisu was accused of treason, and this made him disloyal. 39 What became of the appointment was not recorded; however, in 1756, Nicolas Ortiz resigned as the lieutenant of the presidio, possibly because of Garvisu, 40 and he was replaced by Vicente Ginzo Ron y Thobar. 41 Ron y Thobar was not the best choice, since in 1757 he and other officers of the garrison charged the soldiers of the presidio with scandalous conduct including gambling, drinking, desertion, sale of government property, and a number of other crimes. 42 Under extreme pressure by the soldiers, Ron y Thobar was forced to resign because the governor was not willing to throw the entire presidio in jail. So Ron y Thobar resigned and was replaced by Carlos Fernandez. 43 Thus ended the internal troubles of the military in Santa Fe.

Other minor matters such as a request by the entire garrison that Esteban Rodrigues be appointed drummer were a peaceful respite from the chaos of years before. The Rodrigues boy was willing to be drummer for the garrison because it gave him considerable prestige for a fifteen year old child. The governor approved Rodrigues and he became the official drummer of the Santa Fe garrison. 44

Another serious problem was desertion. Two men, Juan de Benavides and Juan Antonio Marques deserted the garrison. They were caught, tried and sentenced to be shot. They were executed as an object lesson for those who thought that desertion was acceptable. 45

The military was still a serious problem in eighteenth-century New Mexico. Boredom and dreariness surrounded the presidio. The men were willing to do anything to break the cycle. They would gamble, sell their belongings, fight, get drunk, become involved in affairs of the heart and were generally a badly behaved bunch lot. Service records for the years 1755-1761 show that the cavalry company under Thomas Madrid was of poor quality. These records list the number of days, months and years of service, the point of stationing (New Mexico), the race of the men ("white"), the valor of the men and their conduct. In this column, there is but one word, mediana, meaning middling. 46 The soldiers, as in any country at any time were not interested in their performance reports for they could never rise above the rank of sergeant.

Marin del Valle's term of office was not dynamic. The usual civil and criminal cases were present. There was a considerable increase in the adultery cases, while assault, rape, and fraud decreased. Several cases dealing with the theft livestock theft were noted too.

In the matter of adultery, Antonio Joseph, a Genizaro, charged Joseph Gallegos with this crime, but because the case against him was not clear, the charges were dropped, and a warning was issued. 47 Later that year, several cases of concubinage came to light. One of them was against Manuel Lopes. Lopes was found guilty and jailed, but the lady involved was publically forgiven. The children born of this illegal union were legitimized and provided government aid. 48 On the other hand, Jochin Romero was not so lucky. He was charged with having maintained concubines. Found guilty, he was sentenced to three years of imprisonment. 49

Theft cases involved mostly horses and cattle. In 1761 Juan de la Cruz Baldes, a Genizaro, was found guilty of stealing a horse from a Ute Indian. He was exiled for four years. 50

Civil cases also dealt with livestock. This period was filled with litigation over animals, including debts regarding livestock and ownership of cattle and sheep. It was noted that there was a substantial increase in the livestock trade between New Mexico and Chihuahua in the early 1750s. Indications are that the trade thrived by 1760 and that the value of cattle, sheep and horses had increased making it necessary to consider the theft of stock a major crime.
In 1761 the number of civil cases dealing with stock rose dramatically. Criminal cases involving theft rose in that year. That it was of major concern by 1761 is a good indicator of the economic progress of New Mexico.

In the cases of theft, the guilty party was required to return the animals or pay for them. Fines were also imposed. In certain cases, there were stiff sentences such as jail time, but this was the exception. In negligence cases the defendant was fined and required to pay for the damages he caused. 52

Francisco Marin del Valle's term ended in 1761 and he was replaced by Tomas Velez Cachupin, an old hand at New Mexican affairs. The terms of Velez and Marin del Valle were both of interest because during their tenure the province grew. Velez's first term was an exciting period.

New Mexico saw the arrival of four different parties of French traders, a major Comanche campaign and a violent but swift Church-State confrontation. There was a considerable growth in the province's population and trade.

The fact that the Franciscans made a concerted effort to convert the Moqui also indicated that New Mexico's defense was improved. Velez, despite his alleged hatred of the priests, provided escorts and was willing to have the Indians converted, if not for their own souls, at least to insure peace in the province.

The impact of the French intrusions was minimal. Those Frenchmen who did arrive at Santa Fe were promptly questioned. Their goods confiscated and sold to local merchants, and then they were sent off to the interior of New Spain where they could cause no more trouble. After four tries, the French finally understood that the Spanish did not welcome trade and that the government would attempt to keep them out of New Mexico and Texas.

Marin del Valle's term marked an interlude. He came between the terms of Velez and was not an effective governor. He managed to keep New Mexico under control. Trade increased under its own power as did the population. Marin did little to curtail Indian raids, or to further the Church.

Velez's appointment in 1761 was a surprise to many and New Mexicans, remembering his last term, might have looked forward to his new term, for it was likely be quite interesting.
NOTES

1 Tomas Velez Cachupin, Act of taking office, April 6, 1749, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

2 As related by Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico. pp. 250-251. Bancroft is the only source for these reports. He cites them as being in the New Mexico Archives.

3 Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, p. 251. Carlos Delgado, Informe..., cited by Bancroft as being in the New Mexico Archives.

4 Ibid., note 50.

5 Ibid.

6 Juarez Archives, Reel 1, 1726-1779. Hereinafter cited JA. These lists are incomplete and generally undated. Many of them are nearly illegible, but they do give an indication of amount of materials being imported into New Mexico from Chihuahua.

7 Joseph Antonio Villaseñor, Teatro Español, ii, as related by Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, pp. 409-423.

8 Juan Miguel Menchero, Declaracion, 1744, New Mexico Documents, Bancroft Library, MS, 1704-1773.

9 Census, Provincias Internas, 102, Expediente 3, f.1, 1752, in AGN.

10 Menchero, Declaracion, 1744, New Mexico Documents, Bancroft Library, MS, 1704-1773.

11 Census, Provincias Internas 102, Expediente 3, f.1, 1752, in AGN.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Census of 1752, Provincias Internas. 102, Expediente 3, f.1, 1752, in AGN. This was printed on papel selo (stamped paper) indicating that it was a royal census. The stamp bears the markings Mexico City, 1752.

20 Bolton, “French Intrusions into New Mexico, 1749-1752.”

21 Provincias Internas, 34, 1749-1753, in AGN.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Bolton, “French Intrusions into New Mexico, 1749-1752.”

25 Tomas Velez Cachupin, Proceedings against four Frenchmen, February 3-March 12, 1751 at Santa Fe, in SANM.

26 Bannon, Bolton and the Spanish Borderlands.

27 Ibid., pp. 167-168.

28 Ibid., p. 171.

29 Velez Cachupin, Account of Comanche campaign of 1751, reported to viceroy, April 2-12, 1752, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

30 This refers to the trip made in 1745 by Friars Carlos Delgado and Joseph de Yrigoyen to Moqui in an attempt to convert the natives. Fray Delgado is the author of the report of 1749.

