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Applicable To: All Sworn and Communications Personnel |
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Approval Authority: Major Darryl K. Tolleson |
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Signature: Signed by DKT |
Date Signed: 9/29/2004 |
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| Table of Contents | |||
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4.1.1 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) |
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The purpose of this Section Command Memorandum is to establish responsibilities and specific actions that the Atlanta Police Airport Section during threat levels established by the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). Procedures outlined in this Section Command Memorandum are designed to protect individuals and property, associated with air transportation, against explosive devices. Terrorist attacks against air terminals and associated facilities using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) remain a major threat to the national air transport infrastructure. The TSA’s SOP establishes uniform standards for providing bomb security:
It is the policy of the Atlanta Police Airport Section in conjunction with T.S.A., Airport Security and the Airlines to ensure the flying public and vital transportation nodes is adequately protected, against terrorist attacks, from explosive devices.
3. RESPONSIBILITIES [ Return to Top ]
3.1 It is the responsibility of each employee to follow the procedures established in this Command Memorandum.
4.1 Background [ Return to Top ]
Terrorist use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against personnel and structures is a common tactic. By their nature, the IED has the capacity to create considerable damage and injury in a dramatic fashion while protecting the identity of the perpetrator. IED's design, construction, and use are limited only by the ability and imagination of the bomber. IEDs can be relatively small containing only ounces of explosive, as in letter bombs, to very large vehicle bombs containing thousands of pounds of explosive. The purpose of this SOP is to establish procedures to protect airport facilities and the traveling public from the entire range of IED threats.
4.1.1 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) [ Return to Top ]
The explosive threat posed by IEDs can range in size and configuration. With Richard Reid, the device was implanted into his shoes, while other terrorists have used backpacks, suitcases, liquid containers, electronic components, or explosive vests. While it is often difficult to discern these types of threats from routine items carried by the innocent traveling public, an informed workforce, workable procedures and adherence to those procedures give us the greatest potential to defeat the threat.
4.1.2 Large Vehicle Improvised Explosive Devices (LVIEDs) [ Return to Top ]
1. Large vehicle improvised explosive devices (LVIED) offer a means for delivering a large explosive device against a large target such as building, critical infrastructure node, or large group of people in a fairly quick, concealed manner. This method of delivery has been and continues to be a significant threat worldwide. Recent bombings in Israel, Bali, Yemen, as well as the United States demonstrate that this type of improvised explosive device can produce devastating damage and casualties.
2. Parking restrictions should be implemented
concurrently with other procedures restricting traffic flow around the
terminal. A generally recognized airport threat is one of an
explosives laden vehicle driving directly up to the terminal at curbside.
Once heightened security measures are enacted restricting such access from a
vehicle bomb, the secondary attack vector then becomes the parking lot. 4.2. The following identifies the specific actions and responsibilities that will be taken by the Atlanta Police Airport Section at each thereat level established by TSA to protect the airport facility and traveling public from the threat of IEDs and LVIEDs.
4.3 Procedures [ Return to Top ]
1. The Atlanta Police Department Airport Section will implement the following security measures according to threat levels established by the Homeland Security Alert System (HSAS). The ultimate goal is to develop a program plan to protect the airport facility from various means of attack using IEDs and LVIEDs.
2. The procedures that call for restricting
traffic in and around the terminal area are aimed strictly at minimizing the
threat of an attack by a large vehicle improvised explosive device (LVIED)—a
vehicle capable of carrying a minimum 500 pounds of net explosive weight
(NEW). As a point of reference, 400 pounds of explosive material can be
contained in an area approximately equal to the volume of a standard
55-gallon drum (approximately 9 cubic feet in volume). A compact sedan can
hold 500 pounds of explosives—when inspecting vehicles at the terminal and
parking perimeter, the intent is to inspect for LVIEDs; therefore,
inspections should focus on identifying areas where bulk explosives can be
stored such as a trunk, truck bed, or other such cargo type areas.
4.4 Threat Levels [ Return to Top ]
Following are the Threat Levels established by the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) and the procedures that will be followed by the Atlanta Police Airport Section under each Threat Level.
1. This condition is declared when there is a low risk of terrorist attacks. At this baseline level, the airport security consortium will implement a process to assure that all airport facilities are regularly assessed for vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, and all reasonable measures are taken to mitigate these vulnerabilities. This includes refining and exercising, as appropriate, preplanned protective measures and ensuring personnel receive proper training on the Homeland Security Advisory System and specific preplanned airport protective measures.