31 Proceedings against Baltasar and Bernabe Baca, August 2-September 8, 1752, at Albuquerque, in SANM.

32 Proceedings regarding petition of Juana de Analla, October 2-3, 1752 at Santa Fe, in SANM.

33 Proceedings in suit of Salvador de Garcia, September 24-November 8, 1752, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
34 Suit of Vicente Jiron vs. Bentura Mestas, January 20- March 3, 1753, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
35 Suit of Joseph Fresques vs. Antonio Gallegos, April 28- May 19, 1753, at Santa Cruz, in SANM.
36 Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico. p. 256.
37 Francisco Marin del Valle, Order forbidding the sale of horses and guns to hostiles, November 26, 1754, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
38 Marin del Valle, Order to care for livestock, September 14, 1756, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
39 Thomas Madrid, Protest to governor against the appointment of Manuel Sanz de Garvisu, July 4-November 8, 1755, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
40 Resignation of Nicolas Ortiz, January 1, 1756, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
41 Marin del Valle, Appointment of Vicente Ginzo Ron y Thobar as lieutenant to replace Nicolas Ortiz, resigned, January 1, 1756, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
42 Ron y Thobar, et al., Charges against the soldiers of the presidio of Santa Fe for gross misconduct, presented to Governor Marin del Valle, April 17, 1757, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
43 Appointment of Carlos Fernandes to replace Vicente Ginzo Ron y Thobar, May 11, 1757 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
44 Petition of the garrison at Santa Fe for the appointment of Estevan Rodrigues as drummer, May 16, 1757, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
45 Proceedings in the case against Juan de Benevides and Juan Antonio Marques for desertion, May 30-June 24, 1757, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
46 Compania de cavalleria del real presidio de Santa Fe del Nuevo Mexico [under the command of] Don Thomas Madrid, 1755-1761, Provincias Internas, 102, Part II, f.67, in AGN.
47 Proceedings in complaint of Antonio Joseph against Joseph Gallegos, February 9, 1761 at Albuquerque, in SANM.
48 Proceedings against Manuel Lopes, June 21-August 11, 1761, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
49 Proceedings against Jochin Romero for concubinage, June 26- July 14, 1761, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
50 Proceedings against Juan de la Cruz Baldea, for horse theft, March 29-May 6, 1761, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
51 For example: Juan Antonio Duran vs. Pedro Antonio Trujillo for theft of horse, March 8-12, 1761 at Santa Cruz and Juan Pedro Sinersos vs. Clemente Gutierrez for theft of six cows, May 5-December 16, 1761 at Santa Cruz, in SANM.
52 For example: Luis Flores and the Indian mulatto, Tasago, for theft of livestock, June 23-August 12, 1761 at Santa Fe; Juana Roybal vs. Marcial Gonzales for theft of livestock, May 24-July 14, 1761, at Santa Fe; Pedro de Atienza vs. Miguel Ventura, Indian, over livestock, August 4- September 13, 1761, at Santa Cruz and Joachin Pino vs. Juan de Dios for theft of livestock, October 18, 1761-March 14, 1763, at Santa Cruz, in SANM.
In 1760, prior to the return of Tomas Velez Cachupin, Bishop Pedro Tamarón of Durango made a visit to the missions of New Mexico, her pueblos, and all Spanish settlements. His report described some of the towns that he visited and he created a census. The primary objective of this journey was to establish further the claims of the Bishopric of Durango as to the jurisdiction over the province.

His travels began at El Paso del Norte, an area he described as a prosperous valley. He stated: “They grow wheat, maize and other grains of the region as well as fruit trees, apples, pears, peaches, and figs.” El Paso left Tamarón with the impression of a lush area containing a moderate population. He concluded that 2,479 whites and 249 Indians lived in the city and along the river north to Isleta.

On his journey northward along the Rio Grande, the bishop stopped to visit small settlements that grew up along the Rio Grande. His first stop was San Lorenzo, also called Realito; here he found 192 Spaniards and fifty-eight Indians. He noted that there was one Franciscan friar who ministered in a small church that measured 25 varas by 5½ varas. At Senecu, the Bishop found one missionary caring for 425 Piros Indians, fifty-two Sumas, 141 Spaniards and twenty-eight “infidels being taught the catechism.” The church measured 36⅔ varas by 5⅓ varas. The size of the building was commensurate with the population. At Socorro the visitor found 182 Suma Indians, one priest, 424 Spaniards, and a church that measured 36 varas by 7¾ varas. He noted that the pueblos around Socorro were “fertile and luxuriant as El Paso del Norte. . . .” At Isleta, farther up river, Tamarón found one Franciscan, 425 Piros Indians, and 131 Spaniards. This church was a bit smaller than that of Senecu, measuring 36 varas by 5⅓ varas.

Upon arriving at Albuquerque, the bishop toured the nearby pueblos of Sandia and Santo Domingo. The villa of Albuquerque, he reported, had a Spanish population of 1,814 persons who were cared for by one Franciscan friar. Sandia contained 222 Tiwa Indians and one priest, while Santo Domingo had 424 Keres Indians, one priest, and no settlers.

After inspecting the Albuquerque area, Tamarón went on to Santa Fe where Governor Francisco Antonio Marin del Valle, welcomed him in great style. The bishop reported that “the governor came forth with a numerous and brilliant retinue. He dismounted from his horse and joined me in the coach.” Tamarón stayed at Santa Fe for some time. He described it, noting that “the buildings of the villa both churches [one being San Miguel] and houses are all adobe. There is no fortress there nor any formal presidio building.” He was not impressed by the defense of the city as he concluded that “Santa Fe is a very open place. . . .”

While Tamarón remained in the capital, he confirmed a large number of believers. He noted that “Since I have confirmed 1,532 persons in the said villa. I am convinced that the census they [the governor] gave me is very much on the low side and I do not doubt that the number of persons must be at least two times that given in the census.” Tamarón’s personal census indicated that there were 1,285 residents of Spanish and mixed-blood living there. The census of 1752, as conducted by Tomas Velez Cachupin, stated that 605 persons lived in Santa Fe. Tamarón was given a list double that size, yet he claimed that Santa Fe was at least twice again as large. This seems unlikely, for the growth of the city would have be over 100 percent in less than ten years. If Tamarón is correct, over 200 percent in that time. It is more likely that the number of confirmations included settlers of outlying areas who came into Santa Fe, and many mixed-bloods, but since they were house servants they were not counted in official censuses. Such figures were similar to the 1745 census.

After visiting Santa Fe, Bishop Tamarón inspected the northern pueblos. He went to Pecos where he found 344 Indians and one priest, while at Galisteo he counted 255 natives in residence [en residencia]. At Tesuque there were 232 residents regularly visited by a priest from Santa Fe, while at Nambe he found 204 persons, 118 of whom were Europeans. The bishop complained that Nambe was less than comfortable and there was a “plague or swarm of bedbugs [was] encountered here.” His final local visit was to Pojoaque where
he found ninety-nine persons. They, too, were regularly visited by a priest from Santa Fe. 19

Tamaron then proceeded to Santa Cruz de la Cañada, the second largest Spanish city in New Mexico, located about thirty miles north of Santa Fe. Here he found 1,515 Spaniards and mixed-bloods. The bishop offered no other description of the area. 20 From Santa Cruz, he visited Picuris and discovered that there were 328 native residents, 208 Spaniards, and one priest. 21 He then moved on to Taos where he noted that the population included 505 Indians and 160 “Europeanized” citizens. He made no mention of a Spanish population at Taos. 22

At Taos, the most northerly town in New Mexico, Tamaron turned south and visited other pueblos along the river. At Santa Clara he counted 257 Indians, one priest, and 277 Spaniards and mixed-bloods. 23 The pueblo of Cochiti yielded 450 natives, one priest, and 140 Spanish, 24 while San Felipe de Jesus had a population of one priest and 458 natives. 25 At Santa Ana he found 404 Keres Indians under one Franciscan, and another 568 Keres at Zia also under the direction of one priest. 26 Jemez had 373 natives and one Franciscan friar. 27

On the final leg of his visitation, Tamaron turned westward toward Laguna where he reported that 600 natives were being ministered to by sixty-two year old Fray Jose Oranzo. 28 In addition, there were eighty-six Spaniards living at Laguna. 29 Tamarón did not find the place very appealing. He reported that “water is very scarce. The church is small and its adornment poor.” 30 The bishop then went on to Zuñi, westernmost of the pueblos, where he found 664 Indians under one priest. His opinion of the natives was low. He noted that the natives here were: “as stupid and backward in confession and catechism as the rest.” 31

Tamaron then returned to Acoma where he counted 1,502 Indians under the supervision of one friar. Highly impressed with the natives at this location, he described the area as being “the most beautiful pueblo of the entire kingdom. . . .” 32 His final visit returned him to Isleta where he found 304 Indians, 210 Spanish settlers, and one Franciscan priest. 33

After his visitation of 1760 Tamaron concluded that the priests of New Mexico “are comfortably off, each one in his pueblo and the king contributes 300 pesos a year for their support.” 34 He was critical of the progress made by the natives, stating that “they do recite the catechism in Spanish . . . [but] they do not understand what they are saying.” 35 He recommended that the friars make sure that the Indians learned Spanish and more European ways. If this were not accomplished, the bishop saw little hope for the continued usefulness of the missions. The results of the bishop’s visit showed that New Mexico had grown and that the missions were in good condition. Despite a few disparaging remarks about the Indians and their ability to learn, the bishop seemed generally satisfied with the Church in New Mexico.

The situation was not the same for New Mexico’s government. In 1762 Tomas Velez Cachupin returned to Santa Fe and took office. Prior to his arrival, Mateo Antonio de Mendoza was appointed acting governor, a post that he held for only a few months. In 1761 he was succeeded by Manuel Portillo Urríosla who held office until 1762 when a permanent governor was selected. Portillo’s only major accomplishment was the reported deaths of 400 Comanche in a huge fight at Taos during December of 1761. He took eighty men to Taos and dislodged the Comanches who surrounded the town. During the battle, some nearby Utes saw an opportunity to profit from the engagement. They slipped into Taos while the Spanish slaughtered scores of Comanches. In the process, the Ute drove off some 1,000 horses belonging to both parties. 36 Bancroft provides this description from the writings of Pedro Serrano, a Franciscan friar and anti-administration writer. Bancroft expressed considerable skepticism about the number of Comanches that were allegedly killed. The numbers were doubtlessly inflated. The New Mexicans probably could not have mauled the Comanche so severely without great loss to themselves.

When Velez Cachupin took office as permanent governor on February 1, 1762, he was faced with a continuing Comanche threat northeast of Taos. Consequently, he was in contact with the Viceroy Marques de Croillas. The two officials planned the best method of ridding New Mexico of Comanches. 37

The Comanche threat again arose at Taos in 1760 when the natives came to trade. 38 They were so rowdy that campaigns to remove them were effected first in 1760 and then in 1761. The Comanches were naturally
resentful, for all they wanted was to trade, particularly guns and horses. Of course this was illegal. Nonetheless, the new troubles with the Indians caused concern at Mexico City, and in 1763 the viceroy wrote to Velez requesting information about the threat. 39 The punishment the natives took at Taos in 1762 was sufficient warning and they left quietly.

In addition to the Comanche situation, Velez dealt with normal functions of government. He was ordered by the viceroy to take no action against certain residents of Santa Cruz who had left the province without permission. 40 For the first time since the 1600s, residents were able to leave without express consent. It indicates that province was secure enough to allow more movement into New Spain. Increases in population, rapid expansion of trade to the south, and a relaxation of Indian pressure allowed the New Mexicans a chance to move freely about the region. 41

Trade records from Chihuahua show that cloth, leather goods, horses, guns, cookware, and luxury items such as silk, Breton linen, and jewelry were increasingly imported through El Paso. Also, these records indicate that exports from New Mexico were still quite small. Goods such as cattle, horses, woven cloth, wheat, and a small number of hides were sent to Chihuahua. 42

It is also significant that the Spanish colonial system of trade and travel was dramatically altered by the King Charles III, who decided that the monopolistic trade between Seville and the New World needed to be broken to permit more development in the provinces.

More importantly, the Seven Years War concluded with the Peace of Paris in 1763. Spain gained considerable North American territory for her efforts on behalf of France. The Family Compact, renewed in 1760 by Spain, was the key to Spanish participation in the war. The Crown did not become directly involved in North American affairs until January 1762 when British Ambassador Lord Bristol left Madrid and war between the two countries was declared. For its efforts, the Spanish Crown was forced, under the terms of the Peace of Paris, to relinquish St. Vincent, Tobago, Grenada, Florida, and her rights to cut hardwood along the Honduras coast. In return, France compensated Spain with Louisiana and New Orleans. 43

Cuba was given back to Spain; England got Florida; and Louisiana was placed under administration at Havana. France was the big loser, Spain came out quite well. The threat of France in the Mississippi Valley was removed. New Mexico and Texas were for the first time in nearly 100 years free from threat of a major foreign power.

In the rest of the Spanish colonies big things were afoot. From the original viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru came expansion under the Bourbons. Charles III created the viceroyalty of La Plata (Argentina), and Chile was made a governor-generalship. The reorganization, that took place during the 1760s and 1770s, was designed to improve the functions of the colonies and to provide more ports for foreign trade. Now harbors were available at Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Cartagena instead of just Portobello, Panama, Vera Cruz, and Acapulco. 44

In 1768 concessions for expanded trade were allowed for Louisiana and New Orleans became the major port for the Mississippi Valley. This did not have any effect on New Mexico since most of her trade was internal, that is from Chihuahua City to El Paso del Norte to Santa Fe.

At Taos the annual fair was a tradition that provided a place for Spaniards, Indians and, later, fur trappers to meet and exchange their goods. The natives brought hides, minerals and other items that they traded for food, clothing, guns, and horses. The New Mexicans provided manufactured goods, wheat, guns, and horses for trade. This event began in the late 1750s; it is first mentioned 1759 and continued to be an important internal trade event until into Mexican period.

There was also increased external trade. A route from Santa Fe to El Paso to Chihuahua was established quite early and, though very little was exported, imports were heavy.

That goods were imported from Chihuahua is shown in an order from Lucas Montaño de Alcalá to confine the carts of a certain Montoya in his house until a debt of [?] and eight pesos was paid. It also stated that in future all of Montoya's carts were to be restricted to the Royal Road.

Velez Cachupin found that by 1762 criminal and legal matters he dealt with in the 1750s had moderated. Prior to his return, cattle and sheep rustling was on the rise. During his second term the number of such cases dropped greatly. The overall crime pattern changed from civil suits over debts, cattle rustling, and default by merchants to criminal cases such as rape, assault.
robery, and common theft. On some occasions there would be a variation in the pattern. For example, in 1763 Cristobal and Nerio Montoya sued Antonio Baca over the sale of lands belonging to the Indians of the Santa Ana pueblo. Baca said he had legal claim to these lands because they had been sold to him by the natives and that he had a bill of sale. The Montoya brothers claimed that it was illegal to sell any Indian land and that there was no validity to these purchases. The case was found in favor of Baca on the grounds that the natives had the right to sell their own land so long as they were paid a fair price and that they knew what the sale meant.

Other cases that Velez had considered included a complaint by two Genizaro Indian women against their masters, Tomas and Isabela Chavez, for cruel treatment. In this case the two women complained that they were beaten "excessively" and that both masters were unusually brutal in the treatment of servants. After considerable testimony, the Chavezes were found not guilty and the case was dismissed. The complaint of Antonia Martin against her husband, Reynaldo Baca, for cruelty and adultery led to testimony by witnesses that caused the acquittal of the defendant. Marital difficulties seemed to be quite common in New Mexico. If they could not be settled by a priest, they ended up in court. Incest was also a problem. In the case against Manuel Martin, numerous witnesses, and Martin's young daughter told of rape and child abuse. He was found guilty. Martin appealed to Velez and received a pardon. He was released because charge was so hard to substantiate that the verdict should have been "not proven".

The Church took part in protecting servants from their masters. Fray Joachin Rodriguez sent a petition to Velez asking that a Genizaro girl be given her freedom because she was so badly mistreated. The request was noted by the governor's office but no action was taken.

Early in the eighteenth century, most servants were captured Apache or Ute Indians. Early campaigns often resulted in the capture of renegade Indians, who were brought to the Rio Grande valley and were sold into slavery. This practice appeared in the Santa Fe-Albuquerque area as early as 1706 but by 1750 there are no records of enslaved natives. Unchristianized Indians were sold under the condition that they be taught "Christian virtues" and the Catholic faith. Sometimes, if the natives were not converted, the government would free the captives.

Indians who were enslaved were often freed upon the death of their master. Many of these people became part of the Genizaro group that thrived in New Mexico. Indians were treated quite well and literally became part of a New Mexican family. They were taught to speak Spanish, possibly to read a little, and in some cases to write. Some servants had the courage to report crimes against them. However, retribution was usually involved so not many abuses cases were recorded.

Some other civil and criminal cases included the theft of livestock and the usual assault cases. In 1764 Vicente de Seña was accused of wounding soldier Antonio de Armenta. After a lengthy trial the defendant was found guilty. He appealed to Velez and was released when he paid Armenta damages. Velez noted that trial costs of, sixty-six pesos, twelve reales and other expenses, bringing the total cost to ninety pesos. Another case in 1765 brought Eusebio Chaves to the bar for having assaulting Andres Martin. Chaves was found guilty, fined ten pesos, and sentenced to fifteen days in jail. He appealed to the governor, only to be denied.

Cattle theft still was a problem in 1766 as seen in the case against Mauricio Trujillo, who was accused of stealing livestock from Toribio Ortiz. After nearly six months of testimony, Trujillo was found guilty and sentenced to three years in exile. Other livestock cases dealt with civil suits rather than criminal matters. In most of these cases the problem was nonpayment of debts or loss due to negligence.

As time progressed more and more correspondence flowed from Mexico City to Santa Fe. Velez Cachupin's second term saw considerable communication from Mexico City including the most routine matters. In 1764 the Marques de Cruillas sent blank forms to the Captain of the Presidio at Santa Fe for official use. Later that year, the governor received a list from the viceroy confirming the nominations for the officers of the presidio.

Velez Cachupin's term expired in 1767, but before he left, the governor sent an expedition into southern Colorado seeking mineral deposits. The party, led by Juan de Rivera, marched northwest from Santa Fe, reaching the area near modern Durango, Colorado. They then proceeded eastward toward the future site of Gunnison, Colorado where they viewed the awesome
Black Canyon of the Gunnison. The little group spent from 1761-1765 in the Rockies. But the expedition was considered a failure because few minerals were found. The party returned with little information other than there were Ute to be found in the area. 60 Ironically, the land that the New Mexicans explored became one of the richest silver and gold mining regions in the western United States.