2. The Airport Public Safety Answering Point (APSAP)
serves as the 24-hour communication center for airport management and
emergency responders. The TSA may establish contact with the center via
telephone or 911 operators to provide updates or request assistance from the
airport. Dispatchers will ensure that all bomb notification fact sheets
and telephone numbers are up to date. 3. Watch Commanders will ensure that his/her
watch receives roll call training on the following written directives:
“Unattended/Suspicious Bags(s)/Items(s) and Suspected Explosive Device
Calls, Supervisor Notification Required and Bombs and Bomb Threats. 4. The Specialized Unit Commander will ensure that the EOD Squad performs weekly checks of the Threat Containment Unit (TCU) and all EOD equipment for functionality and cleanliness.
1. This condition is declared when there is a general risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the protective measures taken in the previous Threat Condition, airports should consider reviewing and updating emergency response procedures and checking communications with designated emergency responders.
2. Dispatchers will in conjunction with the Atlanta Police Airport Section EOD Squad verify contacts and communications for all off-airport emergency responders including civilian/military bomb squads/EOD units, explosives detection canine teams. Dispatcher will check all information within the computer aided dispatch system to ensure it provides updated information on available mutual aid agencies. The APSAP will initiate contact as prescribed in section command memorandums or as directed by a supervisor.
4.4.3 YELLOW [ Return to Top ]
1. A Yellow Condition is declared when there is a significant risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the protective measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, airports should consider increasing surveillance of critical locations and assessing whether the precise characteristics of the threat require the further refinement of preplanned protective measures.
2. Watch Commanders will ensure that his/her
watch increases the surveillance and security presence in front of terminals
at passenger pick-up/drop-off areas. 3. Watch Commanders will ensure that his/her
watch increases security patrols in parking lots located near the terminal
and other vital air terminal functions such as FAA facilities, Air Traffic
Control Towers, fuel storage facilities, and aircraft parking areas. Police
units will randomly check these areas during each tour of duty and list each
check as a drop in on his/her Daily Activity Report. 4. The Specialized Unit Commander will ensure
that the explosives detection canine patrols conduct random sweeps in and
around terminal and parking lots. If TSA-certified explosives detection
canine teams are not available, a non-TSA certified explosives detection
canine team (e.g. Federal, state, local police, fire, fire marshal) may be
utilized. The current certification status of the team must be ascertained
prior to use. 5. Watch Commanders will ensure that his/her
watch increases monitoring of baggage claim area with attention to bags
being brought into the area during periods of high occupancy and bags left
unattended. 6. Watch Commanders will ensure that monitoring
of public areas throughout the terminal is increased with emphasis on ticket
counters, restrooms, phone booths, waiting areas, front of terminal, baggage
claim, etc. This monitoring could be conducted using trained airline
personnel at counters, terminal maintenance and janitorial personnel, or
other airport personnel in the normal course of their duties. 7. Watch Commanders will ensure that his/her
watch is provided with any daily intelligence updates as received from the
TSA, Airport Security and/or other intelligence agencies. 8. Watch Commanders will ensure that the airport’s curbside parking restriction, as directed by the Airport Police Commander, is enforced.
4.4.4 ORANGE [ Return to Top ]
1. An Orange Condition is declared when there is a high risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the protective measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, airports should take additional precautions in crowded terminal areas, consider options to disperse congested areas, and restrict access to certain areas of the facility to essential personnel only.
2. Watch Commanders will ensure that all actions
of Threat Condition Yellow are implemented. 3. Watch Commander will ensure that random
inspection of vehicles approaching the terminal are conducted as described
in the airport’s approved Bomb Incident Prevention Plan. Random inspections
could consist of all vans and trucks plus a random selection of automobiles
or simply an inspection of a specific class of vehicle. Authorized
emergency vehicles (ambulances, police cars, crash/fire/rescue vehicles, and
airport operations vehicles) are exempt from this inspection. Airport
police, parking enforcement personnel or airport representatives will
conduct random inspections of vehicles as they approach the terminal, enter
restricted parking areas or curbside loading zones. 4. Close portions of parking facilities that
have been determined locally to be a risk, i.e., within the effective
terminal blast damage envelope identified in the airport’s approved bomb
incident prevention plan. The blast analysis and vulnerability assessment,
completed April 2001, has deemed that terminal parking levels three and four
require mitigation or positive control procedures to allow parking during
heighten threat level. HAIA will close these levels to all incoming parking
patrons. The vehicles, already parked in these areas, will be screened by
canine teams and secured in these areas pending the return of the owner.