Velez Cachupin finished his New Mexican career by concluding an investigation begun in 1760 at the Genizaro settlement of Abiquiu, where it was alleged that witchcraft was rampant. After six years of testimony, seven or eight Indians were found guilty and were sentenced to become servants of Spanish families where they would be “rehabilitated.” 61

Since there was no longer the threat of a foreign power in New Mexico and Texas, a less centralized government could be established. Instead of a governor reporting directly to the viceroy, a Commandant-General at Chihuahua City would become the middleman between the provinces and the central government. To implement these plans, Charles III made two major appointments. The first was that of Jose de Galvez, who was given the title of visitador general. It was his job to report to the crown conditions he found in New Spain and to make recommendations for corrective measures. The second appointment went to Cayetano Maria Pignatelli Rubi Corbera y San Climent, the Marques de Rubi. His mission was to conduct a careful inspection of the frontier’s military organization and to assess the state of defense along outlying areas of New Spain.

In May of 1766 Rubi began his tour that included auditing the internal administration of each presidio, considering the relations of officers with their men, and looking into the character of the soldiers and their general fitness. In addition he was to examine the use of royal funds by the military. It was hoped that the Marques might be able to effect new economies at the presidios and save the crown a little money. Rubi was instructed to draw his own conclusions and to recommend abandonment, relocation, or continuation of each presidio. The Marques was accompanied by Nicolas de Lafora, a captain in the Royal Engineers, who wrote an excellent description of the visit beginning in Mexico City and subsequently ending there. 62

Rubi left Mexico City in 1766. He inspected the presidios of northern New Spain before making his way to El Paso del Norte in July of that year. At El Paso he found a well-defended town of about 5,000 with five mission towns nearby. His only suggestion was that a local militia be established, making it possible to release royal troops. Rubi rightly considered El Paso the key to the defense of the lower Rio Grande valley. He thought that the existing garrison might be moved south to close a hole between New Mexico and Nueva Vizcaya. 63 The shift to Carrizal was designed to prevent Apaches raiding the road to Chihuahua City. This caused Rubi to consider a presidio between that town and El Paso del Norte a necessity. The lifeline to New Mexico was threatened and Rubi was ready to protect it.

The Rubi party left El Paso only to be attacked between Fray Cristobal and Albuquerque by Apaches who tried to steal horses and sheep. The raiders were chased off. The expedition proceeded to the pueblos near Albuquerque. Rubi reached Santa Fe in August, 1766 and was greeted by Tomas Velez Cachupin. The Marques found a town of 2,324 and a garrison of eighty men. Nicolas de Lafora was unimpressed with Santa Fe noting that it could not possibly be defended for there was no fortress or walls. 64 The engineer thought that a small compact fort might offer the best protection. Rubi’s only suggestion to Velez was that a presidio be established north of El Paso along the Camino Real in order to protect this vital road from raiding Apaches. He recommended Robledo as the site of a new fort. This suggestion went to Spain but was never acted upon, and the road remained a dangerous passage between Albuquerque and El Paso del Norte because of Apache harassment. 65

Rubi, having completed his tour of New Mexico, went on to Sonora, Arizona, and then the Gulf of California where he made many changes. He also went east into Texas where he inspected the missions. In February, 1768 Rubi returned to Mexico City, and during April of that year he submitted his recommendations in the form of a Dictamen. He proposed line of presidios from the mouth of the Rio Conception in Sonora to the mouth of the Rio Guadalupe in Texas. They would be located forty leagues apart to facilitate complete control of the area. He suggested that certain presidios be abandoned. Rubi proposed that El Pasaje in Nueva Vizcaya, Monterey in Nuevo Leon, Horcasitas, and Buenaven-
tura in Sonora, and Los Adaes and San Luis Ahumado in Texas be eliminated. Each presidio should have a garrison of fifty men properly equipped for frontier patrols and battles. His work showed that proposed reorganization would save the crown 80,000 pesos a year. The Dictamen was submitted to the King and in 1772 it was favorably acted upon.

The Rubi visit to New Mexico had little effect on the defensive structure of the province. His recommendation that a line of presidios be built was followed and El Paso's garrison was modified. Santa Fe was outside the defense line proposed by Rubi, as he knew it would be. He felt that a garrison of eighty men would be adequate to hold northern New Mexico while satisfactorily covering the pueblos.

The second term of Velez Cachupin was less exciting and somewhat more normal than his first administration. There were no further clashes with the Church, there were no Indian campaigns, and there were no Frenchmen. Velez's only major expedition was that into the southern Colorado Rockies and it was a failure.

Upon the expiration of his second stint, Velez retired, one of the few governors of New Mexico to serve two full five year terms. The fact that he ruled so long indicates that the Spanish government considered him one of their better bureaucrats. And that he was.
NOTES

1 Adams, Bishop Tamaron's Visitation, p. 35.
2 Ibid.
3 A vara is a measurement about 2.8 feet long. A 36 vara by 5 vara Church would be about 19 feet wide by 90 feet long.
4 Adams, Bishop Tamaron's Visitation, p. 38.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
7 Ibid., p. 38.
8 Ibid., pp. 43-44.
9 Ibid., p. 44.
10 Ibid., p. 45.
11 Ibid., p. 46.
12 Ibid., p. 47.
13 Ibid., p. 46.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 53.
17 Ibid., p. 54.
18 Ibid., p. 55.
19 Ibid., p. 56.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 65.
24 Ibid., p. 66.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 67.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 68.
32 Ibid., p. 69.
33 Ibid., p. 71.
34 Ibid., p. 77.
35 Ibid., pp. 78-79.

Marques de Cruillas to Velez Cachupin, May 21, 1763, at Mexico City, in SANM.

See: Moorhead, *New Mexico's Royal Road*.

Marques de Cruillas to Velez Cachupin, June 10, 1763, at Mexico City, in SANM.

Marques de Cruillas to Velez Cachupin, Order not to take action against residents of Santa Cruz, December 11, 1763, at Mexico City, in SANM.

The most authoritative work dealing with the Santa Fe-Chihuahua trade is Moorhead, *New Mexico's Royal Road*. Records from the State Archives of New Mexico, the Juarez Archives, and the Chihuahua City Archives provide poor information on trade other than a few illegible invoices. For information on early 19th-century trade see: Abraham P. Nasatir and Noel M. Loomis, *Pedro Vial and the Roads to Santa Fe* (Norman, 1966).

Juarez Archives, 1726-1779, Reel 1.


Order of Lucas Montañó de Alcala against [?] Montoya, n.d., in Juarez Archives, 1726-1779, Reel 1.

The cases listed in the Santa Fe Archives show that emphasis had shifted from 1761 to 1763. The entire year 1762 is missing.

Proceedings in case of Cristobal and Nerio Montoya vs. Antonio Baca for sale of pueblos lands, August 9-25, 1763, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

Proceedings in complaint of two Indian women against their masters, October 12-15, 1763, at Albuquerque, in SANM.

Complaint of Antonia Martin, March 18-October 8, 1765, against her husband, Reymundo Baca at Santa Cruz, in SANM.

Proceedings against Manuel Martin for incest, February 6-4 April 20, 1766, at Santa Cruz, in SANM.

Petition of Fray Joachin Rodriguez for freedom of Genizaro Indian girl, April 14, 1765, at San Ildefonso, in SANM.

See: France V. Scholes, “Civil Government and Society in New Mexico in the Seventeenth Century”.

For example SANM records show that over a period from 1700 to 1776 there were thirteen Indian cases and only two servant cases. Both of these cases were heard in 1740. See: proceedings against Antonio de Ortega for assault against Indian servants, May 29-July 16, 1740, in SANM.

Proceedings against Vicente de Seña for assault, October 17, 1764-October 8, 1765 (including appeal), at Santa Fe, in SANM.

Proceedings against Eusebio Chaves for assault, June 3-July 15, 1765, at Albuquerque, in SANM.

Proceedings against Mauricio Trujillo for livestock theft, July 20, 1765-January 24, 1766, at Santa Fe, in SANM.

For example, Petition of Pedro Padilla for return of mule, October 21, 1765-September 8, 1766, at Santa Fe; Manuel Garcia Pareja vs. Francisco Duran for livestock losses, June 12-14, 1766, at Santa Cruz; Juan Joseph Bustos vs. Joseph Samora over horses, June 14-20, 1766, at Santa Fe, and Nicolas Ortiz vs. Juan Gutierrez and Antonio Baca over sheep lands, July 9-24, 1766, at Albuquerque, in SANM.

Viceroy to governor, Enclosure of official forms, August 6, 1764, at Mexico City, in SANM.

Viceroy to governor, List of confirmations, December 27, 1764, at Mexico City, in SANM.

Bancroft refers to this event through the *Diario de Dominguez and Escalante* (1776). According to it, Juan de Rivera visited the area in 1761 where the term La Plata was given to a river and a mountain range. See also: LeRoy and Ann Hafen, *The Old Spanish Trail*, (Glendale: 1954).


63 Ibid., p. 17.
64 Ibid., p. 91.
65 Ibid., pp. 15-17.
66 Ibid., p. 95.
New Mexico’s “independence” as a separate province were fast closing. For the first time in many years residents saw better days ahead. In 1772 Spain finally admitted that New Mexico was a province that needed to be fully supported. Thus, the last years prior to the reorganization of 1776 were more important to New Mexico’s future than any period since Vargas’ reconquest of 1695.

While the Rubi inspection was in progress, Tomas Velez Cachupin retired. During 1767 Pedro Fermin de Mendinueta became governor and captain-general of the province. Before the end of his term, monumental changes in the structure of this frontier society occurred. Within a few months after taking office, Mendinueta faced his first crisis. A flood along the Rio Santa Fe inundated Santa Fe and its suburbs in October, 1767. Mendinueta called out the residents of Santa Fe to build embankments to save public buildings. Because of their efforts the Palace of the Governors still stands.  

Mandinueta decided that Santa Fe was suffering from a crime wave, since in November, 1767, he issued strong orders that law-breakers be dealt with most harshly to set an example.  

Shortly thereafter, Juan Manuel Padilla was brought to trial for killing one stolen cow “in his own house.” He claimed that his family was on the brink of starvation and he took the cow to feed them. The governor sentenced Padilla to pay for the animal. However, he noted that the sentence was light because the man’s family was poor and he stole for survival. Clearly, Spanish justice in New Mexico was tempered by humane considerations.  

In early 1768 Mendinueta sent an order to Francisco Trebol Navarro, alcalde mayor of Albuquerque, telling him to prevent further gambling, concubinage, theft, prostitution, and other offenses. Otherwise Trebol would be dismissed.  

The governor considered Albuquerque one of the worst dens of iniquity in New Mexico.  

Three days later the same message went to Phelipe Tafoya, alcalde mayor of Santa Fe, for the same reasons. These notices were the first in ten years. Mendinueta’s supposition that crime had increased was correct. Trebol Navarro published the bando in Albuquerque as ordered.

In January, 1768, he was appointed war captain for a proposed Indian campaign. The citizens of Albuquerque promptly submitted a petition to Mendinueta protesting Trebol’s appointment on the grounds that he was not competent and that he was not popular enough to lead residents of that city. The petition was received in Santa Fe, noted and then forgotten.  

Serious crime in the capital increased as seen when Manuel and Pedro Moya were arrested inside the presidio warehouse in late September, 1767. The two were found carrying off weapons, powder and clothing that was royal property. Their reason for theft was that the articles were for trade with the Comanches. The brothers were brought to trial for grand theft and found guilty. They were given three-month jail sentences.  

Along with his attempts at controlling crime in New Mexico, Governor Mendinueta had a normal load of civil cases to deal with. Criminal matters included robbery, assault and cattle theft. In the case of Maria de la Luz Romero vs. Mariano Baca, Maria charged Mariano with slander, claiming obscenities were used against her. For her public vilification, Baca was found guilty and sentenced to nine months in jail. On the other hand, Pedro Yturveita was charged with wounding Toribio Garcia. He was brought to trial and found guilty. Yturveita was ordered to pay Garcia damages.  

The governor dealt with insubordination as in the case of Domingo de Luna. Luna disobeyed the orders of alcalde mayor Francisco Trebol Navarro, refusing to take part in an impending Navajo campaign. The Navajos, stirred up by the Apaches, raided the westernmost pueblos of Zuñi and Acoma. A campaign was organized to protect the two areas. Luna was brought to trial and found guilty. For his insubordination he was fined 100 pesos, and he was jailed for an indefinite term.  

Cattle rustling was still a problem, as a case against three men demonstrated. Pablo Francisco de Villalpando, Joseph Trujillo, and Joseph Yendo were charged with cattle theft at Santa Cruz and were brought to
trial jointly. All were found guilty. They were sentenced to an indefinite jail term. 11
Criminal cases against Indians dropped drastically since the 1740s. There were far fewer cases of murder, assault, and rape. Cases of witchcraft also declined. When a charge against an Indian did come up it was something of a sensation. In 1773 two women from Cochiti were charged with murdering a woman from Tesuque. The murder was brutal and it had a touch of witchcraft to it. The governor, hoping not to upset relations with the natives, decided that the case was too complex for local officials so he sent it to Mexico City. At Mexico City the women were found guilty of both murder and witchcraft. They sentenced to death by fire. 12 The uproar that ensued in New Mexico caused an execution to be delayed for several years while the case was appealed. In 1775 it was sent back to Santa Fe where proceedings dragged on until 1779. Eventually, the women were given long jail sentences. 13
The legal process in New Mexico was simple. After a person accused someone, witnesses were called. These included character witnesses along with those who had seen the crime. The defendant and the accuser were both questioned and testimony was taken. At this point, trials were still on the local level. A verdict was returned and, if no appeals were made, trial transcripts [along with the sentence] went to Santa Fe where the governor approved or disapproved them. In some cases, local trials ended in Santa Fe due to appeals or because the nature of the crime was such that the governor had to sit as judge.

Normally, the judge was the alcalde and he handed down verdicts. There were no juries, and appeals from the local level went to the governor. Testimony, witnesses, defendant and plaintiff were all brought to the capital. Once the governor passed sentence an appeal could be made. If he refused to hear the case again, the defendant could appeal to Mexico City, where the Audiencia of New Spain sat. Upon the recommendation of local officials, the case would be transferred to the capital where it would be heard. The viceroy was the ultimate judge in most cases. If a defendant lost the viceroy's interest, it was usually the end of the case.

In some rare cases, an appeal went to Spain. Usually these were for treason, or murder of a government official. The bulk of New Mexican justice ended at Santa Fe. There are no records that show an appeal directly from New Mexico to Spain, except for the unusual case of Vargas.

The many civil cases during this period were mostly land cases or dealt with the losses of livestock. Land seemed to be more of a problem than it was in earlier times. In the case of Matheo Joseph Piño of San Clemente vs. Mariano Martin, the basis of suit was a partido contract. A partido was a division of land among several parties who could not or did not wish to purchase a large section of land. In the Piño case the plaintiff claimed that Martin had failed to fulfill terms regarding the use of land and therefore the contract should be declared invalid. The court found in favor of Piño, and Martin was ordered to pay damages and to fulfill the agreement. 14

Natives were involved in land cases too. In 1771 the Indians of Isleta sued Mariano Beitia for the recovery of land that he trespassed. Beitia claimed that it was legally sold to him, but the Governor found in favor of the Indians. 15 In land cases it was especially true that the pueblos were favored and they invariably won over claims of Spanish settlers. The contrast between this regard for native rights and that of the position of the native in Anglo frontier society is self-evident.

Other civil cases included damage claims and debt recoveries. In the suit of Joseph Sanchez against Diego Antonio Chaves at Albuquerque, Sanchez claimed that he lost property due to livestock wandering onto his land. The court found that Chaves was not at fault but that Sanchez was since his land was poorly fenced. 16

Debt cases were infrequent. Salbador Garcia, for example, sued Nicolas Serrano in an attempt to recover payments due him for sheep he sold to the defendant. After long testimony, Serrano was found guilty, but not sentenced. He worked out his debt on the installment plan. 17 In another debt case Nicola Antonio de la Sierra sued Joseph Mariano for 478 pesos, 6 reales claiming that payment for services rendered was long overdue. The court found in favor of de la Sierra and Mariano was ordered to pay the amount plus court costs. 18

By comparison, the civil and criminal problems that faced Mendinueta were tiny when compared to the problem of Indians. He was forced to contend with Spaniards who tried to incite the natives. In 1768 Miguel Tafoya, alias El Coyote, a well-known criminal, was charged with inciting the “Apaches de Navajo,” to the
west, to commit depredations against the settlements of New Mexico. The trial was held in Albuquerque, and Tafoya was confronted by eight witnesses who claimed they saw and heard him make inflammatory remarks to the Apache at a camp in the Sandia Mountains. The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to five years hard labor. 19

The threat of Comanches was also constant in New Mexico. Despite all efforts to crush them they continued to raid the northern sector of New Mexico. In the late 1760s the Comanches penetrated the Sangre de Cristo mountains north of Taos into Colorado where, in conjunction with the Utes, they raided into the San Luis Valley and down the Rio Grande toward Santa Fe. In May, 1768 the government established the Cerro de San Antonio post just north of Ojo Caliente to protect these lands. 20

Fermin de Mendinueta decided that the new garrison had to be strong enough to drive out the Comanches. He assigned fifty men to the Cerro de San Antonio, where they watched the Rio Grande ford. 21 Despite efforts at containing these raiders, the new post did little good.