After the vehicle owners have removed their vehicle, the levels will be
sealed from public use. At the discretion of the airport general manager,
the parking manager may initiate restricted parking in the effected areas
provided that all in-coming vehicles are searched in accordance with TSA
guidance. 5. The Specialized Unit Commander will ensure
that explosives detection canine patrols, if available, are increased in and
around the terminal. HAIA will employ its TSA-certified explosives detection
canine teams as directed by the airport police commander, aviation general
manager or designated representatives. The current certification status of
the team must be ascertained prior to use. 6. Watch Commanders will ensure his/her watch conducts surveillance throughout the airport facility and perimeter every hour. Airport police, operations and security personnel will conduct surveillance or inspections in assigned areas of operations. Units will list each check as a drop in on his/her Daily Activity Report.
1. A Red Condition reflects a severe risk of
terrorist attacks. Under most circumstances, the protective measures for a
Red Condition are not intended to be sustained for substantial periods of
time. In addition to the protective measures in the previous Threat
Conditions, airports also should consider increasing or redirecting
personnel to address critical emergency needs, closing certain areas, and
assigning emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and mobilizing
specially trained teams or resources. 2. Watch Commanders will ensure that all actions
of Threat Condition Orange are implemented. 3. Watch Commanders will ensure his/her watch
conducts surveillance throughout airport facility and perimeter every thirty
minutes. Units will and list each check as a drop in on his/her Daily
Activity Report. 4. Watch Commanders will ensure his/her watch,
in conjunction with airport operations and the airlines, restrict public
access points to terminals and increase security presence around those
points to randomly check incoming personnel. 5. Watch Commanders will ensure his/her watch, in conjunction with airport operations and the airlines, control access to baggage claim areas only to incoming passengers waiting to claim luggage. Luggage and items being brought into the area by non-ticketed passengers must be subjected to visual search. Air carriers or air carrier contractors operate the baggage claims areas. The airport security consortium would determine procedures to control access in these areas. At a minimum, the baggage claim terminal doors would be restricted to exiting traffic only. Air carriers or their representatives would be directed to verify baggage claim tickets before allowing access to these areas.
6. Watch Commanders will ensure his/her watch conducts LVIED inspection of vehicles approaching the terminal. Authorized and pre-inspected emergency vehicles (ambulances, police cars, crash/ fire/rescue vehicles, airport operations vehicles and airport park and ride vehicles) may be permitted. The inner curbside lanes will be limited to only commercial vehicles, authorized vehicle and pre-inspected emergency vehicles.
7. Watch Commanders will ensure that the Airport Police Section Command Post is established in the police precinct.
5. DEFINITIONS [ Return to Top ] 5.1 Bomb Incident Prevention Plan:
A plan that is part of the ASP that includes specific protective measures
based on an airport’s specific security needs. 5.2 Homeland Security Advisory
System: A system to provide comprehensive and effective means to
disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks. The system
consists of five threat conditions with graduated protective measures
designed to reduce vulnerability or increase response capability during
times of heightened alert. 5.3 Improvised Explosive Device:
A device consisting of an explosive material and firing components necessary
to initiate the device. 5.3 Net Explosive Weight: The
actual weight in pounds of explosive mixtures or compounds, including the
trinitrotoluene equivalent of energetic material that is used in the
determination of explosive limits. 5.4 Sterile area: An area of an
airport defined in an airport security program to which access is controlled
by the inspection of individuals and property in accordance with Federal
regulations. 5.5 Threat Containment Unit: A bomb containment vessel designed to safely contain the detonation of an improvised explosive device inside a piece of luggage. When used correctly, the TCU is capable of containing the detonation of up to five pounds of explosive with a safe standoff distance from the TCU for personnel of two feet.
5.6. ABBREVIATIONS ASP Airport Security Program FSD Federal Security Director IED Improvised Explosive
Device HSAS Homeland Security Advisory
System NEW Net Explosive Weight TSA Transportation Security
Administration TCU
Threat Containment Unit LVIED Large Vehicle Improvised Explosive Device
6. CANCELLATION [ Return to Top ]
AS.CM.02.014, Airport Police Section Bomb Incident Prevention Plan
N/A
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