However, the governor did not give up. He employed several novel measures to strengthen the Spanish defensive system in New Mexico. One of the first weaknesses he noted was that the Spanish population was spread out along the Rio Grande valley where it was vulnerable to attack. He proposed that all Spanish residents be concentrated in population centers where they could repel invaders. The governor suggested that Spanish settlements should be designed much like the Pueblo Indian villages which were far more defensible than individual rancho1s. He also noted that since the early days of the eighteenth century, New Mexico's Spanish population tended to spread out, and that a number of small villages and private ranches were built well away from the protection of a major town.

Such a proposal was in opposition to traditional Spanish settlement. The governor observed that there were ready-made Indian villages available for Spaniards to occupy. However, he insisted that for defensive purposes natives should settle in Spanish towns where they could be taught Spanish ways. The weakness in Fermin de Mendinueta's plan was that all three major Spanish towns in upper New Mexico would have to be rebuilt since none of them could withstand sustained attack. Nicolas de Lafora noted that Santa Fe was open to attack and it remained so during the entire Spanish period. If the Spanish would have rebuilt their defensive system on such short notice is questionable. 22

Governor Fermin de Mendinueta, following an established pattern, also augmented his meager forces by using settlers and Christianized Indians. He ordered that all settlers had to obey his demands for military service no matter when or where they were needed. He also stated that each settler was to appear with a horse, a lance, pike, or other weapon that was adequate. Since every resident of the province was obligated to perform eighteen days' public service, there was no hardship. 23

Despite the governor's determined efforts at crushing the Comanches, he was unsuccessful. He never had enough soldiers, guns, or horses at any one time to mount a major campaign. The raiders of the plains continued to commit depredations virtually daily against northern New Mexico. Clearly, the governor had to come to some agreement with the Comanches in order to stop them. In response he arranged a treaty with the Comanche in February, 1771 at Taos. By this agreement, the Spanish would refrain from going into Comanche territory if the Indians stopped raiding the Rio Grande valley. Trade concessions were made. The Comanche were allowed to return to the annual Taos fair, from which they were banned in 1761 because of their rowdy behavior. 24 This treaty did not last, since the Comanche continued to raid New Mexico well into the 1780s when their hold finally was broken. Oakah L. Jones states that there was continual warfare throughout the 1770s. Bancroft cites the treaty as ending Comanche-Spanish difficulties. Neither Jones nor the State Archives of New Mexico show any treaty on record. Bancroft only makes a vague statement about it. 1771 did not see an end to hostile actions against New Mexico. Mendinueta continued to battle them for the balance of his term.

In 1772 the Reglamento para presidios went into effect. This was a product of the Marques de Rubi's extensive visit in the 1760s. In general, his recommendations were followed. A line of presidios was established from the Gulf of California into Texas to provide a more thorough defense system.

The new order had little impact on New Mexico since Santa Fe was already a presidio. The defensive needs
of the province were more or less being met. Other
than establishing a civilian militia at El Paso del Norte
and shifting that presidio's force southward to Carrizal,
there were no changes in the defensive structure of
the province. The Robledo project, designed to put a
presidio along the El Paso-Santa Fe route at Robledo
was never carried out. Santa Fe neither gained nor lost
by the implementation of the Regulations. 25
It is surprising that Rubi did not consider the New
Mexican situation worse than it was. Comanches, Utes,
and Apaches surrounding New Mexico caused consid-
erable trouble for Spain. Yet despite this, he made no
recommendations. The fact is that Velez Cachupin
maintained a careful balance between hostile tribes by
trading with them and sometimes forcing them back
by military expeditions. When Rubi visited, a shakey
truce was in effect. Velez must have presented a picture
of tranquility to the Marques, since Rubi made no
mention of Indian difficulties north of Santa Fe.
But Mendinueta ruined his delicate balance with his
persistent campaigns against the Indians. He placed New
Mexico in greater peril than she had known since the
days of Vargas. By the time the Reglamento of 1772
was published there was constant warfare on the
northern edge of New Mexico. It was not until after
the northernmost provinces of New Spain were
reorganized in 1776 that a new and comprehensive
policy of Indian control was developed. The Regulations
of 1772 had no effect on New Mexico other than to
irritate the Apache by establishing a presidio at Carrizal,
causing them to move back into the Rio Grande valley
where they committed more depredations.
Governor Mendinueta's other duties included normal
the communications with Mexico City. Among the many
notices that came north were orders about the arrival
of the trade fleet in Vera Cruz during 1769, decrees
establishing new rules for the Catholic Church in Spain,
notification that the Royal Squadron (Navy) had arrived
at Vera Cruz to help protect the coastline, and
numerous other official communications from Spain. 26
Prior to this time, notices that came from Mexico City
dealt with New Mexican affairs and anything that was
not of interest to the governor of that province was
not sent. The change of policy occurred after 1763, with
the new bureaucracy in New Spain.
The rapid extension of New Spain after 1763, with the
exception of Louisiana, was indicated by better
organization at Mexico City. No longer was New Mexico
the main stronghold of the north; on the contrary, the
newly added regions like California and Arizona tended
to detract from New Mexico's position of supremacy
in the northern lands of New Spain.
Fermin de Mendinueta kept busy answering Mexico
City. He was requested to submit regular military status
reports containing the number of soldiers at each
garrison, a list of the commanders, the extent of military
actions, and the status of the military in New Mexico
in general. The governor submitted these reports
annually (and sometimes semi-annually). 27 In addition
to the military reports, the governor was requested
to send in his personal records for review, which he
did. 28
The governor was also in touch with the Bishop of
Durango who was interested in the status of the Church
in New Mexico. In 1774 and 1775, the Bishop wrote
Fermin de Mendinueta to discuss ecclesiastical matters,
particularly the effectiveness of the missions and the
cost of maintaining them. This was precipitated in 1774
when Viceroy Antonio Maria de Bucareli wrote to the
Fermin telling him that the missions stipends would be
reduced by royal order. The viceroy wanted to know
what he thought would happen to the missions of New
Mexico if this happened. 29 Several months later the
Bishop of Durango wrote the governor inquiring about
the recommendations to cut stipends in New Mexico.
He also asked if the missions would be hurt by the
proposed budget cuts. Other matters of religion that
were discussed included the Inquisition and the numbers
of churchgoers in Santa Fe, Albuquerque, and Santa
Cruz. But the bishop seemed most interested in the
missions. 30
Due to faulty records, it is hard to determine the extent
of the cutbacks. The Crown probably did cut the mission
stipend, but not enough to damage the system. In 1775
the Bishop wrote Fermin de Mendinueta about a matter
that concerned him since the issuance of a cedula in
1768 revising the code for church sanctuary for
criminals. The government determined that churches
were used too frequently. To reduce these abuses, the
Crown ordered that the practice of sanctuary was to
be limited. The King stated if this order was ignored,
the privilege would be revoked entirely. 31 The Church,
having this right for hundreds of years, was considerably
upset by the orders and circulated letters asking all
Bishops what the effect of the cedula was on local officials.

When the Bishop of Durango wrote to the governor of New Mexico, he inquired about the order of 1768, whether it was being enforced, and how it might affect the status of the Church in New Mexico. The bishop also pondered the question of Church sovereignty. 32

In a draft letter, Fermin replied that asylum might be abused and that in some cases the friars of New Mexico gave sanctuary to known criminals, letting them escape justice. The governor had to admit that in some of these cases there was a fine line between Church and State control but he noted that it was his duty to obey the Crown even if it was to the detriment of the Church’s status and power. 33

Official communications from Mexico City sometimes were ridiculous, as in the case of a notice to Fermin de Mendinueta that pelicans were a menace to fishing areas along the coastline and therefore measures to eradicate them should be taken. Imagine the mirth in Santa Fe since the nearest pelican was hundreds of miles away. 34

New Mexico muddled along under a system of government imposed in the days of the Vargas reconquest. But those times were numbered. 35 In 1776 a major reorganization took place and it had a major effect on the province. From the time that Jose de Galvez arrived in New Spain as visitador-general, he considered the northern provinces serious trouble spots within the empire. Galvez went back to Spain in 1771 where he held the powerful position of Minister-General of the Indies. New Spain was continually on his mind and he considered the many ways in which the northern provinces could be reconstructed to provide more efficient government.

After a number of years of study and debate, the royal council recommended to the Crown that sweeping reorganization be undertaken to insure the safety of northern New Spain. In May 1776 the King gave the order that changes suggested by Galvez be implemented and that the northern provinces be removed from the direct jurisdiction of the viceroy of New Spain. They would be made into a separate administrative district under a Commandant-General who would have quasi-viceroyal authority. This new administrative unit was called the Provincias Internas of which there would be two major sections: the eastern provinces (Texas and Nueva Leon), and the western provinces (New Mexico and Arizona). To fulfill the job of Commandant-General, King Charles III named Teodoro de Croix. 36

Croix had previous experience in New Spain and was well-suited to his duties. During the year 1777 he spent time familiarizing himself with the frontier. A continual stream of letters went to Galvez with suggestions and recommendations as to the functions of the Provincias Internas. Croix later visited the major sectors of the Provincias, discussing various problems of defense with the governors. He also planned for an extensive campaign to wipe out the continuing threat of the Apaches and the Comanches. However, this was not to come about until the 1870s.

New Mexico was affected by changes in governmental structure only to the point that as of 1776 the governor was no longer responsible to the viceroy. He lost his status as governor, becoming only a military official. He reported to Croix. A radical increase in correspondence between Santa Fe and Chihuahua occurred. The fact that a Commandant-General was so much closer to New Mexico meant that there was a lot more interest in the province.

The reorganization of 1776 could be looked upon as being both beneficial and detrimental to New Mexico. On one hand, New Mexico benefited by having more direct contact with the Commandant-General who could solve problems more quickly. On the other, New Mexicans were long used to ignoring orders not considered relevant to the situation. With the Provincias Internas there was more direct control exerted on New Mexico and orders could not be circumvented. The year 1776 marked the end of the era that could be called a true “frontier society.” From that time on, New Mexico became more and more integrated into New Spain. While the province’s identity was never fully lost, New Mexicans did not regain the unique status they enjoyed prior to 1776.
NOTES

1 Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, p. 259.
2 Pedro Fermin de Mendinueta, order for harsh treatment of law-breakers, November 9, 1767, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
3 Criminal proceedings against Juan Manuel Padilla, November 22-December 5, 1767, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
4 Fermin de Mendinueta to Francisco Trebol Navarro, January 2, 1768, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
5 Fermin de Mendinueta to Felipe Tafoya, January 5, 1768 at Santa Fe, in SANM.
6 Petition of residents of Albuquerque, January 28-February 15, 1768, at Albuquerque, in SANM.
7 Proceedings against Manuel and Pedro Moya for robbery, October 5-December 24, 1767, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
8 Proceedings in case against Mariano Baca for slander, March 21, 1767-January 5, 1768, at Albuquerque, in SANM.
9 Proceedings against Pedro Yturveita for assault, April 25-May 22, 1767, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
10 Proceedings against Domingo de Luna for disobedience, July 24-August 31, 1768 at Albuquerque, in SANM.
11 Proceedings against Pablo Francisco Villalondo, Joseph Trujillo, and Joseph Yendo, January 23-April 11, 1769, at Santa Cruz, in SANM.
12 Proceedings in case against two Cochiti women for murder, April 22, 1773-October 14, 1775 at Santa Fe and Mexico City, in SANM.
13 Appeal proceedings in case of two Cochiti women charged with murder, October 14, 1775-February 26, 1779, at Santa Fe and Mexico City, in SANM.
14 Matheo Joseph Piño vs. Mariano Martin, April 25-May 25, 1767, at San Clemente, in SANM.
15 Isleta Indians vs. Mariano Beitia, July 4-November 2, 1771, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
16 Joseph Sanchez vs. Diego Antonio Chaves, July 18-27, 1767, at Albuquerque, in SANM.
17 Salvador Garcia vs. Nicolas Serrano, July 8, 1767-March 14, 1768, at Albuquerque, in SANM.
18 Nicolas Antonio de la Sierra vs. Joseph Mariano, August 1, 1767-November 22, 1768, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
19 Proceedings against Miguel Tafoya for inciting the Apaches, June 21-October 6, 1768, at Albuquerque, in SANM.
20 Jones, Pueblo Warriors and Spanish Conquest, p. 139.
21 Alfred B. Thomas, The Plains Indians and New Mexico, 1751-1778, Ed. George P. Hammond (Albuquerque, 1940), XI, Coronado Cuarto Centennial Publications, 39. Also see: Jones, Pueblo Warriors and Spanish Conquest, pp. 139-144.
22 Lawrence Kimnaird, The Frontiers of New Spain, p. 91.
23 Fermin de Mendinueta, Order for local militia rules, November 16-17, 1771, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
24 See: Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, p. 259, n.14, MS in Pinart Collection (original found in Pinart Collection, Bancroft Library, Berkeley); see also: Jones, Pueblo Warriors and Spanish Conquest, pp. 146-147.
26 Marques de Croix to Fermin de Mendinueta, regarding arrival of fleet, December 23, 1769; Croix to governor regarding religious matters, June 6, 1769; Croix to governor regarding arrival of Royal Squadron, March 31, 1769; and Croix to governor regarding sanctity in churches, cedula real of July 29, 1768, April 24, 1769, at Mexico City and Madrid, in SANM.
27 Marques de Croix, acknowledging receipt of military records, March 25, 1769; March 30, 1771, June 3, 1772, April 14, 1773 and October 11, 1775, at Santa Fe and Mexico City, in SANM.
28 Pedro Fermin de Mendinueta to Marques de Croix, submitting personal service records, August 18, 1770, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
29 Antonio Maria de Bucareli to governor, transmittal of cedula real concerning mission stipends, June 8, 1774, at Mexico City, in SANM.

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30 Bishop of Durango to governor, regarding religious matters, August 18, 1774, at Durango, in SANM.
31 Marques de Croix to governor, transmittal of cedula of July 29, 1768, relative to church sanctuary, Madrid, and Mexico City, April 24, 1769, in SANM.
32 Bishop of Durango to governor, regarding religious matters and church asylum, March 10, 1775, at Durango, in SANM.
33 Fermin de Mendinueta to Bishop of Durango, draft of letter regarding church asylum, May 4, 1775, at Santa Fe, in SANM.
34 Antonio Maria de Bucareli, order regarding pelican eradication, May 22, 1775, at Mexico City, in SANM.
35 See: Marc Simmons, Spanish Government in New Mexico.
36 The most complete description of Croix's actions in the northern frontier is contained in Alfred B. Thomas, Teodoro de Croix and the Northern Frontier of New Spain, 1775-1783. (Norman, 1941).
Chapter XI

New Mexico, 1776-1821

The reorganization of 1776, transformed New Mexico from a sleepy rural province to a more vital player in the greater Spanish Empire. Upon being absorbed into the western province of the Provincias Internas, the government looked at New Mexico with a more critical eye. Finally, the Crown was willing to invest substantial amounts of money in New Mexico.

The man behind this remarkable vitality was Teodoro de Croix, the nephew of Viceroy Croix who had served in New Spain during the 1760s. Croix was commissioned by Viceroy Antonio Maria de Bucareli to organize the north and to implement the Regulations of 1772. He travelled throughout northern New Spain. In 1778 he called a conference of all provincial governors to discuss Indian affairs. Juan Bautista de Anza, from Sonora, Fermin de Mendieta of New Mexico, Barri of Nueva Vizcaya, and many others attended. Here they approved an alliance that Croix worked out with the Comanches, one that was also designed to stop raiding Apaches. It was noted that 1,800 men would be needed to implement the new policy. ¹

However, a royal order in 1779 told Croix to make friends with enemy Indians in order to prevent further depredations. While Croix tried subdue the natives of northern New Spain, New Mexico was active in solving her Indian problems. Then, in 1777 Juan Bautista de Anza was named governor.

When Anza arrived in Santa Fe during 1779, things began to happen. Prior to his assumption of power, during 1776 an expedition set out from Santa Fe under the leadership of Fray Silvestre Velez de Escalante who, with a party of nine, including Fray Francisco Atanasio Dominguez, left the capital headed toward present-day Four Corners. They sought a route to Monterey, California. In doing so they crossed western Colorado, entered modern Utah, followed the Colorado River through Arizona and ended up back in Santa Fe via Zuñi, having failed to find a route to the coast. But this expedition left the Spanish with their first knowledge of western Colorado and the Great Basin. ²

Governor Anza refused to be cowed by the Comanche threat. Upon assuming office, he organized an expedition to eliminate the menace. In 1779, de Anza set out with 573 men who were later joined by Ute and Apache allies. During August, 1779 he marched into the San Luis Valley, up the west side of the Sangre de Cristos, crossing the rivers of San Antonio, Pinos, Conejos, La Jaras, and the Rio de los Timbres. He forded the Rio Grande at “El Paso de San Bartolome”, and then headed north to “La Cenega” [sic], from whence de Anza crossed Poncha Pass into South Park. Finding no natives, he proceeded into the eastern foothills and, near present day Pueblo he discovered a large band of Comanche led by Chief Cuerno Verde [Greenhorn]. During a monumental battle, Greenhorn was killed and de Anza delivered a resounding defeat to the natives. The Comanche, having suffered heavily at the hands of the Spanish, sued for peace. ³

However, de Anza found that the Utes now presented problems. They feared relations with the Spanish, and therefore refused to cooperate with de Anza in crushing the Comanches. It took the governor several years to sign a peace treaty with all the Indian nations concerned.

In 1786 the Comanches agreed to give up their nomadic ways and settle in villages. For this the Spanish needed seeds, tools, and the technology needed for farming to help resettle the plains raiders. A settlement named San Carlos was established near Taos in 1787. It soon failed and they abandoned the area in disgust. This ended attempts at pacifying the Comanches. Yet a lasting peace was secured. ⁴

During the 1780s the Commandante of the Provincias Internas, General Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola, decided that the two most distant capitals of New Spain must be linked. In 1786, he sent Pedro Vial from San Antonio, Texas. Vial arrived in Santa Fe in May, 1787, where Governor Fernando de la Concha warmly received Vial’s party. Pedro Vial completed his map and diary at Santa Fe. Concha soon discovered that it was hardly the most “direct” route. The governor, with Vial’s approval, revised the map and came up with a shorter route. With the new trail opened, trade into Santa Fe from the east became much easier.

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In 1792 Governor Concha sent Vial, Vicente Villanueva, and Vicente Espinosa to Saint Louis from Santa Fe under express orders from Viceroy Revillagigedo to the two towns with a trade route. Vial's successful trip to Saint Louis provided a trace that eventually became the Santa Fe-Missouri trade of the famous Santa Fe Trail.  

The days of Spanish dominance in northern New Spain were nearly over. During a twenty year period after the Revolutionary War in the United States, more and more Americans found their way into Santa Fe. The 1803 Louisiana Purchase robbed Spain of her last buffer against American incursions.

This change was reinforced in 1806 when Zebulon M. Pike was captured along the Conejos River, in the San Luis Valley of Colorado. He was taken to Santa Fe where he professed total ignorance of being on “Spanish” land. Despite Pike's fate, more Americans arrived in Taos and Santa Fe. Manuel Lisa showed up as early as 1805, while Joseph Mclanahan, James Patterson, Reuben Smith and others arrived just a few years later, only to be slapped in jail. During 1812 Robert McKnight, Samuel Chambers, and James Baird arrived in Santa Fe with six mule loads of goods. They were arrested and their wares were confiscated. The ill-fated party was held in prison until 1820.

A major problem that any trader faced was the constant change of government during this period. One governor would be permissive and the next far from friendly. American traders never knew what to expect. Only after 1821, when Mexico secured her independence, did Santa Fe break away from the colonial trading system and become the major center for a Mexican-United States commerce.

The year 1821 marked the end of Spanish rule in New Spain, and of course, New Mexico. In that year Agustin de Iturbide, raised the banner of rebellion and drove out the Spanish. A new nation called Mexico was born. The Spanish were removed from Santa Fe and a Mexican governor was appointed.

New Mexico became a different province. Trade was opened and the route between Santa Fe and Saint Louis became permanent. Americans came and went. For the first time in its history, New Mexico was able to develop her economy through trade. The conditions for New Mexico's citizens improved for the first time in a hundred years.

Yet New Mexico did not experience Mexican rule for long. In 1846 the United States declared war against Mexico over the Texas annexation question. New Mexico was taken by Stephen Watts Kearny in a relatively bloodless military operation. The Americans, like the Spanish, found that the land, the climate, and the great distances may have been too great for them.

As the Spanish period drew to a close, New Mexicans could look back at a history that originated some 300 years before. Back to 1540 and Coronado's first probing of the arid, hostile land that was so remote. From the outset New Mexico provided nothing but bleak prospects. There was no gold. There were no cities. The parched countryside, relieved only by the muddy Rio Grande, was so uninviting, so unpromising that it languished for another fifty years until colonists breached its hostile interior.

Prodded by the Church, authorities at Mexico City sent Juan de Oñate north in 1598. At this point New Mexico became a colony. The Spanish had the opportunity to remove themselves forever from New Mexico in 1680. The moral power of the Church and a fear of losing land to foreign powers brought the Spanish back. In 1692 the heroic figure of Diego de Vargas retook the whole of New Mexico. By 1695 Vargas had restored all of the province.

1776 marked the greatest change in New Mexican governmental and military affairs since the days of Vargas. In that year, the Regulations were published. New Mexico was incorporated into the Provincias Internas. The Marques deRubí's report, one of the most sensible ever written about New Mexico, brought many of its woes to the attention of the crown. It is a credit to King Charles III, his ministers, and various viceroys, that Rubí's perceptive ideas were implemented.

During the 300 years of Spanish occupation, New Mexico can be said to have been a land in which Spain found itself entrapped. The forbidding land, its native peoples, the harsh climate, and other factors contribute to Spanish entrapment. A century later, the United States, too, found this strange land to be a place of disappointment.
NOTES

1 The late eighteenth century in New Mexico is best described by the following: Alfred B. Thomas, Forgotten Frontiers: A Study of the Spanish Indian Policy of Don Juan Bautista de Anza, Governor of New Mexico. 1777-1787 (Norman, 1932); Thomas, Teodoro de Croix and the Northern Frontier of New Spain, 1776-1783; Donald E. Worcester, Ed., "Advice on Governing New Mexico, 1786," New Mexico Historical Review (July, 1949), XXIV, 236-254.; Bernard E. Bobb, The Viceregency of Antonio Maria de Bucareli in New Spain, 1771-1779 (Austin, 1962); and Fray Atanasio Dominguez, The Missions of New Mexico, 1776. Trans. by Eleanor Adams and Angelico Chavez (Albuquerque, 1956).

2 The Escalante expedition is described in Herbert E. Bolton, Pageant in the Wilderness: The Escalante Expedition to the Interior Basin (Salt Lake City, 1950). See also: Angelico Chavez and Ted J. Warner (Eds.) The Escalante Diary. (Provo, Utah, 1976).

3 Indian policy during the late Spanish period is discussed in: Max L. Moorhead, Jacobo Ugarte and Spanish-Indian Relations in Northern New Spain, 1769-1791 (Norman, 1968), and San Luis Valley historian Ruth Marie Colville, Del Norte, Colorado, May 11, 1989. Personal Communication.

4 Bernardo de Galvez, Instructions for Governing the Interior Provinces of New Spain, 1786. (Berkeley, 1951), Trans. and Ed. by Donald E. Worcester.

5 New Mexico during the early nineteenth century is described in: Noel Loomis and Abraham P. Nasatir, Pedro Vial and the Roads to Santa Fe (Norman, 1966).
Bibliographic Essay

While considerable material dealing with New Mexico is found in that state, major sources of primary materials are also in Mexico and Spain. These include materials in the Archivo General de la Nacion (Mexico City), the Archivo General de las Indias (Seville), the Museo Nacional (Mexico City) and the Biblioteca Nacional (Mexico City). All of these sources are available in microcopies or on microfilm.

Many of these documents were collected and microfilmed by the late France V. Scholes, of the University of New Mexico, and other scholars like Lansing Bloom. While much of the collected material deals with the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, there are also considerable quantities of eighteenth century materials. The AGN archives provide excellent material from the Ramos of the Provincias Internas, Historia, Vínculos, and other branches. The AGI Legajos of the Inquisition, Guadalajara and limited other areas are of value for New Mexico. The Biblioteca Nacional’s records include Franciscan documents for this period. The Museo Nacional also contains various documents of interest. Copies of these collections can be found in the Coronado Collection, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

A truly major depository for Spanish documents is the State Records Center at Santa Fe. Dr. Myra Ellen Jenkins catalogued the Spanish Archives of New Mexico. They are on microfilm and can also be used in the original. These documents are mainly legal, both civil and criminal and include reports of military actions, status reports, and correspondence. There are very few personal documents in the collection. Family collections in the Records Center provide limited Spanish documents. Also contained in the State Records Center is a microfilm copy of the Archives of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe. The originals were moved to Albuquerque and are not readily obtainable. However, Fray Angelico Chavez’s catalog is vital for consulting the microfilm copy of these invaluable archives. They contain records of the missions of New Mexico, correspondence, orders, and accounts. Another microfilm copy of these documents is available at the Huntington Library, San Marino, California.

Other less valuable archives include those in Chihuahua City and Ciudad Juarez, available on microfilm at the University of Texas at El Paso. In both cases, the only documents of value are trade records. The Juarez Archives are poorly filmed and nearly illegible in most cases. The Parral Archives, available on microfilm from Fort Lewis College, Durango, Colorado, are of use only for limited military correspondence with Santa Fe. The Latin American Collection of the University of Texas at Austin contains little documentary material pertaining to New Mexico in the eighteenth century but it is an excellent source of secondary material. The Huntington Library’s Ritch Collection contains a few eighteenth century documents that are found nowhere else.

The Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley, is most valuable for documents in the Pinart Collection. At this library manuscripts and hard to obtain original works can be found. These archives are also on microfilm at the University of New Mexico’s Coronado Collection.
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